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SOME ELEMENTS OF RELIGION

SOME ELEMENTS OF RELIGION

Lent Lectures

1870

BY

H. P. LIDDON, D.D., D.C.L.

LATE CHANCELLOR AND CANON OF ST. PAUL'S

NINETEENTH IMPRESSION

(SIXTH EDITION)

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Perchè, se tu alla virtù circonde
La tua misura, non alla parvenza
Delle sustanzie che t' appaion tonde,
Tu vederai mirabil convenenza,
Di maggio a più, et di minore a meno,
In ciascun cielo, a sua intelligenza.

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To

John William Ogle, Esq., M.D.

OF TRINITY COLLEGE, OXFORD

WHOSE WORK AND CHARACTER SUGGEST

MANY PRECIOUS LESSONS

WHICH HE NEVER THINKS OF

TEACHING

Preface to the First Edition.

These Lectures were delivered in St. James' Church, Piccadilly, during the Lent of 1870.

They were, at the time, through God's mercy, of service at least to some minds,—anxious, if it might be, to escape from perplexities which beset an age of feverish scepticism. It was accordingly difficult to resist the practical reasons which were urged in favour of publishing the Lectures; but the announcement of their intended publication was, perhaps, made, before the drawbacks which must necessarily accompany the rhetorical treatment of such a subject as the present, in a permanent form, had been sufficiently considered. Moreover, a fulness and method of discussion which satisfies the purposes of a Lecture, and which indeed is all that an audience will bear, must fall altogether below the standard which may be reasonably looked for in a book, supposed to make any pretension whatever to the character of a formal treatise upon a wide and very serious subject. Of this, upon further reflection, the writer became so strongly convinced, as to have entertained the de-

sign of expanding these fragments into a larger work. But, apart from the pressure of other duties, he could not but feel that such an attempt would destroy, together with the identity of the Lectures, any moral or spiritual associations that might cling to them; and, in working for the cause of faith, as in other matters,

> "Un sou, quand il est assuré,
> Vaut mieux, que cinq en espérance."

The Lectures are therefore published as they stand. It will be borne in mind that they suggest only a few thoughts on each of the points of which they treat; that they cannot but raise some difficulties which they leave unanswered; and, in a word, that their limits are not in any sense determined by those of the general subject, but only by the number of Sundays in Lent.

WHITSUNTIDE, 1872.

Preface to the Second Edition.

A FRIENDLY reviewer[1] has expressed his opinion that the point of the "scientific" objection to prayer on the ground of the idea of law is missed in the fifth of these Lectures.[2]

"That objection," he says, "we understand to be that a certain absolute universality in the physical order of the universe is now well ascertained to be a part of the Divine Rule, and consequently that to pray for anything which involves a violation of that order is to pray for what it is unreasonable, arrogant, and even irreverent to ask. For example, for a man to pray that a sword thrust into the body of his friend shall not wound him, that deadly poison if drunk by him should not injure him, that a stone thrown from a tower should be suspended in mid-air, that a body in which decomposition has set in should be restored to life, that a leafless tree should blossom months before its season, that a ship should perform in two days a voyage never yet performed in less than ten,—to pray for these things, *with however holy an aim or purpose*, would seem we say arrogant, unreasonable, irreverent, as assuming that God had no higher or larger purpose in laying out the plan of the universe than one which any pious finite wish might overset."

The "scientific" objection which is here stated so vividly, is, it would seem, only such an objection as

[1] *Spectator*, Sept. 21, 1872. [2] Pages 184–187.

a sincere believer in God's existence could entertain. "Scientific objectors" to prayer on the ground of a supposed invariability of natural law, are not, generally speaking, Theists at all. Whether they dogmatically deny that God exists, or, as is more common, decline to affirm His existence, on the ground that they cannot prove it experimentally, they alike conceive of Nature in a manner which is irreconcilable with the ideas of a Creator and a Providence. For them the laws of Nature are existing forces, of whose origin they can give no account, —forces which, as they conceive, act fatally, inevitably, and in accordance with an observed order. My reviewer too understands by natural law an ascertained order governing the Universe. But for him law is so far from constraining God's liberty, or usurping His throne, that it only expresses the regularity of His action, which is perfectly and always free. God freely wills to work regularly; and the result is what we call law. Yet since natural law is the product or expression of the Highest Love and Wisdom, it is, says my reviewer, irrational and irreverent to ask for its suspension, at any rate on what might be deemed a considerable scale.

This objection to prayer appears to be rather theological than "scientific," if we understand the latter word in the narrow sense which is now so commonly assigned to it. It is an appeal *ad verecundiam*—an

appeal to our creaturely sense of ignorance and nothingness in presence of the Wisdom and Greatness of the Author and Ruler of the Universe. But the objection which is contemplated in the passage referred to does not take any account of God: my reviewer reads his own deeply religious convictions into the objection, and makes it substantially a distinct one. Still, as it issues from his hands, it is entitled to respectful attention, and certainly not less so, because it is advanced in the name of a higher truth than any science of created things can claim to represent.

When it is maintained that God knows, and that knowing He does what is best; that the laws of nature shew what is His settled plan of governing His creation; and that we cannot plead our particular and finite wishes before Him without implying that He ought to change His all-comprehending purpose at our entreaty; it is clear that such a line of objection might be made to cover a great deal more ground than my reviewer at least would desire. It has indeed been urged, that since every specific petition involves something like an attempt at interference with Perfect Wisdom and Perfect Love, the only lawful kind of prayer is one continuous act of resignation and of praise. Prayer however, as mankind have everywhere understood it, means a great deal more than resignation. No one will affirm that the Bible only means resignation when it prescribes

prayer: or that, according to the Mind of our Lord, it is irreverent or unreasonable to say, not merely, "Thy Will be done," but, "Give us this day our daily bread," "Lead us not into temptation," "Deliver us from evil." Yet these are petitions for blessings which may or may not be granted to us when and as we ask. Nor do such petitions involve an irreverent claim that God should overset the plan of His general government in the interests of one of His creatures. It is maintained in these Lectures that prayer is a human act, which, together with its results, is already embraced in the eternal predestination of God: and that real answers to prayer are no more inconsistent with God's Wisdom and Sovereignty than any other real consequences of human free-will. Correspondingly to this, in asking God for specific and personal blessings, we are not asking Him to suspend the general principles of His government in our particular interests; we assume that these principles of His and our own deepest interests, as we conceive of them, are reconcilable by His Wisdom: we refuse to believe that He is in such sense the slave of His own rules, as to become the author of anarchy, because He supersedes a lower rule of working by a higher one. Whether He can do this or not in a given case we leave to Him: but we are not restrained from asking Him to grant our petitions, because we know that in His wise Love He may refuse to do so.

My reviewer will rejoin that he only objects to prayers which ask God to work "miracles;" he contends that "no miracle, properly so called, could be properly prayed for, *for a private purpose*, at all." But what does he mean by a *private* purpose? If he is thinking of a temporal blessing, granted to an individual, such as an increase of family, or of income, with no moral or spiritual aim beyond, we must all agree with him. But if the object of a given prayer be sincerely spiritual and moral, it is difficult to see why the moral Ruler of the Universe should not grant it, even although to do so involves one of those physical occurrences which we term miraculous, and benefits only a single soul. The distinction between individual and public interests, which is so legitimate and familiar in human legislation, is unknown to the spiritual world. There is no reason for supposing that a number of souls interest Almighty God because of their number, while a single soul does not interest Him, at any rate sufficiently to be redeemed or sanctified. If our Lord says, "God so loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son" to save it; an Apostle cries "He loved me, and gave Himself for me." It belongs to God's Infinity to be as interested in units as in multitudes; while it belongs to His essentially moral nature to give precedence to the least moral interests over the largest material interests. Although then a specific petition be urged with a private or individual object, it may

surely, if the object be moral, be so preferred without immodesty or irreverence, considering the absolute morality and the all-embracing tenderness of God.

But is it right under any circumstances to pray for what we popularly term a miracle? On this subject the reviewer observes:—

"We can only pray for physical benefits when we fully believe that they might be granted without miracle, that they might be granted, for instance, through that providential guidance of our own or other hearts and wills, which may, as Mr. Galton has himself admitted, materially alter the physical facts of the world without any real interference with physical law. The legitimacy of such prayers as that for rain seems to us to depend on the possibility that the conditions of rain are not absolutely determined by fixed laws of creation—that the conditions of rain are not as purely physical as the conditions of an eclipse. All the world would quite rightly protest against the blasphemy of praying that we might be spared an eclipse at the time astronomers predicted one, however detrimental it might conceivably be to human interests. On the other hand, it is possible, though hardly probable, that rain, like human health and the health of cattle, may depend on laws not purely physical,—not absolutely invariable; and so long as this is possible, there is no harm in praying for rain under the ordinary reserves of Christian prayer. But Dr. Liddon himself would hardly justify a prayer against an eclipse, even though it could be shewn to be apparently in the highest degree injurious to us."

It may perhaps be questioned whether every real answer to prayer is not miraculous. Every such answer disturbs the normal operation of existing laws, whether by procuring the intervention of a higher law, or otherwise. Or, to speak more accurately, every such answer involves a certain de-

parture from what, as we presume, would otherwise have been His mode of working, Who works everywhere in the physical as in the moral world. The difference between a resurrection from the dead at a prophet's prayer, and the increase of clearsightedness or of love through an infusion of grace, in the soul of a cottager, is a difference of degree. It is not a difference of kind. Each result is the product of a Divine interference with the normal course of things. And if this be the case, the distinction between what we think great and striking answers to prayer, because they impress our human imaginations so powerfully, and ordinary answers, does not exist for Him, to Whose Intelligence the least among created things are as the greatest, and before Whom all that He has made is in the aggregate so infinitely little.

But if I rightly understand this passage, it practically divides the universe, when considered with a view to determining the legitimate range of prayer, into three districts. In one district, the purely physical, everything is regarded as irrevocably fixed. Here prayer is held to be out of the question. On the other hand, in the province of human will and destiny—the moral and spiritual sphere,—the fact of human free-will opens the widest scope to the agency of prayer. In an intermediate region,—which affects human life very directly and powerfully,—"rain and human health may depend on

laws not purely physical, not absolutely invariable." Here, although prayer is less at home than in the sphere of spiritual blessings, it is not "irrational" or "irreverent," as it would be in the reviewer's judgment, if it should invade the sphere of astronomy.

The objections to such a theory would appear to be twofold. In the first place, it implies that the reign of law is confined to certain districts of the universe, and in particular that it does not obtain in the spiritual sphere. This assumption appears to involve philosophical as well as theological difficulties. Theological difficulties; because those attributes of the Divine Being which lead Him to work anywhere according to that order, of which law is an expression, would lead Him to do so everywhere. And philosophical difficulties; because recognition of the existence of law is the result of an ever-widening induction; and there are no adequate grounds for supposing that the frontier of the material universe is also the frontier of the empire of law. In particular, the phenomenon of free-will does not appear to constitute such a ground. It is true that the activity of free-will in the moral sphere makes the laws which govern that sphere much more intricate and difficult to trace than are physical laws. But it cannot be held to annihilate all law in the highest region of created life, and therefore, if the presence of law is an objection to prayer anywhere, it is an objection to it everywhere

If it is an impertinence to ask God to vary His ordinary working in the lower region of physics, it must be an impertinence to ask Him to do so in the higher region of spiritual being, or of morals.

Accordingly, it seems to be difficult to follow the reviewer in the sharp distinction which he draws between prayers for rain, and prayers against an eclipse, predicted by the astronomers. The rainfall, he says, is determined by laws less purely physical than are the motions of the heavenly bodies. Is this certainly the case? May it not be that the only real difference lies in our power of recognizing the presence of law in these two departments of the natural world? If men knew more than they do know, they would probably be able to predict rain as accurately as they predict eclipses. But the laws which govern the rainfall being more complex than astronomical laws, human knowledge is at present able to trace the latter unerringly, while it is at fault about the former. Can we suppose that the empire of law is only conterminous with our knowledge of it? Does not all that we already know of it lead us on to the inference that it extends as perfectly into spheres where we cannot as yet trace it, as it does into the regions through which we can; that it governs the weather and the health of human beings or animals as truly as the movements of the suns and stars? Certainly human health and even the rainfall are not beyond the influence of the human

will. A shower has been suddenly brought down by a discharge of artillery, and health is affected by human energy in ways too numerous to mention. Still, as has been already said, this efficacy of will does not arrest the reign of law. We are not here dealing with a purely capricious force, which defies all attempts to measure it. Will makes the operations of law more complex. Probably at the most human will can only arrest or precipitate the working of one law by bringing another into the field.

But this theory would further seem to suggest, that the lawful subjects of prayer will be constantly diminishing with the increasing progress of our knowledge. Science is continually enlarging our conceptions of the range of law. With this progressive enlargement the frontier within which prayer is possible will recede, if prayer is only possible in the region of "the unsettled," where we cannot recognize law. "If," it has been said, "we still pray for rain and health, we shall probably find that rain and health are just as much regulated by law as are eclipses of the sun and moon, and that prayer for either is equally irrational." Thus it may happen that prayer for any physical blessing will ultimately be pronounced unscientific. But if this conclusion be accepted, can it be supposed that men will continue to recognize the reasonableness of prayer for purely spiritual blessings? Are we right in thinking that law has no sway in the spiritual

world, only because we have not yet made a survey of its dominion? Does it not seem probable that the recognition of law will be carried through psychology as clearly and certainly as it is being carried through physics? And when this has been achieved, if the recognized presence of law is to check or forbid prayer; will it not become just as "arrogant" to ask for peace of the soul, with the idea that a Power independent of ourselves will interfere to give it us, as to pray for safety from lightning and thunder, from plague and pestilence?

Certainly it would appear to the present writer that if the scientific "idea of law" is fatal to the practice of prayer in any department of human interest, it must, sooner or later, be fatal to that practice, in any serious sense, altogether. And therefore he cannot allow that the admitted government of the physical world by laws which God has ordained, and which science has traced, and is tracing every day with increasing accuracy, makes prayers for objects within the recognized jurisdiction of these laws irrational or irreverent. If God is Omnipotent, He can vary the laws, that is, He can vary His accustomed methods of working, when He wills. If He is a moral Being, He is likely to do so, supposing moral interests to be really at stake. Whether a prayer for a physical object, say for the suspension of an eclipse, be irrational or irreverent, would surely depend upon the motive of such a

prayer. It would be shocking to pray against an eclipse only in order to gratify the curiosity of a scientific association: no serious Theist can conceive that such a prayer as that would be granted. Nay, the bodily distress of millions of human beings might perhaps be no sufficient reason for asking God to work so complex and gigantic a miracle as is here in question, in order to avert it. But let us suppose an eclipse to provoke some outbursts of crime, which could not be counteracted by any known human agency, such as that of missionaries who have prevented the execution of great acts of cruelty among savage tribes. In that case prayer against an eclipse would at least be rational and reverent. Rational, because God might arrest eclipses, and a great deal else, if He willed to do so; and reverent, because God is pre-eminently a Moral Being, and such a prayer would be an acknowledgment of His Morality. Of course He might not answer such a prayer under any circumstances. But it is inconceivable that, being what He is, He should be angry with His suppliant.

Happily, the practical question is easily settled, for all who believe that God is really Almighty, and that He is not merely a Force or an Intellect, but a Father. As His children, whom He loves dearly, and for whom He has done and is ever doing so much, and doing it so wonderfully, we can have no cold distrust of Him. We must indeed watch, anxiously and reverently, His ways of working in

nature as elsewhere; we may not lightly ask Him to reverse what we believe to be His rules of working: we dare not ask Him to vary capriciously His action in the physical world, or at once to take our judgment of the needs of the moral world for granted. All our prayer must be accompanied by the reserves which His Wisdom imposes upon our shortsightedness; and the more filial our spirit, the less likely shall we ever be to feel disappointment at His decisions, be they what they may. But this temper of resignation, incessantly present to religious minds, will not lead us practically to treat the Living God as a helpless Fate, nor will it dry up the springs of prayer, by stripping of their power and encouragement the undying words,—as fresh now as they were eighteen centuries ago,—"Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in My Name, He will give it you."

St. Paul's,
September, 1873.

Preface to the Third Edition.

These lectures are now issued in a smaller and cheaper form than that of previous editions, by way of answer to an appeal which the writer did not feel at liberty to disregard. It was represented to him, and with the authority of experience, that the book would be welcome and useful to a section of the working men in London and other large towns, if it could be placed within their reach; and accordingly, through the courtesy of his publishers, it is reprinted in its entirety, with only such changes as a rearrangement of the pages has rendered necessary.

Ten years have passed since the lectures were delivered, and in the world of negative thought as elsewhere they have been years of rapid change. In particular, among the cultivated classes, Agnosticism has apparently made a progress which might seem to require some extended notice. But to attempt this would be to write a substantially new book. The readers of Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Data of Ethics" will have noted the anxiety with which

that eminent writer views the prospects of *moral* convictions among the people at large, in the event of a general acceptance of Agnostic speculations. But can the efforts hitherto made to provide a "scientific" basis, so termed, for that practical idea of right conduct which has hitherto rested on Faith in Almighty God, the Maker and Judge of all mankind, be deemed successful? As soon as Agnosticism attempts to provide for the moral needs of daily human life, it has to fall back upon those large assumptions which are inevitable, whenever men try to construct a working theory of duty, apart from belief in a Personal and Moral God. This necessity must in the end be fatal either to its intellectual consistency, or to its pretension to deal adequately with human nature as a whole; and it may be hoped that such a dilemma will lead some of the gifted minds who are at present attracted by a way of looking at things, that has seemed to them to be so modest and so clear, to reconsider the steps by which they have left the Faith and Church of Jesus Christ.

ST. PAUL'S,
October, 1880.

Preface to the Fifth Edition.

IN this edition no corrections have been made.

3, AMEN COURT,
December, 1884.

Preface to the Sixth Edition.

This Edition has been furnished with an Index, at the desire of some persons who have every right to say that such an addition would make the book more useful.

St. Paul's,
December, 1888.

Publisher's Note.

The present edition of Liddon's "Some Elements of Religion" is issued in response to a request, which has been made with some frequency of late, for very cheap reprints of standard religious and theological works.

39, Paternoster Row, London,
January, 1904.

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LECTURE I.

First Sunday in Lent.

THE IDEA OF RELIGION.

Ps. cxliii. 8.

Shew Thou me the way that I should walk in, for I lift up my soul unto Thee.

Our age, it has been said, longs to be religious. If this is too unguarded an assertion, it is at least true that the instinct or sentiment of religion is treated among us with more respect and sympathy than has been the case at some past epochs of our national history. Amid the debaucheries of the Restoration, and the shallow habits of thought on the gravest subjects which marked portions of the last century, Religion, in the broad sense of the term, was largely discredited, even when it was not openly scouted as a weakness or a superstition. Whereas in our day religion is named, even by the irreligious, with the forms if not with the sincerity of respect. And some men interest themselves in religion as an abstract good, with very great sincerity, who oppose by turns all that asserts its power and presence in the world. Thus they declaim against churches, while they explain that in doing this they are

befriending that true Religion which churches misrepresent. Or, they would do away with priesthoods; but then they are only anxious, while rescuing the fair jewel of religion from clerical keeping, to make its sway more imperial, by making its mien and countenance more human. Or they make war upon theology—the theology of Apostles, Fathers, Creeds; but theology, they declare, again and again, is a pedantic product of the clerical understanding, and they for their part are passionately interested on behalf of the religion of the human heart. They discredit "book revelations," and insist upon errors of fact or errors of morals, which they hold to be discoverable in the Bible; but they are all the more eager to profess and feel a zeal for that unerring and sublime essence of religion, which is not bound, as they phrase it, to the letter, and which fires their enthusiasm in renouncing the letter. And thus, however warmly the institutions, the ministers, the beliefs, the sacred literature of religion, may be successively assailed, religion itself, we are assured, is respected; or rather it is respect for and loyalty to religion—to religion divested of accretions which have gathered round it and obscured its beauty during the lapse of time,—which is in fact the animating motive of this most friendly and discriminating opposition.

That religion should be thus safeguarded as an idea, when all that secures its practical power is by turns objected to; that the abstract, disembodied, intangible essence should be so sedulously honoured, while its concrete forms, its living and working embodiments, are opposed and denounced, is a fact

which must engage attention. How are we to account for it? Is it that we live in a "period of transition," when men have not yet faced the last consequences of the principles which they are adopting, and hang with a pardonable, although illogical tenderness between premiss and conclusion? Does the sacred name of religion still command an awe which, while it is not strong enough to protect many practical interests, can yet hedge around a remote object with the forms of popular respect? Is it that, as of old, barbarian invaders, who will without scruple devastate the precincts and sack the interior of the temple, are pausing involuntarily, spell-bound, almost terrified, upon the threshold of the sacred shrine? Or does the æsthetic feeling of our time, looking at man's life with the eye of an artist rather than with the eye of a statesman or philanthropist, prompt this interest on behalf of religion, as alone adequately representing and upholding the ideal side of human enterprise? Does it anticipate, not without reason, the dull, barren, uninteresting, prosaic level of existence to which we should be reduced, if all that points upward in thought and feeling could be utterly stripped from us, and eliminated; if human life could be robbed of the most refining and stimulating influences that can be brought to bear on it? Or is this reserve of interest on behalf of religion at bottom a social, or political—if you like, a selfish—class instinct? Is it order cowering before approaching revolution, and endeavouring to support its regiments and its policemen with forces summoned from some higher world, whether of fact or fancy; with invisible

powers capable of making their way into the very heart of the enemy's camp? Is it that we of this generation, who have read in the annals of a neighbouring country the stern lessons taught by eighty years of active or suppressed anarchy, are more keenly alive than were our ancestors to the tremendous force of the volcanic passions latent in human nature? Are we willing to grant that some religion at least is a social necessity; a necessity in the sense of Machiavelli, if not in the sense of Jesus Christ? Are we satisfied that the brute within us, if he is to be chained and imprisoned at all, can only be taken captive by a superhuman master, and will never forfeit his destructive liberty, except at the bidding of an unearthly creed?

Undoubtedly, it may be admitted that religion owes something, on the score of respect yielded to her as an abstract idea, to each of these causes. The awe which a reasoned scepticism cannot always crush, the perception of what it is that constitutes beauty in life, combine with the stern practical instincts of social safety, with the love of order, and the anxiety to make property and life secure, to insist that man must have something in the way of a religion. Schemes of independent morality, even if they were theoretically defensible, are not equal to resisting the impetuosities of passion, or the exorbitant demands of a low self-interest. "Take my word for it," said a great statesman, "it is not prudent as a rule to trust yourself to any man who tells you that he does not believe in a God or in a future after death."[1]

[1] Sir Robert Peel.

But a deeper reason for the fact we are considering, is to be found in the wider conviction that religion is, if I may so express it, an indispensable part of man's moral and mental outfit. Two causes have contributed to deepen this conviction in modern times.

The first is the subjective spirit of the age, which insists on looking at truth, not as it is in itself, in its utter independence of the mind of man, but as it presents itself to man's mind, or rather as man's mind in very varying moods apprehends it. This spirit, while it has weakened the public hold upon Creeds and Scriptures, has directed attention, with an intensity unknown before our day, to the needs of the human mind, and among them to its supreme need of a religion. It has indeed exaggerated this into maintaining, as with Feuerbach, that all existing religions are but the creations of human thought, which, while it is really doomed to an uninterrupted contact with the world of sense, aspires to create, if it cannot discover, an ideal world beyond; but this paradox only yields an additional testimony to the need we have, as men, of some religion, in order to do justice to our humanity. Religion, says a modern English writer, who certainly will not be suspected of any desire to exaggerate its influence, is that "which gives to man, in the midst of the rest of creation, his special elevation and dignity."[1] And it was perhaps, upon the whole, the most marked feature in the work of Schleiermacher, that when groping his way back from the grim intellectual desert into which many of his countrymen had been

[1] Froude: Hist. Engl. xii. 535.

led, under the guidance of the older Rationalism, he insisted with such emphasis and success upon the necessity of religion in order to the completion of human life. Beyond any of his contemporaries, he saw and pointed out that by our capacity for religion, by our power of looking beyond this deceptive and passing world of sense to a higher world, invisible and eternal; by loyalty to the obligations which that clearer sight imposes on us, we men are best distinguished from the brutes around us. Language itself, the physical dress in which we clothe our thought, is not more distinctly royal among our outward human prerogatives, than that upturned countenance which, as the heathen poet divined, is the symbol of our intelligent capacity for a higher life.

The indispensableness of religion to human life has also been forced on the mind of this generation by a deeper study of history. The more we know of the annals of our race, the more clearly is it seen how the greatest catastrophes, and the most profound and far-reaching changes, have really turned upon religious questions; and that the stronger and more definite has been the religion, the more fundamental and striking have been these results. Thus, for instance, the modern history of Europe has been little else than a history of struggles fundamentally religious. A recent historian of civilization has indeed maintained that this is true only of the past,[1] and that the present age has more and more learned to restrict its enthusiasm to material objects. But he forgets that religion does not cease to influence

[1] Buckle: Hist. Civ. i. 241–325.

events among those who reject its claims: it excites the strongest human passions not merely in its defenders, but in its enemies. The claim to hold communion with an unseen world irritates when it does not win and satisfy. Atheism has again and again been a fanaticism; it has been a missionary and a persecutor by turns; it is lashed into passion by the very presence of the sublime passion to which it is opposed. We of to-day know full well that no political subjects are discussed so warmly as those which bear even remotely upon religion. "The deepest subject," says Goethe, "in the history of the world and of mankind, and that to which all others are subordinate, is the conflict between faith and unbelief."[1]

While these causes make an interest in religion, of whatever kind, inevitable among thoughtful men in our day and generation, they only reinforce, they do not obscure or supersede, those permanent reasons for its influence, which are part of our natural and human circumstances. Among these it may suffice to mention one. It is a fact, certain to each one of us, that we shall individually die. If science could arrest the empire of death, as it has limited that of disease; if thought, in its onward march throughout the centuries, could rob us utterly of the presentiment of an immortality and of our aspirations towards a higher world, then religion would retain, in the fixed circumstances of life, no ally of anything like equal power. But there is the certainty, present to each one of us in our thoughtful moments, never entirely absent from the thought of

[1] Qu. by Luthardt.

those who seriously think at all, that an hour will come when we shall face the problem of problems for ourselves and alone; when we shall know by experience what really is beyond the veil, and how it is related to that which we see and are here; and it is impossible, with this prospect before us, to treat the voice and claims of religion as wholly trivial or unimportant.[1]

But here the question arises as to what it is that man seeks in seeking religion. Or rather, what is religion? We know it when we meet it in life; we know it by its bearing, by its fruits, by the atmosphere with which it surrounds itself. But what is it within the soul? what is its chief element or substance? What is this power which does not meet the eye, but which we trace in its results? what is the true psychological account that must be given of it?

I.

As we repeat the question, "What is religion?" we find ourselves, it may be, in the position of standing face to face with a very old acquaintance, with whose countenance and habits we have been familiar all our lives, but of whose real self we cannot but feel we have a somewhat shadowy perception.

1. Is religion, then, in the heart of man, to be looked upon chiefly as the highest and purest form of feeling? Is feeling the essential thing in true religion? So thought no less a person than Schleier-

[1] This is admitted, although, of course, in terms which the writer would not adopt, by Mr. Buckle. Hist. Civ. i. 113.

macher.[1] He makes religion to consist in feeling—notably in our feeling of dependence on a Higher Power; and his influence has won for this representation a wide acceptance in modern Protestant Germany.[2] Such in England is, or has been at times, the practical instinct, if not the decision, of Wesleyanism and kindred systems.[3] Feeling, not knowledge; feeling, not morality; feeling, not even conscience, is the test of acceptance—that is to say, of satisfactory religion. Acceptance is warranted by the sense of acceptance; religious progress is measured by the sense of enjoying more and more the raptures of the religious life.

Nor, if we look either into the recesses of the human heart, or into the historical expressions of religious earnestness, can the high place of feeling in the religious life be rightly depreciated. Feeling is the play of our consciousness coming into contact with its object: it varies in intensity according to the interest we take in that object: it is a totally different thing in the case of a casual acquaintance and of a near relative. When, then, the soul is in intimate contact with the Object of objects—with

[1] Schleiermacher, Christliche Glaube, i. pp. 6-14. He is expanding the proposition that "Die Frömmigkeit, welche die Basis aller kirchlichen Gemeinschaften ausmacht, ist rein für sich betrachtet weder ein Wissen noch ein Thun, sondern ein Bestimmtheit des Gefühls oder des unmittelbaren Selbstbewusstseins." Compare p. 16. Das gemeinsame aller derjenigen Bestimmtheiten des Selbstbewusstseins, welche überwiegend ein Irgendwohergetroffensein der Empfänglichkeit aussagen, ist dass wir uns als abhängig fühlen.

[2] As with Nitzsch, Twesten, and others. Cf. Grimm, Inst. Th. Dogm. p. 19.

[3] Compare the remarks in Southey's "Life of Wesley," p. 267.

God,—feeling, the purest and most intense, is not merely legitimate, but ordinarily inevitable. How much of the Psalter is feeling—the tenderest, the strongest, the most loyal, the most affectionate! "Like as the hart desireth the water-brooks, so longeth my soul after Thee, O God. My soul is athirst for God, yea, even for the living God: when shall I come to appear before the presence of God?" "Whom have I in heaven but Thee, and there is none upon earth that I desire in comparison of Thee!" "My soul hangeth upon Thee: Thy right hand hath upholden me." "Do not I hate them, O Lord, that hate Thee, and am not I grieved with those that rise up against Thee: yea, I hate them right sore, even as though they were mine enemies!"[1] How profoundly is the religion of S. Paul, as we study it in his Epistles, penetrated by feeling! Always in felt contact with an unseen Master; he is tender, he is vehement, he burns, he is melted: his dispositions towards his fellow-men are so various and keen, because in him feeling has been educated in a higher Presence.—"The love of Christ constraineth us:" "To me to live is Christ:" "Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?" "I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me:" "If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema maranatha."[2]

But the question is not whether feeling be an element of sincere religion; but whether it be the one most essential element. And here two observations cannot fail to strike us.

[1] Ps. xlii. 1; lxxiii. 25; lxiii. 8; cxxxix. 21, 22.

[2] 2 Cor. v. 14; Phil. i. 21; Rom. viii. 35; Gal. ii. 20; 1 Cor. xvi. 22.

In the long run, there can be, for well-ordered minds, no strong play of feeling apart from a sense of the intellectual truth of the object upon which feeling is bestowed. To lavish feeling, if it be possible to do so, upon a personage who is even suspected of being mythical or half mythical, is to prostitute feeling. Some idea, then, of the object of feeling must precede the feeling, as well as a conviction of the truth of the object so conceived of. We are told that religious feeling is especially the sense of entire dependence upon a Higher Power: man's inmost soul hangs confidingly upon the Power in which we live and move and have our being. But, then, what is this power? That is a question which must be answered before feeling can determine its complexion. Is this power an impersonal force? is it a blind fate or destiny? is it some vast machine, having neither heart nor will, but moving onwards through endless cycles of destructions and recombinations, of life and death, unceasingly, resistlessly, inexorably? If so, feeling at least cannot take the form of absolute dependence: there is no such thing as surrendering yourself in trustful resignation to a piece of machinery, which may crush you to death at any moment in its advance. Trustful dependence is only possible when that on which we depend is seen to be a Person, and a *moral* Person, that is to say, holy, truthful, compassionate, just. But here we pass out of the region of feeling. It appears that before feeling can trust itself, something is wanted to guide and colour it. Knowledge is at least as essential to religion as feeling; and knowledge of the Object of religion, expressed in clear and

precise terms, is after all only another name for dogma.

But, moreover, feeling, even if intelligent, must accompany right moral effort, in order to be religious. Feeling, even when directed to heavenly objects, may be, in its substance, partly physical; and there is no necessary connection between feeling so originating and moral earnestness, or even a right morality. Nay, it is very possible for those who feel warmly to imagine, mistakenly enough, that warm feeling is the same thing as, or an adequate substitute for, acting rightly. He who said, "If ye love Me, keep My commandments,"[1] implied that there are forms of religious passion, distinct no doubt from the true Christian grace of love, which may co-exist with disobedience, and may even appear to compensate for it. The Galatians had not been the less willing to "pluck out their own eyes," out of devotion to S. Paul, at the time of their conversion, because they afterwards looked on him as a personal enemy for telling them the truth about the Judaisers.[2] The Apostle was not insincere who protested, "Though I should die with Thee, yet will I not deny Thee;"[3] albeit a few hours later, at the crisis of danger, he could exclaim, "I know not the Man."[4] Feeling is not necessarily moral purpose; and its possible deficiencies on this side, as well as on the side of knowledge, show that we cannot regard it as alone forming the raw material of religious life.[5]

[1] S. John xiv. 15.
[2] Gal. iv. 15, 16.
[3] S. Matt. xxvi. 35.
[4] S. Matt. xxvi. 72, 74.
[5] Hegel, Werke, xvii. 295 (qu. Grimm). Gründet sich die Religion im Menschen nur auf ein Gefühl, so hat solches richtig

2. Is it then more nearly true to say that the one essential thing in religion is knowledge—knowledge of God and of the things of God? Somewhat of this kind was the opinion of the Gnostics of the second century. They regarded the Christian doctrines as simply an addition to the existing stock of current human speculations, and they ventilated what appear to us nothing less than the wildest fancies under the protection of current Christian phrases, which served to decorate and recommend speculations that often had nothing to do with Christianity. They thought that the Apostles had been unintellectual persons, upon whose well-meant efforts they had themselves improved.[1] Since faith has in it a large moral element, their watchword was, not *faith*, but *knowledge*; and, in their own phrase, this knowledge was to be the salvation of souls.[2]

The history of the human mind repeats itself, and a position which is at bottom akin to the foregoing, is familiar to some of us in the philosophies of Schelling and Hegel. Here too faith is only the lower grade, the popular form of the religious consciousness; its most cherished doctrines are only

keine weitere Bestimmung als das Gefühl seiner Abhängigkeit zu seyn, und so wäre der Hund der beste Christ, denn er trägt dieses am stärksten in sich, und lebt vornehmlich in diesem Gefühle. Auch erlosungsgefühle hat der Hund, wenn seinem Hunger durch einen Knochen Befriedigung wird." This does not exclude the truth that the affectionate loyalty of a dog for his master is a rebuke to the coldheartedness of Christians; but it is rightly implied that the religion of humanity must be based on something more than feeling.

[1] S. Irenæus, Hær. III. 12, 12.

[2] Compare the account which S. Irenæus gives of the Valentinians, Hær. i. 6, 2. Their contemptuous estimate of Catholic Christians is expressed in the phrase "*οἱ δὶ ἔργων καὶ πίστεως ψιλῆς βεβαιούμενοι καὶ μὴ τὴν τελείαν γνῶσιν ἔχοντες.*"

parables of the realities open to the eye of science upon which the modern thinker may gaze. His religion is thus mainly an effort of the intellect, which is perpetually engaged in disentangling and distilling from the rude forms of old-world creeds those abstract scientific conceptions which are better suited to the palate of modern philosophy.[1]

It has already been implied that knowledge—true knowledge of truth—is of vital importance to religion. No one would question this, except in the interests of a morbid fanaticism. Religion is impossible without some knowledge of its object; and our capacities for true religious life must, to a certain extent, vary with our varying degrees of religious knowledge.[2] "This," says our Saviour, "is life eternal; that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, Whom Thou hast sent."[3] The knowledge spoken of here, and elsewhere in the Bible, is indeed not merely intellectual: it is knowledge in act; it is the knowledge which is won by love and obedience, as distinct from, although together with, intelligence. Nevertheless, knowledge, in its ordinary sense of information apprehended by the understanding, is indispensable to religion. Sight is not the power of walking or working; but we cannot work or walk blindfolded without disaster.

[1] In the words of a more recent Hegelian writer, "Dass der Inhalt der Religion und Philosophie derselbe sey, indem den Vorstellungen des religiösen Bewusstseyns ein ihner fern liegender Sinn untergelegt wird, den man unverholen auszusprechen sich nicht getrauen darf. *Daumer, Andeutung eines Systemes speculativer Philosophie*, p. 45, qu. by Grimm.

[2] Rom. x. 2; Eph. i. 17; iv. 13; Phil. i. 9; Col. i. 9, 10; ii. 2; 1 Tim. ii. 4; 2 Tim. iii. 7; Heb. x. 26; 2 Pet. i. 2, 3, 8; ii. 20.

[3] S. John xvii. 3.

Yet no mere action of the intelligence, however active, upon the subject-matter of religion, is the true back-bone of religion. Knowledge alone may only enhance responsibility. If Christ had not come and spoken to the Jews, they had not had sin: as it was, they had no cloke for their sin.[1] S. Paul contrasts a merely intelligent apprehension of religious subjects with love. "Knowledge," he says, "puffeth up, but charity edifieth."[2] The whole drift of S. James's Epistle goes to show the worthlessness, religiously speaking, of unfruitful knowledge. The hearer of the Word who is not a doer, is compared with the man who continueth in the perfect law of liberty besides looking into it. The first does but realize a fleeting and unproductive impression; the second has undergone a change of life.[3]

The most intellectual of the Greeks, whose thoughts about God and the soul might at times almost seem to anticipate Christianity, as they have been welcomed with the respect of many a generation of Christians, has unwittingly warned us of the religious impotence of mere culture, by staining his pages, not once or twice, but habitually, with sympathetic references to crimes, tolerable enough to the public sentiment of Athens, but the very names of which are defiling to Christian lips. The most intellectual Gnostics were sensualists; sensualists upon a theory and with deliberation.[4] And modern history,

[1] S. John xv. 22; ix. 41.

[2] 1 Cor. viii. 1.

[3] S. James i. 22–24.

[4] S. Irenæus, Hær. i. 6, 3. *διὸ δὴ καὶ τὰ ἀπειργμένα πάντα ἀδεῶς οἱ τελειότατοι πράττουσιν αὐτῶν, περὶ ὧν αἱ γραφαὶ διαβεβαιοῦνται, τοὺς ποιοῦντας αὐτὰ βασιλείαν Θεοῦ μὴ κληρονομήσειν.* Cf. 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10.

if it were worth our while to consult it here, yields many a warning that intellectual culture about religious things is one thing, and genuine religion quite another. Henry VIII., who had been destined for the English Primacy, was among the best read theologians of his day; but whatever opinion may be entertained of his place, as a far-sighted statesman in English history, no one would seriously speak of him as personally religious.[1]

Intelligence indeed, however cultivated, is only a department of human life. Man is something greater than a cultivated intellect; even than an intellect cultivated by study of the highest objects that can be presented to it,—by study of the things of God. More than this is needed to constitute religion; which, if it be not merely a sentiment or passion, so certainly it is more than an intellectual effort, however serious be its purpose or sublime its goal.

3. Are we then to say, with a large section of the modern world, that the essential thing in religion is morality? This was the teaching of Immanuel Kant. Religion, as he phrases it, is a practical recognition of the Divine origin of the moral law.[1] And it is a doctrine which constantly meets us in the society and the general literature of our own country at the present day. Its popularity is easy of explanation in an age when belief in the Unseen has been seriously weakened among those classes of the people to which the political necessity of strengthening virtues which purify life and uphold society is pre-eminently obvious.

And certainly we must admit that religion has no

[1] Quot. in Luthardt: Apologetische Vorträge, 1. 6.

more appropriate work than the regulation of human life in accordance with moral truth: it is in this province especially that we look for evidences of its reality and its power. "By their fruits ye shall know them,"[1] said its one great Master, of certain religious aspirants. "Pure religion," according to His Apostle, "and undefiled before God and the Father, is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world."[2] In other words, it is active philanthropy and personal purity. The language used to describe it in the Bible, implies that knowledge of religion and religious emotions are, as we have seen, worse than incomplete, if they do not lead to active goodness.[3] What a man knows or feels is of little import, until it is ascertained what he does, or rather what he is.[4]

But it by no means follows that morality can be truly described as the essence of religion. It differs from religion in this, that morality is conformity to a law of right, while religion is essentially a relation towards a Person. A perfect, absolute morality will cover the same practical ground as true religion. But if men endeavour to treat morality as the only essential element in religion, and accordingly attempt to plant it on some independent basis, physical or otherwise, of its own—two things will happen. Such a morality will be much narrower than a religious morality; it will, in the judgment of religious men, present an incomplete view of the

[1] S. Matt. vii. 16. [2] S. James i. 27.
[3] S. Matt. vii. 22, 23; 2 S. Pet. ii. 20, 21.
[4] Ps. xv. i. *sqq.*; xxiv. 3, 5; Rom. viii. 13, 14.

real cycle of duty; notably, it will fail to recognize that most important side of duty which we owe exclusively to God. But, besides this, morality, divorced from religion, will tend more and more, from the nature of the case, to approximate to a department of mere human law; to concern itself only with acts and not with motives; to make the external product, and not the internal governing principle, the supreme consideration. Morality, severed from religious motive, is like a branch cut off from a tree: it may, here and there, from accidental causes, retain its greenness for a while; but its chance of vigorous life is a very slender one. Nor is it possible to popularize a real morality, a morality that shall deal with motives as well as with acts, without unveiling to the eye of the soul something more personal than an abstract law. It is when man has caught sight of the one Perfect Being, and in the effort to escape from the weakness and degradations of his own earthly life, "lifts up his soul" to this unseen, all-powerful, all-bountiful Friend, that he may hope to discover the true ideal of his life, and to realize it. Religion is thus the constant spring and best guarantee of morality; but morality is not the "essence of religion." Religion consists fundamentally in the practical recognition of a constraining bond between the inward life of man and an unseen Person.[1]

The ancients were fond of discussing the derivation of the word religion; and Cicero refers it to

[1] Compare Eus. Præp. Ev. 1, 2. ἡ πρὸς τὸν ἕνα καὶ μόνον ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁμολογουμενόν τε καὶ ὄντα Θεὸν ἀνάνευσις καὶ ἡ κατὰ τοῦτον ζωή.

that anxious habit of mind which cons over again and again all that bears on the service of heaven.[1] Lactantius may be wrong in his etymology, but he has certainly seized the broad popular sense of the word, when he connects it with the idea of an obligation by which man is bound to an invisible Lord.[2]

With this the Biblical phraseology is in substantial harmony. The expressions which describe the religion of the earliest Patriarchs are in point; and, like much else in the Pentateuch, they mould the later language of the Psalter. Enoch and Noah are said to have "walked with God;" Abraham was bidden "walk before the face of God, and be perfect."[3] Here God is represented as the bounden Companion of a man's life, as well as his all-surveying Judge and Master; and this idea of religion as personal devotedness to God underlies all the representations of Scripture on the subject. Religion in the understanding, is the knowledge of God,[4]—of His will and commandments; it is the knowledge of His "mystery" or secret counsel revealed in Christ.[5] When the Jewish law had been given, religion was practically a "walking in the law of the Lord;"[6] when the Christian revelation has been made, it is an "acknowledgment of the truth which is after godliness."[7] But in this truth, in that law, it seeks

[1] Nat. Deor. ii. 28. Qui omnia quæ ad cultum deorum pertinerent, diligenter retractarent et tanquam relegerent, religiosi dicti sunt ex relegendo.

[2] Inst. Div. iv. 28. Vinculo pietatis obstricti, Deo religati sumus, unde ipsa religio nomen cepit. Compare the hostile phrase of Lucretius, "religionum se nodis solvere." Cf. St. Aug. Retract. 1. 13; de verâ relig. xli. 55.

[3] Gen. v. 24; vi. 9; xvii. 1. [4] Hos. iv. 1.

[5] Eph. i. 17. [6] Ps. cxix. 1; Cf. S. Luke i. 6. [7] Tit. i. 1

a Person; it is fundamentally the maintenance of a real relation with the Personal God, or with a Divine Person really incarnate in Jesus Christ. Accordingly, religion, both Jewish and Christian, is described as a covenant; it is a bond or understanding between the nation or the soul and God; or, still more, from the point of view of a faith that worketh by love, it is personal communion with God. "That which we have seen and heard," says S. John, "declare we unto you, that ye also may have communion with us, and truly our communion is with the Father, and with His Son Jesus Christ." [1]

Thus religious life is more than feeling, since feeling may be physical, misdirected, selfish. It is more than knowledge, which, even if it be complete and accurate, may fail to govern the moral nature. It is more than obedience to a moral code, because such obedience, if sufficiently complete to be religious, already implies relations to the Lawgiver. And yet religion is feeling; it is mental illumination; it is especially moral effort; because it is that which implies, and comprehends, and combines them all. It is the sacred bond, freely accepted, generously, enthusiastically, persistently welcomed, whereby the soul engages to make a continuous expenditure of its highest powers in attaching itself to the Personal Source and Object of its being. It is the tie by which the soul binds itself to God, its true friend. To be thus bound to a person is to cherish strong, nay, passionate feelings towards him; it is to seek to know all that can be known about his wishes and character, and to register this knowledge in exact

[1] 1 S. John i. 3.

terms; it is to obey scrupulously all that is clearly ascertained to be his will. "Shew Thou me the way that I should walk in, for I lift up my soul unto Thee." This is the language of feeling, pure and strong; it is the language of intelligence, ever desiring a higher knowledge of its Highest Object; it is the language of obedience, the most absolute that man can proffer. It is these, because it is the voice, the exceeding great cry, of that unquenchable passion, of that irrepressible aspiration, whereby the soul of man shews forth its truest dignity and highest virtue in seeking the better to know and love and serve its Highest and Invisible Object; because, in a word, it is the language of religion.

II.

If the prayer of the human soul be granted, can we infer from the needs of the suppliant any of the necessary characteristics of the great gift which is to relieve them? To say that we can do so will not be "dictating terms to God," because He is not more the author of a religious Revelation than of the moral and mental instincts which demand it. To say that we can do so will not involve our "paying court to the corrupt instincts of a fallen nature;" because it certainly is not these instincts which seek a close approach to a nearer vision of the Throne of Moral Purity and Light. Nor will it compromise the True Faith by drawing attention to some features which are, and must be, more or less common to it with the false faiths whereby man, again and again, during his long and weary history,

has sought to satisfy the noblest of his passions, even when he has only lighted up the dark canopy of heaven from fires kindled by himself on earth. For in order to exist at all, false beliefs must embody some, even considerable elements of truth; and conversely, the True Faith, in order to be itself, must have something, both in its form and in its substance, that is common to itself and to every falsehood that opposes it.

1. First of all, then, an answer from God to the religious needs of man will be, at least in some degree, a mysterious answer: it will half unveil much which shades off into the unknown and the incomprehensible. To profess to reveal the Infinite, and yet to undertake to explain everything to the perfect satisfaction of a finite understanding, is worse than unreasonable. And a creed which should discover nothing that lies beyond the province of our experience, can have no pretensions to be a religious creed at all. For religion is not a relation to or communion with nature, or with any natural force or law; it is communion with an Invisible Person. Certainly, we hear men speak of a religion of art, of a religion of work, of a religion of civilization. Harmless metaphors these, if it be only meant that all the occupations of life can and should be penetrated and sanctified by the sense of God's Presence and Will; but mischievous and misleading to the last degree, if it be suggested that either art, or work, or civilization is in itself an end worthy of the highest energies of the human spirit. He only who made us for Himself—the Infinite and Eternal God—can be the object of religion, and any serious

answer to the religious aspirations of humanity must point to *Him*. "Our preachers," said a German writer, referring to his university some thirty years ago, "having got rid of the Christian doctrines by means of the higher criticism, are now insisting with much earnestness upon the importance of taking regular exercise."[1] Regular exercise is no doubt a matter of real importance in its way: but an advocacy of its advantages, however impassioned, says nothing to that side of our being which breathes the prayer, "Shew Thou me the way that I should walk in, for I lift up my soul unto Thee."

That Christianity is mysterious, is no new objection against it. Unquestionably it is mysterious. In the year 1702, Toland undertook to prove that "Christianity is not mysterious:" but he only succeeded in leading a certain number of minds to a belief that it is false. That "the Gospel contains nothing contrary to reason" is the conviction of every Christian, who knows that right reason and revelation are alike gifts of God. That the Gospel "contains nothing above reason," is an assertion so paradoxical, as to be undeserving of a reply from those who believe that the historical and doctrinal statements of the New Testament are integral elements of the Gospel. Toland, indeed, could only make any approach to demonstrating his thesis, by tampering with the ordinary and world-wide sense of the term "Mystery;" and since the days of Toland science herself has, by her discoveries, made men feel more keenly than did our fathers the mysteriousness of Nature, and through Nature, of Nature's God.

[1] Dr. Tholuck to Dr. Pusey.

2. Next, God's answer to man's prayer must, at least within limits, be definite. An answer made up altogether of vague hopes, aspirations, surmisings, guesses, probabilities, whatever its other merits, will not meet the specific needs of man. What does man seek in seeking a religious creed? He seeks intellectual satisfaction and moral support. His intellect asks for reliable information upon certain subjects of the most momentous importance. How does he come to be here? Whither is he going? What is the purpose and drift of the various forms of existence around him? Above all, what is the nature, what are the attributes and dispositions, of that Being to Whom the highest yearnings of his inmost self constantly point as the true object of his existence? In asking that the answers to these questions shall be definite, that what is certain shall be affirmed as certain, what is doubtful as doubtful, what is false as false, he is only asking that his religious information shall be presented in as clear and practical a shape as his information on other subjects. In no department of human knowledge is haziness deemed a merit: by nothing is an educated mind more distinguished than by the resolute effort to mark the exact frontiers of its knowledge and its ignorance; to hesitate only when hesitation is necessary; to despair of knowledge only when knowledge is ascertainably out of reach. Surely on the highest and most momentous of all subjects this same precision may be asked for with reverence and in reason; surely the human mind is not bound to forget its noblest instincts when it approaches the throne and presence of its Maker.

Yet more necessary are definite statements of truth and duty to the moral side of human life. To obey at all, we must know what are the true limits of obedience, and what the nature and authority of the lawgiver. A soldier under fire has two things to do: first to attend to the word of his commanding officer, and then to strengthen his will by all the considerations which may enable him to do his duty. Man, as a moral being, is engaged in a perpetual campaign against the invading forces of temptation which assail him from without, and the insurrectionary outbreaks of lawless passions from within. If he is to make a successful resistance, he must be penetrated by a conviction that it is of vital importance to resist to the last extremity. This conviction must itself be made up of and depend upon other convictions, such as the sanctity of God, His power, His omnipresence, the interest which He takes in our success, the strength with which He supplies us, the certainty that He will come to judge us. A hazy sketch, a faltering utterance may suffice for an aimless sentimentalism; it is useless for the purposes of an earnest moral struggle.

An exact creed and code of conduct is therefore a need of man's mental and moral nature; and all religious systems, whatever their truth or falsehood, have attempted to satisfy it. The answer to this need, with which we are familiar, is that contained in the Christian theology; and we use that word in its broad sense, as including the whole cycle of revealed doctrine and morals. Theology, in its scientific exhibition, results from the effort which the Christian mind makes from age to age to reduce to

a precise and working form the deposit of truth committed at the first to the Christian Church. It is the elaborate inventory which century after century the Church has been taking of the priceless treasures which were committed to her keeping in the age of the Apostles. What doctrines may and may not be catalogued in that inventory without serious inaccuracy, is a point upon which, unhappily, there are wide divisions in the Christian world; but in the fifty generations of Christians from the first until the present age there has never been any sort of question as to the duty of ascertaining, as correctly as may be, what are the truths which Christ and His Apostles have taught, what is the exact area and import of these truths, what their moral and social significance, what our practical duties towards them.

Yes; but it is said, has not this inveterate instinct of the Christian mind been fatal to the beauty of religious truth? Is not religious truth better left in the vague, hazy distance of popular thought? Is it not vulgarized by this nearer probing, by this inquisitive anxiety to make out exactly what it is? Is not the New Testament vague and undecided, and are we likely to improve upon it? Are not the clergy, too, under a temptation to confuse between their professional instinct of making the most of their title-deeds, and the real broad interests of Christendom? Has not Christendom, in fact, suffered by over-definitions, by false definitions; and this in former ages as certainly as in our own?

Certainly there are arguments which may be urged against definitions; and first of all on æsthetic grounds. A picture of Turner's is a more beautiful

thing than a working drawing; but if your object be to give the measurements of a public edifice, Turner's picture would not be the more useful guide of the two. It is easy to advise a man to "study and admire the poetry of Isaiah and S. John, without troubling himself with the truth of their theological dogmas, or even of their historical statements." No doubt the poetry of the Evangelist and of the Prophet is of consummate beauty, but it is not their poetry which has impressed them on the thought and heart of the Christian world. The really important question about both these writers is, what do they exactly teach upon the gravest subjects that can interest thoughtful men? And next, is their teaching true? The answer to this, to be worth having, must be a sharply defined answer; and art, if needs be, must make a sacrifice to the demands of truth. That there have been unnecessary definitions, rash definitions, false definitions in Christendom, must be frankly granted: that they are still possible cannot be denied, in view of contemporary events; that they have injured the cause of Christ cannot be doubted. But the question is as to the principle of definiteness, not as to its abuse: false definitions, like false miracles, imply the true, of which they are a counterfeit and caricature. As to the New Testament, those who speak of its teaching as indefinite, appear to confuse between its substance and its form. Made up as it is of four biographical sketches, of one narrative of the lives and works of some missionary teachers, of twenty-one letters, six of them addressed to individuals, and of one description of a heavenly vision, its form is, of necessity, unmethodical; it is, if you

will, anti-scholastic. But its form is distinct from its substance; and from age to age the clear import of its substance is pressed upon the imagination and heart of the world by the matchless beauties of its form. The teaching of the New Testament indefinite! It is simple paradox. What can be more definite than the account of Christ's Birth, of His Miracles, of His Resurrection, of His Ascension into heaven, in the first three Gospels? What more definite than the awful representation of His Person in the fourth? Is the account of justification in the Epistle to the Romans and the Galatians indefinite? Or that of the Eucharist and the supernatural gifts of the Spirit in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, or that of the incorporation of the Church with the living and triumphant Christ in the letters to the Colossians and Ephesians, or that of its organization in the Pastoral Epistles? Is it not rather true that the New Testament is much too definite for modern unbelief, and that the real crime of the Church is, not that she has added the quality of definiteness to the writings of the Apostles and the Evangelists, but that she has persistently called attention to that quality which from the first, and from the nature of the case, belonged to them?

How, indeed, could it be otherwise? How would the cry of humanity for light and guidance have been answered? how would it not rather have been mocked and scorned, by a revelation of the indefinite; by a revelation of mists whereof none could decide the frontiers, or unfold the meaning, or insist upon the worth? Such a revelation would have in fact revealed nothing; nothing that might not have

been in some degree surmised by reason; nothing that could invigorate the heart or control the will. And in Christianity God has not thus disappointed us. He has not contrived to say much without asserting anything. If our Heavenly Father has not answered the petition of His children for the solid bread of truth with a stone, He as certainly has not met it by offering them a transcendental vapour.

3. Thirdly, a real answer to the religious needs of man must be positive. It must state what is truth, and not merely what is not truth. The soul of man does not look inward and upward only in the hope of detecting falsehoods: its deepest desire is to know, not what is not, but what is. Merely negative teachers are as the wind; they destroy but they cannot build; at their best they do but sweep away the unsubstantial fictions of human fancy or human fraud, but they erect nothing solid in the place of the discarded fictions. Positive truth alone can feed, sustain, invigorate the soul. It is no support in the hour of despondency or in the hour of temptation to reflect or to be told that such and such a doctrine or system is false. Possibly enough it *is* false; but what then? Does a sense of its falsehood nerve the will to do and the heart to sustain when action and endurance are hard? A sense of falsehood only supplies moral power so long and so far as you are confronted with the falsehood. You hate the lie, and your hatred imports force into your contradiction; you loathe the idol, and a righteous scorn nerves your arm to shatter it. But when the idol has been pulverized and the lie is exploded,

your force is gone. Your force was purely relative to the objects of its animosity, and it perished with them. Nay, more; even while they lasted, your force was good for nothing beyond and beside the function of destroying them. Such force is like Jehu; it is trenchant energy so long as vengeance has to be wreaked upon the house of Ahab; but it is abject impotence when the time comes for settling the polity of Israel on a sure foundation, so as to store up a legacy of strength and safety for the coming times. Positive doctrine, on the other hand, is, or ought to be, moral power. The whisper, "there is no God," in the heart of the moral fool, can never add to his stock of practical force. The faith of the Psalmist, "the Lord liveth," is at once followed by the exclamation, "and blessed be my strong Helper, and praised be the God of my salvation."[1] The soul cannot rest upon the void which is the result of that vast negation: it can and does draw comfort, strength, support, determination, as it grasps and leans upon this greatest of all assertions.

This is a point which requires insisting on, especially in an age of criticism. Here and there criticism may vindicate an affirmation; its more ordinary occupation is to destroy. It almost proceeds upon the assumption that the soil of truth is encumbered on all sides with brushwood and rubbish, and that it can scarcely do wrong in burning and clearing away for ever. We may allow that there is legitimate and useful work for it to do; but it is not the less true that the temper of mind which it creates is prone to entertain a most serious misap-

[1] Ps. xviii. 47.

prehension on religious matters. It tends to beget the notion that religious truth is simply negation—negation of false beliefs, negation of superstitious practices, negation of the errors and mistakes of other people; but scarcely anything that is really positive, with a body and substance of its own. Very many people in this country, especially among the educated classes, conceive of religion in this way, and to their own unspeakable loss. What God is not, what Christ is not, what the atonement and work of Christ are not, what prayer is not, what sacraments are not;—these are the questions with which they concern themselves almost exclusively. Yet the only question that is lastingly practical is what God, Christ, the atonement, prayer, the sacraments *are*. The negative conclusion does nothing beyond removing one or more misconceptions, or being supposed to do so; or rather it does something which were better undone. It satisfies the vague sense that religion is too important a concern to be entirely passed by: it furnishes a form of interest in religion, of strictly intellectual interest, that may be warranted to entail no practical consequences. And thus the half-awakened conscience is again lulled to sleep, by encountering a religious idea which only presents itself to be discarded; and the eyes of the spirit close, perhaps for ever.

Do I say that a true faith has no negative aspects? Certainly not. The Jewish faith was a negation of Polytheism: Christianity is a negation of Polytheism, and of much besides. The most characteristic writings of the great Apostle are protests against false ideas of the work of Christ: the most

elaborate of the Catholic creeds contains a repudiation of errors which deny the truth of the Divine Nature, or the truth of the Person of Jesus. But in these cases the negation does not stand alone; it is only the inevitable corollary of a greater affirmation. Unlike the dreary criticism which makes a solitude in the human spirit, and then sardonically calls it peace, the negations of the Creed do but remove obstructions to its positive statements: they clear a space in thought for laying the foundations and raising the walls of a solid edifice, within which the Divine Architect has provided for the most urgent wants of man.

4. Yet again, if man's deepest needs are to be satisfied, he must believe that his creed is absolutely, and not merely relatively, true. Relative truth—truth which is true only to certain persons or under certain circumstances—ceases to be truth when those persons and circumstances pass. It is transient; and to say that truth is transient, is to qualify the idea of truth by an attribute which destroys it. Relative truth is not truth, in the plain sense of the term; it is only opinion; it is opinion which in the event proves to be unfounded.

We are often told that Christianity, like the other positive religions of the world, is relatively true; and hard words are used of Christians, who say that its truth is absolute if it be true at all. Yet how can a creed profess to be relatively true without admitting itself to be really false? It was pardonable in Benhadad's Syrians to suggest that the God of Israel was only a God of the hills; but no believing Israelite could have granted this without deny-

ing the first article of his creed. And Philosophy has sometimes meant to befriend Christianity, by asserting that it teaches a relative truth. She bids believers make the best of it, on the ground that if not absolutely true, it is a phase of truth, true to the believer, true provisionally, although liable to be superseded by a higher truth in days to come. But who could make the most of a creed with such an estimate of its worth as this? Would any sensible man die for a "relatively true" religion? Could it teach him the duties of prayer or self-sacrifice? Would he live for it? Would he be even interested for long in a philosophy which he believed to be only relatively true? While the Ptolemaic system of the heavens lasted, it was supposed to be absolutely true. Would the ancient world have listened quietly to the Ptolemaic teachers had it suspected, however distantly, the advent of a Copernicus? The ceremonial element in the Jewish dispensation, as S. Paul has taught us, was only of relative authority. But it was believed by the Jews to be absolute. To see in it "a figure of the time then present," was already to have become a Christian. Any creed, whether true or false, must claim to be absolute, or it must make no claim at all; since upon our faith in its absolute truth depends our persuasion of the necessity and even of the reasonableness of the acts, habits, efforts, sacrifices, which constitute its practical side—of the ventures, in short, which men make on account of it.

To say that Christianity is only relatively true; that it is but the prelude and introduction to some broader religion of humanity, which will in time

supersede it, is, in fact, to reject Christianity. For from the first Christianity has claimed to be the Universal Religion. It was destined from the first to embrace the whole world; it was to last throughout the ages. "Go ye," said its Founder, "and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost;" and, "lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world."[1] In this claim of universality, whether in time or range of empire, there lay the implied and further claim to be the Absolute Religion—the one final unveiling of the Universal Father's mind before the eyes of His children.[2] This conviction underlies S. Paul's earnest apostolate of the Gentiles in the face of active Jewish prejudice. He "owed"[3] the absolute religion, as he could have owed no relative religion whatever, to the Greeks and to the Barbarians alike, to the philosophers and to the uneducated. To his eye all the deepest divisions of country, race, and station vanished entirely as men passed within the Church. "There is," he exclaimed, "neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free, but Christ is all, and in all."[4] A religion conscious of being suitable only to particular dates or localities could never have originally aspired to bring within the range of its influence all the varieties of race and thought that are found in the human family. It would feel its unsuitableness to

[1] S. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20.
[2] Baur: Vorlesungen über Neutestamentliche Theologie, p. 131.
[3] Rom. i. 14.
[4] Col. iii. 11; cf. Gal. iii. 28.

some races, to some civilizations, to some historical periods, if not to all. "To make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God,"[1] was an ambition appropriate "to the faith once for all delivered to the Saints."[2]

5. Lastly, if man's religious wants are to be answered, his creed must speak, not merely to his intelligence, but to his heart and will. He cannot really rest upon the most unimpeachable abstractions. He needs something warmer than the truest philosophy. He yearns to come in contact with a heart; and no religion therefore can really satisfy him which does not at least lead him to know and love a person. An unseen Friend, who will purify, and teach, and check, and lead, and sustain him:—this is his great necessity. And this want, this last but deepest want of man's religious life, Christianity has satisfied. As humanity, "sitting in darkness and in the shadow of death," pleads with the Power Whom it feels but cannot see—"Shew Thou me the way that I should walk in, for I lift up my soul unto Thee"—lo! the heavens drop down from above, and the skies pour forth righteousness. And One fairer than the children of men presents Himself to all the centuries and countries of the world with the gracious bidding, "Come unto Me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest."[3]

In the Lectures which are to follow during the succeeding Sundays of Lent, an attempt will be made to insist upon some of the truths which are

[1] Eph. iii. 9. [2] S. Jude 3. [3] S. Matt. xi 28.

most fundamentally related to the soul's religious life, as they come into contact with some forms of modern thought. Of so vast a subject a few fragments are all that, from the nature of the case, can possibly be offered. If we could say all that could be said, such truths must still shade off into the unknown. But we may at least endeavour to trace what we can see of their real outline, to quicken our sense of their positive contents, to deepen our convictions of their absolute and unchanging significance, to enhance the influence which they already exert over our moral natures. It is not well that such topics should be approached with no higher purpose than that of an intellectual enterprise. If we do not mean the cry, "Shew Thou me the way that I should walk in, for I lift up my soul unto Thee," it were better not to enter on the holy ground. Religion must indeed always command the attention of practical men, because it is, at least, one of the most powerful forces, because it shapes the strongest passions, that can govern the conduct of large masses of mankind. It also will ever be interesting to serious thinkers, whether they accept its authority or not; for without controversy it has a word to say upon the highest objects of human thought. But for those who look at it, not only from without but from within, not as a toy of the intellect, but as a necessity of the soul, it must be something more than this. If there be any truth in its teachings at all, if its aspirations be anything more than a waste of heart and effort, lavished through centuries upon what are after all only weird or graceful phantoms of the brain, then nothing that

can occupy our thoughts can really compare with it in point of absorbing and momentous import. Beyond everything else, it must have imperious claims upon the time and thought and working power of every human being who has ever felt, in any serious degree, the unspeakable solemnity of life and death. May God endow us with a sense of this interest in that which binds us to Himself, or may He deepen it; and then, in answer to the longings which it will assuredly foster in every sincere soul, may He this Lent be merciful to us, each and all, and bless us, and shew us the light of His countenance, and be merciful unto us![1]

[1] Ps. lxvii. 1.

LECTURE II.

Second Sunday in Lent.

GOD, THE OBJECT OF RELIGION.

Ps. xlii. 2.

My soul is athirst for God, yea even for the living God: when shall I come to appear before the presence of God?

THERE is scarcely, even in the Psalter, a more touching psalm than this. The Psalmist is probably an exile of the early Assyrian period. In the land of his captivity, he is surrounded by all the institutions of an established idolatry, and, as he sadly reflects, he is far removed from the Holy Home of the race of Israel; from the place which the Lord had chosen to put His name there; from the worship and fellowship of the sacred commonwealth. His thought spans the intervening desert, and he dwells with a full and aching heart on all that lies beyond it. He remembers the festival services in Jerusalem in bygone years, when he went with the "multitude keeping holyday," when he, too, had his share in the "voice of joy and praise." As he calls up in memory this cherished part, he pours out his soul in secret grief; and while the cruel heathen around taunt him with the insulting question, Where is thy God? he can only find refuge in tears; his tears, as he

tells us, flow by day and by night. When will the long years of exile have an end? When will he come to "appear before the presence of God"? He is like the thirsty stag, panting after the distant water-brooks; his inmost being is "athirst for God, yea even for the living God."

"The living God!" What a strange, yet what a pregnant phrase! Surely, the Author of Life must live; yet here is an expression which hints at the idea of deities who are not alive. It was thus that the Hebrews distinguished the true God Who had revealed Himself to their ancestors from the false gods of the nations around them. "As for all the gods of the heathen, they are but idols; but it is the Lord that made the heavens."[1] The heathen deities were so much carving, sculpture, and colouring; or they were so much human imagination or human speculation; they had no being independent of the toil, whether of the hands or of the brains of men. They had no existence in themselves; they did not live, whether men thought about them or not: as we should say, they had no objective existence. It was true that evil spirits, by lurking beneath the idol forms, or draping themselves in the debasing fancies of the heathen world, might contrive to appropriate the homage which the human heart in its darkness lavished upon its own creations; and thus the Canaanites are said, in their cruel Moloch-worship, to have sacrificed their sons and their daughters unto devils.[2] But the broad contrast, latent in the expression "the living God," is the contrast between imagination and fact; between an

[1] Ps. xcvi. 5. [2] Ps. cvi. 37.

Existing Being and a collection of fancy personages; between a solemn truth and a stupid and debasing unreality.

We are not here concerned to inquire what elements of truth there may have been in the forms of heathen worship with which the Jews came into contact.[1] Some truth there certainly was in the most degraded of them; since a religion which is pure undiluted falsehood could not continue to exist as a religion, and the false religions which do exist, only exist by virtue of the elements of truth which in varying proportions they severally contain. The lowest fetichism witnesses to the great truth, that man must go out of himself in order to seek for an adequate object of his heart-felt devotion—of his highest enthusiasms. And no instructed Christian would deny that certain forms of heathenism embrace incidentally the recognition of considerable districts of fundamental truth. If, indeed, as S. Paul says, God teaches all men up to a certain point through nature and conscience,[2] it could not be otherwise; and this intermixture of truth, which is thus latent in all heathenism, affords the best starting-point for convincing heathens of the errors which they admit, and of the truths which they deny beyond.[3] In this

[1] On the "Dispensation of Paganism," see Newman's "Arians of the Fourth Century," pp. 87–91; and the quotation from S. Clem. Alex. Strom. vii. 2. "He (the Word) it is who gives to the Greeks their philosophy. . . . His revelations, both the former and the latter, are drawn forth from one fount; those who were before the Law, not suffered to be without Law; those who do not hear the Jewish philosophy, not surrendered to an unbridled course."

[2] Rom. i. 19, 20.

[3] So S. Clem. Alex. speaks of Greek philosophy as *ὑποβάθραν*

sense, undoubtedly, the science, which has been of late named Comparative Theology, may be made really serviceable to the interests of Christian truth. It is a widely different thing to start with an assumption that all the positive religions in the world, the Jewish and Christian revelations included, are alike conglomerate formations in very varying degrees, partly true and partly false; and that the religion of the future—an etherealized abstraction, to be distilled by science from all the creeds and worships of mankind—will be something beyond, and distinct from all of them. Certainly heathenism is not treated, either in the Old Testament or in the New, with the tenderness which would befit such an anticipation as this. Practically speaking, and as contrasted with the revealed truth, whether Jewish or Christian, heathenism is represented as a lie. To live within its territorial range is to live in the kingdom of darkness;[1] to practise its rites is to be an enemy to God by wicked works;[2] to go after false gods is to have the earnest of great trouble,[3] and to provoke the anger of the real Lord of the Universe. The Assyrian idols did not raise in the exile's mind any question as to the stray elements of truth which might be underlying so much tawdry and impure error. "My soul," he cried, "is athirst for God, yea even for the living God: when shall I come to appear before the presence of God?"

The language of this exile is in truth the language

οὖσαν τῆς κατὰ Χριστὸν φιλοσοφίας.—Strom. vi., qu. by Newman, ubi sup.

[1] Is. lx. 2; 1 Pet. ii. 9.

[2] Col. i. 21.

[3] Ps. lxxviii. 59, 60; cvi. 36-40.

of the human heart, under the stress of the purest and deepest desire that man can know. In this life man is an exile; he is parted from his true home and country; he is the victim of an unconquerable restlessness. This restlessness of the mind—this "wasting fever of the heart" of man—this unwillingness to be satisfied with any earthly good—attracted the attention of ancient thinkers. But they did not understand its secret. They would fain have accounted for it by pointing to some fatal warp or flaw in human nature; or they would have silenced it by the tentative guesses of successive philosophies, moving in cycles which ended in proclaiming that nothing beyond the province of sense is trustworthy; or they would have buried it beneath the cares of business, or the cares of empire, or the grosser attractions of sensual pleasure. But again and again the human heart has protested against these endeavours to crush the noblest of its aspirations; and history again and again has echoed with the cry, "My soul is athirst," not for pleasures which may degrade, nor yet for philosophies which may disappoint, but for the Pure, the Absolute, the Everlasting Being. "My soul is athirst for God: when shall I come to appear before the presence of God?"

Was this cry ever heard more distinctly by those who have ears to hear the voices of the spiritual world than in our own generation? The passion, or, as the Psalmist phrases it, the thirst for God—the strong desire of the soul mounting towards Him with all the agonized earnestness of a disappointed and tortured sense—speaks, not merely or chiefly in

churches and pulpits, but in magazines, in newspapers, in social gatherings, in political assemblies, with a fervour and decision which would have startled the age of George III. The pulse of this desire is felt outside the Christian camp; it quickens the very enthusiasms of error and paradox; often enough, it mistakes friends for foes and foes for friends; but it is generally sincere, vehement, intolerant of trifling and delay. "My soul is athirst for God, yea even for the living God," is the desire of desires; it really underlies and explains all others that are not purely brutal in this Europe, this England of the nineteenth century. Let us see how it fares—this thirst for God—at the hands of some great speculative systems which more particularly challenge attention in the present day.

I.

High in the world of thought, if we determine its place by the intellectual forces which it can at present muster, while we refuse to adopt any truer and worthier rule of measurement, lies the camp of the Materialists. Materialism is sometimes digested into a system; sometimes it is little more than an intellectual tendency. Occasionally it displays the constructive enthusiasm together with the stiff, and, perhaps, pedantic livery of Positivism: more frequently, it is shy of committing itself to definite theories, while it is consistently earnest in resenting all attempts to base knowledge upon anything besides the verdict of sense. It bids us believe what

we can see and smell, and taste and touch; it invites us to make such generalizations as we can out of the report which our senses bring to us. Thus, it assures us, will the mighty universe in which we live reveal itself to us; and we shall learn to perceive in it two, and only two, elements in the last analysis, —a kingdom of matter, that is apparently eternal, unceasingly, infinitely modified by eternal force. How this force and that matter came to be, it knows not: it affirms, as it denies nothing. A philosophy that is positive does not concern itself with the origin of the universe, "if it ever had one," or with what happens to living beings after their death.[1] Of this eternal interfusion of force with matter, man himself is only a ripe and very complex product. There is nothing in him for which his chemistry cannot give an account: his intelligence is exactly proportioned to the mass of his brain: his thought is "but the expression of molecular changes in the physical matter of his life:"[2] his thought is impossible without phosphorus; his consciousness is only a property of matter:[3] his virtue is the result of a current of electricity; his virtue and his vice are strictly due to his natural organization, they are "products in the same sense as are sugar and vitriol." All that he can do, either with himself or with the world around him, is to search out and to register the several qualities of matter, and to number and

[1] Paroles de Philosophie Positive, p. 31, qu. by Bp. Dupanloup.

[2] Fortn. Rev., 1869.

[3] Büchner, Kraft und Stoft, § 122. Ohne Phosphor kein Gedanke, . . . auch das Bewusstsein ist nichts als eine Eigenschaft des Stoffes.

measure the ever-shifting forms of the force which governs it. There may be something beyond matter and force—who knows? But science, which deals only with positive realities, cannot concern herself with, as she does not need, "such an hypothesis" as God. Can God be verified by the senses? Is He not a phantom that belongs properly to the childhood of humanity? Is He not an anachronism in a scientific age?[1] What is He, then, whom men commonly name God? God, says Feuerbach, whose Pantheism is really Materialism, is only "the nature of man regarded as absolute truth;" "that which is given to man's God, is in truth given to man himself;" "what a man declares concerning God, he in truth declares concerning himself;" "the Divine activity is not distinct from the human;" "in God man has only his own activity as an object;" "the mystery of the inexhaustible fulness of the Divine predicates is nothing else than the mystery of human nature considered as an infinitely varied, infinitely modifiable, but consequently phenomenal being."[2] In other words, God does not exist apart from the mind and imagination of man; He is only its creation, and has no rightful place in the region of serious and scientific thought.

This is not, I trust, a misrepresentation of the language of contemporary Materialism: and whatever else may be said of it, this at least is certain, that it does nothing whatever towards satisfying that great desire or "thirst" for communion with

[1] See Conservation, Révolution, Positivisme, p. 70, qu. by Dupanloup, l'Athéisme, p. 70.

[2] Feuerbach, Geist des Christenthums, § 2.

a Higher Being, of which, in his best and highest moods, man is so profoundly conscious. It denies, if not that any such being really exists, at least that we can know Him to be really existing. They who have no satisfaction to offer to a need naturally condemn the demand for one: they who have no answer to give, would rather not be questioned. And yet the religious side of man's nature is a fact of which a philosophy of experience should surely take account. Upon what is man's religious instinct to spend itself in the Materialistic universe? Upon that phantom-god who, as we are told, is only a pale reflection of human vanity? But the soul asks for reality, and cannot occupy itself with a confessed shadow. Upon that eternal flux of self-existent matter? upon that ceaseless activity of self-existing force? But is there anything in mere force or matter, or in both combined, I will not say to satisfy a passion which is purest and strongest in saintly men, but even to have any contact with or relation towards it whatever? How can that which is purely physical touch the sense which appreciates a moral world? It is a merit of Auguste Comte to have recognized the necessity of some answer; and he tells us that it is our privilege and our business to love, reverence, and worship "a Being, immense and eternal—Humanity."[1] Not, mark you, a sinless and Divine representative of the race, such as we Christians adore in the Incarnate Jesus, seated as He is at the right hand of the Father. Not even an idealized abstraction, which, in the pure realms of thought, might conceivably be separated from the weaknesses

[1] Cat. Pos. Int.

and degradations of the sum-total of human flesh and blood. But this very collective human family itself, in all ages and of all conditions, viewed as one organism; this human family, not merely illuminated by its struggles, its sufferings, its victories, but also weighted with its crimes, its brutalities, its deep and hideous degradations. It might be thought that "we men know man too well to care to worship him." Yet, seriously, this is the god who is to supersede the Most Holy Trinity, when Positivism has won its way to empire in European thought. Will he, think you, satisfy the mighty thirst of the human soul? What does this thirst mean but man's endeavour to escape from himself, to rise to an ideal, or rather to a reality above himself, to lose himself in a Being who is greater, wiser, better than himself? Yet here he is bidden, in the name, if without the sanction of the most recent science, to seek the object of his trust and worship within himself, since nothing higher than himself is really cognizable by his understanding. It is clear that teachers who do not believe in a living God must leave one side, and that the highest, of human nature altogether uncared for; since in truth they have nothing to say to it. And history does not smile upon materialistic attempts to bribe the religious yearnings of the soul of man. Atheism could indeed, on one fatal day, throne naked vice as the goddess Reason upon the high altar of a Christian basilica, while an apostate archbishop lent his presence to the hideous ceremony; but it was one thing to obey the interested or sentimental fanaticism of the Jacobin Clubs, and quite another per-

manently to control the heart and convictions even of the Voltairianized multitudes of Paris.[1] The realities of religion might have been hated; but this godless parody of worship could only provoke a languid contempt.

II.

Against Materialism, in all its forms, the common sense of man, not to speak of his religious instinct, will ever protest. The idea or presentiment of God, everywhere rooted in the mind of man, is a fact sufficiently important to be treated as something better than a superstition by those who put forward any serious doctrine about human nature. A mental fact is as worthy of attention as any fact which can be appraised in a chemical laboratory or on the roof of an observatory. Cicero's statement[2] that there is no nation so barbarous and wild as not to have

[1] Pressensé, L'Eglise et la Révolution Française, p. 280. "Il ne resta de ce jour que le souvenir d'une stupide parodie qui vengeait à elle seule la religion sainte que l'on avait voulu fouler aux pieds. C'est en vain que pour ranimer la ferveur on remplaça à Paris et dans les départements les actrices par les prostituées. L'ennui et le dégoût frappèrent le nouveau culte dès ses débuts.

[2] Cic. de Legibus, i. 8. Itaque ex tot generibus nullum est animal præter hominem quod habeat notitiam aliquam dei: ipsisque in hominibus nulla gens est neque tam immansueta neque tam fera, quæ non, etiam si ignorat qualem habere deum deceat, tamen habendum sciat. Tuscul. Disput., i. 13. Ut porro firmissimum hoc afferri videtur, cur deos esse credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit deorum opinio:—multi de diis prava sentiunt (id enim vitioso more effici solet); omnes tamen esse vim et naturam divinam arbitrantur: nec vero id colloeutio hominum aut consensus effecit; non institutis opinio est confirmata, non legibus. Omni autem in re consentio omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est.

believed in some divinity, is still, notwithstanding certain apparent exceptions, true. A nation of pure Atheists is yet to be discovered.[1] Unworthy and degraded as are many of the beliefs on the subject of a Higher Power that are to be found in the heathen world, some groping after the Great Unseen, some tentative intuition, some shadowy belief there is to be found always and everywhere. Man thinks of a Higher Power as naturally as he thinks of the world around him, or of himself. Nay, he thinks of Truth; and truth is no mere abstraction; it is a Real Being; it is God.[2] He thinks of the Infinite, says Fenelon, as he thinks of the circle, of the line, of the distinction between whole and part.[3] The spontaneous activity of his consciousness brings with it, contains in itself, the thought of One who is greater, if not also stronger, wiser, better than all else; and

[1] Cf. Diderot, Philosophie des Canadiens. Œuvres, I. p. 433. Max Müller, "Chips from a German Workshop." "There is perhaps no race of men so low and degraded as the Papuas. It has frequently been asserted that they have no religion at all, and yet these same Papuas, if they want to know whether what they are going to undertake is right or wrong, squat before their karwar, clasp the hands over the forehead, and bow repeatedly, at the same time stating their intentions. If they are seized with any nervous feeling during this time, it is considered as a bad sign, and the project is abandoned for a time; if otherwise, the idol is supposed to approve. Here we have but to translate what they in their helpless language call 'nervous feeling' by our word 'conscience,' and we shall not only understand what they really mean, but confess, perhaps, that it would be well for us if, in our own hearts, the karwar occupied the same prominent place which it occupies in the cottage of every Papua."

[2] Plat. Repub. vii. 517.

[3] De l'existence de Dieu, 1ere partie, p. 60. L'idée de l'infini est en moi comme celle des nombres, des lignes, des cercles, d'un tout et d'une partie. Changer nos idées ce serait anéantir la raison même.

that man should in all ages and everywhere thus think of Him, is of itself a presumption that He really exists.[1] This instinctive perception and affirmation of God is not indeed merely an act of the intellect; it is also, as will be insisted on presently, perhaps it is chiefly, an act of the moral sense, an act of the conscience. It is that upward attraction of the soul upon which Plato dilates;[2] it is the universal hypothesis which Aristotle registers;[3] it is the world-wide prejudice of Epicurus; it is the "anticipation" naturally imbedded in the human mind, of Cicero.[4]

[1] The *ontological* "argument" for the existence of God is stated in varying degrees of completeness by S. Augustine, Boethius, S. Anselm, and Descartes. To cite the two last; S. Ans. Proslog. 2, convincitur etiam insipiens (Ps. xiv. 1) esse vel in intellectu aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari potest. Et certè id quo majus cogitari nequit non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re quod majus est. Si ergo id quo majus cogitari non potest est in intellectu; id ipsum, quo majus cogitari non potest est quo majus cogitari potest: sed certè hoc esse non potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re. Descartes observes (Medit. de Prim. Philos. 3, 4, sub fin.) "notiones nostras esse aut adventitias, aut factitias, aut innatas. Ideam de Deo non esse adventitiam, Deum enim non experientiâ duce reperiri; neque factitiam, nam non arbitrio a nobis effictam esse; ergo esse innatam, sive a Deo ipso nobis suppeditatam." This is undoubtedly the weakest of the arguments for God's existence; but its real value should not be mistaken on account of the facility with which it lends itself to the Hegelian doctrine that "God is only God in so far as He has knowledge of Himself; but His self-knowledge is 'scin selbst bewusstseyn in Menschen und das Wissen des Menschen von Gott'" (Encycl. p. 576, qu. by Grimm).

[2] Cf. the whole passage in Plato, de Legibus, ix. x. 899, c. d. e., qu. by Staudenmaier, Dogm. II. 22.

[3] Arist. de Cœlo, 1–3. *πάντες γὰρ ἄνθρωποι περὶ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ὑπόληψιν, καὶ πάντες τὸν ἀνωτάτω τῷ θείῳ τόπον ἀποδιδόασι.* Referred to by Staudenmaier, ubi sup.

[4] Cic. de Nat. Deorum, i. 16. Solus enim vidit [Epicurus] primum esse deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem

It precedes demonstration; it is out of the reach of criticism; it resists hostile argument. It is, speaking philosophically, a fact in psychological science, and a fact so fruitful and stimulating, that to it must be traced all in human life and effort that looks really upward,—man's love of truth, his clinging to a coming life, his aspirations to rise above the level of an animal existence. It is, speaking religiously, in its way, a revelation; it is a revelation of God within, as S. Paul says, answering to the revelation of God from without; it sets man's thought in motion as he gazes upon the natural world, and bids him not to rest until he has wrung from it a disclosure of the highest truth which it has to teach him.

And thus, with this preparatory idea or intuition of a Divinity, the human mind approaches what are called the proofs of God's existence. Looking out upon the universe around it, the mind seeks for its productive cause.[1] Whatever efforts may have been

impressisset ipsa natura. Quæ est enim gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrinâ anticipationem quandam deorum? quam appellat προλῆψιν Epicurus, id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine quâ nec intelligi quidquam, nec quæri, nec disputari potest. Cujus rationis vim atque utilitatem ex illo cœlesti Epicuri de regulâ et judicio volumine accepimus.

[1] The *cosmological* proof of God's existence is stated with great beauty and variety of illustration by Fenelon, Traité de l'existence et des Attributs de Dieu, c. 1, 2. To the original form of the argument which, looking upon the world as an effect, seeks for its cause, Leibnitz adds a second, based upon the *contingent* nature of the world and its several parts, which obliges us to seek in the πρῶτον κινοῦν, or First Cause, the Unchanging and intrinsically Necessary Being. This Necessary Being is not, as Strauss says, the "ewiges Grundwesen der Welt," or the permanent material of the universe, as distinct from its ever-changing forms; because the necessity of seeking

made by recent writers to reduce causation to mere antecedence, the law of causation is at once a primary law of human thought and of the world without us.[1] What cause, what force, preceded and brought into existence this universe? All the causes with which we come in contact here, are, as we term them, second causes; but they point to a cause beyond themselves, to a cause of causes, to a supreme all-producing Cause, Itself uncaused, unoriginated. The heavenly bodies move on unceasingly in their orbits, obedient to the laws of gravitation, but no law of gravitation could have assigned them their place in space.[2] The whole universe bids us look beyond itself for the adequate explanation of its existence. "So far is it from being true," says Lord Bacon, "that the explanation of phenomena by natural causes leads us away from God and His Providence, that those philosophers who have passed their lives in discovering such causes can find nothing that affords a final explanation without having recourse to God and His Providence."[3] The father of the inductive philosophy does but speak the common

a first cause obliges us to go beyond the universe, which, as a whole, is an effect. On the other hand, the cosmological argument does not of itself lead us to a moral God, such as would satisfy the instincts of piety—the "thirst" of the soul.

[1] Cf. M'Cosh, "Method of the Divine Government," Appendices III. and IV.

[2] Newton, Philos. Nat. Princip. L. III. schol. gen. Perseverabunt quidem in orbibus suis per leges gravitatis, sed regularem orbium situm primitus acquirere per has leges minimè potuerunt.

[3] De Augm. Scient. iii. 4. Adeo ut tantum absit ut causæ physicæ hominem à Deo et Providentiâ abducant, ut contra potiùs philosophi illi qui in iisdem eruendis occupati fuerunt, nullum exitum rei reperiant, nisi postremò ad Deum et providentiam confugiant.

sense of religion; but will it be maintained, except by writers who are prepared to deny the existence of causation, that he does not also utter the common sense of scientific thought?

Does the universe tell us anything as to the nature of its First Cause? Surely we may at least presume that the Author of the natural world must be higher and greater than anything in the natural world.[1] Water will not rise above its source; and it is inconceivable that, if there be an Author of nature at all, His Self-existent Life must not be higher and nobler than any life which He has bestowed. Who does not see the force of the Psalmist's argument, "He that made the ear, shall He not hear? and He that gave the eye, shall He not see?"[2] Above the life of the tree, there is that of the animal; above that of the animal, there is the life of man. Man, with all his ingenuity and will, cannot produce a leaf or a shell-fish: and is it to be supposed that the author of man's life is less endowed with thought and volition than man? We may paraphrase the Psalmist: "He that made the human intellect, shall He not think?" And how came the intellect to exist, if He did not make it?[3] There are chasms in the

[1] That the one true God may be known from His works in Nature is taught, as against Gentile idolatry, in Isaiah xliv.; xlv. 18, *sqq.*; Acts xiv. 15–17; xvii. 22, *sqq.*; Rom. i. 19, 20. That the natural world witnesses to the beauty of His Being and Attributes is implied in Psalms viii. 2–4; xix. 1, *sqq.*; civ., passim, &c. Holy Scripture, of course, does not demonstrate the existence of Him Whose true Nature it unveils; but it points to the natural world as having in trust for all reasoning beings the privilege and the responsibility of some knowledge of its Author's existence, and of His character.

[2] Ps. xciv. 9.

[3] Bossuet, Œuv. i. 79. Si nous étions tous seuls intelligents

natural world which no theories substituting a fated self-development for the free action of God will really bridge over. There is the chasm between the inorganic and the organic; the chasm between the lifeless and that which lives; the chasm between animal instinct and the reflective consciousness. At each of these levels of creation we seem to feel more sensibly than elsewhere the fresh intervention of a creating Intelligence; and our conviction of His activity is strengthened when we observe the interdependence and harmony of the universe as a whole, in which each part is necessary, in which nothing is really out of place, and between the several elements of which new relations are continually coming to light, as if to justify His foresight and to enhance our estimate of His inexhaustible resources.[1] "Those

dans le monde, nous seuls nous vaudrions mieux avec notre intelligence imparfaite, que toute la reste, qui serait tout-a-fait brute et stupide, et on ne pourrait comprehendre d'ou viendrait dans ce tout qui n'entend pas cette partie qui entend, l'intelligence ne pouvant nâitre d'une chose brute et insensée.

[1] The *teleological* argument for the existence of God, which sees a purpose in the forces and laws of the natural world, and in the events of human history, has been chiefly discredited in modern times by the popular supposition that modern attacks upon the doctrine of final causes have been finally successful. For a partial and popular consideration of some recent objections to Final Causes, urged by Mr. Herbert Spencer, Mr. Lewes, and others, cf. M'Cosh, Christianity and Positivism, pp. 78–88. Even if a doctrine of evolution should in time be accepted as scientifically, and so theologically certain, such a doctrine would not be inconsistent either with that belief in the original act of creation which is essential to Theism, or with "the recognition of plan and purpose in the number and variety of animated beings." "Evolution," from a Theistic point of view, is merely our way of describing what we can observe of God's continuous action upon the physical world; and because the phrase seems tacitly or poetically to invest the universe with a power of self-unfolding, it does not follow that the question of

persons," says Montesquieu, "who maintain that a blind fate has produced all the effects we see in the world, maintain that which is a great absurdity; for what absurdity can be greater than a blind fate producing intelligent beings?"[1] How do you know, a Bedouin was asked, that there is a God? "In the same way," he replied, "that I know, on looking at the sand, when a man or a beast has crossed the desert —by His footprints in the world around me."

III.

Thus does the common sense or reason of man lead him up to recognizing One Supreme Intelligence as at least the original cause of all that he is and sees around him. But then the question arises, what is the relation that actually subsists between this Highest Intelligence and the universe? To this question there are two leading answers.

The Deist so far agrees with the Christian, as to admit that God is related to the world as its Creator; and that He must have made it out of nothing by the fiat of His Will. But with this admission—momentous as it is—the old Deism practically closes its account of God's free personal action upon His work. Since the creation, God's action is represented as being practically superseded by a system of unchangeable routine; and this routine is conceived to be so strictly invariable, as to bind the liberty of the presumed Agent. The Deistic theory of the universe

an Intelligent Creator and Ruler is thereby decided in the negative by those who employ it.

[1] Esprit des Lois. Cf. Ps. xiv. 1.

might remind us of the relations which, at least until some very recent events, were understood to exist between the Government of Egypt and the Sublime Porte. There was occasionally a formal recognition of the sovereign power on the part of the nominal dependency, but Egypt was governed by a practically independent Viceroy; the Suzerain's name was mentioned rarely, or only in a formal way; his active influence would have been at once resented, the real power being lodged elsewhere. According to the old Deism, God created the world; but He cannot be supposed ever to interfere with the ordinary laws of its government. He cannot work miracles; He is, in no tangible sense, a Providence. He is well out of the way of active human interests: it is not to be supposed that He can hear the prayer of a worm writhing on one of His planets; that the happiness or misfortunes of a larger sort of animalculæ can give Him any real concern. So He is throned by the Deistic writer in magnificent inactivity at a very remote corner of the universe, while a new power has practically taken His place.

In the last century, at the first great outburst of Deistic thought, Nature practically superseded God. Men talked and wrote persistently about the laws of Nature, the moods of Nature, the religion of Nature: Nature was so vividly and constantly personified in conversation and in literature, that the European world might be supposed to have lighted upon a new goddess, charged, in a very special sense, with the interests of humanity. We live in a more positive and realistic age; and where our fathers

talked of Nature, modern Deism names "laws." What is lost in picturesqueness is gained in truth. There is no such person as Nature; but there are observable modes of the Divine activity, which may never vary within the experience of a race. Order is, as Christians know, a characteristic of all God's works; but He, the Almighty, is so little enslaved by the rules which He freely observes, that moment by moment He wills the very order that seems to bind His liberty. Deism, however, really means by "laws"—forces which have become somehow independent of God; fatal forces, which defy His power to innovate upon their resistless play. But what can this impotent Deistic god, from whose control his universe has so escaped as to constitute itself a self-governing machine,—say or do to meet the aspirations, or to relieve the despondencies of the human soul? If we cannot love and trust volcanic forces, or vital forces, the laws of growth or the laws of decomposition; can we love and trust a being who has left this universe to itself; who surveys it, if he does survey it, in the cynicism of an unbroken silence from a very distant throne; to whom its vast oceans of hope and fear, and struggle and disappointment, and triumph and failure—all the mysteries of its moral life,—are of no more concern than they are to the rocks and seas around us? No, the god of Deism does not quench the religious thirst of the soul. The soul of man seeks the Living God, not a deity who is as remote from human interests as was the Jupiter of expiring Paganism.

The French Revolution was fertile in religious or

irreligious experiments; and as it endeavoured to satisfy the human soul with Atheism, so it made yet more strenuous effort to satisfy it with Deism.[1] Robespierre had publicly declared that Chaumette deserved death for the abomination which accompanied the Feast of Reason in Notre Dame, on November 7, 1793; and he took a leading part in the Feast of the Supreme Being, which was celebrated in the gardens of the Tuileries and in the Champ de Mars, on June 9, 1794. The Convention

[1] So Alison. Compare Pressensé, l'Église et la Révolution, p. 294. La fête eut lieu le 20 prairial. Rien n'avait été épargné pour la rendre grandiose et cependant elle n'évita pas les puérilités ridicules. Robespierre, président de la Convention, en bel habit bleu, avec un bouquet de fruits et d'épis dans les mains, prit place avec tous ses collègues sur l'amphithéâtre élevé au milieu des Tuileries. Après un pompeux discours, il en descendit pour incendier la statue de l'Athéisme, promptement remplacée par celle de la Sagesse qui parut malheureusement très enfumée. Des Tuileries la Convention se rendit au Champ de Mars, entourée et comme enlacée d'un ruban tricolore, que portaient des enfants ornés de violettes, des adolescents ceints de myrtes, des hommes d'âge mûr couronnés de feuilles de chênes et des vieillards parés de pampre et d'olivier. Un char bucolique chargé d'instruments aratoires suivait la Convention, traîné par les inévitables bœufs à cornes dorées et suivi par les non moins inévitables jeunes filles en blanc. Au Champ de Mars la Convention se plaça sur une montagne artificielle, monument flatteur pour les députés de la majorité. Le président pérora, les jeunes filles chantèrent, les vieillards donnèrent leur bénédiction, les canons tonnèrent et tout se termina par le cri de *vive la République*. Ces pompes d'opéra comique, ces symboles ridicules et ces rites glacés apprenaient à la France qu'il est plus facile de décréter un changement de religion que de l'opérer. Jamais le déisme ne fondera un culte et tout ce qu'il essayera dans ce genre tombera sous la risée publique. La fête fut trouvée bien longue, surtout pour ceux qu'irritait le rôle prépondérant de Robespierre. On raconte qu'un représentant moins patient que ses collègues lui dit en termes d'une trivialité énergique: "Tu commences à nous ennuyer avec ton Être Suprême."

decreed that he should discharge the duties of Supreme Pontiff on the occasion. The Deism of Robespierre was sufficiently vivid to admit of his believing that God does rule the affairs of men; he maintained with particular earnestness that God hates kings and priests. The undeniable eloquence of the president of the Convention, the art and industry of the painter David, the music, the costumes, the political enthusiasm at fever height, did all that could be done for the success of the festival. But you cannot lash a multitude into devotion to a remote and hypothetical abstraction by any elaborate display of ceremonial; and the real deity of the occasion was Robespierre. As he marched along, overshadowed with his plumes, and adorned with his tricolor scarf, while the air resounded with cries of "Vive Robespierre," his countenance, says the historian, was radiant with joy. "See how they applaud him," said his colleagues. "He would become a god: he is no longer the High Priest of the Supreme Being." History does not ascribe to this attempt any special efficacy in reviving among the French people a sense of their duties towards their forgotten Maker. The most tangible result of the day was the decree proposed by Couthon, for increasing the powers of the Revolutionary Tribunal.

To the question, What is the relation between the universe and the Supreme Intelligence? another and a very different answer has been given. If Deism practically banishes God from the world, Pantheism, at least, sees what it calls God every-

where, and in everything.[1] The Pantheistic god is the common principle which not only is held to constitute the unity of, but which is, the universe. According to Benedict Spinoza,[2] God is the one eternal substance, which makes its appearance in the twofold realm of thought and of matter. Out of it all individual forms of existence are constantly emerging, and like waves upon the ocean, they are as constantly sinking back into, and being absorbed by it, as the common stream of universal life. God alone is, says Fichte, and apart from Him is nothing,[3] —a great truth in one sense, and a great falsehood in another. Hegel teaches that the Absolute is the universal reason; which, after having buried and lost itself in nature, recovers itself in man, in the shape of self-conscious thought. Man's thought of God, therefore, is the true God, the only existing God. God exists only in human thought; human thought is the reason of nature arriving at self-consciousness. Man thinks of God, and, in man's thinking, God exists; He has no independent or personal existence.[4]

The great attraction and strength of Pantheism lies in the satisfaction which it professes to offer to

[1] Wegscheider, Inst. p. 240. Pantheismus—ea sententia quâ naturam divinam mundo supponant et Deum ac mundum unum idemque esse statuunt.

[2] Cf. Tractat. de Deo. c. 2. Suppl. ad. opp. Amst. 1862. For his Theory of Substance, cf. Ethic, p. 1, Def. 5.

[3] Fichte, Von Sel. Leben, § 143.

[4] Hegel's fundamental error consists in his identification of the "abstract thought" of man with the "Absolute Thought." Fichte (Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Bd. 17, § 292) says that this is "nicht nür höchst willkurlich und grundlos, sondern eine contradictio in adjecto." Qu. by Hettinger; cf. Hegel, Phil. der Rel. §§ 207, 261, 263; Encycl. § 56.

one very deep and legitimate aspiration; it endeavours to assure man of his real union with the source of his own and of the universal life. It is this profound idea, this most fascinating allurement, that can alone explain the empire, which, in various ages and under various forms, Pantheism has wielded in human history. It inspires Eleatic and Indian philosophies; it is the animating principle of such worship of the generative and life-sustaining powers in nature, as was, for instance, that of the Phœnician Baalim. Since Lessing, Spinoza has almost reigned in certain districts of cultivated Europe, and Germany is by no means the only home of the thought of Schelling and of Hegel. In its later forms Pantheism is, speaking historically, a reaction from and a protest against the older Rationalistic Deism. It often represents a noble plea that God shall not be banished by modern thought from all real contact with humanity: nay, it would fain essay to do in its way what the Divine Incarnation has actually done; it would make men partakers of the Divine Nature. And this, its religious aim, is beyond question a main secret of its power.

Yet does the Pantheistic deity afford any real satisfaction to the needs of the soul of man? Can he be the object of any serious religious effort whatever? What is there in him to which the life of religion can possibly attach itself? He is not a person: for Pantheism necessarily denies the existence of personality. He is not a cause: for Pantheism cannot tolerate any doctrine of causation. He is not even, as the Absolute Substance, in anywise distinct from phenomena; for while it is loyal

to its central position, Pantheism cannot afford to admit the correctness of such a distinction. What is he then? He is only a fine name for the universe. He has no existence apart from it: he is the universal life, of which you and I are transient manifestations or forms. You may indeed encounter him draped and veiled in a phraseology so reverent and tender, that it might seem to have been borrowed from the inmost shrines of Christian mysticism; but when you force yourself to look at the hard reality beneath, you find that it is practically identical with that presented by Materialism.[1] If God be in reality only the spirit or life of the universe, how can He provoke the yearnings of the soul, or how satisfy its aspirations? How can He be the object, whether of religious homage, or of religious trust? How can we yield love, obedience, worship to a mere torrent of existence that flows onwards inexorably beneath our feet; we, the ripples, who do but rise upon its surface to sink away after our little moment of undulation? Or how can a sensible and modest man love, trust, worship, his own self-consciousness, under the idea that in each reflecting mind God has become conscious of Himself? Nay, if religion has anything to do with reverence for goodness and with abhorrence of moral evil, if it is not a sentiment that has been rendered by modern speculation wholly independent of moral truth, how can we worship either an inner self into which, as we must each of us know, evil penetrates so con-

[1] Strauss, Gl. 1, § 517. Seine Existenz als wesen ist unser denken von ihm; aber seine reale Existenz ist die Natur, zu welcher das einzelne Denkende als Moment gehört

stantly and so pervadingly; or a universal life of which in its highest, that is its human, manifestation, evil is, as a matter of fact, more frequently an accompaniment than good? How, I say, can such an absolute principle be the object of religion, if its activity be manifested not less truly in murder and lust than in heroism and unselfishness; if the darkest forms of evil stand to it in a relation just as necessary as do the highest forms of good; if by it, in a word, all moral distinctions whatever are really annihilated?

Between Pantheism and an earnest hatred of moral evil there is accordingly a necessary opposition, and this reason alone establishes a permanent divorce between it and any true effort at communion with the All-Pure, such as all that is best in us enjoins. But further, that which in a Christian, as in any earnest Theist, makes Pantheism impossible, is the first article of his creed: "I believe in God the Father Almighty, *Maker* of heaven and earth." As the act of creation was not witnessed, so it cannot be demonstrated. "By faith we understand that the worlds were made by the word of God."[1] Creation

[1] Heb. xi. 3. That God created the universe is the first truth which Scripture teaches us about Him, Gen. i. 1. Cf. Job xxxviii. 4–7; Ps. xxxiii. 6–9, thus revealing His majestic beauty; Ps. xix. 1–7; xcvii. 1–6; cxix. 64. The Jews knew that this creation involved not merely the bringing order and life, ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης, Wisd. xi. 17, but also originally the calling this formless material itself into being, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, 2 Mac. vii. 28. In the New Testament, creation is generally referred to as furnishing arguments for moral truths or duties; as by our Lord, Matt. xix. 4–6, for its witness to the indissolubility of the marriage tie; and by S. Paul, as yielding proof of God's real relation to the world, Acts xvii. 24; or of His interest in the whole human family, and of our duty of seeking Him, *ib*

interposes an immeasurable chasm between the Creator and the creature; between that Pure and Awful Life Which is indebted to none else either for existence or for support, and this life of dependence, weakness, corruption. And belief in creation is a necessary outwork of any true theism whatever: deny creation and you deny God. If God in His unfettered freedom did not summon into existence all that is, if the universe escaped from Him against His will, He is not alone the Omnipotent: if anything that we term matter or spirit has from the beginning co-existed side by side with Him, He is not alone the Eternal.[1] The difficulty is not met

26; for the refutation of a false dualistic asceticism, 1 Tim. iv. 3; cf. Eph. iv. 6. That He has created all things and for Himself is His title to praise and adoration, Rev. iv. 11. Although the New Testament does not in express terms speak of creation out of nothing, it implies this truth. S. Paul's arguments in Acts xvii. 24, and 1 Tim. iv. 3, would lose their force, if it were true that God was not the maker of matter as well as the artist who gave it form, while the doxology of Rev. iv. 11 could not be truthfully addressed to a Being who had not created matter, or who had formed anything out of a pre-existent material which he did not create. The ἄμορφος ὕλη of S. Justin Martyr (Apol. i. 10), and even the ὕλη ἄχρονος of Clement (Phot. Bibl. cod. 109) is not necessarily eternal; the creation of matter out of nothing, and of the world out of matter, were distinct events, separated by intervals that distance all human thought. Tertullian pointed out that Hermogenes, in teaching the eternity of matter, was really a Ditheist (Adv. Herm. c. 4.) The general teaching of the ancient church is expressed by S. Augustine (De fid. et symb. c. 2): Credimus omnia Deum fecisse de nihilo, quia, etiamsi de aliquâ materiâ factus est mundus, eadem ipsa materia de nihilo facta est, ut ordinatissimo Dei munere primo capacitas formarum fieret, ac deinde formarentur quæcunque formata sunt. Hoc autem diximus, ne quis existimet contrarias sibi esse Scripturarum sententias: quoniam et omnia Deum fecisse de nihilo scriptum est, et mundum esse factum de informi materiâ.

[1] Cf. S. Aug. Conf. xii. 7. Fecisti cœlum et terram non de

by phrases about the eternal Idea passing into reality; since it will be asked how such a passage could have been effected, or rather, why it should have taken place at all? A creative Will having no limits to its power, is at least intelligible, but the mind refuses to dwell seriously on such a process as a transmutation of thought into matter. In its attempt to explain itself, Pantheism practically sinks back into Materialism; it has no expedients equal to the task of saving its god from burial beneath the materialistic chaos of matter and force.

Will it be said that to believe in a Creator-God is to close the eye to the presence of God in creation? But who that believes in the Omnipresent can limit His presence? Is not the original act of creation a warrant for the Creator's continued presence with and action upon His work?[1] The Apostle who taught the Athenians that God made the world and all things therein, taught them also, and in the same great sermon, that "He is not far from every one of us, for in Him we live and move and have our being."[2] To assert God's presence in His works is one thing; to identify Him with them is another. His omnipresence is a necessary attribute of His Deity; while if He could be identified with nature He would cease to be. If the mystery of life, which attests God's presence in the natural world, was ever felt in all its awe and its beauty by any human soul,

Te, nam esset æquale Unigenito Tuo, et aliud præter Te non erat, unde faceres, ideo de nihilo fecisti cœlum et terram. S. Iren. Hær. ii. 10, 4. Homines quidem de nihilo non possunt aliquid facere, sed de materiâ subjacente: Deus autem materiam fabricationis suæ, cum ante non esset, ipse adinvenit.

[1] S. John v. 17. [2] Acts xvii. 27, 28.

it was felt by the great Augustine. Witness the often quoted passage of the Confessions in which he tells us why nature was in his eyes so beautiful, by telling us how nature had led him up to God. "I asked the earth, and it said: 'I am not He;' and all that is upon it made the same confession. I asked the sea and the depths, and the creeping things that have life, and they answered: 'We are not thy God; look thou above us.' I asked the breezes and the gales; and the whole air, with its inhabitants, said to me: 'Anaximenes is in error, I am not God.' I asked the heaven, the sun, the moon, the stars: 'We too,' said they, 'are not the God Whom thou seekest.' And I said to all the creatures that surrounded the doors of my fleshly senses, 'Ye have said to me of my God that ye are not He; tell me somewhat of Him.' And with a great voice, they exclaimed 'He made us.'"[1]

IV.

So long as the human mind only conceives of God as a Supreme Intelligence, it will oscillate hesitatingly between these two errors; between a sterile Deism which banishes God from the world, and a

[1] S. Aug. Conf. x. 6. Interrogavi terram et dixit: non sum; et quæcumque in eâdem sunt idem confessa sunt. Interrogavi mare et abyssos et reptilia animarum vivarum, et responderunt: Non sumus Deus tuus, quære super nos. Interrogavi auras flabiles, et inquit universus aër cum incolis suis: Fallitur Anaximenes, non sum Deus. Interrogavi cœlum, solem, lunam, stellas: Neque nos sumus Deus quem quæris, inquiunt. Et dixi omnibus iis quæ circumstant fores carnis meæ: Dixistis mihi de Deo meo quod vos non estis, dicite mihi de illo aliquid. Et exclamaverunt voce magnâ: Ipse fecit nos.

reactionary Pantheism which buries Him in it. It is when we gain a height beyond, and observe the third great form of argument with which man clothes and fortifies his presentiment of God, that we are saved from this liability. Here a view of God's Nature opens out upon us, which is at once conservative of His moral Purity and distinctness from created life, and also does justice to the intimacy of His contact with the world and with humanity.

The philosopher of Konigsberg, who in his Critique of Pure Reason has made the most of some well-known objections against those arguments for God's existence, which are drawn from the existence and structure of the universe,[1] insists with great force upon the strength of the inference by which the human conscience ascends to the recognition of God. If Kant is a sceptic in the domain of speculative thought, his doubts vanish altogether when, entering that of the practical reason, as he terms it, he listens to the commands of moral truth.[2] This practical reason is wholly independent of any discovery or decision external to itself: it apprehends the good as such without waiting for the judgment of experience. Its commands are issued without limit or reserve; they have an objective certainty; they "judge all things, while they themselves are judged of no man." They lead us to recognize as necessary truths, first, the freedom of man's will; next, a future life; thirdly, the existence of God. The voice of the practical reason, "Thou oughtest," implies "Thou

[1] Luthardt, Apologet. Vortr. L. iii. Scholten, Phil. in Rel. p. 100.

[2] Kritik d. reinen Vernunft, Abt. ii. B. 2, kap. 3, §§4, 5, 6.

canst"; the categorical imperative is meaningless in the absence of moral freedom. Man is free, and his conscience perpetually affirms that he must do good at all costs, even although doing good should not make him happy. It affirms no less clearly that if he is really virtuous he should be happy. Yet, in the experience of life, the good man who does good is often unhappy, while vice is not unfrequently salaried and crowned with rewards that are denied to virtue. The sight of this contradiction forces the conscience to infer a life to come, and a Moral Being Who, in His justice, will re-establish those relations between happiness and virtue which it persistently recognizes as necessary. Thus the practical reason reaches God, not by a demonstration of His existence, but as a postulate of its own activity. Speculation may mislead, but duty is a certainty; and duty is no arbitrary creation either of our reason, or of our self-interest; it is not an abstraction which rests on nothing beyond itself; it is out of the reach of merely speculative criticism, yet it leads us to the Master of the moral world. Those clear, precise, categorical orders which are imposed in varying degrees of urgency upon all human wills, point to a really living Ruler of men, in Whom man cannot disbelieve without doing violence to himself. Certainly Kant would have had little patience with the theory that conscience itself is only a collection of prejudices received from childhood, and incorporated with the moral life; that it is simply the result of early training, and has no real basis in the soul. For this theory confuses the furniture of the conscience with the conscience itself; the acquisitions of a

faculty with its existence. It might be contended with equal justice that the human mind does not exist because it is developed by exercise, and enlarged by information.[1] Certainly conscience may be enlightened or it may be misinformed by education. But the original faculty which perceives the existence of some right and of some wrong, whatever may be apprehended as such, and which refers actions to such right and wrong; the faculty which under all circumstances pronounces in favour of truth, and justice, and self-sacrifice, and courage, and purity, wherever these can be found, because it intuitively perceives their necessary excellence;—this faculty demands God. Conscience is unsatisfied, according to Kant, unless there exists some Being above the world, Who can hereafter reconcile the discrepancies which exist between virtue and fortune in this present life, in His quality of an arbiter of human conduct. Here Atheism, especially in its Positivist guise, pleads the disinterestedness of real virtue, which is good and does good for the sake of goodness, seeking no reward, and daunted by no misfortune.[2] But when Kant maintains that there must be a moral God, he does this not in the interests of a mercenary virtue, but in those of an absolute and consummate justice, which proclaims in every human conscience the necessity of establishing some harmony or correspondence between the conditions

[1] Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, pp. 462–491, ed. Rosenkranz. Sämmtt. Werke, 2er Theil. These criticisms are discussed by Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit. Bd. ii. p. 46, *sqq.* Philosophie der Vorzeit, ii. diss. 9, 1.

[2] Cf. too Strauss Glaubensl. 1, 393, qu. by Luthardt, Lect. III., whom I here follow.

of human existence on the one hand, and man's demerits or deserts on the other.

Thus it is that conscience demands God; and the atheistic whisper in the fool's heart of which the Psalmist speaks, belongs in truth to moral rather than to intellectual folly. It is ultimately traceable to a failure to perceive and feel the mighty and abiding contrast which exists between moral good and moral evil, and the necessary bearing of this contrast upon the ultimate destinies of the universe. In a good man, belief in God results from belief in the invincibility of good; the intensity or feebleness of a man's belief in God is a spiritual thermometer, whereby the temperature of his moral being may be pretty accurately measured. When the moral sensibilities are weakened or blunted by culpable indulgence until known sin is tolerable or even welcome, then the intellect is always open to theories which represent good and evil as alike forms of the Universal Life, or as equally fatal results of that "unreasoning and irresistible piece of machinery which we name the Universe." But although the human conscience is an earnest theistic apologist in exact proportion to its vitality, its affirmation of God should not be divorced from the intellectual inferences which the universe suggests to us. The evidential strength of Theism, like that of Christianity, lies not in any single proof, but in the collective force of the various evidences which are producible in its favour; and of these, the cry of conscience, if the strongest practically, is, after all, only one. Nor does it follow that because conscience is a true guide towards the throne of a

Living and a Moral God, it is therefore an infallible judge in reviewing all that He may reveal to us about Himself or the laws of His government. We may reasonably accept the witness of the universal conscience of good men in favour of Theism, without binding ourselves to accept all that has been pleaded by individuals in the name of conscience against portions of the Jewish history, for example, or the doctrine of the Atonement. If it be urged from another side that it is after all "the conscience of fallen man upon which we rely for this great affirmation of God," the reply is, that the Fall cannot have destroyed our powers of apprehending truth, or it would have destroyed our responsibility, and that it is not the weakness which the Fall has wrought in human nature, but the strength which still survives it, whereby man affirms the existence of a Moral God and seeks Him. So far as man is a fallen being, no doubt, at the approach of the Lord God, he "hides himself amid the trees of the garden," to the end of time. But those truth-seeking elements of his spiritual nature which, as the Christian creed teaches, were in Paradise invigorated by a robe of supernatural grace, afterwards forfeited by the sin of our first parents, are throughout heathendom still kindled into activity by the prevenient grace of the Holy Spirit, breathing as He wills across the deserts; and thus fallen man seeks the Lord, if haply he might feel after Him and find Him, though He be not far from every one of us,[1] instinctively assured, as all good men must be, of His existence, and hoping that He may be fully unveiled at last.

[1] Acts xvii. 27.

Yet the feebleness of conscience in fallen man is a fact of significance. Although conscience seeks in God, not merely, as does intellect, a solution of the problem of the universe, but a Legislator Who has given and Who will enforce the law of right and wrong written in the human heart, conscience is nevertheless in the mass of men, if left to itself, too enfeebled to keep a Moral God clearly in view, even when it has caught sight of Him. It requires an aid external to itself, a token from its Object that it is not mistaken about Him. It requires a revelation. Without a revelation, historical theism is either the fruitless speculation of a few isolated thinkers, or the underlying idea of a popular superstition which obscures and degrades it. In a certain true sense it is itself a revelation; but its utterances require a countersign in the world without, which may make it certain that the inner legislator is also the Ruler of the Universe. Conscience itself, exactly in the ratio of the clearness with which it discerns the moral nature of God, discerns the implied necessity of a revelation. It is sure that He Who is Himself just and merciful, cannot leave men altogether to themselves: that the All-Good cannot permanently disappoint the desires and powers which He has Himself implanted. And thus the antecedent probability of a revelation is to a good man not less than overwhelming; and Christianity assures us that his conviction is warranted by the fact.

The substance of the Christian revelation of God consists not merely in the teaching of Jesus Christ, together with the old Hebrew literature on which He sets His seal, and the apostolical doctrine which

He warrants by anticipation, but also in His Life. His Life was an unveiling of God to the eye of man's sense, that the eye of man's spirit might understand Him. Christ's Life, not less than His teaching, confirms the highest instincts of the human conscience, and educates them up to a point which of themselves they could never have reached. But how is man enabled to identify the Author of this law within him, perfectly reflected, as it is, in Jesus Christ, with the Author of the law of the universe without him? The answer is, by miracle. Miracle is an innovation upon physical law,—or at least a suspension of some lower physical law by the intervention of a higher one,—in the interests of moral law. The historical fact that Jesus Christ rose from the dead identifies the Lord of physical life and death with the Legislator of the Sermon on the Mount. Miracle is the certificate of identity between the Lord of Nature and the Lord of Conscience,—the proof that He is really a Moral Being Who subordinates physical to moral interests. Miracle is the meeting-point between intellect and the moral sense, because it announces the answer to the efforts and yearnings alike of the moral sense and the intellect; because it announces revelation. It may be asked whether miracle, in revealing God, is not subversive of the idea of God, Whom it reveals. Does it not postulate in Him two contradictory wills, the one whereby he enacts a permanent law, the other whereby He suspends it? And is not this irreconcileable with the highest views of His Nature, as the Immutable, Who is what He is unchangeably, because what He is, is abso-

lutely the best? No. For this is to apply to the Divine Mind a human standard of measurement. Succession is a law of human thoughts; because the mind of man is finite. If I resolve to spend each day for the next six months in a given way, and then, three months hence, determine that I will spend one particular day very differently, I am without doubt guilty of traversing my original and general intention by a second and particular intention which contradicts it. But with God, no such self-contradiction is possible; because in the Divine Mind there is no succession, whether of ideas or resolves. The Eternal Being sees the end in the beginning; He sees the exception together with the rule so simultaneously, that it is untrue to say that He anticipates it. It is a simple, indivisible act of will, whereby He everlastingly wills the rule together with the exception—the exception with the rule. With Him is "no variableness, neither shadow of turning."[1] The idea that God, in working a miracle, contradicts His own earlier purpose in giving to the physical world unchangeable laws, not merely betrays a conception of law as something independent of the free activity of God, but introduces into our conception of the Divine Mind the finite and human idea of a succession in thought and will. Whereas, in truth He, the Infinite, embraces, by one single act, present, past, and future, the general and the particular, the individual and the universal; reaching, as the Wise Man says, "from one end to another, mightily, and smoothly and sweetly ordering all things."[2]

[1] S. James i. 17. [2] Wisd. viii. 1.

But does God compromise His dignity by working a miracle, or by exerting a special Providence over His works? It is pleaded, indeed, that He must do so. It is said to be inconceivable that the Maker and Monarch of all these suns can interest Himself in the concerns of one of the smallest of His planets; in a particular race of creatures on its surface, in individual members of that race, in you and me. To imagine this, we are told, is only to indulge human self-love, which interprets all things, even the Deity Himself, by the promptings of its own boundless self-complacency.

And yet, what kind of "dignity" is it which is thus pleaded in order to depreciate the freedom, energy, and ubiquity of God's Providential Rule? It is at best the dignity of an oriental despot; he is too engrossed in the cares of personal government, or in the pursuits of personal indulgence, to listen to the voices and to study the wants of the poor, who struggle and suffer around the walls of his seraglio. The notion that a really great intelligence will concern itself only and exclusively with the broad principles and general interests, to the neglect of particulars and details, is, even when we are speaking of human minds, a mistaken notion. This vulgar contempt for details belongs to the pretentious imitation rather than to the reality of mental power. A really great intelligence combines the observation and study of details with the firm grasp of comprehensive principles; and in this power of combining things, which in lower minds are found apart, lies the strength and secret of its greatness. Nor is this less, rather it is much more the case.

with the Eternal Mind. God is not less Divine in literally numbering the sparrows that fall to the ground, and the hairs of the human head, than in formulating the highest laws which govern either planetary systems or spiritual intelligences; while this comprehensive and penetrating interest and action, spending itself upon the whole outward and inward life of His creatures, is the symptom and expression of the moral interest which the reasonable creation commands in the heart of the Creator.

No; God's greatness is not enhanced by systems which would banish Him from the world, or condemn Him to impotence. The miracles of Christianity are so far from compromising its Theism, that they illustrate and secure it. The God of Christianity is no mere First Cause, or Supreme Intelligence. He is a Moral God. If He is Power and Wisdom, He is also Sanctity, Justice, Providence, Mercy, Love. According to the Gospel, Love is His Essence; and love is interest in, and self-sacrifice for that which is its object. It is such a God as this Who can alone be the adequate object of religion.

Traceable everywhere in human history, traceable especially in the history of one separated and chosen race, the interest of the Perfect Moral Being in the moral and thinking creatures of His Hand culminates at Bethlehem and on Calvary. The Incarnation of the Eternal Son, the manifestation of the Divine life of Love, and Justice, and Compassion, and Purity, flashing through a veil of flesh, and leading up to a death of agony and shame, which alters the whole existing moral relation between earth and heaven; this is the glorious creed which rivets a Christian's

conviction of the moral intensity of the Life of God. "God so loved the world that He gave His Only begotten Son." What could He do more in order to convince us that He is not merely a Force or an Intelligence, but a Heart? At the feet of Him Who could say, "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father," we understand, and rest upon the certainty, that God is moral as well as intellectual "light, and that in Him is no darkness at all." When a man's hold upon this creed is gone, his thought falls back, at best, upon the more rudimentary and less adequate ideas of the Godhead; the darker mysteries of the world's history present themselves with more painful force; and the mind tends inevitably, in the last resort, either to Deism or to Pantheism; to a Deism which just permits God to create, and then dismisses Him from His creation; or to a Pantheism which identifies Him with all the moral evil in the universe, and ends by propagating the worship of new Baals and Ashteroths.

A few words in conclusion.

God being really alive, His existence is a fact with which no other fact that the human mind can come to recognize will possibly compare. Nothing among created things that can engage and stimulate thought, nothing that can warm and expand affection, nothing that can invigorate will and purpose, ought, in the judgment of any thinking human being, to compete with the Eternal God. Our reasonable duty towards God is "to believe in Him, to fear Him, and to love Him, with all the heart, with all the mind, with all the soul, and with all the strength." And yet that unbegun, unending, self-existent Life;

that boundless Intelligence administering a boundless Power; that long array of moral attributes which win our love while they must also move our reverence and fear; what is He, our God, to us? Do we thirst for God? As the days, and months, and years pass, do we ever look out of and beyond ourselves upon that vast ocean of Uncreated Life Which encircles us, Which penetrates our inmost selves? Do we ever think steadily, so as to dwell with a real intellectual interest upon Him Who is the first and highest of truths, to Whose free bounty we ourselves owe the gift of existence, and to Whom we must one day account for our use of it? Do we ever sincerely desire to love Him, and to live for Him? Or are we constantly hurrying along our solitary path from one vanishing shape towards another, while we neglect the Alone Unchangeable? Be sure that, if we will, in God revealed in Christ, the soul may slake the thirst of the ages; and the dreariest, and darkest, and most restless existence may find illumination and peace. "This God is our God for ever and ever: He will be our guide unto death, and beyond it." To each one of us, now, He is, if we will—if we will, He will be, for ever, to each—the Eternal Truth, wherein thought can never find its limit; the Uncreated Beauty, "most Ancient, yet always Fair," whereof affection can never tire; the Perfect Rule, existing eternally in the Life of the Necessary Moral Being, whereunto each created will may perpetually conform itself, yet never exhaust its task. Without this Awful and Blessed Being, man has no adequate object, even during these days of his brief earthly existence; his thought,

his affection, his purpose spring up and are exercised only that they may presently waste and die. With God, the human soul not merely interprets the secret of the universe; it comprehends, and is at peace with, itself. For God is the satisfaction of its thirst;—He is the object of Religion.

LECTURE III.

Third Sunday in Lent.

THE SUBJECT OF RELIGION—THE SOUL.

Ps. viii. 4.

What is man, that Thou art mindful of him?

Religion, we have seen, is not a sentiment, or an idea, or even a code of moral practice. It involves the establishment and maintenance of a real bond between God on the one hand and man on the other. To the perfectness of this bond, feeling, thought, and moral earnestness on the part of man, contribute elements which are indispensable to it; so that religion in itself, although beyond each of them, is dependent upon all. Its object, as we have also seen, is the Personal and Moral God. In a mere first cause, in a mighty force, in an all-surveying intelligence, religion finds nothing to which it can attach itself; and systems which, like Pantheism, deny the Personality of God, or, as did the old Deism, remove Him from all interest in and moral action upon the world, are thereby destructive of religion. And we have so far anticipated the matter before us, as to observe that, whatever else may be said for or against it, Christianity satisfies those conditions of a real religion, in which these theories severally fail; and that in Christendom, the purity and spirituality of a Personal God on the one hand, and His intimate

contact with us men on the other, by means of a Personal Incarnation, are fully and equally recognized. But this brings us face to face with a question of scarcely inferior importance, at least from our human and practical point of view. Religion being a real relation between man and God, it is natural and inevitable to pass from considering one of its terms to the consideration of the other. If God be the object, what is the subject of religion? What is this created being who can thus enter into relations with the high majesty of heaven? or, as the Psalmist puts it at once more reverently and more truthfully, "What is man, that Thou art mindful of him?" What is it in man which makes him capable of this exceptional relation to God, as implied in his capacity for religion?

It would be a mistake to treat the inquiry on which we are embarking as so entirely speculative that it can secure or fortify no practical results. It is easy, but unwise, in days like these to ignore the great questions which open beneath our feet as well as above our heads, under the pretence of being practical men who have neither time nor inclination for theory. No doubt, it is better to be a good man than to be a good psychologist; but an accurate notion of the real nature of the soul may contribute very materially in such an age as ours to personal enthusiasm for practical goodness. How are you to decide whether man is capable of religion, or how far his capacity extends, until you know what, in his inmost, deepest being, man really is? In other words, this question of man's capacity for religion is substantially the question whether man be not

merely a bodily organism, but also and especially a spiritual personality.

Certainly Revelation has familiarized Christians with the angels, as supramundane beings, in a very high degree capable of religion. But religion, as it comes before us on the surface of this planet, is a monopoly of man. Among the lower creatures we find nothing like it; we can discover no place for it. Man is the highest being of which these creatures have cognizance. Often, indeed, may we discover in their attachment to ourselves, in their fidelity, in their tenderness, in the true delicacy of the attention which they show us, much that rebukes us when we reflect on the poor service that we ourselves pay to a Higher Master. But having no unseen world open to them, and being, as they are, incapable of any properly reflective thought, they are also incapable of religion, of any consciously personal relationship to the Source of all Life. Man, however, can look above and beyond this world of sense; he can enter into real communion with the Monarch of both worlds; and the secret of his doing this lies in that which, by virtue of God's bountiful gift and appointment, he himself is; it lies in the characteristic which separates him utterly from the creatures around him.

I.

What is man? What, let us ask, is this or that given man of our acquaintance, a near relation, one of ourselves? In the distance, or at first sight, a single human being is what the world chiefly

associates with him; he is so much property, so much professional skill, so much political influence, so much social power, so much literary reputation, so much practical capacity for public affairs. Upon these things the public eye is wont to rest chiefly, if not exclusively; these things are labelled with this or that great name when it is repeated in conversation or in the newspapers. But they are only the accidents of any human life. They are external to it. They tell us nothing about it, nothing at least that a true appreciation of human greatness would most care to know. When do we see the man himself? We stand face to face with him; we listen to a voice; we note the peculiarities of a manner; we study the ever-varying lines of a human countenance; but we are still outside the real man. His voice, his manner, his expression, may tell us something about him; it may be a great deal; but they are not himself. We get nearer his real self, when we can observe and compare and take to pieces what he says and does; in his speech and his action, he reveals at least some portion of his character. But that which speaks and acts is beneath speech and action; it is always and necessarily invisible. The knife of no anatomist, however delicately wielded, can detect it in the folds of any human brain; no psychologist can draw it out into the light by an exhaustive analysis of any human thought. Underlying all the outward decorations of man's life; underlying the human face, and form, and speech, and action, although thrilling through them as if threatening ever and anon to become visible; underlying all that is most private and subtle

even in secret thought, is that around which all else is gathered, and without which all else would be stripped of its significance, without which it would never have been or would cease to be.

What is man? He is, in the root and seat of his being, a person. He is that which each of us means when he says, "I." Let us turn to look at this question from within, rather than from without; for after all, it is within ourselves that we can, each for himself, only and really grapple with it. What do we mean, each of us, by "I." We mean, first of all, something distinct, utterly, profoundly distinct, from all that is not "I"; something which is conscious, as nothing else is conscious, of this deep distinctness. I think, and I know that it is only I who think; I think about myself, and I know that it is myself only about whom I only am thinking; no other self commingles with this consciousness, or I should not be myself; I am thus conscious of my own identity, and of my radical separateness from all besides. Nay, more, I can trace and assert this identity of myself with myself, this separateness of myself from all that is not myself, for a long term of past years. When the outward circumstance of my life were far other than they are now; when my bodily mien was so different that none could recognize in it the myself of to-day; when the inner companions of my secret being were not as they have been since, so that I had other thoughts, other feelings, other resolves than now; yet still underlying these differences there was, deep down at bottom, the same self, thinking, feeling, resolving then, even as it resolves, and feels, and thinks now.

And of no one fact am I more certain, or so certain, as of this;—that this self of the present is the self of thirty or forty years ago; that it was then as it is now, that it is now as it was then, a thing distinct from all else in the universe; and a thing of which, among creatures, I alone have actual cognizance. And as I am certain that it is separate from all besides, and that, as long as my memory will serve me, it has never been otherwise; so I feel at this moment, as I always have felt, that I possess it; that its thoughts are *my* thoughts; that its will is *my* will; that this thought and will are not powers which come in upon me like a flood and possess me, but that they are strictly forms of my own activity. If I think, I choose to think; if I will, it is I, and no other being in the universe, who does will; my will is the exercise of a freedom, unshared by any partner of my life; and, if I choose, indestructible.[1]

Such, or, at least, something of this kind, is the sense of personality as we, each one of us, experience it. As long as we can remember, it has been at the bottom of all that we have felt, thought, and done; it has penetrated every movement of our minds and hearts; it has welded the many elements of our lives, outward and inward, moral and intellectual,

[1] See Psychologie, by Amedée Jacques, in the Manuel de Philosophie, Hachette, 1867. In Is. xxvi. 9, the *Ego* אֲנִי is clearly distinguished both from the נַפְשִׁי and the רוּחִי; in Prov. xxxiii. 15, and Eccles. vii. 25, it is distinguished from the לִבִּי of the Speaker. In Scripture *πρόσωπον* (2 Cor. i. 11) refers to external manifestation of the person, and *ὑπόστασις* (Heb. i. 3, xi. 1) to the substance that underlies the appearance. There is no word in Scripture to express "person" in the sense of a self conscious, self-determining being. Del. Bibl. Psychologie, vi. 1. Wörter's art. Seele in Wetzer and Wette; Dict. Encycl.

spiritual and even bodily, into a consistent whole. When it is felt, our inmost being is felt; we can get no deeper than that reflective thought, than that conscious will. Here we touch, so far as we can touch, personal spirit; and it is because man is a personal spirit, or, as Scripture terms it, a being made in the image of God, that he is master of the world around him.[1] The mere animal is not thus conscious of, and capable of reflecting on, his own existence. He lives and feels; he carries instinct forward, it may be, to the very confines of reason. But he does not comprehend his life; he does not reflect that it is he who lives; he is not conscious of remembering a line of personal existence, unshared by any other being, and threading a series of years and a long train of divergent circumstances. He does not anticipate a future. Neither is he free or deliberate in his exercise of will: his will is only impulsive desire or passion, unregulated by intelligence; it is not his instrument; it is his master. Being thus the slave of nature around him and of his own nature, of his own instincts, and of the force of circumstance, he never can project himself beyond nature, and so rise above it, and take the measure of it and of his own relation towards it. He is thus passive when face to face with his nature, he is thus

[1] On the Likeness of God in man see Delitzsch, Biblische Psychologie, ii., § 2. The Divine Image consists in man's self-consciousness and moral freedom, *τὸ νοερὸν καὶ αὐτεξούσιον*. Man's dominion over the earthly world is "an effluence of the Divine likeness, and not the Divine likeness itself." By means of the Resurrection even man's body attains *τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου* (1 Cor. xv. 49), in that it is transfigured into the image of the God-man. See the whole of this interesting section.

entirely under its control, because he altogether belongs to it; because in him there is nothing which comes from a higher world, and is independent of the world of sense.[1] Accordingly the single animal is only a specimen of his kind, the individual exists only in the species: but man, besides belonging on his animal side to an animal species, yet knows himself to be, in his individual capacity, a solitary essence, personal and indivisible. With man, the animal species, the lower nature which he shares with his kind, is subordinate to the individual, because in man that which constitutes the individual, his inmost being, belongs to a separate and a higher order of existence.[2]

This consciousness of personal life is not to be referred to anything in man's physical constitution. Thought after all is not merely phosphorus; and psychology is not correctly described as a branch of physiology. The great Scottish thinkers of half a century ago laid much stress upon the doctrine of what they called "internal facts." By an internal fact they did not mean a fact removed from the

[1] Wörter, art. Seele, ubi sup.

[2] It were to be wished, observes Delitzsch, that personality and individuality were less frequently confused in common language than they are. Personality is common to all men as such: by it men are raised above plants and beasts. Between the "thought," feeling, instinct of the brute, and the inner life of man, who is conscious of himself, and can in thought project himself beyond himself, there is an impassable gulf. Individuality only marks off the single specimen of the kind, whether it be man or beast; it implies nothing as to his subjective life. Although this obvious distinction is not formally expressed in Scripture, it is observable that in the narrative of the creation נֶפֶשׁ is used only of plants and beasts, not of man; as if to imply that man is more than an individual specimen of a kind,—that he is a person.—Bibl. Psych. iv. 1.

cognizance of the five senses; because there are many purely physiological facts which might be defined in this way,—as, for example, valvular action in the circulation of the blood. They meant an act of which the personal consciousness alone takes cognizance. If you lift a heavy weight, so far as the visible muscular exertion of the arm goes, that is an external fact; but the cause of this external fact is an internal fact, a determination of your will—that is, of yourself; and of this cause you alone are conscious. How your will acts upon your muscles, you cannot say; but this at least you do know, that it is your will which, by a voluntary self-determination, caused the movement of the muscles of your arm: and this internal fact is just as certain to you as the external one. Or suppose that you feel annoyance at some action of a neighbour, and reflect almost immediately that this feeling is undeserved, and fall back upon this and that consideration in order to set it aside, and succeed in doing so. Here you have three distinct internal facts; the original feeling, the bringing reason to bear upon that feeling, and the altered state of feeling which succeeds. All of these are strictly internal, strictly peculiar to the consciousness; yet as appreciable by observation, and as immediately appreciable, as any fact of physiology. There is no necessity, exclaims the eminent thinker who suggests this illustration, for losing ourselves "in metaphysical hypotheses, in order to demonstrate the spirituality of the soul, and Kant was right in throwing these old-fashioned arguments to the winds. The spirituality of the soul is a fact; it is a positive fact; it is a fact just as notorious as

the sunlight. Men are still inquiring, and will probably inquire while time shall last, what matter is. But we do practically know what spirit is, for we have each one of us a sample of it in ourselves, that is to say, in the thinking, feeling, determining subject which we name 'self.'"[1]

It would be an impertinence to say that the spirituality of the human soul "is taught in Scripture," because Holy Scripture everywhere presupposes it, and is unintelligible without it. But a question may be raised as to the form in which it is taught there. Scripture sometimes appears to exhibit human nature as composed of two elements, sometimes as of three. Moses represents man as originating from "the combination of an immediate breathing of God with an earthly body,"[2] and Solomon marks off the dust which at death must "return to the earth as it was" from "the spirit" that "shall return unto God who gave it."[3] After a like manner our Lord distinguishes the true life or soul of man[4] from his animal life, and the "spirit," which in His disciples was "willing," from the "flesh" that was weak;[5] and in dying He resigns His Human Soul to the Father, with the words, "Into Thy Hands I commend My Spirit."[6] On the same ground S. Paul bids Christians glorify God both in their body and in their spirits, since both body and spirit belong to Him;[7] and S. James compares faith without works to that separation

[1] Saisset, L'âme et la Vie, pp. 16, 17, 18, 22.
[2] Gen. ii. 7; cf. Del. Bibl. Psych. ii. § 4. [3] Eccles. xii. 7.
[4] S. Matt. vi. 25, *οὐχὶ ἡ ψυχὴ πλεῖόν ἐστι τῆς τροφῆς.*
[5] S. Matt. xxvi. 41. [6] S. Luke xxiii. 46.
[7] 1 Cor. vi. 20, see text.

between the body and the spirit which implies the death of the body.[1] In these passages, man is regarded as composed of a body and of a single supersensuous nature, which is sometimes called life or soul,[2] and sometimes spirit; but elsewhere, this immaterial nature itself is subdivided into self-conscious, self-determining spirit, and animal life-power or soul. Thus S. Paul prays that the spirit, and soul, and body of the Thessalonian Christians, each part subsisting in its perfect integrity, may be preserved blameless until our Lord's second coming;[3] and the word of God is described in the Epistle to the Hebrews as having, from its moral power, an analytical efficacy which separates as clearly between the spiritual and psychical elements of man's immaterial nature, as between the life of sensation and the life of motion in his corporeal nature.[4] Still it cannot be concluded from these two passages that man consists of three essentially distinct elements. If this language of S. Paul obliges us to see in soul and spirit something more than two distinct relations of man's inward nature, it does not imply more than two distinct departments of that nature, the higher

[1] S. James ii. 26.

[2] "According to the *usus loquendi* of all the books of the Bible, נֶפֶשׁ *ψυχή*, frequently denotes the entire inward nature of man." This is true even of S. Paul. If *ψυχή* in his writings means nothing more than "vis quâ corpus viget et movetur," he is at issue with S. Luke, with the Epistle to the Hebrews, and with Eph. vi. 6, Col. iii. 23, Phil. i. 27; in all of which passages the seat of moral resolve is placed in the *ψυχή*. Cf. Delitzsch Bibl. Psych. iii. § 9.

[3] 1 Thess. v. 23, *ὁλόκληρον ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα.*

[4] Heb. iv. 12, *διϊκνούμενος ἄχρι μερισμοῦ ψυχῆς τε καὶ πνεύματος, ἁρμῶν τε καὶ μυελῶν.*

region of self-conscious spirit and self-determining will, which belongs to man as man; and the lower region of appetite, perception, imagination, memory, which in the main is common to the undying soul of man and the perishable inmost being of the brute. Man's soul is not a third nature, poised between his spirit and his body; nor yet is it a sublimate of his bodily organization, any more than his body is a precipitate of his soul. It is the outer clothing of the spirit, one with it in essence, yet distinct in functions; the centre of man's life, psychical and animal, is his spirit.[1]

But whatever Holy Scripture may explicitly say about the spiritual personality of man as a formal doctrine, it implies much more by its constant appeal to man's higher nature. From first to last it treats man as a being who, although clothed in an animal form, is essentially and in himself a spirit. It surrounds him with precepts which a self-determining spirit only can obey; with examples, of which only a reflecting spirit can enter into the force and drift; with prayers, aspirations, modes of thought and feeling, that have no meaning for a being who is not experimentally conscious of his spiritual subsistence. Especially is this observable in those

[1] In our own day Anton Günther revived the psychological dualism of Occam, by making the distinction between the soul and spirit in man an essential distinction; in other words, by representing each man as possessed of two souls, one the seat of reason, the other of sensation and growth. That this theory has no biblical warrant appears to have been satisfactorily shown by Delitzsch: its experimental difficulties are obvious. The *Ego* which thinks, reasons, wills, is, we all of us know, identical with the *Ego* which experiences the sensations of sight, smell, hearing, touch.

Divine pages which form the inmost sanctuary of Holy Scripture; in the Life and Words of our Lord Jesus Christ. As human forms pass before Him, in the Gospel, although He is constantly relieving human want and pain, it is plain that the outward man means for Him, relatively, almost nothing, and that His eye rests persistently, exclusively, upon the man within. As we accompany Him in that brief but exhaustive study of humanity, we feel before the centurion or Pilate little or nothing of the majesty of the Roman name. Although Christ appeared when the Empire of the Cæsars was in its splendour, He speaks of the "kings of the Gentiles," in a phrase of studied vagueness; as if to suggest the utter insignificance of the highest political interests which only touch man's outward life, when they are contrasted with those higher interests of the human spirit which He had come to promote. Even the greatness and authority of the successors of Aaron disappears, or recedes into the background, in the atmosphere of this exacting estimate, which knows no respect of persons; while on the other hand, at His bidding, a few obscure and illiterate Galilean peasants become respectively a S. Peter, a S. John, a S. Mary Magdalen—names which of themselves recall neither political weight nor intellectual prestige, but types of spiritual character, beautiful and majestic, upon which already eighteen centuries of progressive civilization have been forward to lavish all but the best of their reverence and their love.

It is indeed as personal spirits, tabernacling in bodily forms, that we men are capable of religion. Resolve man's higher nature into physiological sen-

sation with Materialism, and religion becomes an absurdity. As spirits, we are linked and bound to the Father of Spirits; as spirits, we believe, we hope, we love; as spirits, we enter into the complex mystery and activities of prayer; as spirits, we take in each other that deep and penetrating interest which pierces beneath the outline of the human animal, and holds true converse with the supersensuous being within. All that weakens or lowers our consciousness of being spirits, weakens in that proportion our capacity for religion: all that enhances that consciousness, as surely enlarges it.

II.

Man, then, if we track him to the centre of his being, is a spirit, whatever be the dignity and organic indispensableness of his outward form. What do we know about the origin of man's spirit, of his deepest self? We know when and under what conditions a human body comes into existence. What do we know about the origin of a human soul?

If we take account of the ancient and of the Eastern world, one of the most popular answers to this question will be found in the theory that the soul exists before the body. Sometimes this is stated without an attempt at closer definition; more frequently it takes the form of a doctrine of Metempsychosis. According to this doctrine the spiritual part of each man's being is as a forced emigrant, who has previously occupied other frames, and who may have others to inhabit hereafter; although man's inextinguishable hope suggests that an escape from this

fatal cycle may be achieved by pre-eminent virtue, which will at length secure an incorporeal immortality for the weary wanderer.[1]

The Western and less systematized form of the doctrine is due to Plato. Plato, who did so much in the way of training the ancient world to realize the greatness and uniqueness of the soul, accounted for the soul's present and, as he deemed it, humiliating relation to the body, by saying that the soul had existed previously in another state of being, and was condemned to tenant a human frame as a kind of punishment. Plato was probably less anxious to give a complete account of the origin of the soul, than to explain the source of certain ideas which he encountered in the human mind. They occupied much of his attention, and he desired to invest them with an authority that might place them beyond the reach of popular discussion. To Plato it seemed that these ideas were relics of a higher knowledge enjoyed by the soul in some earlier stage of its being; he could account for them no otherwise, because they so transcended the poor realities of man's present experience. Thoughts which appeared to result from scientific speculation were in truth only a form of memory—memory of some bygone existence, passed in an ideal world from which the soul had fallen down into the sphere of sense and under conditions of time.[2]

Plato's speculation about the soul was of deeper

[1] For a recent European theory of a curiously Gnostic complexion, see "Le Lendemain de la Mort, ou la vie future selon la Science," par Louis Figuier. Paris, 1871.

[2] *ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα.* Cf. Plat. Phæd., E. 73-77, 246.

and more permanent interest to humanity at large, than the particular theory which led him to adopt it. It naturally found its way, in company with his other guesses, to Alexandria. It was adopted by Neo-Platonist thinkers, and even in the Jewish schools; it was taught by Philo, as well as by Plotinus; it was filtered through Essenism into the religious philosophy of the Talmud and the Cabbala;[1] it entered into more than one type of Gnosticism; it appears among the other eccentricities of the eccentric Origen; it forms a link between the philosophical bishop of Cyrene, Synesius, and the outer world of Pagan thought. But it was stoutly opposed by the immense majority of Christian teachers,[2] and was finally condemned by the collective Church, as an untenable error.[3] For it never had any basis in Holy Scripture; not even in those writings which are historically connected with Alexandrian thought, or which have been considered, on strictly internal grounds, to have an Alexandrian colouring.[4] To suppose that it un-

[1] Delitzsch quotes Joel, Religions philosophie der Sohar, pp. 107–109.

[2] Even by Clement of Alexandria, *ὁ Θεὸς ἡμᾶς ἐποίησεν οὐ πρόοντας· ἔχρην γὰρ καὶ εἰδέναι ἡμᾶς ὅπου ἦμεν εἰ προ ἦμεν.* Qu. by Klee, Dogmatik. p. 433, from Strom. viii.; Maii, tom. vii. p. 88. S. Peter of Alexandria characterizes it as a shred of heathenism: *τὸ γὰρ μάθημα τοῦτο τῆς ἑλληνικῆς ἐστι φιλοσοφίας κένης καὶ ἀλλοτρίας οὔσης τῶν ἐν Χριστῷ εὐσεβῶς θελόντων ζῆν.* De Anim. frag., *ib.*

[3] In the Second Council of Constantinople; Hefele, Conciliengesch. ii. 772.

[4] *E.g.*, not in Wisd. viii. 19, 20, which refers to an altogether exceptional attribute or Personality. The Cabbalist reference to Eccles. xii. 7, and Origen's to Rom. ix. 11–13, Luke i. 47, Jerem. i. 5, are set aside on examining the passages. Nor are such arguments as Heb. vii. 9 to the point. The pre-existence

derlies the doctrine of an original or birth-sin, as taught in the New Testament, is to forget that the great teacher of that doctrine expressly states that the consequences of the first sin devolve upon those who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression.[1] The conception of a pre-existing soul is, moreover, broadly at issue with the Scriptural account of man's creation. Holy Scripture knows of no creation of souls prior to the creation of bodies; the creation of the first man comprises the simultaneous creation of his body and his soul. Scripture carries us up to no moral act of any soul living and working before the creation of Adam's body; it traces no moral circumstance of man's present condition higher than to the sin of Adam in Paradise. It represents marriage as honourable, and the offspring of marriage as a blessing from the Lord. But these representations are inconsistent with the theory which would treat the human body, the product of marriage, as only a strange house of detention, wherein the unwilling soul is bound during a lifetime, far from its true end and home. In short, the theory of the soul's pre-existence is broadly at issue with the biblical and Christian doctrine of man, which makes man the synthesis of body and spirit: since, according to that theory,

of our Lord's Divine Person, as taught in S. John and S. Paul, would be relevant, if those Apostles had taught the pre-existence of any one else, and if, in His case, this pre-existence did not clearly attach to a representation of His Personal Dignity as superhuman. His Human Soul was, like His Body, created in time, and then hypostatically united to His pre-existent Godhead.

[1] Rom. v. 14, ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντας ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι τῆς παραβάσεως Ἀδάμ.

man existed in his completeness, as spirit, before he was sent to inhabit a human frame. And in this way such a theory cuts up by the roots that profound argument for the future resurrection of the body, which is suggested by the fact that the body is, under the terms of man's natural constitution, the soul's one adequate organ and instrument; it reduces the body to the rank of a temporarily indwelt shell, which might be escaped from with advantage. Nor is the verdict of our experience at issue with that of Christian doctrine in this particular. If we have all of us existed in some previous state of being, how is it that no living memory records any one distinct event in this presumed phase of past existence? If all traces of this supposed pre-existent life should have been blotted out from one memory, or from the majority of memories, how are we to explain their entire disappearance from all? Such universal oblivion of a great past is in fact inexplicable, except upon the extreme and violent hypothesis of a miraculous annihilation of memory in all spirits that have been heretofore united to human forms. The failure of any one memory to recall the supposed life of human souls in another sphere of being, is as unfavourable to the supposition at the bar of reason, as its other demerits must be held to be condemnatory of it in the judgment of faith.[1]

But if man's soul cannot be supposed to exist, as an independent being, before the formation of his

[1] For some considerations to the contrary, see Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych. i. 1, who, however, insists that the theory in question has no Scriptural foundation.

body, is it a part, the highest part, of that transmitted inheritance of life, which we receive, each one of us, from our earthly parents? Among the ancients this position was maintained most earnestly by Tertullian.[1] He had already broken away from the Church, and he wanted a strong psychological tenet capable of bearing him well out in the vigorous resistance which, in his Montanist isolation, he offered to the Marcionite notion of a pre-existing soul. Of course, if the soul was generated simultaneously with the body, there was no room left for saying that it had ever existed independently; and Tertullian accordingly pressed the theory of Traducianism, as it is termed, with this object, just as in a later age S. Augustine was attracted towards it, for another reason equally independent of its intrinsic merits.[2] If the soul was transmitted from sire to son, then it was easy to answer the Pelagian question, how original sin could be passed on together with it from Adam to his descendants. But, notwithstanding this powerful motive for accepting it, Augustine saw in the Traducianist doctrine an

[1] Cf. Tertull. de Animâ, c. 19. He speaks of the human soul "velut sarculus quidam ex matrice Adam in propaginem deducta;" and argues that in the process of natural conception, "cum omni suâ paraturâ pullulabit, tam intellectu quam sensu." Cf. passim, 19–21, 25–27, 37.

[2] Beausobre (Hist. Crit. de Manichée, Amst., 1734) goes so far as to attribute a strictly Traducianist doctrine respecting the origin of the soul to S. Augustine. How keenly Augustine felt the dangers of Materialism latent in this theory appears from such passages as De Gen. ad Litt. lib. x. cap. i. 24–25. His general language is studiously undecided: cf. De Animâ et ejus orig. i. 2; iv. 2. De Lib. Arbitr. iii. c. 21, n. 59. His hesitation is the more remarkable, as Pelagius made great use of Creatianism in opposing the Catholic doctrine of original sin. See his Letter to S. Jerome; Ep. 166, c. 5, 9.

element of Materialism.[1] The ordinary comparison of lighting one lamp from the flame of another, was too gross an image worthily to adumbrate the act of giving being to an immaterial consciousness. The idea of the soul which Traducianism suggests, is really derived from animal analogies, and is inapplicable to the conception of a purely spiritual and indivisible essence. The difficulty was not removed by saying that the body was not, as in the theory of Tertullian, the real generating agent, but only one intermediate link in the process by which a soul is engendered by parent souls. When Lactantius asked whether, on the Traducianist hypothesis, the soul of an infant was to be supposed to be derived from the father, or from the mother, or from both parents at once, he asked a question which was, in fact, fatal to the theory.[2] It was inconceivable that a spirit, personal and indivisible, or that two spirits, should engender another spirit; because to conceive this was to attribute a purely animal process of propagation to inhabitants of the supersensuous world.[3]

[1] Ep. 190, ad Opt. c. iv. n. 13, 14, 15, qu. by Wörter.

[2] De opificio Dei, c. 19. Illud quoque venire in quæstionem potest: utrumne anima ex patre, an potiùs ex matre, an verò ex utroque generetur. Sed ego id meo jure ab ancipiti vindico. Nihil enim ex his tribus verum est, quia neque ex utroque neque ex alterutro seruntur animæ corporibus. Corpus enim ex corporibus nasci potest, quoniam confertur aliquid ex utroque; de animis anima non potest, quia *ex re tenui et incomprehensibili nihil potest decedere.*

[3] Delitzsch's attack upon the position that "the assumed ability of spirit to propagate itself is contrary to the dualism of nature and spirit," does not appear to be convincing. The Divine Nature being the Parent of the material as well as of the Spiritual Universe, those Eternal Truths internal to It, which are shadowed out by the names of Father, and Son, may well be the archetypes of material rather than of spiritual facts

It has been observed that children generally resemble their parents in those qualities which we describe collectively as temperament, as belonging to the region of animal life-power; but that no such resemblance can be calculated on, or, where it does occur, regarded as other than purely accidental, in respect of strictly personal qualities, such as genius, or will.[1] Traducianism can undoubtedly point to great names who favour it in ancient and modern times;[2] and it rests on too large an area of possibilities to be rejected with anything like peremptoriness. But the general sense of the Church is now, as it has been in past times, against it; it does not seem to harmonize, at least naturally and easily, with the fixed outlines of a consistently spiritualist philosophy, or, notwithstanding the easy explanation which it affords of a doctrine of transmitted sin, to make itself really at home with such an estimate of man's spiritual nature as is implied by the great doctrines of the Christian creed.

in the universe. The Eternal Spirit Himself is "not begotten but proceeding." The חוֹלָלְתִּי of Prov. viii. 24, is to be referred to the Son, Who is identical with the Wisdom of the Proverbs. The application of the metaphor of generation and birth to God's natural (Job xxxviii. 28; Ps. xc. 2; Deut. xxxii. 18) and supernatural (1 Pet. i. 3; James i. 18; 1 S. John iii. 9) creations does not warrant any inference as to a possible parental relationship between one created spirit and another. The angelic reference in Gen. vi. 1–4, is, to say the least, far too doubtful to be made the basis of an argument. But cf. Bibl. Psych. ii. § 7, sub fin.

[1] As by Wörter, ubi supra.

[2] S. Jerome, indeed, himself an earnest Creatianist, attributes Traducianism to the majority of Western teachers in his day: maxima pars occidentalium, Ep. 78, ad Marcell; but in antiquity Tertullian stands out almost alone in his unfaltering decision. Augustine hesitates. Of modern Traducianists, Delitzsch among Lutheran, and Klee among Roman Catholic writers, are perhaps the greatest.

The other and the more generally received doctrine is known as Creatianism. Each soul is an immediate work of the Creator: He is perpetually creating souls out of nothing, and infusing them into bodies.[1] He creates each soul at the moment when the body which is destined for it enters really and properly on its inheritance of life.[2] Creatianism recognizes that sense of the immateriality of the human spirit which expressed itself falsely in the doctrine of a pre-existence, and which is so seriously compromised by Traducianism. Personal spirit, it is asserted by the Creatianist, cannot be transmitted from one created life to another, like animal vitality. Yet Creatianism recognizes the truth for which the Traducianists contended against the advocates of the soul's pre-existence, when it maintains that the soul and body are strictly contemporaneous in their origin, and that they have profound and ineffaceable relations to each other.

When it pleaded against this account of the origin of the soul that it is at issue with the Scriptural representation of a Sabbath rest, which brought God's creative activity to a close,[3] it is sufficient to reply that such an interpretation of the Mosaic narrative would oblige us to close our eyes to the proved fact of a later origin of new species of animals, besides being inconsistent with any adequate idea of God's

[1] Quotidiè Deus operatur animas et in corpora mittit nascentium. S. Jerome; adv. Ruf. Apol. xvi. 1, 3. Traducianism he thinks absurd: Satis ridendi qui putant animas cum corporibus seri, et non a Deo sed a corporum parentibus generari. Qu. by Klee, Dogm.

[2] This is apparently the drift of Peter Lombard's often-quoted maxim: Creando infundit animas Deus et infundendo creat.

[3] As by Klee, Dogmatik, p. 431.

providential relation to the world.[1] When it is said that Creatianism, if true, would enslave God, by bidding Him give existence to an immortal spirit at the will of the adulterer, and in defiance of His own law, this objection[2] does indeed reveal one peculiar malignity of sins against chastity; but it is merely an extreme illustration of the general truth, that man can only sin with God's assistance; that all sin consists in the employment of God's bounty against Himself. When, lastly, it is urged that the transmission of original sin is on this hypothesis unintelligible, it may be sufficient to say that since original sin is rather of the nature of a defect than of a positive taint, there is no difficulty in understanding how created souls did not receive a gift which had been withdrawn from the race to which they were united at their entrance into life. Upon the whole, the Creatianist theory seems to fall in with the scattered hints and with the general language of Scripture more readily than the Traducianist. It is more in harmony with the account of the creation of man, and with the general representations of God's relation of Maker to the spirit of man, which we find in the Old Testament.[3] Especially does it seem to be borne out by the distinction which is drawn in the Epistle to the Hebrews between the "fathers of our flesh" and the "Father

[1] S. John v. 17.

[2] S. Augustine admits to S. Jerome that, before hearing his answer to this difficulty, he had himself solved it by dwelling on God's power and will to draw good out of evil in all His earthly providences. The giving being to a soul, capable of knowing and loving its Creator, is of itself a good, however it may be occasioned. Ep. ad Hieron. 166, c. 5.

[3] Gen. ii. 7; Job xxxiii. 4; Ps. cxix. 73; Zech. xii. 1.

of Spirits."[1] These expressions discriminate with an accuracy from which there would appear to be no escape between the contribution made to the composite being of man by our Heavenly Parent immediately, and that which He bestows through created channels of the gift of life.[2]

This question of the soul's origin has carried us into a region where we have at best to deal with high probabilities; where revelation has rather hinted at the truth than unveiled it, and where reason certainly cannot pretend to dogmatize. But it is not altogether unfruitful to look at this side of our subject, even where certainty is unattainable. To do so makes us all the more thankful for certainty, when we know that it is within our reach. After all, the difference between the Creatianists and Traducianists does not raise the question whether the human soul is made by God, but only the question whether it is immediately created by Him. All that we are and have, except the evil which we have wrought, and which clings to us, comes from the One Source of Life; but if religion finds its strength in this general conviction, it is especially stimulated by the conviction that the soul is God's immediate handiwork. The belief that the inmost being of

[1] Heb. xii. 9. The contrast, Delitzsch admits, between *τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν πατέρες*, and the Divine *πατὴρ τῶν πνευμάτων*, is physical and not ethical. "There can hardly," he remarks, "be a more classical proof-text for Creatianism." The passages which imply the organic oneness and responsibility of the race of Israel do not set this aside (vii. 5, 10). Cf. Num. xvi. 22.

[2] Cf. Delitzsch on Heb. xii. 9 against Ebrard's theory that *σάρξ* means here the natural life in opposition to the regenerate life. Had this been the sense, the phrase would have been *τοὺς μὲν ἡμῶν κατὰ σάρκα πατέρας*. And the original Hebrew text of Numb. xvi. 22, xxvii. 16, is decisive.

each one of us is created as immediately by God as was that of our first parent Adam, brings each of us into a felt relationship with God, and reminds us of our obligations towards Him, more effectively than would be the case if we supposed ourselves to receive spiritual as well as corporeal life through a long series of ancestors. It is this persuasion which underlies Bishop Andrewes' favourite ejaculatory prayer from the Psalter, "Despise not Thou the work of Thine own Hands." It is not in the anatomy and faculties of the body, but in the analysis and structure of the soul, that the greatness of human life is best realized, and our indebtedness towards its Giver most deeply felt. This reflective reason; this heart, capable of a boundless expansion; this will, which may be trained to a freedom and an intensity of extraordinary power;—of what are these faculties so suggestive as of the knowledge, love, and service due to that Being of Beings Who is the end, as He is the Author, of this centre of complex and self-controlling life?

III.

Man, then, is a spirit; and, as it would seem, he is, as such, immediately created by God. The gravest question yet remains: What is his destiny? Whatever may be said of the importance of questions bearing on the soul's origin, no reflecting man will deny the interest of all that bears upon its future. It is true that even this question is ostentatiously set aside on the ground of its being unpractical to discuss it. "The dead," it is argued, "do not return

to tell us their experience. What then can be known certainly of that which befalls them? We may hope, or we may conjecture; we may desire, or despair; we may dogmatize in the air, and make creeds of our aspirations; but would it not be better to confine ourselves to subjects that are well within the range of our experience, and where sure results are attainable, than to waste time and sympathy upon that which belongs really and only to the realm of fancy?"

This way of treating the subject is possible and not uncommon among young men and women in good health, who have never known a heartache; and in the pages of clever serials, where readers are carried forward almost unresistingly, by clear type and well-turned sentences, over the dreary wastes of sceptical thought. But the question of the eternal future is too pressing to be thus left at a distance, permanently. If religion has many enemies in the predominant tendencies of the modern world, she certainly has steady and inalienable allies in the permanent circumstances of human nature. To the most refined and cultured of ourselves, death is just as certain a contingency as it was to our rudest forefathers, and its dread solemnities enter just as penetratingly into the homes of rank and science, as into the humblest cottages in the land. Sooner or later it comes close to all of us, and the mists which hide its stern realities from our eyes roll away, and leave us face to face with them.

"They think that their houses shall continue for ever: and that their dwelling-places shall endure from one generation to another; and call the lands after their own names.

"Nevertheless man will not abide in honour: seeing that he may be compared unto the beasts that perish; this is the way of them.

. . . . . .

"They lie in the hell like sheep, death gnaweth upon them, and the righteous shall have domination over them in the morning: their beauty shall consume in the sepulchre out of their dwelling.

. . . . . .

"Be not thou afraid, though one be made rich: or if the glory of his house be increased;

"For he shall carry nothing away with him when he dieth: neither shall his pomp follow him.

"For while he liveth he counted himself an happy man: and so long as thou doest well unto thyself, men will speak good of thee.

"He shall follow the generation of his fathers: and shall never see light.

"Man being in honour hath no understanding: but is compared unto the beasts that perish."[1]

This is the solemn irony of life, and from year to year we find ourselves face to face with it. Death does not move us much, when it visits those whom we do not know, or whom we know only slightly; when it only meets us as it travels gloomily through the crowded thoroughfare towards the distant cemetery, or as it catches our eye in the supplement of our daily newspaper. It does not touch us as being what it is, so long as it only produces social changes which excite our interest, while it keeps sufficiently at a distance not to wound our hearts. We drape it in phrases which treat it

[1] Psalm xlix. 11, 12, 14, 16–20.

as a solemn abstraction. No doubt it is solemn; but so is the war lately raging in Paraguay, or a Russian campaign in Central Asia. We should speak very differently of a revolutionary struggle in the streets of London, upon the issue of which it was clearly understood that our own life and property might immediately depend. But we find that at last death comes home to us, even to us, in all the closeness of its dreadful embrace. Not, it may be, this time to ourselves: that were perhaps more bearable. The one human being whom we have loved best on earth —the parent, the husband, the wife, the child—lies before us. We see what is coming. It is very gradual, perhaps, and there are many rallies in which vital power struggles with disease, in which hope flickers up in its contest with the presentiments of reason, only to die back into a deeper despair. It is very gradual—a slow processional movement to the grave: but the end comes at last. At last a day comes to which the preceding days are as if they had not been; a day comes which lives in memory. We can no longer reckon on hours; we dare not be away even for a few minutes, lest we should be too late. A change has taken place, which they know well who are familiar with death, and of which none can mistake the import. We feel, all feel, that the time is short, and a few words are said into which is compressed a life—its most sincere thought and love—a few assurances, messages, entreaties; no more is possible. Already, one by one, the vital powers take their leave: first speech, then movement, then hearing, then even eyesight. Still there is breathing, now rapid and deep, now

weaker and intermittent; and then there comes a last breath; and we wait; and there is none after it.

It lies before us, that loved form: only an hour ago it spoke: we speak to it now, but in vain. We bend over it in our agony, as if it was still what it had been; but we know—what would we not give to escape from our conviction?—that neither thought nor feeling tenants it now. And the question must rise then, if it never rose before, with an urgency proportioned to the grief which asks it;—Is all really over? Has the real being, which one short hour ago thought and felt so keenly, actually and for ever ceased to be?

Do you say that in presence of that passionate agony it is folly to ask for a decision which should only be dictated by the coolest, the calmest, the most unimpassioned, the most disinterested science? I answer that that agony, if it be not itself an argument, is well fitted to win a hearing for arguments to which, under ordinary circumstances, our materialistic science is deaf. Such a condition of feeling may be impatient on the one hand of a physiology which seeks for the immaterial spirit in the brain; as it cannot, on the other, enter into a metaphysical discussion of the alleged indestructibility of uncompounded essences. But being itself pain, mental pain, one of the great chastening, illuminating powers of the moral world, it is at least in a mood to understand a moral argument. And the moral argument for our immortality is, after all, the strongest of those upon which reason can fall back. It is no fancy which insists that

Eternal Justice cannot close His account with any human conscience at the moment of death; that there must be an after-world in which the too unequal balance of suffering and happiness, of good and evil doing during life, will be surely rectified. We must do stern violence to the best and deepest instincts of our better nature before the voice of this argument can be silenced. It is a moral conviction which protests against the Materialistic theory that the soul is but an animated vapour which becomes extinct with the life of the bodily frame. It equally rejects the Pantheistic dream, that what looks like a separate personality ceases when we cease to breathe, while the soul sinks back into some vast undercurrent of boundless life, which is the fabled vital force of the Pantheistic universe. If morality has any serious basis in the nature of things, if it be not a dream or a conventionalism, there must be a future wherein each personal spirit will subsist under conditions which will have direct reference to its moral and spiritual attainments here.

For if one thing is evident to a man who takes notes of what passes within him with the lapse of time, it is that the inward being which he contemplates as "self," is continually developing. As the years pass, whether for good or evil, this immaterial, thinking, resolving being acquires accumulating strength and intensity. Long after the animal life of man has reached its highest point, and is fairly on the decline, the spirit feels itself sensibly growing; growing in the range of its intellectual grasp, growing in its power of will, growing in its sense of being a centre of life, unlike any of the forms of

animal or vegetable life around it. Is it possible that death will abruptly put an end to this hitherto uninterrupted development? Is it possible that we thus continuously expand in all that constitutes our real human selves, only to find at the gate of death that we were nothing but brutes after all, although endowed with sensibilities and imaginations just keen enough to make us the victims of an immense and exceptional delusion?

It is often remarked that the Bible nowhere deals with the natural immortality of the human soul as a thesis to be proved.[1] As in the case of the soul's spirituality, the Bible scarcely asserts, but it everywhere takes the truth for granted. When patriarchs and kings are said in the language of the Old Testament to be gathered to their fathers, it is not merely meant that their bones were laid in the common family resting-place. The natural scenery of Palestine probably suggested the word which described the revealed invisible home of the spirits

[1] It is not meant that the soul of man is immortal through any internal necessity, such as might be held to belong to an uncompounded essence. In this sense God is *ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν* (1 Tim. vi. 16). In all creatures, indestructibility is a gift. It is a gift to the spirit, as distinct from the animal life-power of man. The ancients, Tatian and Justin Martyr, who protested against the Greek idea of a necessary immortality inherent in the soul, did not deny the gift of immortality, which as a matter of fact the Creator had bestowed. Just as man conceives of God, so he conceives of eternity, and longs for it. His longing shows that he is designed for an eternity; it is otherwise inexplicable. "God has placed eternity, עוֹלָם in the heart of man" (Eccles. iii. 21). It is a matter of experience; and the argumentum ab appetitu æternitatis to the reality of an eternal future is an adaptation of the Cartesian inference from the idea to the being of a God. Cf. Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych. vi. § 2.

of the dead.[1] It was "a land of darkness, as darkness itself;"[2] the common receptacle of the "small and great," of the "servant and his master," of kings and counsellors of the earth, of prisoners and of oppressors.[3] All were gathered there, under new conditions of life, incompatible with those earthly forms of activity[4] which cease at death. Not that the dead are passive or unconscious. Isaiah's description of the movement of spirits in the unseen world at the descent of the spirit of the King of Babylon can hardly be resolved into poetical license; and it is observable that the heathen monarch is there together with the rulers of Israel.[5] This doctrine of *Scheol* is perfectly consistent with the general truth that at death the human spirit returns to God,[6] and that the souls of the righteous are in "His Hands," in the sense of being exempted from torment.[7] Nor is it in any way at issue with the doctrine of a bodily resurrection; which, while its early and distinct appearance in the Psalter[8] is utterly inconsistent with the theory of its being due to Eastern influences[9] upon the Jewish Revelation at the period of the Captivity, does undoubtedly, in the later books, come very prominently into view. Apart from a popular belief in this doctrine, the imagery of Isaiah[10] and Ezekiel[11] would

[1] שְׁאוֹל is properly what is sunk deep, bent in; hence a ravine, abyss, depth. Cf. Fuerst, Lex. in voc.

[2] Job x. 21. [3] Job. iii. 13–19. [4] Eccles. ix. 10.

[5] Is. xiv. 9, *sqq.* [6] Eccles. xii. 7. [7] Wisd. iii. 1.

[8] Ps. xvi. 10, 11; Acts ii. 25–31. Cf. also Ps. xlix. 16; lxxiii. 23, *sqq.*

[9] As suggested by Jul. Müller, Studd. und Kritt, 1835.

[10] Is. xxvi. 14–19.

[11] Ezek. xxxvii. 1-14. Cf. Hos. vi. 2; xiii. 14.

have been unintelligible to their contemporaries; and both in the dark days of the Captivity in Babylon,[1] and in the later struggle of the Maccabees against Antiochus Epiphanes, this faith in a Resurrection sustained the oppressed against the persecutors, even the martyrs in their agony.[2] So far as Alexandria influenced Judaism, it discouraged faith in a corporeal Resurrection. Philo, like a genuine Platonist, sees in death the emancipation of the soul from its bodily prison-house. But the ruling religious minds in Palestine at the time of Christ's appearance believed in the resurrection of our actual bodies.[3] Such a doctrine of course implies the immortality of the soul; but the only demonstration of the truth of the soul's immortality is given in our Lord's reply to the Sadducees on the subject of the Resurrection. He argues from the title, "the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob," which God was pleased to claim in centuries long after the death of the patriarchs, that the patriarchs must still be living, because God is the God, not of the dead, but of the living.[4] By this general statement our Lord apparently implies that God does not create spiritual beings only that they may sink back into nothing. The distinctive teaching of the New Testament about the future world everywhere presupposes the soul's immortality. If death were annihilation for all of us, or for all but the just, the descriptions of the end of the world, of

[1] Dan. xii. 1-3, 13.
[2] 2 Macc. vii. 9, 11, 14, 23; xii. 42–45; xiv. 16.
[3] S. Matt. xxii. 24, *sqq.*; Acts xxiii. 8, xxiv. 15. Joseph Ant. xviii. 1-3. Bell, Jud. ii. 8-14. Qu. by Grimm.
[4] S. Matt. xxii. 32; S. Mark xii. 27; S. Luke xx. 38.

the last judgment,[1] of the general resurrection,[2] and of the future state,[3] would have no interest for any but a minority of mankind. It is the steady conviction that, in some way, we shall each and all personally subsist after death, which secures to these pages of our Bibles such universal interest.

This conviction of our immortality rests on what is for Christians an unquestioned certainty. In Christian eyes, the central fact of the world's annals is the Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead. It occurred in the full daylight of history: it was attested by hundreds of witnesses.[4] We can only deny its truth upon *à priori* principles, which are not merely destructive of serious belief that God is a Moral and even a Living Being, but which are also fatal to confidence in human history. The Resurrection of Christ is the guarantee of our own. The clouds which hung around the gate of death in earlier ages have rolled away since the day of our Saviour's triumph over death; the presumptive speculations which were previously rife as to the future state have been exchanged for strong certainties. "Life and immortality have been brought to light by the Gospel:" "God has begotten us again to a lively hope, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ

[1] S. Matt. xxv. 31–46; Acts xvii. 31; Rom. xiv. 10; 2 Cor. v. 10; 2 Tim. iv. 1; 1 S. Pet. iv. 5.

[2] S. John v. 28, *sqq.*; Acts xxiv. 15.

[3] Rom. ii. 10, viii. 18; 1 Cor. xiii. 12; 1 S. John iii. 2; Heb. x. 26, 27; Rev. xiv. 13; S. Matt. viii. 12; S. Mark ix. 43, *sqq.*; S. John xii. 26, xiv. 2, *sqq.*; xvii. 24; Rev. xxi. 7, 8.

[4] 1 Cor. xv. 6, *ὤφθη ἐπάνω πεντακοσίοις ἀδελφοῖς ἐφάπαξ, ἐξ ὧν οἱ πλείους μένουσιν ἕως ἄρτι, τινὲς δὲ καὶ ἐκοιμήθησαν.*

from the dead:" Christians are "not to sorrow as those that have no hope:" Death has lost its sting, and the grave its victory.[1]

Here, too, let it be noted, that although the soul is the seat of man's personal life, it is not, as has been already hinted, man in his completeness. Man is a body as well as a soul. Materialism itself has here done valuable service in correcting the exaggerations of a one-sided spiritualism. It is common, but erroneous, to speak of man's body as being related to his spirit only as is the casket to the jewel which it contains, or only as is a prisoner to the walls of his dungeon.[2] As a matter of fact, the personal spirit of man strikes its roots far and deep into the encompassing frame of sense, with which, from the first moment of its existence, it has been so intimately associated: in a thousand ways, and most powerfully, the body acts on the soul, and the soul on the body. They are only parted at death by a violent wrench. The spirit can indeed exist independently of the body, but this independent existence is not its emancipation from a prison-house of matter and sense; it is a temporary and abnormal divorce from the companion whose presence is needed to complete its life. Would the soul, permanently

[1] 2 Tim. i. 10; 1 S. Pet. i. 3; 1 Thess. iv. 13; 1 Cor. xv. 55.

[2] The false spiritualism which is implied in these metaphors is, in modern times at least, chiefly due to the Cartesian philosophy. Descartes held that the human soul was made only for the purposes of *thought* (Disc. sur la Méth. pt. 5); the animal-life of man was, as a consequence, in his judgment, merely that of an independent machine. Madame de Sévigné rallies this once popular theory "des machines qui aiment, des machines qui ont une élection pour quelqu'un, des machines qui sont jalouses, des machines qui craignent." Œuvr. t. iii. lett. 170.

severed from the body, still be, properly speaking, man? Would it not really be some other being? Our inmost consciousness here echoes the answer of science. The body which has been so long the associate and partner of the soul's life, the instrument of its will, the minister of its passions, mingling lower physical sensations with that higher life of thought and feeling which belongs to it, could not be altogether cast away without impairing the completeness of our being, without imperilling the continuous identity of our changeful existence.

This, then, is the true ground of the general resurrection, which is no eccentric or gratuitous miracle, but the restoration to man of that completeness of identity which is impaired by death. If the body did not rise, man would, by dying, not simply enter upon a new stage of being; he would exist as a different order or species of creature. His moral history would have changed its conditions and character. The disembodied spirit might repudiate the weaknesses or excesses of the companion with which it had finally parted company. In point of fact, all men are to rise again with their bodies, and to give account of their own works. The complex being which acted here is to be judged hereafter.

In this life the body and soul together form one composite being; each acts upon the other as well as with it. The corruptible body presseth down the soul. The passions which have their seat in the soul depict themselves upon the surface of the body. On the one hand, an Apostle reminds us that fleshly lusts war not merely against the bodily health, but

against the soul.[1] On the other hand, a beautiful soul illuminates the face of a S. Stephen with angelic light;[2] and hereafter the bodies of the blessed will be "glorious," that is to say, translucent with the splendours of the glorified spirit.[3]

IV.

Religion, in order to meet the wants of human nature, will take account of each element in man's nature: she will maintain lower relations with the bodies as well as higher relations with the souls of men. As man has, besides his unseen person, an outward and visible shape, so will religion herself provide sensible forms as well as supersensuous realities. She will exact outward as well as inward reverence, because in a being constituted like man, the one is really the condition of the other. There are bodily postures which absolutely forbid heavenly exercises to the soul: to lounge in an armchair is inconsistent with the tension of thought and will which belongs to adoration of the Most Holy. Religion, like man himself, is a beautiful spirit tabernacling in a body of sense. Her divine and immutable truths are shrouded beneath the unrivalled poetry of Bible language; her treasures of grace beneath the outward and visible signs which meet us in sacraments. She proclaims the invisible by that which meets the eye; she heralds the eternal harmonies by a music that falls upon the ear. She certainly is not all form, for man is not a brute; but also she is not all spirit, for man is

[1] 1 S. Pet. ii. 11. [2] Acts vi. 15. [3] 1 Cor. xv. 43.

not an angel. She deals with man as being precisely what he is, and she enlists the lower faculties of his being in aid of the higher. Yet if she is true to man and to herself, she never allows her disciple to forget the unseen in the seen, the inward in the outward, the soul in the body. For religious purposes, the soul must always be incomparably of the highest importance, as being the very man himself; the man in the secret recesses of his being; the man at the imperishable centre of his life; the man as he lives beneath the Eye, and enters into relations with the Heart of his Infinite Creator.

Certainly if belief in our personal spirits is essential to religion, and belief in the immediate creation of the soul by God is stimulating to it, belief in the soul's immortality is of yet higher religious importance. The relation between God and the soul, in which religion consists, would be little more to us than a sentiment or a literary taste, if we were persuaded that we should have taken leave of it, as we shall have taken leave of our clothes and of our books, when we are laid in our coffins. Would religion be worth our attention as serious men, would it be anything more than a plaything, if all really ended at death? That the soul is immortal, standing in its immortality, for weal or woe, face to face with the Everlasting God;—this truth, dimly grasped by natural religion, has been wrought into the very heart and fibre of Christendom. It is taken for granted by Christian faith just as naturally as is the fact of life itself. It underlies that sense of an eternal life which good men already enjoy here, and which implies not

simply a consciousness that admits of no idea of succession or time, but an immortal soul in fixed communion with an Eternal Object. It teaches man to look upon all the acts and habits which really feed and strengthen religion as a part of his preparation and outfit for eternity, to be in some sense carried with him as he crosses the heights which form his present horizon, and which shut out from his view the eternal world. And thus it has elevated and enriched human nature in a thousand ways, which we only do not sufficiently appreciate because we are so entirely accustomed to them.

Let me illustrate this by an example. Putting religion for the moment out of the question altogether, there is no doubt as to the view which a philanthropist must take of suicide, supposing it to become general, and regarding it in its influence upon society. When a popular Cyrenaic teacher, Hegesias, advocated suicide, at Alexandria, as being the course upon which a really wise man would resolve after comparing the sum of the pleasures of life with the sum of its misfortunes, Ptolemy felt it necessary, in the interests of good government and of society, to oblige him to close his lecture-room. But the sentiment with which suicide is practically regarded among us is not based on any mere estimate of its social bearings; still less is it looked upon only as a mode of passing out of life. The announcement that this or that well known man had destroyed himself would create in any modern society a sensation distinct in kind from that which would be caused by the simple announcement of his

death.[1] Why is this? It is because Christianity revealing to man as a certainty the fact of his immortality, has given a new meaning, value, solemnity to life. To live is to be on our trial, with a tremendous future immediately before us; and to shorten this trial by a voluntary act, is, apart from other and even graver aspects of such an act, felt to be altogether irreconcilable with this, the Christian estimate of life.[2]

Considering the strength of the instinct of self-preservation which is naturally implanted in us, suicide shocks us as being a violent contradiction of that instinct. Yet while cases of suicide are to be found here and there, in all times and districts of history, there have been periods and places when suicide has been nothing less than a passion—a moral epidemic swaying the imaginations and wills of whole classes even among educated men. In India suicide has been for at least two thousand years the result of energetic conviction; it is still what it was at the date of Alexander's conquest. It is at this day the effort by which the individual would plunge into the infinite, in which it is his presumed happiness to forfeit his individuality; whether that infinite be the supreme soul of the Brahmins, or the Nirvâna of the Buddhists. In Greece and Rome, suicide was a precept not of religion but of philosophy. It was recommended by philosophies the

[1] Since this observation was made, it has been painfully illustrated in the case of the lamented M. Prévost-Paradol.

[2] Lecky, "History of European Morals," ii. 52. "Direct and deliberate suicide, which occupies so prominent a place in the moral history of antiquity, almost absolutely disappeared within the Church." Cf. pp. 40-63 of this interesting chapter.

most opposed to each other. In Greece the great representatives of the Cynic school, Zeno, Diogenes, and in Christian times, Peregrinus, died by their own hands. The Cyrenaics formulated the doctrine of suicide, as an escape from the preponderating miseries of life. At Rome, Lucretius, the Epicurean poet, as well as Cato and Brutus, under Stoic influences, destroyed themselves The Epicurean feeling, that when life had been made the most of for the purposes of enjoyment it was time to end it, coincided as to its practical result with the Stoic doctrine that the stern effort by which man could in extremity make good his self-mastery is a voluntary death. Of this doctrine Seneca is the great master. Suicide is, he contends, the act by which man asserts his right over himself, when face to face with the menaces and oppressions of tyranny: suicide is the door through which liberty may retire from a world of slaves.

This doctrine especially it was which dictated suicide on a considerable scale in the first of the three periods when like a moral plague it has darkened the life of Europe. During the later days of the Roman Republic, and under the stern Cæsarism of the Empire, suicide was recommended and practised as an escape from the political and social evils of the time. The spirit of suicide only fell back before the advance of the Church; and more than three centuries after Seneca, we find S. Augustine combating his arguments one by one in the closing books of the treatise on the City of God. The second period was that of the Renaissance in the sixteenth century. Suicide had nearly dis-

appeared during the Middle Ages; but when educated Italy, with Leo X. at its head, had saturated itself afresh with Paganism, it was natural that some of the moral ideas of antiquity should reappear in the train of so engrossing a study of its mind and style. Philippo Strozzi, the prisoner of the Grand Duke Cosmo I., destroys himself, praying God—it is an odd mixture of Christian and Pagan creeds—that his soul may be placed along with the soul of Cato of Utica, and of others who have died after the same fashion. Montaigne in his essays defends suicide elaborately; and in time it had its devotees in England, no less than in France and Italy. The more positive and earnest Christianity of the seventeenth century brought with it a more worthy appreciation of the real seriousness of life: but in the succeeding age the taste for suicide was renewed, not as a part of the complete Pagan ideal of conduct, but as the fruit of a melancholy estimate of our condition in this world, joined to impaired or decomposing religious convictions. The felt disappointments of life as a whole, the absence of fixed aims, the culture of imagination and passion without any regulating faith, the feverish indecision, the languid yet ever-growing self-idolatry, the moral atmosphere of impatience, irritation, curiosity, the mingled rapture and pain of vagrant imagination, the utter caprice and prostration of will,—these were the characteristics of a period which was impersonated by, and which recognized itself at length in Goethe. In the earnestness as well as in the levity of an irreligious age, the ordinary motives to self-destruction acquired a new and fatal force;

and the growing evil was only checked by the Christian reaction which followed on the French Revolution throughout Europe; and which again restored belief in the solemnity of life by forcing men to look steadily at the eternity which succeeds it. Certainly, we have only to refer to yesterday's paper[1] to read the account of a suicide from London Bridge. Domestic misfortunes, temporary derangement, moral despair, still count their too numerous tale of victims. But it is a simple matter of fact that belief in a future state, as taught by Christ and His Apostles, is the one adequate antidote to this weird contempt for the gift of existence—a contempt which cannot really extinguish the gift which it yet can so irretrievably curse.[2]

It would be easy to shew in like manner how —sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly—Christianity has bettered the condition of the masses of mankind by making Christians feel the value of each separate life. Our Lord has done this, as no other has done it: nowhere is human life thought so highly of as where the Christian creed is sincerely believed to be absolute truth. The history of infanticide is one among other illustrations of this result of a hearty belief in immortality. The great Christian doctrines centre in, they are unintelligible apart from, faith in the value of the individual soul. The soul's value is measured in a Christian's judgment by the stupendous truth of the Incarnation

[1] *Standard*, March 19, 1870.

[2] On this subject the opening Essay in M. Caro's Nouvelles Études Morales is full of interest; and I am indebted to it in the foregoing paragraphs

and Death of the Everlasting Son; by the gift and energies of the Divine Spirit; by the perpetual intercession of Christ in heaven; by the grace and power of the Sacraments; by the prospects which open to faith's eye beyond the grave—upwards into an illimitable Heaven, downwards into a fathomless hell. Confronted with each of these truths, the soul confidently, yet tremblingly, feels its dignity—its priceless dignity—in the Eye of its Maker. The soul feels as if, when it turns awhile from the daily round of duty to gather itself up into itself, to sink a shaft into the depths of its consciousness, there were two, and only two, beings in existence—itself and its God. To know more of Him, to love Him more, to serve Him better—this is its constant effort; and its hope and prayer is to receive day by day, in larger measures, more abundant communications of His Mind and of His Life. In a word, when dwelling on the soul's nature and destiny, man understands that religion is his highest and most reasonable field of thought and work.

It has indeed been said that the old phrase of "saving one's soul" has ceased to have much meaning for the religion of educated people in the present day. If this be indeed true, we can only rejoin, in all truth and sorrow, "so much the worse for the educated people." Whatever be a man's place in society or in letters, whatever his circumstances in this earthly scene, it remains true that, to close with the offers which Christ makes to sinners, to "work out his salvation with fear and trembling," is his one most important business here. The eternal realities do not change with our intellectual fashions;

and, like the laws which govern our physical frames, the spiritual rules under which men live or die are the same for all of us. The day will come when the God-fearing peasants of Devonshire or of Yorkshire will rise in judgment against the cultured irreligion of the centres of our modern civilization: not because it is cultured, but because it is irreligion; because in the glare of its enthusiasms for the additions which it has made to the knowledge of our material home and structure, it has forgotten almost or altogether the Eternal Home beyond.

The salvation of the soul can only be treated as an old-world anachronism, when it is clear either that man has no real soul, or that it does not survive death, or that if it does survive, its condition hereafter has no reference whatever to its state and actions here. If this be really meant, it is better to say so; only, in that case, it is difficult to see what sphere is left for religion at all. If it be not meant, then, undoubtedly, a variety of the gravest questions at once open before us, both as to what we have to be saved from, and as to the means and conditions of our salvation. Upon the first of these questions, we shall encounter in the next lecture some of the more serious differences which divide the modern world: to-day it must suffice to have insisted upon the mingled blessedness and awfulness of life. What it is to live here at all as a human being; what it is to possess or rather to be a centre of self-reflecting thought, of self-determining will, a centre of life which under some conditions will be perpetuated indefinitely;—this, when we think of it steadily and in good earnest, is, next to the spiritual sight of

God Himself, the most solemn, the most chastening, the most stimulating consideration that can open upon us. Let us make much of it, in the interests both of the present and the future, for the sake of God and truth, as well as of our own lasting happiness. Let us determine to ask ourselves again and again during the coming week, what in our inmost selves we really are, and, next, whither we are going. Let us listen to a voice which will at times find some echo in every conscience, and which bids us, in God's name, reflect that "the things which are seen are temporal, while the things which are not seen are eternal."

LECTURE IV.

Fourth Sunday in Lent.

THE OBSTACLE TO RELIGION—SIN.

S. James i. 15.

When desire hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death.

The ground which we have hitherto traversed is, in the main, common ground to those who accept the idea of religion in any serious sense at all. Religion is impossible, except as a bond between a real, that is to say, a moral and governing God, and a real, that is to say, a conscious, self-determining, immortal soul. Deny either term of the statement, and religion dissolves into an unpractical sentiment, which either has no adequate object, or else no adequate subject and field for its existence. Hitherto, therefore, at least generally, we have occupied positions which may be taken up even by theories which are very earnestly opposed to some of the most distinctive features of the Christian creed. But to-day we advance a step further; and this advance, it is well to say at the outset, must forfeit the sympathy of many who have thus far been able to accompany us. We have reached a point at which we encounter a fact of such widespread and deep significance, that it must perforce colour and impress any real religion,

from first to last; so that its pressure and importance are felt both in the drift and substance of religious belief, and in the characteristic temper and dispositions of a religious mind. The fact in question is moral evil. Moral evil, or sin, is the disturbing and disorganizing force which breaks up the original relationship of love and confidence between God and man. In view of moral evil, revelation must be not merely illuminative, but remedial; and religion, in order to be true to the facts of human nature, must consist predominantly in penitence and contrition. And Christianity is broadly at issue with not a few of the religious proposals which aspire to take its place in the present day on this very ground. It does, and they do not, practically recognize this universal and fundamental fact: they do, and it will not, consent to gloss sin over, or to explain it away, or to assume that man's religious wants can be really satisfied without looking it boldly in the face, and providing a cure for and an antidote against it.

It would be a very great error to suppose that Christianity has invented the idea of sin only for the purpose of remedying it. If sin were not a fact independent of Christianity; if it were not an integral feature of human life, Christianity would long ago have perished. In the spiritual world, too, there is such a thing as supply and demand; and if a religion pre-supposes wants which do not exist, and brings remedies for diseases of which nobody is conscious, it has already signed its death-warrant. It is true that Christianity, as a revelation of the highest moral truth, has, beyond any other religion, educated man's sense of sin; but this sense of sin

was not itself a result of Christianity. Long before Christ came, the moral sin and sickness of the world was felt, rather than explicitly recognized. It was of course recognized by the educated conscience of Israel, with its moral law, creating a knowledge of sin, and its sacrificial system, deepening the sense of the guilt of sin, and its prophetic ministry, bring ing these general truths home with an unflinching courage and precision to the sinful kings and populations of the later centuries of its history. But this heart-sickness of the world was also a fact very vividly present to the comparatively uneducated conscience of Greece. What makes a great heathen say that even if death does involve endless unconsciousness, it ought, nevertheless, to be looked upon as substantial gain; a deep sleep throughout a lifetime, a sleep unbroken by dreams, being, in his opinion, preferable to the active life of the most fortunate of mankind? Probably he could not have told us the real reason; this was an instinct of his rather than a reasoned judgment. He instinctively perceived that in human life, as he saw it, even under its brightest aspects, there was on the whole more evil than good. More evil than good,—but not merely or chiefly more physical evil. The natural courage of a great soul would never have regarded a preponderance of misfortune or of pain in a human life as a reason for wishing to be practically non-existent. The evil which decided the balance of judgment against the expediency of life, was more penetrating, more oppressive, more fatal to the sense of having a right to live than any pain of body, or loss of friends or of goods could possibly be. It was,

in a word, moral evil. The heathen knew of the existence of moral evil, but they had very imperfect ideas of its extent and nature. They knew that there was a right and a wrong, to which man is bound to conform himself. But what is right and what is wrong, and why right is right, and wrong is wrong;—these were subjects upon which their knowledge was exceeding imperfect. Yet the general fact of man's disloyalty to such moral truth, as he knew, is often admitted by the leading minds of antiquity. They acknowledge man's secret misery; his proneness to yield to temptations which his conscience condemns; his forfeiture of the light which he actually enjoys by disobedience to its requirements. "I see and approve of the better course," says Ovid, "I follow the worse." "Nature has given us small sparks of knowledge," says Cicero, "we corrupt and extinguish them by our immoralities." "We are all wicked," says Seneca, "what one of us blames in another, each will find in his own bosom."[1]

The Epistle to the Romans itself, which sets out by shewing that both the Jewish and Gentile worlds, by reason of the sin which had overmastered them, stood in need of the justifying righteousness of Christ, is scarcely more explicit in its assertions than are these great heathens. For to observe human life at all, and to reflect on the observation, is to be conscious of its moral anomalies. This consciousness often takes the disguised form of a bitter complaint against the external conditions, nay, the very fact of life itself. So it was at the end of

[1] Quoted by Luthardt.

the last century. Werther translated Hamlet into the language of modern life, and Goethe made Werther European. Werther embodied the philosophy of melancholy; of dissatisfaction with life, grounded on a sense of hopeless irretrievable failure. In days nearer to our own, this Pessimism has found a prophet in Schopenhauer, the philosopher of Frankfort. "The history of every life," he says, "is but a history of suffering; the course of life is generally but a series of greater or of less misfortunes. The true sense of the monologue in Hamlet may be thus summed up. Our condition is so wretched that utter annihilation would be decidedly preferable." . . . "The oft-lamented shortness of life may be its best attribute." . . . "Life," he pursues, "may be represented as a constant deceiver in things both great and small. If it makes promises, it never keeps them, except to shew how undesirable is that which was desired. First the hope, then the thing hoped for, disappoints us. Life gives only to take away. The charm of distance shews a paradise, which vanishes like an optical delusion, if we allow ourselves to approach it. Hence our happiness ever lies in the future or in the past; the present may be compared to a dark cloud which the wind drives before it over the sunny plain; behind it there is the sunshine, beneath it a constant shadow. Life is consequently ever unsatisfying; the future being uncertain, the past irrecoverable. Life with its hourly, daily, weekly, and yearly, little, great, and greater discomforts; with its disappointments, its misfortunes, baffling all calculation; bears so plainly the impress of something which is to be spoilt to

us, that it is difficult to imagine how this could ever have been mistaken, and how any one could have conceived that life was given to be thankfully enjoyed, or man made to be happy. The general structure of life would rather produce the conviction that nothing is worth our efforts, our energies, and our struggles; that all possessions are vanity, the world a bankrupt in all quarters, and life a business which does not pay its expenses. Satisfaction and prosperity are merely negative—merely the absence of suffering; only sorrow and want can be positively felt." . . . "We do not perceive that certain days of our lives have been happy till they have given place to unhappy ones. If, then, there were a hundred times less sorrow in the world than there is, its mere existence would be enough to confirm a truth expressed in various ways, though always with some indirectness—namely, that the existence of the world is a matter not of rejoicing but of grief; that its annihilation would be preferable to its existence; that it is fundamentally something which ought not to exist. Human life, far from wearing the aspect of a gift, has every appearance of an incurred debt, the payment of which is exacted in the form of the urgent necessities, the tormenting desires, the unceasing want which life involves. The whole period of life is generally consumed in the liquidation of this debt, and yet it is only the interest which can be thus paid off. The payment of the capital is effected by death." [1]

Such is Schopenhauer's reply to the sunny Opti-

[1] Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, § 67, 59, ii. 46, qu. by Luthardt, Apolog. Vortr. Vorles, 2, Notes.

mism of Leibnitz, who deems this "the best of possible worlds"; and in this philosophy of despair we listen to the same chord as that already struck by the Platonic Socrates, although the despair is deeper and sadder than was possible for a heathen, who had never heard of a Christian's hope. For Schopenhauer might also seem at times to be expanding and paraphrasing S. Paul's picture of the whole creation groaning and travailing in pain together until now; only S. Paul saw light upon the distant horizon, and he knew the secret of the present distress. It was moral evil which had introduced this unrest and disorder, or which, if it had not introduced all physical suffering into the universe, at least had made it so intolerable. The aggravated, unappeasable restlessness which results from a conscious forfeiture of the harmony of our being with the moral law of the universe;—this it is which quickens the agony of that piteous wail to which we have just been listening: this it is which lights up in the human consciousness the sense of an almost infinite capacity for pain.

I.

The presence and power of moral evil in the world has ever afforded matter for the persevering, anxious, weary exercise of human thought. The difficulties of the problem have not silenced inquiry; the failure of one generation of thinkers has not discouraged another. Like the movements of the heavenly bodies, or the laws of health, the existence of moral evil is too patent, too importunate a subject,

to be permanently set aside by human beings: it exerts over all who seriously consider the meaning and facts of life too irresistible a fascination not to demand from each generation some attempt at accounting for it, however others may have failed to do so. And in dealing with this problem let us observe that there are two fatal tendencies, which beset, on this side and on that, the necessary path of inquiry with the importunity of a resistless fascination. Like Scylla and Charybdis, they divide between them the great majority of those who would attempt a passage; to escape from the one is generally to fall a victim to the attractions or violence of the other. Our path then lies between the temptation to extenuate the idea of evil, and the temptation to tamper with the idea of God.

1. Of these, the more welcome to the spirit of our time is the former. It is impossible to deny that moral evil exists; but is it impossible to soften that stern idea of evil which haunts the human conscience, and which is sanctioned by Revelation? May not moral evil be represented as a necessary product of man's nature and constitution, as the mere expression and symptom of his place among created beings, nay, even as an indispensable condition of his turning his opportunities to the best account and of fulfilling his destiny? Yes, it has been said, sin in man is only the measure of his failure to achieve ideal or metaphysical perfection. Man is confessedly a finite being; and the evil which clings to him, or which he does, is but an appropriate feature of his original circumstances. "The good is that which is, or the real: evil begins with that

which is not, or with the unreal." Therefore the Unbounded, All-powerful Being is alone the good, because of His Infinity and Almightiness. Creatures are partly good and partly evil; they are good so far as they exist; their evil begins with their finitude; it begins at the point where their little life shades off through weakness into non-existence. In this sense too, "whatever is, is right:" whatever tries to be, and cannot be, is wrong. Sin and weakness, strength and virtue, are interchangeable terms. Man as a moral agent suffers in two ways for this metaphysical imperfection of his life. His knowledge of duty is very limited, so that, while he really aims at what is good he constantly does something less than good, only from want of that enlarged information which is denied him by the limited conditions of his being. And he is also tied down to a gross material body, filled with sensual impulses and instincts, which control and overmaster his loftier aspirations. His sensuous nature necessarily and perpetually depresses the level of his thought and action; and in this depression, thus physically necessitated, from the line of his ideal attainments to that of his actual attainments, consists his sin.

Now, so far is sin from being the product of imperfect knowledge, that the imperfection of man's knowledge is the measure of his innocence. Knowledge is essential to responsibility; the latter can only exist in the ratio of the former. The lower creatures cannot sin against the knowledge which we have, but which they do not possess: we cannot sin against a higher knowledge than that which has

been vouchsafed to us. But we know enough to have enormous opportunities for sin open to us; and when we do sin, our consciences do not whisper that had we known more we might have been innocent still. Omniscience is not a condition of virtue; philosophers are not always saints, nor little children always criminals. Nor is sin correctly attributed to the necessary action of our sensuous nature. It is not, by any means, universally or even generally the product of insurgent senses. Ruinous as are the sins for which perverted sensual instincts furnish the material, there are many sins of the darkest type which have nothing to do with sense. We should be just as capable of envy and hatred, of ambition and pride, of untruthfulness, or the desire to destroy a fellow-creature, if we had no bodies at all. Sin then, as such, is not the irrepressible product of a sensuous body; nor is it the imperfection of moral or spiritual effort which alliance to such a body is thought of necessity to imply. In order to practise virtue, it is indeed often necessary, with the Apostle, to keep under our body and bring it into subjection;[1] but the body does not exert any irresistible power of depression over the higher instincts of the soul, or it would be useless to struggle against it. The seat of sin is in the will, whether sin be chiefly spiritual or sensual; the body merely furnishes one of the spheres wherein temptation may be found and sin is possible; and sin is a much graver thing than any failure to attain ideal goodness which arises from our being weighted with a body of sense. If sin were only inevitable weakness; if it were no

[1] 1 Cor. ix. 27.

thing more serious than a lowly condition in the scale of being resulting from man's physical circumstances; the conscience of man would no more torture him on account of it than the conscience of the cripple or the blind accuses him of his misfortune. Sin differs from virtue not as a flower which has been frostbitten differs from a flower which has escaped the frost, but as a self-made devil differs from an angel; and the body can no more fetter the will of the saint than the triumph of its rebellious senses can be held to measure or diminish the responsibility of the sinner.

So faint an estimate of evil may help us to create a morality that shall accommodate itself to human life as it actually is. It will not furnish us for long with a standard of moral truth which will remind us of what our life actually is not. It may recommend itself at once, and very persuasively, to our self-love. It were pleasant to think, if we could think, that we have never been in the terrible predicament of opposing and refusing a known standard of goodness; that, at the worst, we are only pardonable and even interesting instances of failure to be all that we conceivably might have been. To see in evil nothing beyond the result of man's finite nature; to see in it a privation only and not a contradiction of good, is undoubtedly calculated to put us all on very good terms with ourselves. But is any theory of the kind consistent with the most rudimentary idea of evil? Surely our consciences tell us that evil is a great deal more than a maimed effort at goodness, more than a privation of goodness which might be but is not. Evil and good are not, so

to put it, upon the same line of advance, with only this difference, that while goodness is success, evil is failure. If, for instance, I tell a very deliberate lie, with a view to getting possession of a sum of money by doing so, I surely do something more than fail to reach an ideal of perfect truthfulness. I move very deliberately in an opposite direction to that of truth; I do not come short of it; I contradict and trample it under foot. If nobody ever told a lie without wishing to tell the truth, while yet he failed, from defective knowledge, to do so perfectly, this theory of evil as the symptom of man's finite nature might at least claim a hearing. As it is, the real facts of every human conscience are against it.

And, accordingly, Holy Scripture speaks of sin in terms which are utterly at variance with any such estimate of moral evil as this. It speaks of "sin having dominion over us,"[1] and of the justified being "dead unto sin;"[2] but we are not ruled by imperfect forms of goodness, nor do we "die" to moral efforts which were only less successful than our present ones. It speaks of sin as a service, the wages of which is death;[3] as a defilement from which we must be cleansed and washed;[4] as a bondage from which Christ makes us free.[5] There is, it appears, a law of sin in our members, to which we may be brought into captivity;[6] and sin it is which constitutes the sting of death,[7] and which in its deliberate

[1] Rom. vi. 14. [2] Rom. vi. 2.
[3] Rom. vi. 23; cf. 1 S. John iii. 8.
[4] Ps. li. 2–7; Isa. i. 16; Jerem. iv. 14; Acts xxii. 16; 1 Cor. vi. 11; Rev. i. 5; Rev. vii. 14.
[5] Rom. vi. 16–22 [6] Rom. vii. 23.
[7] 1 Cor. xv. 56.

and emphatic form is the death of the soul.[1] How is all this language, which presupposes an energetic contradiction to exist between sin and holiness, to be reconciled with any representation of sin as being merely imperfection, whether of knowledge or of moral force? As if there were no sins except those of negligence and omission, no sins of set purpose to do evil; as if there were no such thing as knowing evil to be evil, and deliberately embracing it![2]

Indeed, to represent sin as something due to the original imperfection of human nature is to contradict the sanctity and justice of God. God is the Maker of His creatures; and if creatures are imperfect, as compared with the Creator, it is from the necessity of the case, because the creature is not the Creator. But this inherent or metaphysical imperfection does not necessarily imply moral imperfection: had it been so, God could not have created at all without violating His own attributes. And certainly, if man only sins because his views of absolute good are limited, and his higher aspirations weighed down by the body of sense which encompasses him, the author of that intellectual finiteness and of that sensual frame is the author of man's sin; and God, in creating, forfeits His sanctity, and in forfeiting His sanctity ceases to be the object of religion.

This conclusion, indeed, is not declined by the Pantheistic philosophy, and by that large body of thought in our day, which is profoundly, because for the most part unconsciously, moulded by it. Sin, we are told, like everything else, is really due to the Divine activity; but, then, sin is not without its

[1] S. John v. 16. [2] Rom. i. 32.

uses—I had almost said, its merits. It is, forsooth, the stimulant and condition of goodness. As in the world of Hegelian thought, truth, we are told, is not to be looked for in any single and direct affirmations, but only as the term of a series of contradictions, which not only may be true together, but are together necessary to express the full truth; so it has been asserted, that in the moral sphere there is a somewhat similar law of contradictories; that it is as unphilosophical to find fault with what is vulgarly described as sin, as it is to keep no terms with what is coarsely described as falsehood. Sin is the necessary foil to goodness: without sin goodness would never be roused into active life. Contradiction is a condition of moral life: goodness is not tranquil conformity to law, but energetic struggle against that which contradicts it, and which by contradicting it makes it what it is. "Just as nature is made up of contrasts, and in it we see light opposed to darkness, and heat to cold, and expansion to concentration, and pleasure to pain, and health to sickness, —even so does the true life of the human soul emerge from deep contrasts; it is only developed by the encounter between truth and falsehood, between good and evil." . . . "Evil is thus a condition, almost an ingredient of good. Goodness would slumber in itself, it would be without the necessary impulse to exertion, unless it were constantly kept on the alert by the antagonistic energies and excesses of evil."[1]

This singular travestie of the account which the Christian Revelation has given of the permission of

[1] Cf. quot. by Klotz, in his art. Sünde.

moral evil in the world, involves a fallacy of confusion. It confounds the good ends which evil, against its nature, may subserve in the purposes of an overruling Providence, with the inherent qualities of evil itself. Certainly it is better for the health of the body that latent disease should shew itself in pronounced illness; and when such illness is over, a patient may be all the stronger and better for having being ill. But for all that, disease is disease, and not a variegated form of health; and a man in whom disease had never been latent, and whose constitution had been even monotonously free from its assaults, will be, at least, as well as another who may have happily survived a scarlet fever. What God in His loving Omnipotence may make evil do in spite of its nature is one thing; what it is in itself is another. Vice is not a necessary aliment, it is not even a necessary foil to virtue. The devil is not necessary to the existence of God; and goodness does not depend either for its beauty or its strength upon the antagonistic efforts of sin. If it were so, we should at once reach the practical conclusion of the Materialistic philosophy, which denies the existence of any free will in man whatever, and sees in all moral actions, whatever their colouring, the inevitable result of antecedents which create them, by as necessary a law as any which rules the world of matter. Upon Materialistic principles, the murderer Traupmann ought never to have been executed: he was no more responsible for his atrocities than a flash of lightning or a wave would be for the destruction of human life. But upon the principles of the æsthetic Pantheism, it might even

have been questioned whether French society did not on the whole gain by his horrible activity: and whether one who had done so much to exhibit the virtue of respect for human life in high relief, by so emphatically contradicting it, was not, in consideration of his services, entitled to receive some higher and more substantial reward than a reprieve of the penalty which he actually suffered.

Indeed, it is here that we see how irreconcilable any such theory is with the plainest instincts of a healthy conscience. If evil is necessary to the existence of good, why should conscience condemn evil? How can conscience condemn that which is necessary to the good which it approves? How, if we are to pursue this line of thought, can we ultimately avoid acquiescing in a theory which, denying all distinctions of right and wrong as of the nature of baseless prejudice, sees in evil, as in good, only an energetic manifestation of life apart from any moral colouring whatever? A last protest may indeed be made to the effect that man's business is to contradict the metaphysical necessity for evil by the moral demand that it should be resisted. But this very demand, if it is to be enforced, must proceed upon the serious conviction that moral evil is evil; that it is a something which need not be; and that if we will, we are individually and perfectly free to accept or reject it.

Theories such as these are in truth expedients for representing sin as being less serious than it is; for softening the repulsive contrasts which it presents to holiness; for securing to it a right to feel at home in human conduct and in the human soul.

Every such theory attempts to put forth a more or less disguised justification and apology on behalf of sin, at the bar of intellect, that sin may, if possible, be received without dishonour, if it be not welcomed at the court of conscience. But conscience, when she is not benumbed or asleep, must protest implacably against these attempts to make sin respectable. She can see in them only so many invitations addressed to the single soul, bidding it look tolerantly or fondly on the sure instrument of its degradation and ruin; so many invitations addressed to human society, bidding it recognize or welcome the foe who is sworn to impede and to destroy the indispensable conditions of its coherence and progress.

2. It has indeed been the dread of softening down the idea of evil which has led the human conscience in very early ages to tamper with the idea of God. The instinctive recoil from the one error has plunged it into the other. The physical evil of pain, of disease, of death, inflicts itself upon the senses; and conscience accounts for physical evil by tracing it to moral evil. Conscience cannot deny the malignity of moral evil without dethroning herself. But why should moral evil exist? The All-Holy could not have created it: to have done so would have been to cease to be Himself. But why did He permit it? And who gave it being, that He should permit it?

In ages and civilizations when the idea of God was imperfect or impoverished, men accounted for the existence of evil by ascribing to it a being or principle, coeval with God, independent of Him, and of course opposed to Him. Whether this evil

was supposed to be matter out of which the Good God had fashioned the world, or whether it was conceived of as something more spiritual, the object and origin of the system was identical. It was an effort to account for the great perplexing mystery—the existence of evil. It is impossible, argued these ancient thinkers, that moral life and death, that good and evil, can flow from a single source. It is impossible that a Holy God can have been the author of evil. Evil, then, must be referred to some other origin: it must have had an author of its own. So far we cannot but follow; but then the argument appeals, in order to sustain its own false inference, to the gigantic proportions which evil has actually assumed. Considering how world-wide and imperial is the sway of evil, must not evil, it asks, be referred to some person, principle, force, or tendency, higher and older than created things; to some almighty source, existing side by side with the Author and Source of goodness, in eternal contradiction to His Mind and work?

If we take the ancient Parsee doctrine as a sample, we find, in the lines of the Bundehesch, the good and evil principles—Ormuzd and Ahriman—contrasted as follows:—

> "Ormuzd is the light;
> This light is without beginning;
> Ormuzd is on high,
> Ormuzd is Holy,
> Ormuzd hath all knowledge."

On the other hand—

> "Ahriman is in darkness;
> This darkness is without beginning;

> Ahriman is in the depths;
> Ahriman delighteth in strife;
> Ahriman hath only a derived knowledge."[1]

Here, while Ahriman is in respect of knowledge the inferior of Ormuzd, they are represented as coeval; although the modern Parsees, especially when in conflict with Christianity, have tended, by exalting Ormuzd alone, by teaching that Ahriman became evil through an act of will, or by recognizing an eternal essence above both principles, from which they alike derive their origin, to approach more and more closely to a virtual Monotheism.[2] But there is no real question as to the practical Dualism of the earlier doctrine, which prevailed in Persia at least from the date of Darius Hystaspes to that of Alexander the Great, and again after the fall of the Parthian dynasty,—the doctrine which is confronted in the pages of the Hebrew Scriptures. In Isaiah, the God of Israel proclaims—

> "I am the Lord,
> And there is none else:
> There is no God beside Me. . . . . .
> I form the light and create darkness;

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[1] Ahardanesch, qu. by Hanneberg from Jos. Müller, art. Parsismus.

[2] Cf. Hanneberg, who quotes Wilson, "The Parsee Religion," Bombay, 1843, p. 107. It would seem that the superiority of Ormuzd was never supposed to imply his power of preventing the birth of Ahriman or of annihilating him. Compare on the Zeruane Akerene, or eternal essence above the two principles, Müller, L. von d. Sünde, ii. 5. "Being only seldom mentioned in the Zendavesta," he says, "this is a very isolated conception, exercising no influence upon the system as a whole, nor on the development of the conflict between the two principles: and thus this ultimate unity is too meagre and weak an abstraction to have any power in itself to rob the evil principle of its strength or to reconcile it with the good."

I make peace and create evil;
I the Lord do all these things."[1]

Here we have a revelation probably designed to protect the faith of Israel against the Dualistic influences to which it would be exposed during the later period of the Captivity. The Eternal Lord of Heaven was much more ancient than this antagonism of good and evil which meets men's eyes in the world, and which suggested the faith from which was evolved the Zendavesta. The evil principle itself was only created by Him in this sense; that He had formed the wills which, in their perverted freedom, gave it birth. "I am the Lord, and there is none else."

In Christian times we find S. Paul insisting upon the truism, as it appears to us, that "every creature of God is good, and nothing to be despised,"[2] as a reason for rejecting certain distinctions of food which were insisted on by some ancient ascetics at Ephesus. But S. Paul is really combating another form of the doctrine of Two Principles; which held matter to be the seat and source of evil, and certain kinds of food to be peculiarly representative of the grossness of matter. When Augustine, in a later age, as a still unconverted young man, giving the freest license both to sensual passion and to intellectual enterprise, was casting about for a theory which would at once countenance his excesses, and furnish him with a working philosophical explanation of the universe, he found it in Manicheeism. Manicheeism was the Dualism which had acquired

[1] Isa. xlv. 5, 6, 7. [2] 1 Tim. iv. 4.

a Christian flavour by coming into contact with Christianity; and we may form some idea of the strength and fascination of the theory, by observing how tenacious was its hold upon the clear and beautiful mind of the greatest of the Fathers, even when the full light of Catholic truth was already breaking upon him.

Isaiah's words will have already suggested that seriously to believe in two eternal principles is fatal to serious belief in the existence of God. God is the one Self-existent Being; the Maker of all things, visible and invisible. To assert that another—whether essence, person, or even matter—existed eternally side by side with God, is to deny God's first and necessary prerogative, as the Alone Eternal, and Self-Existent. If God is to be screened in human thought from the blasphemy which would credit Him with the origination of evil, it must be by some doctrine which, unlike Dualism, does not virtually annihilate Him in order to do so.

But the doctrine of Two Principles does not succeed even in its main object, namely, the protection and affirmation of the unimpaired idea of evil itself. Evil is, in its quaintly perverted estimate, rather a growth of nature than the free product of a created will: evil has a positive substance of its own. Evil must therefore be conquered by a physical rather than a spiritual or moral treatment. This would seem to have been the idea of these mistaken ascetics at Colossæ,[1] whom S. Paul observed and reproved. And the error leads to consequences beyond itself. If evil is physical, there is no more

[1] 1 Col. ii. 22, 23.

reason for distress at a habit of lying, than at tuberculation of the lungs. If sin is physical, remedies may or may not succeed; and a moral struggle is on the whole less reasonable than a torpid resignation.

At any rate, it may be said, we of this generation are not Dualists: and what good is to be done by disinterring and gibbeting the corpses of ancient errors? But let us recollect that when error is buried as a formal theory, it often leaves behind it a miasma which infects the world of thought for many a succeeding generation.[1] We practically affirm a second evil principle in the universe when we acquiesce in the notion that evil in ourselves or in others, in individuals or in societies, is invincible. We do not talk of a second principle; we assume one. We assume not merely a powerful but an unconquerable devil, when we despair of expelling, by God's Grace, that which is evil in ourselves or in others. We bow, as we say, to the inevitable; we recognize such and such tendencies of the times. They are perhaps at issue with what we know to be right. But there they are; the current flows all one way and with increasing strength, and we say that it is useless to attempt to make head against it. Instead of overcoming evil with good, like the Apostle, we philosophically resign ourselves to being overcome with evil. But our notion of the invincibility of sin and error is at issue with our still pro-

[1] Müller, L. von d. Sünde, ii. 5: "The theological and philosophical characteristics of the present day furnish a poor guarantee that the tendency to take a dualistic view of the world, may not, perhaps at no very distant time, become again as strong as it was a few decades of years ago, and as the Pantheistic *furore* is again in our own day."

fessed faith in the One All-Powerful and Holy God. Our faint-heartedness, our despair, our abject fatalism in presence of evil, within and around us, is probably a relic of the old Dualistic leaven, which sees in evil the resistless play, the unconquerable energy of an eternal principle; which refers it to a power that, could it have existed, would have made God impossible.

No. There must be no tampering with the idea and character of God; with His Unity, with His Omnipotence, with His Sanctity. To deny these is to destroy, in human thought, the ascertained object of religion. If there is One God, All-powerful and Moral, and if moral evil is a fact in the universe, the existence and nature of moral evil must be in some way accounted for by serious Theists, if it can be accounted for at all, without impugning the morality and the Omnipotence of God.

II.

What, then, is sin in itself? What representation of it will neither obliterate the lines of moral truth, nor do injustice to the Sanctity or the Omnipotence of God?

S. James, in the passage which is before us, furnishes us with materials for answering this question. He says that desire when it hath conceived bringeth forth sin. He thus places the origin of moral evil in the created will, of which desire is the moral ingredient. Desire is, indeed, the raw material of moral life. It is neutral force which may become, under different circumstances, either sanctity

or sin: and thus S. Augustine has defined virtue as "love or desire ruled by true order." Desire is part of the original outfit of every human being; a sympathetic impulse whereby the various instincts and faculties of our nature are drawn towards something external to itself. What is that something? In man's unfallen state of old, and in his state of perfectly restored sanctity hereafter, God is the true object of all human desires: man desires God for His own sake, and all created objects only for the sake of God. In the original design of God, desire in the moral world corresponds to the law of attraction in the physical; and the perfected saint, in all the activity of his moral and intellectual life, moves around the great Centre of his adoration with an undeviating regularity, such as is that of the planet circling in its orbit around its parent sun. But the planet cannot modify or weaken the attraction which governs it. It cannot plunge anarchically through space, seeking a place in some other system where it may attend upon some other sun, or itself become the centre of other satellites; whereas desire, being moral, does not bind free agents to loyal revolutions around their true Centre by any such necessity. Man may at his option cease to desire God: he may, in the stead of God, desire one of God's creatures for its own sake, and with the vehemence of an absorbing passion. And since no other creature can really take God's place, man thus tends to make himself his own centre; to view all persons and events relatively to himself; to think of God, if at all, as only one of the points on the circumference of his own petty and fictitious uni-

verse. When desire is thus perverted by being wedded to the things of time and sense, as if they could really satisfy the yearnings of the soul, it "bringeth forth sin." Like an atmosphere charged with infection, desire spent upon created things is pregnant with sin: it implies that idolatrous surrender of self to creatures, that passionate claim upon creatures on behalf of self, which in the end severs the bond between God and the soul.[1] And hence an act, or series of acts, whether of thought, or word, or deed, to which in its freedom the will consents, and which contradict the moral order of the universe.

And this is sin. Sin, to be complete, need not become speech or action: a formed desire, deliberately assented to by the will, constitutes sin.[2] "He that looketh on a woman," says our Lord, "to desire her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart."[3] Indeed, it is the internal act, and not the material product of the act, which is chiefly of moral importance. What is the precise form or turn of the inward act? Here the beautiful and suggestive words, which are used to express the idea of sin in the sacred language, but which are untranslatable into our clumsier Western tongue, will help us. In the fifty-first Psalm, for instance, besides the generic expression for evil,[4] there are three words which

[1] 1 S. John ii. 17, ἐπιθυμία τοῦ κόσμου. Tit. ii. 12; Rom. vii. 7, 8.

[2] This aspect of sin has been well re-stated in Jul. Müller's Lehr. v. d. Sünde, i. i. c. 8.

[3] S. Matt. v. 28.

[4] רַע, v. 6, broadly opposed to טוֹב—Gen. xxiv. 50; Levit. xxvii. 10. In a more emphatic moral sense, Prov. viii. 13; Ps. vii. 10. רשׁע means originally to be noisy, tempestuous; the

describe different aspects of the idea of sin. Of these, one implies that God's Will being the aim which man rightly pursues, sin is a missing his true goal in life.[1] A second regards sin as a twisting or perversion of the will from the right way.[2] A third brands it as rebellious transgression of Divine law,[3] of a covenant with God, of the law which man is bound to obey. The New Testament expressions substantially correspond; and they have *this* in common. Sin is an offence against moral truth; known, and contradicted although known. "Sin," says S. Augustine, "is something said or done or desired in contradiction to the Eternal Law."

Why the "Eternal" Law? This question can only be answered when we reflect on the nature of moral truth. Moral truth is not like the laws and facts of the physical world; it is not something which might have been otherwise than as it is, had

transition to the idea of moral disorder appears in רָעַע, which is primarily used of breaking in pieces with a crash, Job xxxiv. 24; Ps. ii. 9; then of evil generally, and finally, in the Hiphil especially, of evil action.—J. Müller, Lehr. v. d. Sünde, i. i. c. 2.

[1] חָטָא, v. 5. The primary idea seems to be that of stumbling on the way to a goal—Prov. xix. 2; in which is implied the missing of the object in search—Prov. viii. 36. Not that חטא is used only or chiefly of sins of infirmity, whether of thought or will: it is often applied to the gravest sins, and implies that which is characteristic of all sin, namely, that sin is a moral action, in which man misses the aim for which he was created by God.

[2] עָוֹן v. 4, from עָוָה, to be bent or distorted, implies evil considered as departure from man's appointed path—Job xiii. 26; Gen. iv. 13.

[3] פֶּשַׁע, v. 5. פָּשַׁע primarily implies faithless rebellion against a covenant, as in Isa. i. 2, xliii. 27; Jerem. iii. 13; Amos iv. 4 1 Kings xii. 19, &c

God so willed. God was under no necessity to make either one or a million suns or planets, or to furnish them with a particular temperature and particular inhabitants. Why not? Because there was nothing in His necessary nature which constrained Him to do so. He created in His freedom: He created as He created in His freedom: He might have created otherwise: He was free not to have created at all. But could God ever have sanctioned you or me in saying that that which we know to be false is true? Why not? Because, in sanctioning us, God would be contradicting, not a law which He might have made other than as He has made it, but a necessary truth of His Own Eternal Nature. A moral truth is like a mathematical axiom; we see it intuitively, and we do this because it is necessarily true, and, as being necessarily true, is also a truth of God's Eternal Nature. Can any reasonable man, for instance, without destroying and uprooting the very constitution of the mind which God has given him, conceive that under any possible circumstances it could ever have been true that things which are equal to the same are not equal to one another? If not; then, here we have an eternal truth. And if this be an eternal truth, it is, as such, a real part of God's Eternal Nature; since if this be denied, we must admit that there are eternal truths independent of God, and existing eternally apart from Him. Would not this in effect be a denial of His solitary self-existence? Either God does not exist, or all that is eternal is God. But if pure mathematical truth, as being eternally true, be thus Divine, moral truth is not less so. If we cannot believe that a lie

was ever right, this is because veracity is an eternal law of the Divine Nature; and this applies to the whole moral law, which is, in reality, the Divine Nature formulated into rules which suit the conditions of creaturely existence. Thus, given the parental relationship, it never could have been right to dishonour a father or a mother: given human life, murder could never have been other than criminal: given the responsibility of transmitting the gift of life, and adultery, which trifles with that responsibility, could never have been condoned: given the idea of personal rights, of property, and stealing is necessarily condemned. And thus it is that sin does not contradict a rule which God has made of one kind, but which He might have made of another; it contradicts a rule which, in its principle, is necessary and eternal; a rule which does not depend even upon the Will of God Himself, since it embodies and expresses His Divine and unchanging Essence; a rule which accordingly it is impossible to contradict, without running counter to, and, so far as we can, setting at naught and destroying the very Being and Nature of God Himself. "Against Thee only have I sinned," is the voice of the sinner's deepest knowledge of himself. And it was this which led ancient divines to say, that if, *per impossibile*, moral evil could be pushed to a point of sufficient exaggeration, it would annihilate God. By this saying, they expressed the vital and fundamental opposition which exists between sin and the Divine Nature.

Now, such an account of moral evil cannot be said to attenuate its malignity; but is it equally careful of the character of God? If evil be thus antagonistic

to God, how can God, at once Almighty and All-holy, have allowed it to exist? As All-holy, He must abhor it; as Almighty, He surely might have proscribed what He abhors?

The answer is, that, notwithstanding the inherent quality of evil, the possibility of its existence is, so far as we can see, a needful condition of true moral freedom. God might have created a universe ruled from first to last by physical law, and so incapable of deviation from the true rule of its action. In such a universe, moral evil would have found no place, only because there would have been no creatures properly capable of moral good. Our experience tells us that God has not chosen to stint down His creative activity to these proportions: that we are free agents, is not more a matter of faith than of experience. We know that God has created beings whose high privilege it is to be able freely to choose Him as their King, as the accepted Master of their whole inward life; but if this privilege is to be real, it also carries with it the implied power of rejecting Him. The alternative risk is the inevitable condition of the consummate honour: it is actually a substantial part of the honour. A moral being must at least have a capacity for disobedience if he is to be able freely to obey.

If, then, God has permitted evil, it is not because He has ceased to be Himself, but because His generosity has been abused. The source and root of moral evil is to be found, not in the Good God, but in the abused freedom of the creature, whether it be man or angel. It were hard indeed to blaspheme God for His generosity; to complain that He has

made us men and not brutes or stones, because, forsooth, as a race, as well as in our individual lives, we have turned His bounty against Himself, and made the greatness of His gift the measure of our degradation.

It will be urged that God must have "foreseen" the abuse that would follow upon His gift of freedom. Certainly. But those who believe in His Wisdom and His Love at all, must surely believe that He foresaw much else. They will believe with S. Paul that if, in the event, sin has abounded, grace has much more abounded.[1] They will believe with S. Augustine that "God knew it to be more agreeable to His almighty goodness even to bring good out of evil, than not to permit evil to exist."[2] He might be trusted to strike the balance of advantages between a universe ruled only by physical law and a universe so open to the possible invasion of evil as to be darkened by its actual presence and apparent victory, but withal illuminated by the remedy, which, in the long run, was to be much more than equal to grappling with the disease. Sin might be tolerated, if the Eternal Son was to redeem the world. We know at any rate how the world's Ruler has decided, and it is scarcely reasonable to complain that He has not admitted us to share all the reasons which governed His decision.

[1] Rom. v. 18–20, *οὗ δὲ ἐπλεόνασεν ἡ ἁμαρτία, ὑπερεπερίσσευσεν ἡ χάρις.*

[2] De Cor. et Gr. c. 10. Qui creavit omnia bona valde et mala ex bonis exoritura esse præscivit; scivit magis ad omnipotentissimam suam bonitatem pertinere etiam de malis benefacere quam mala esse non sinere.

III.

Here, then, I repeat the statement with which I began, that if a religion is to be a life-controlling principle, it must practically recognize the fact of sin. For, since sin provokes God's necessary displeasure on the one hand, and destroys man's power and even his wish to seek God on the other, its direct effect is to break up that bond between God and man in which religion essentially consists. Religion, therefore, must deal with sin, not as if it were making a supererogatory exertion, but as a condition of its own survival. It must remove this fatal obstacle to its proper activity, if it is to exist at all. Not less necessary is this practical recognition of sin by religion, if religion is to be of any real benefit to society. Go out into the streets of this great capital, or read the daily journals which register the thought and incidents of our national life, and what are the two spectres which meet you most constantly? Are they not suffering and crime? And what is suffering, at least in the main, but the effect and shadow of sin; if not of the sufferer's own sin, yet at least of some physical or social legacy from a parent's error? What is crime in its most venial form but sin, prompted by suffering and organized and solidified, until in its brutal exuberance it threatens even the existence of society? Has religion nothing to say to the moral mischief which is the parent of these dark phantoms? Is she dreaming? Is she powerless? Is she abandoning her high hope and mission of saving humanity from its worst enemies?

It is here that true religion parts company altogether with certain phases of so-termed religious thought, which are not without an ambition to be considered at least the rudiments of some future religion or civilization. Doubtless they embody much which recommends them, at any rate, to the interest of educated people. They are philosophical; they are enterprising; they are in good taste; they occupy a large amount of attention in our journals and periodicals. Nor are they insensible to the evil of crime, considered as a cause of social disturbance and danger. They would sometimes deal more hardly with it than would be morally possible for men who had a deeper insight into the relative responsibility of criminals. But ignoring the awful yet blessed doctrines of Redemption and Grace, they have no remedy for sin; no remedy, that is, of any practical value;[1] and, after all, sin is the great fact

[1] The profound remarks of Julius Müller on the attempt observable in many modern schemes of education to expel one sin by the cultivation of another, are well worth transcribing here. Speaking of the internal disagreement of evil with itself, he observes that "the two fundamental sinful tendencies, pride, and the empire of fleshly desires, are precisely those which stand in the most striking contrast and mutual hostility to each other. Whoever gets between these two currents is unceasingly driven by them hither and thither; when he gets clear of the one, he is seized by the other. In a condition of higher cultivation, this alternate service of opposing sins is determined by the play of man's own secret will. Man learns the miserable trick of turning, now to the one side, and now to the other, to pride at one turn, at another to sensuality. The virtuous aspirations to which man rises out of his sensual degradations, only serve to excite and fortify a self-satisfaction which had been humbled; he abandons the pleasures of lust in order to refresh himself with the efforts of his pride. Rightly recognizing the fact of this internal conflict of evil with itself, Modern Education, by alienating itself from that Christian

with which they ought to deal. Animated speculation on religious topics, careful reproduction of the external drapery of scenes in early sacred history, quick capacity for analyzing and delineating sentiment, is very welcome in its place. It has indisputably a literary value; but it does not help us to confront the stern realities of this human world. The religion which has no fixed doctrines, or scarcely any; no code of absolute truth, to be taught and suffered for at all costs; no word of heart-searching warning, and yet of tenderest consolation for sinners, —is not really a religion at all. It is at best a very one-sided philosophy. Its endeavours to deal with the great heart-sores of humanity remind us of a celebrated physician who, at the bedside of a patient, writhing in protracted agony, would airily discuss his own last excursion in the Alps, or the last debate in Parliament, or at best the most recent resolution arrived at by the Metropolitan Board of Health.

The religion of Jesus Christ, as taught by His Apostles, does not thus trifle with the seriousness of sin. It begins by deepening the sense of sin, the perception of its real area and power in human life. It adds poignancy to the feeling of shame and guilt which in a healthy conscience follows upon deliberate sinful action. By the Mosaic law there was a knowledge of sin.[1] By the teaching and Example of Jesus Christ there is a much truer and deeper

principle upon which alone true self-love and noble self-reliance may rest, often adopts the plan of conquering the sins of self-degradation and dissipation in youth by the passionate stimulus of pride and ambition; and thus, alas! it has achieved nothing beyond casting out the devil by Beelzebub the prince of the devils." Lehr. von d. Sünde, ii. 5.

[1] Rom. iii. 20.

knowledge of it.[1] That faultless and unapproached Life which we study in the pages of the Gospels, brought home to the heart as well as to the understanding by the secret teaching of the Eternal Spirit, endows the Christian with an ideal of sanctity altogether his own.[2] Around the Sermon on the Mount, or the last discourse in the Upper-room, there is an unearthly atmosphere of purity and holiness, which lights up in the soul, with microscopic distinctness, the consciousness of secret evil, more perfectly than could any code of precepts. One only appearing among us in human form has been able to ask the tremendous question, "Which of you convinceth Me of sin?"[3] And as we gaze on Him, Holy, Harmless, Undefiled, separate from sinners, in His purity, His courage, His humility, His tenderness, His majestic moral strength, His fearless loyalty to truth, His vast charity, we see that which reveals us to ourselves. At the Feet of the Lamb without blemish and immaculate, we feel, with Job, that the report of God's sanctity has been at length exchanged for sight;[4] we exclaim with the Apostle, "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord."[5]

Nor does Jesus Christ stop here. He reveals, as does no other, not merely the fact and malignity of sin, but its consequences. The sternest things that have ever been said, as regards sin's prospects in another world, first passed the tenderest lips that ever proclaimed God's love to man.[6] Our Lord

[1] S. Matt. v. 21–48. [2] S. John viii. 12.
[3] S. John viii. 46. [4] Job xlii. 5. [5] S. Luke v. 8.
[6] S. Mark ix. 43-48; S. Matt. xxv. 46; S. John v. 29.

would not leave the revelation of the penal future to His Apostles: He took the unpopularity of making such a revelation upon Himself. No unbelieving criticism can really touch the plain meaning of the tremendous words in which the All-Merciful One has depicted the case of a moral being, stiffened by final impenitence into a permanent, self-torturing rebellion against Eternal Justice and Eternal Love. But for that awful measure of sin, the saying concerning Judas had been a paradox: "It were good for that man if he had never been born."[1]

Yet if Jesus Christ had only taught us the penalties of sin, He would but have enhanced the terrors of the ancient law. Whereas, in reality, He has made it possible for us to look at moral evil as it is. We Christians can dare to examine it, for He has brought us both a pardon and an antidote. His Cross and Passion are a revelation as well as a cure. When dying, He shews us what sin is. At least to those who take Him at His word, and see in Him One Higher than the sons of men, the Cross will surely have this meaning. Why could not the Holy One, manifested to His reasonable creatures in a Form of sense, have ended a life of beneficence and glory by such a visible ascent to heaven as was that of the Tishbite? Why those years of privation and sorrow, those sufferings and insults, that shame and scorn? Why the prostration in the garden, and the Wounds and the Blood, and the Agony lengthened out by ingenious cruelty, and the ostentatious exultation and triumph of the hosts of evil, and the darkness and gloom of the closing scene? Would not this

[1] S. Matt. xxvi. 24; S. Mark xiv. 21.

mean failure, if it had not been proved by the event to mean a victory, wherein the Divine Sufferer was triumphing, as His Apostle notes, over the associated powers of darkness?[1] That unfathomed pain is the true measure of sin for Christians. In that keen sensitiveness, in that strength of a self-sacrificing Will, in that exhaustive anticipation of and intellectual familiarity with the coming Agony, followed by so entire an acceptance of it, we Christians discern the real character of the adversary which the Perfect Moral Being conquered by His voluntary death. From that fountain of pardon and strength which He opened upon Calvary, all[2] the resources which His Church can wield in her struggle with His great enemy, and in her continuation of His work of reconciliation and peace, are consistently derived. No virtue exists in the world which is not His; no cleansing which His Blood has not made good. Standing beneath the Cross, we can never deem moral evil less or other than the greatest, if it be not rather the only evil. Kneeling before the Crucified, be our sense of guilt what it may, we can never despair; since the complete revelation of the malignity of sin is also and simultaneously a revelation of the Love that knows no bounds.[3]

It is these concrete truths, and no abstract considerations, which really keep alive in the Christian heart an abhorrence and dread of moral evil. With that evil, even when all has been pardoned, every Christian life is, from first to last, in varying degrees, a struggle. There are great conflicts, and there are periods of comparative repose; there are days of

[1] Col. ii. 15. [2] Acts iv. 12. [3] 2 Cor. v. 14; Rom. v. 15.

failure as well as days of victory; there are quickenings of buoyant thankful hope, and there are hours of a discouragement which is only not despair. But two things a genuine Christian never does. He never makes light of any known sin,[1] and he never admits it to be invincible.[2] While he constantly endeavours, by the sanctification of his desires, by entwining his affections more and more around the Source of goodness, to destroy sin in the bud, or rather in its root and principle, he is never off his guard; never surprised at new proofs of his natural weakness; never disposed to underrate either his dangers or his strength. He knows that now, as eighteen centuries ago, he wrestles not against flesh and blood,[3] but against principalities and powers that bear him no good will: he knows, that as at the first so now, "if any man sin, we have an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the Righteous, and He is the propitiation for our sins."[4] And thus, in his inmost life, he is at once anxious and hopeful; confident yet without presumption; alive to all that is at stake day by day, hour by hour; yet stayed upon the thought, nay, upon the felt Presence of a Love Which has not really left him to himself. And at last, when it seems best to that Eternal Love, the day of struggle draws to its close,[5] and the towers of the Everlasting City come into view; the city within whose precincts intellectual error cannot penetrate, and moral failure is unknown. "Thanks be to God Who giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ."[6]

[1] 1 S. John iii. 9; v. 18
[2] 1 Cor. x. 12.
[3] Eph. vi. 12.
[4] 1 S. John ii. 1.
[5] 2 Tim. iv. 6.
[6] 1 Cor. xv. 57.

Your alms are asked to-day on behalf of the additional clergy needed by this great parish with its twenty thousand poor.[1] You will feel that this is an opportunity of testing the earnestness of your desire to struggle against our common enemy, whether in the world or in your own hearts, by freely placing your means at His disposal, Who is its real and only Conqueror.

[1] St. James's, Piccadilly, Additional Curates' Fund.

LECTURE V.

Fifth Sunday in Lent.

PRAYER, THE CHARACTERISTIC ACTION OF RELIGION.

S. Matt. vii. 7.

Ask, and it shall be given you.

Religion is the bond between the soul and God, which sin, by virtue of its very nature, breaks up and destroys. It is of importance to inquire whether man can strengthen and intensify that which he can, it seems, so easily ruin if he will. Does his power lie only in the direction of destruction? Has he no means of invigorating and repairing a tie, in itself so precious, yet in some respects so frail? The answer lies in our Lord's promise. Prayer is the act by which man, conscious at once of his weakness and of his immortality, puts himself into real and effective communication with the Almighty, the Eternal, the Self-Existent God. I say, effective communication. For prayer, as our Lord teaches in the text and elsewhere, is not without results. God answers prayer in many ways. His answers to the soul's petition for health and strength are collectively described as grace; grace being the invisible influence whereby He on His part strengthens and

quickens the tie which binds the petitioner to Himself. "Ask, and it shall be given you." Prayer then braces the bond of religion from the side of man; and grace, God's highest answer to prayer, braces it in a different and far more powerful sense on the part of God.

It is not too much to say that the practice of prayer is co-extensive with the idea of religion. Wherever man has believed a Higher Power to exist, he has not merely discussed the possibility of entering into converse with such a Power; he has assumed, as a matter of course, that he can do so. Upon desert plains and wild promontories, not less than in crowded thoroughfares and gorgeous temples, priesthoods, and kings, and multitudes have taken prayer for granted, as being the most practical as well as the most interesting and solemn concern of life. The surface of the earth, of parts of our own island, is still covered with the relics of some among these ancient worships. And if the implied conceptions of deity were degraded, and the rites cruel, or inhuman, or impure, and the minds of the worshippers not seldom imbruted by the very acts which should have raised them heavenward; still the idea of worship as the natural correlative of belief in the superhuman was always there. To know that a higher Being existed, and interested Himself, in whatever way, in the destinies of man, was to feel that it was at once a right and a duty to approach Him.

And as we pass the historical lines within which, as Christians believe, mankind has enjoyed a knowledge of God's successive revelations of His true Self

and His true Will, we find that prayer is the prominent feature, the characteristic exercise of man's highest life. Sacrifice begins at the very gates of Eden.[1] The life of early Patriarchs is described as a "walking with God," a continuous reference of thought and aspiration to the Father above, Who yet was so near them.[2] And after the Mosaic Law was given, when the idea and range of sin had been deepened and extended in the mind of Israel, we find prayer organized in a system of sacrifices, suited to various wants and moods of the human soul, consciously dealing with its God as the King, both of the sacred nation and of the individual conscience. Penitence, thanksgiving, intercession, adoration, each found an appropriate expression.[3] Later still, in the Psalter, prayer—the purest, the loftiest, the most passionate—took shape in imperishable forms. And when at length a new revelation was made in Jesus Christ, there was little to add to what was already believed as to the power and obligation of prayer, beyond revealing the secret of its acceptance. Our Lord's precepts[4] and example[5] are sufficiently emphatic; and His Apostles appear to represent prayer not so much as a practice of the Christian life, as its very breath and instinctive movement. The Christian must be "continuing instant in prayer;" he must "pray without ceasing."[6]

[1] Gen. iv. 4. [2] Gen. v. 24; vi. 9. [3] Levit. i.–vii.

[4] S. Matt. vi. 9; S. Luke xi. 2; S. Matt. xxvi. 41; S. Mark xi. 24; S. Luke xviii. 1, &c.

[5] S. Matt. xiv. 23; S. Mark vi. 46; S. Luke vi. 12; ix. 28; S. John xvii. 1.

[6] Rom. xii. 12; 1 Thess. v. 17.

I.

Each faculty, or endowment, or form of activity that belongs to man has, over and above a number of more indirect effects, its appropriate and characteristic action, in which its whole strength is embarked, and in which it finds its full play and impetus. To this law religion is no exception. While its influence upon human life is strong and various in proportion to its high aim and object; while it is felt, when it wields real empire, in every department of human activity and interest, as an invigorating, purifying, chastening, restraining, guiding influence, it too has a work peculiarly its own. In this work it is wont, if we may so speak, to embark its collective forces, and to become peculiarly conscious of its direction and intensity. This work is prayer. Prayer is emphatically religion in action. It is the soul of man engaging in that particular form of activity which presupposes the existence of a great bond between itself and God. Prayer is, therefore, nothing else or less than the noblest kind of human exertion. It is the one department of action in which man realizes the highest privilege and capacity of his being. And, in doing this, he is himself enriched and ennobled almost indefinitely: now, as of old, when he comes down from the mountain, his face bears tokens of an irradiation which is not of this world.

That this estimate of the value of prayer is not universal among educated people in our day, is only too notorious. If many a man were to put into

words with perfect honesty and explicitness what he thinks, he would say that prayer is an excellent thing for a clergyman, or for a recluse, or for a sentimentalist, or for women and children generally; that it has its uses as a form of desultory occupation, an outlet for feeling, a means of discipline. For himself, he cannot really think that much prayer would help him greatly. It implies a life of feeling—perhaps, he would say, of morbid feeling; and he prides himself upon being guided only by reflection. It is sustained, he thinks, by imagination, rather than by reason; and he deems imagination puerile and feminine. His religion, whatever it is, has nothing to do with imagination, and is hard reason from first to last; and accordingly prayer seems to him to be altogether less worthy of the energies of a thinking man than hard work, whether it be work of the hands or of the brains, whether it be study or business. The dignity of real labour is proverbial, but where, he asks, is the dignity of so sentimental an occupation as prayer? "For his own part, he thinks" (I am quoting words which have actually been used) "that religion is not worship, but only another name for doing good to our fellow-creatures."

Now, without saying one word to disparage the intimate connection between religion and philanthropy, let us examine the idea of prayer, which is taken for granted in such language as the foregoing. Is it true that prayer is, as is assumed, little else than the half passive play of sentiment which flows languidly on through the minutes or hours of easy reverie? Let those who have really prayed give

the answer. They sometimes, with the patriarch Jacob, describe prayer as a wrestling together with an Unseen Power, which may last, not unfrequently in an earnest life, late into the night hours, or even to the break of day.[1] Sometimes, with S. Paul, they refer to common intercession as a concerted struggle.[2] They have, when praying, their eyes fixed upon the Great Intercessor in Gethsemane, upon the drops of Blood which fall to the ground in that Agony of Resignation and Sacrifice.[3] Importunity is of the essence of successful prayer. Our Lord's references to the subject especially imply this. The Friend who is at rest with his family, will rise at last to give a loaf to the hungry applicant.[4] The Unjust Judge yields in the end to the resistless eagerness of the widow's cry.[5] Our Lord's Blessing on the Syro-Phœnician woman is the consecration of importunity with God.[6] And importunity means, not dreaminess, but sustained work. It is through prayer especially that "the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force."[7] It was a saying of the late Bishop Hamilton of Salisbury, that "no man was likely to do much good at prayer who did not begin by looking upon it in the light of a work, to be prepared for and persevered in with all the earnestness which we bring to bear upon subjects which are, in our opinion, at once most interesting and most necessary."

This indeed will appear, if, looking to an act of

[1] Gen. xxxii. 24. [2] Rom. xv. 30. [3] S. Luke xxii. 44.
[4] S. Luke xi. 8. [5] S. Luke xviii. 5.
[6] S Matt. xv. 27, 28; S. Mark vii. 28, 29.
[7] S. Matt. xi. 12.

real prayer, we take it to pieces. Of what does it consist? It consists always of three separate forms of activity which, in the case of different persons, co-exist in very varying degrees of intensity, but which are found, in some degree, in all who pray, whenever they pray.

To pray, is first of all to put the understanding in motion, and to direct it upon the Highest Object to Which it can possibly address itself, the Infinite God. In our private prayers, as in our public liturgies, we generally preface the petition itself by naming one or more of His Attributes: "Almighty and Everlasting God!" If the understanding is really at work at all, how overwhelming are the ideas, the truths, which pass thus before it: a boundless Power, an Existence Which knows neither beginning nor end. Then the substance of the petition, the motives which are alleged for urging it, the issues which depend upon its being granted or being refused, present themselves to the eye of the understanding. And when prayer is not addressed to our Lord Jesus Christ Himself, the fact that it is addressed to the Father through Him, and in reliance on His Merits and Mediation,[1] opens upon Christian thought the inmost mysteries before the Eternal Throne. And thus any common act of real prayer keeps, not the imagination, but the understanding, occupied earnestly, absorbingly, under the guidance of faith, from first to last.[2]

Next, to pray is to put the affections in motion:

[1] This sentence has been altered to obviate a misapprehension of the writer's meaning.

[2] Eph. vi. 18; S. John iv. 22–29; Rom. x. 14; Heb. xi. 6.

it is to open the heart. The object of prayer is the Uncreated Love, the Eternal Beauty; He of Whose beauty all that moves love and admiration here is at best a pale reflection. To be in His Presence in prayer, is to be conscious of an expansion of the heart, and of the pleasure which accompanies it, which we feel, in another sense, when speaking with an intimate and loved friend or relative. And this movement of the affections is sustained throughout the act of prayer. It is invigorated by the spiritual sight of God, but it is also the original impulse which leads us to draw near to Him.[1] In true prayer, as in teaching, "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh."[2]

Once more, to pray is to put the will in motion, just as decidedly as we do when we sit down to read hard, or when we walk up a steep hill against time.[3] That sovereign power in the soul, which we name the will, does not merely, in prayer, impel us to make the first necessary mental effort, but it also enters most penetratingly and vitally into the very action of the prayer itself. It is the will which presses the petition; it is the will which struggles with the reluctance of sloth or with the secret opposition of sinful passion; it is the will which perseveres; it is the will which exclaims; "I will not let Thee go, except Thou bless me."[4] The amount of will which we severally carry into the act of prayer is the ratio of its sincerity; and where prayer

[1] S. Matt. xv. 8; 1 S. John iii. 21, 22.
[2] S. Matt. xii. 34; S. Luke vi. 45.
[3] S. John ix. 31; S. Matt. vii. 21; S. James iv. 7, 8. These passages all imply that prayer in which the will is not engaged is worthless.
[4] Gen. xxxii. 26.

is at once real and prolonged, the demands which it makes upon our power of concentrating determination into a specific and continuous act are very considerable indeed.

Now, these three ingredients of prayer are also ingredients in all real work, whether of the brains or of the hands. The sustained effort of the intelligence and of the will must be seconded in work no less than in prayer by a movement of the affections, if work is to be really successful. A man must love his work to do it well. The difference between prayer and ordinary work is that in prayer the three ingredients are more equally balanced. Study may in time become intellectual habit, which scarcely demands any effort of will: handiwork may in time become so mechanical as to require little or no guidance from thought: each may exist in a considerable, although not in the highest degree of excellence, without any co-operation of the affections. Not so prayer. It is always the joint act of the will and the understanding, impelled by the affections; and when either will or intelligence is wanting, prayer at once ceases to be itself, by degenerating into a barren intellectual exercise, or into a mechanical and unspiritual routine.

The dignity of prayer as being real work becomes clear to us if we reflect on the faculties which it employs. This will be made clearer still if we consider the effect of all sincere prayer upon the habitual atmosphere of the soul. Prayer places the soul face to face with facts of the first order of solemnity and importance; with its real self, and with its God. And just as art, or study, or labour

in any department is elevating, when it takes us out of and beyond the petty range of daily and perhaps material interests, while yet it quickens interest in them by kindling higher enthusiasms into life, so in a peculiar and transcendent sense it is with prayer. Prayer is man's inmost movement towards a Higher Power; but what is the intellectual view or apprehension of himself that originally impels him to move? Under what aspect does man appear to himself in prayer? In a former lecture we have encountered the mystery which lies enclosed within each one of us,—the mystery which is yet a fact,—of an undying personality. It is that which each human speaker describes as "I." It is that of which each of us is conscious as no one else can be conscious. Its existence is not proved to us by a demonstration, since we apprehend it as immediately obvious. Its certainty can be shaken by no sophistical or destructive argument, since our conviction of its reality is based upon a continuous act of primary perception. No sooner do we withdraw ourselves from the importunities of sense, from the wanderings of imagination, from the misleading phrases which confuse the mental sight, than we find ourselves face to face with this fact, represented by "I." For it is neither the body which the real self may ignore, nor a passionate impulse which the real self may conquer, nor even that understanding which, close as it is to the real self, is yet distinct from it. The body may be in its decrepitude; the flames of passion may have died away; the understanding may be almost in its dotage; yet the inward, self-possessed, self-governing being may remain untouched, realizing

itself in struggling against the instincts of bodily weakness, or in crushing out some embers which survive the fires of extinct passions. Now it is this self, conscious of its greatness, conscious of its weakness, which is the real agent in prayer. In its oppressive sense of solitude, even in the midst of multitudes, this self longs to go forth, and to commune with the Father of spirits Who gave it life. This real self it is which apprehends God with the understanding, which embraces Him with the affections, which resolves through the will to obey Him; and thus does it underlie and unite the complex elements of prayer, so that in true heartfelt prayer we become so conscious of its vitality and power. It is in prayer especially that we cease to live, as it were, in a single faculty, or on the surface of our being: it is in prayer that we cease to regard ourselves as animal forms, or as social powers, or as family characters, and look hard, for the time being, at ourselves, as being what we really are; that is to say, as immortal spirits, outwardly draped in social forms and proprieties, and linked to a body of flesh and blood, but in our conscious spiritual solitude looking steadily upwards at the Face of God, and straining our eyes onwards towards the great Eternity which lies before us.[1]

Prayer is then so noble, because it is the work of man as man; of man realizing his being and destiny with a vividness which is necessary to him in no other occupation. But what shall we say of it, when we reflect further that in prayer man holds converse with God: that the Being of beings, with all His

[1] S. Luke xviii. 13, 14.

majestic Attributes, filling and transcending the created universe, traversing human history, traversing each man's own individual history, is before him: that although man is dust and ashes, he is, by prayer, already welcomed in the very courts of Heaven? It is not necessary to dwell on this topic. Whatever be the daily occupations of any in this Church, be he a worker with the hands or a worker with the brain, be he gentle or simple, be he unlettered or educated, be he high in the state or among the millions at its base, is it not certain that the nobleness of his highest forms of labour must fall infinitely below that of any single human spirit entering consciously into converse with the Infinite and Eternal God?

II.

But granted, men say, the dignity of prayer—granted even its dignity as labour: what if this labour be misapplied? There are many functions in many states, very dignified and not a little onerous, yet in a social and human sense not very productive. Is prayer, in its sphere, of this description? Has it no tangible results? Does it end with itself? Can the labourer in this field point to anything definite that is achieved by his exertions?

The question is sufficiently serious at all times, but especially in our own positive and practical day. And it is necessary to make two observations, that we may see more clearly what issue is precisely before us.

In the first place, there is here no question as to

the subjective effect of prayer; the effect which it confessedly has upon the mind and character of the person who prays. Such effects have been admitted on the part of those who unhappily do not pray themselves; just as the Jews, at the time of the Betrayal, were so alive to tokens in the disciples of companionship with Jesus. That all the effects of Christian prayer upon the soul, or most of them, are natural, a Christian cannot admit: he believes them to be chiefly due to the transforming power of the Grace of God, given, as at other times, so especially in answer to prayer. But that *some* effects of prayer upon the soul are natural consequences of directing the mind and the affections towards a superhuman object, whether real or ideal, may be fully granted. Thus it has been observed that persons without natural ability have, through the earnestness of their devotional habits, acquired in time powers of sustained thought, and an accuracy and delicacy of intellectual touch, which would not else have belonged to them. The intellect being the instrument by which the soul handles religious truth, a real interest in religious truth will of itself often furnish an educational discipline; it alone educates an intellect which would otherwise be uneducated.[1] The moral effects of devotion are naturally more striking and abundant. Habitual prayer constantly confers decision on the wavering, and energy on the listless, and calmness on the excitable, and disinterestedness on the selfish. It braces the moral nature by transporting it into a clear, invigorating unearthly atmosphere: it builds

[1] Ps. cxix. 100.

up the moral life, insensibly but surely remedying its deficiencies, and strengthening its weak points, till there merges a comparatively symmetrical and consistent whole, the excellence of which all must admit, though its secret is known only to those who know it by experience.[1] Akin to the moral are the social effects of prayer. Prayer makes men as members of society different in their whole bearing from those who do not pray. It gilds social intercourse and conduct with a tenderness, an unobtrusiveness, a sincerity, a frankness, an evenness of temper, a cheerfulness, a collectedness, a constant consideration for others, united to a simple loyalty to truth and duty, which leavens and strengthens society. Nay, it is not too much to say that prayer has even physical results. The countenance of a Fra Angelico reflects his spirit no less than does his art: the bright eye, the pure elevated expression, speak for themselves. It was said of one who has died within the present generation,[2] that in his later years his face was like that of an illuminated clock; the colour and gilding had long faded away from the hands and figures, but the ravages of time were more than compensated for by the light which shone from within. This was what might have been expected in an aged man of great piety; to have lived in spirit on Mount Tabor during the years of a long life is to have caught in its closing hours some rays of the glory of the Transfiguration.

Secondly, prayer is not only—perhaps in some of the holiest souls it is not even chiefly—a petition for something that we want and do not possess. In the

[1] Ps. xxvii. 4, 5, 6.

[2] Rev. J. Keble.

larger sense of the word, as the spiritual language of the soul, prayer is intercourse with God, often seeking no end beyond the pleasure of such intercourse. It is praise; it is congratulation; it is adoration of the Infinite Majesty; it is a colloquy in which the soul engages with the All-wise and the All-holy; it is a basking in the sunshine, varied by ejaculations of thankfulness to the Sun of Righteousness for His light and His warmth. In this larger sense, the earlier part of the Te Deum is prayer as much as the latter part; the earliest and latest clauses of the Gloria in Excelsis as truly as those between them; the Sanctus or the Jubilate no less than the Litany; the Magnificat as certainly as the fifty-first Psalm. When we seek the company of our friends, we do not seek it simply with the view of getting something from them: it is a pleasure to be with them, to be talking to them at all, or about anything; to be in possession of their sympathies and to be shewing our delight at it; to be assuring them of their place in our hearts and thoughts. So it is with the soul, when dealing with the Friend of friends—with God. Prayer is not, as it has been scornfully described, "only a machine warranted by theologians to make God do what His clients want:" it is a great deal more than petition, which is only one department of it: it is nothing less than the whole spiritual action of the soul turned towards God as its true and adequate object. And if used in this comprehensive sense, it is clear that, as to much prayer, in the sense of spiritual intercourse with God, the question whether it is answered can never arise, for the simple reason that no answer is asked for.

But whether prayer means only, as in popular language it does generally mean, petition for a specific object, or the whole cycle of possible communion between the soul and God, the question whether it is heard is a very practical one. We do not address inanimate objects, however beautiful they may be, except in the way of poetical apostrophe. We do not enter into spiritual colloquy with the mountains, or the rivers, or the skies, with a view to discharging a duty to them, or really improving ourselves.[1] If there is really no Being above Who does hear us, what can be the use of continuing a practice that is based upon an altogether false presumption? The subjective benefits of prayer depend upon our belief in its real power But even if they did not, who would go through a confessedly fictitious exercise at regular intervals with a view to securing them? Who would continue to pray regularly, if he were once well persuaded that the effect of prayer is after all only like the effect of the higher philosophy or poetry; an education and a stimulus to the soul of man, but not an influence that can really touch the Mind or Will of that Being to Whom it is addressed? Nobody denies the moral and mental stimulus which is to be gained from the study of the great poets. But do we read Homer, or Shakespeare, or Goethe each morning and evening, and perhaps at the middle of the day? Or if such were the practice of any of us, should we have any approach to a feeling of

[1] The apostrophes of the Psalms and the Benedicite are really acts of praise to God, of which His creatures furnish the occasion.

being guilty of a criminal omission, if now and then we omitted to read them? No: if prayer is to be persevered in, it must be on the strength of a conviction that it is actually heard by a Living Person. We cannot practise any intricate trickery upon ourselves with a view to our moral edification. We cannot pray, if we believe in our hearts that in prayer we are only holding communion with an ideal world of our own creation; that we are like children, with overheated imaginations, vainly endeavouring to pass the barriers which really confine us to our dark earthly prison-house; while, in our failure, we half consciously, half unconsciously, cheat ourselves with the consolation of talking to shapes of power or benevolence traced by our fathers or by ourselves upon its inexorable walls. We cannot fall into the ranks of the Christian Church, lifting up the holy hands of sacrifice and intercession on all the mountains of the world, if in our hearts we see in her only a new company of Baal-worshippers gathering upon the slopes of some modern Carmel, and vainly endeavouring to rouse her idol into an impossible animation; while the Elijahs of materialistic science stand by to mock her fruitless efforts with the playful scorn of that tranquil irony to which their higher knowledge presumably entitles them.

The question whether God hears prayer, is at bottom the question whether He is really alive; whether in any true sense of the term He exists at all. No word is used more equivocally than the word "God" in the present day. If by "God" we mean only a product of the thought or consciousness

of man, to which it cannot be certainly presumed that any being actually corresponds: the highest thought of man—yet only man's highest thought: then there is of course no one who can hear us. It has been said that if a man talks out loud to himself, apostrophizing what are in truth only his own conceptions, it is difficult not to credit him with a certain tinge of madness; and it would be just as practical to address our prayer to the carved and gilded idols of Babylon, whose manufacture roused the sternest satire of the Evangelical Prophet, as to the unreal abstractions, which, labelled with the Most Holy Name, are sent us from the intellectual workshops, ancient and modern, of Alexandria or of Berlin. And if by "God" is meant only the unseen force of the universe, or its collective forces; if He is the principle of growth in the plant, the life-principle in the animal or in man; we need not read Spinoza in order to convince ourselves of the fruitlessness of prayer. A self-existing force or cause, if such can be conceived, without intelligence, without personality, of course without any moral attributes, may be a thing to wonder at, but it certainly is not a Being to speak to. We may of course ejaculate to such a thing if we like; but we might just as well say litanies to the winds or to the ocean. The question may be safely left to our utilitarian instincts. Time and strength, after all, are limited, and we shall not in the long run spend "our money," at least in this direction, "for that which is not bread, or our labour for that which satisfieth not."[1]

[1] Isaiah lv. 2.

If, on the other hand, God exists, whether we think about Him or not; if He be not merely the mightiest force, the first of causes, but something more; if He be a Personal Being, thinking with no limits to His thought, and willing with no fetters around His liberty; then surely we may reach Him, if we will. What is to prevent it? Cannot we men, at our pleasure, embody our thought, our feeling, our desires, our purposes in language, and so make them pass into and be apprehended by the created finite personalities around us? Where is the barrier that shall arrest thought, longings, desires, entreaties, not as yet clothed (why need they be clothed?) in speech, as they mount up from the soul towards the all-embracing Intelligence of God? And if God be not merely an infinite Intelligence, but a moral Being, a mighty Heart, so that justice, and mercy, and tenderness are attributes of His character, then to appeal to Him in virtue of these attributes is assuredly to appeal to Him to some purpose. If an Omnipresent Intelligence is a sufficient guarantee of His being able to hear us; an interest such as Justice and Mercy imply on His part towards creatures who depend upon Him for the original gift, and for the continued maintenance of life, is a guarantee of His willingness to do so.

It is on this ground that God is said to hear prayer in Holy Scripture. That He should do so follows from the reality of His Nature as God. Elijah's irony implies that He is unlike the Phœnician Baal in being really alive.[1] A later Psalmist contrasts Him in like manner with the Assyrian

[1] 1 Kings xviii. 27.

idols, in that "they have eyes but see not, they have ears but hear not."[1] They do but fill their temples with gorgeous impotence. But Israel's God is the Author of the very senses whereby we are conscious of each other's presence and wishes, and can enter into a companionship of thought and purpose. Is He debarred from the use of the gifts which He Himself bestows with so bountiful a hand? "He that planted the ear shall He not hear, or He that formed the eye shall He not see?"[2] Is it not, on the contrary, reasonable to believe that these powers must exist in a much higher and more perfect form in the One Being Who gives them than in the myriads upon whom they are bestowed, and by whom they are only held in trust? And if it is improbable that, amid the innumerable beings who are alive to the sights and sounds of His creation, the Creator alone should be blind and deaf; is it more probable that He Who has implanted in our breasts feelings of interest and pity for one another should be Himself insensible to our pain and need? Our hearts must anticipate and echo the statement of the Psalmist, that God does hear the desire of the poor; that the innocent, the oppressed, the suffering, have especial claims upon Him. And, to omit other illustrations, our Lord reveals Him as a Father, the common Parent of men, of Whose boundless love all earthly fatherhood is a shadow and a delegation. If the earthly parent, being evil, does not yet give a stone when his child cries for bread; the Heavenly Father will not fall short of the teachings of an instinct which He has Himself implanted, by failing to give the Holy Spirit to them that ask Him.[3]

[1] Ps. cxv. 5. [2] Ps. xciv. 9. [3] S. Luke xi. 11-13

III.

If a man is a good Theist—we need not add, a good Christian—he must believe that the Father of Spirits is not deaf to the voice of the human soul; that the thanksgiving and praise, the intercessions and supplications, the penitence and the self-surrender of beings to whom He has given moral and intellectual life, is not utterly lost upon the Giver. But will He indeed answer prayer, when prayer takes the form of a petition for some specific blessing which must be either granted or refused? There is no doubt as to the reply which the Bible and the Church have given to this question. But what do some modern thinkers say about it? Do they not deny the power of prayer, by surrounding the Throne of God with barriers, which, as they would have it, oblige Him, while "the sorrowful sighings of the prisoners" of this vale of tears incessantly "come before Him," to make as though He heard not, and to shorten His Hand as if it could not save?"

The first presumed barrier against the efficacy of prayer to which men point is the scientific idea of law, reigning throughout the spiritual as well as the material universe. This idea, as we are constantly reminded, is one of the most remarkable conquests of modern thought; and no man, so it is said, can enter into it with an intelligent sympathy without abandoning the fond conceit that God will grant a particular favour to one of His creatures upon being asked to do so. It may have been pardonable to pray for rain, for health, for freedom from pestilence

and famine, when these things were supposed to depend upon the caprice of an omnipotent will. But the scientific idea of law renders these prayers absurd. We know that a shower is the product of atmospheric laws, which make a shower, under certain circumstances, inevitable; that the death of an individual is the result of physiological laws which absolutely determine it. The idea that a shower or the death of a man are contingent upon the good pleasure of a Being Who can avert or precipitate them at pleasure is unscientific; it belongs to days when the idea of law had not yet dawned upon the intellect of civilization, or when, at any rate, large margins of the physical world, and the whole of the spiritual world, were supposed to be beyond its frontiers, as being abandoned to the government of a capricious omnipotence. Surely, it is added, we have really attained to a nobler idea of the universe, than was this old theological conception of the Bible and the Church: the superiority is to be measured by those fundamental instincts of fitness within us, which assign to law and order a higher place in our minds than can belong to a personal will.

Does not the very word Law, by reason of its majestic and imposing associations, here involve us in some indistinctness of thought? What do we mean by law? When we speak of a law of nature are we thinking of some self-sustained invisible force, of which we can give no account except that here it is, a matter of experience? Or do we mean by a law of nature only a principle which, as our observation shews us, appears to govern particular

actions of the Almighty Agent Who made and Who upholds the universe? If the former, let us frankly admit that we have not merely fettered God's freedom; we have, alas! ceased to believe in Him. For either such a self-sustained force is self-originating, in which case there is no Being in existence who has made all that constitutes this universe. Or otherwise, having derived its first impact from the creative Will of God, this force has subsequently escaped altogether from His control, so that it now fetters His liberty; and, in this case, there is no Being in existence who is Almighty, in the sense of being really Master of this universe. If, however, we mean by law the observed regularity with which God works in nature as in grace; then, in our contact with law, we are dealing, not with a brutal, unintelligent, unconquerable force, but with the free will of an intelligent and moral Artist, Who works, in His perfect freedom, with sustained and beautiful symmetry. Where is the absurdity of asking Him to hold His Hand, or to hasten His work? He to Whom we pray may be trusted to grant or to refuse a prayer, as may seem best to the highest Wisdom and the truest Love. And if He grant it, He is not without resources; even although we should have asked Him to suspend what we call a natural law. Can He not then provide for the freedom of His action without violating its order? Can He not supersede a lower rule of working by the intervention of a higher? If He really works at all; if something that is neither moral nor intelligent has not usurped His throne,—it is certain that "the thing that is done upon earth He doeth it Himself;"

and that it is therefore as consistent with reason as with reverence to treat Him as being a free Agent, Who is not really tied and bound by the intellectual abstractions with which finite intellects would fain destroy the freedom of His action.

No; to pray for rain or sunshine, for health or food, is just as reasonable as to pray for gifts which the soul only can receive—increased love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith. All such prayers presuppose the truth that God is not the slave of His own rules of action; that He can innovate upon His work without forfeiting His perfection; that law is only our way of conceiving of His regularized working, and not an external force which governs and moulds what we recognize as His work. It dissolves into thin air, as we look hard at it, this fancied barrier of inexorable law; and as the mist clears off, beyond there is the throne of the Moral King of the universe, in Whose Eyes material symmetry is as nothing when compared with the spiritual well-being of His moral creatures.

A second barrier to the efficacy of prayer is sometimes discovered in the truth that all which comes to pass is fore-determined in the predestination of God. How is the efficacy of prayer to be reconciled, asks the fatalistic predestinarian, with the boundless Power and Knowledge of God? Is not everything that happens to us the decision of an Almighty, Wise, Beneficent Will; a Will which, in human phrase, has ordained it from all eternity? Could this Will have been, could It be, other than It is? Has time any meaning for It? Is It not in Its Omniscience and Omnipotence eternally what It is?

Where, then, is there any room for the effect of prayer? Can it be conceived that the erring understanding and finite will of the creature will be allowed to impose its decisions on the infallible Mind and resistless determinations of God? Surely if we are to go on praying, after recognizing the Sovereignty of God, we must give up the notion of exerting a real influence upon the Divine Will: we must content ourselves with resignation, with bringing our minds into conformity with that which, as a matter of fact, is quite beyond the range of our influence.

This language does but carry us into one department of the old controversy between the defenders of the Sovereignty of God on the one side, and the advocates of the free will of man on the other. The very idea of God, as it occurs to the human mind, and the distinct statements of revelation, alike represent the Divine Will as exerting sovereign and resistless sway. If it were otherwise, God would not be Almighty, that is, He would not be God. On the other hand, our daily experience and the language of Scripture both assure us that man is literally a free agent: his freedom is the very ground of his moral and religious responsibility. Are these two truths hopelessly incompatible with each other? So it may seem at first sight; and if we escape the danger of denying the one in the supposed interests of the other, if we shrink from sacrificing God's Sovereignty to man's free will with Arminius, and from sacrificing man's freedom to God's sovereignty with Calvin, we can only express a wise ignorance by saying, that to us they seem

like parallel lines which yet must meet at a point in eternity, far beyond our present range of view. We do know, however, that being both true, they cannot really contradict each other; and that in some manner, which we cannot formulate, the Divine Sovereignty must not merely be compatible with but must even imply the perfect freedom of created wills. So it is with prayer and the Divine Predestination. God orders all that happens to us, and, in virtue of His Infinite Knowledge, by eternal decrees. But He also says to us, in the plainest language, that He does answer prayer, and that practically His dealings with us are governed in matters of the greatest importance as well as of the least by the petitions which we address to Him. What if prayers and actions, to us at the moment perfectly spontaneous, are eternally foreseen and included within the all-embracing Predestination of God, as factors and causes, working out that final result which, beyond all dispute, is the product of His Good Pleasure? Whether I open my mouth or lift my hand, is, before my doing it, strictly within the jurisdiction and power of my personal will: but however I may decide, my decision, so absolutely free to me, will have been already incorporated by the All-seeing, All-controlling Being as an integral part, however insignificant, of His one all-embracing purpose, leading on to effects and causes beyond itself. Prayer too is only a foreseen action of man which, together with its results, is embraced in the eternal Predestination of God. To us this or that blessing may be strictly contingent on our praying for it; but our prayer is nevertheless

so far from necessarily introducing change into the purpose of the Unchangeable, that it has been all along taken, so to speak, into account by Him. If then, with "the Father of Lights" there is in this sense "no variableness, neither shadow of turning," it is not therefore irrational to pray for specific blessings, as we do in the Litany, because God works out His plans not merely in us but by us; and we may dare to say that that which is to us a free self-determination, may be not other than a foreseen element of His work.

A third barrier supposed to interfere with the efficacy of prayer is the false idea of the Divine dignity which is borrowed from our notions of human royalties. It is assumed that a supreme governor cannot be expected to take account of trifling circumstances, or to decide between petty and conflicting claims. He legislates for the universe; but it is not to be supposed that He will also discharge all the minute and harassing duties of a local executive. The power of prayer implies a special providence, and a special providence, we are told, is beneath the dignity of God. We have already encountered this line of thought, not in its practical bearings upon prayer, but as it affects our belief as to the Divine Nature. "Do you imagine, men ask, when you reflect upon the vast universe in which we live—upon that immeasurable space—upon those innumerable worlds—upon those systems beyond systems of suns which are discovering themselves slowly but surely to our telescopes—that He Who made this mighty whole has nothing to do but listen to the little story of your wants and

hopes and fears? He has instituted some good and universal rules of government under which you live: if they sometimes bear hardly upon you, your case is only that of others, and you must take your chance. To expect Him to suspend or to revoke His legislation on your particular account, is to sacrifice common sense to outrageous egotism; the egotism which can suppose that a petty individual life, a worm crawling on the surface of one of His smallest planets, can be an object of this particular consideration and interest to the Almighty Creator."

Even at the risk of representing human egotism, it must be here and again asserted that man's place in the creation is not determined by the considerations which this objection supposes. In the eyes of an intellectual and spiritual being, material bulk is not the only or the highest test of greatness. If God is not to be supposed to be mainly interested in vast accumulations of senseless matter; if there be in the estimate of a Moral Being other and worthier measures of superiority; if the organic be higher than the inorganic; and that which feels than that which has no feeling; if that which thinks be higher than that which only feels; and that which freely conforms to moral will higher than that which only thinks; if a fly be really a nobler thing than a granite mountain, and a little child than a rhinoceros or a mammoth,—then we need not acquiesce in this depreciatory estimate of man's place in creation, or of his claims upon the Ear of God. On his bodily side man is insignificant enough. As a spirit conscious of his own existence, and de-

termining his action in the freedom of his will, he does not deceive himself in believing that God has crowned him with an especial glory and honour among the visible creatures.[1] But even if man were not thus honoured, it is, as we have seen, no part of the Divine dignity to be inattentive even to the lowest creatures of His Hand. The Throne of heaven is not modelled upon the type of an Oriental despotism, and God's Greatness is not compromised by the duties of administration any more than it is heightened by the enactment of law. The Infinite Mind is not less capable of formulating the most universal principles because He enters with perfect sympathy and intelligence into each of our separate wants and efforts; the wants and efforts of creatures who are really greater, because immeasurably more like their Creator, than are the largest stars and suns.

A fourth barrier to the efficacy of prayer is thought to be discoverable in an inadequate conception of the interests of human beings as a whole. To suppose that God can answer individual prayers for specific blessings is inconsistent, we are told, with any serious appreciation of human interests. One man or nation asks for that which may be an injury to another. The Spaniards prayed for the success of their Armada: the English prayed against it. Both could not be listened to. The weather cannot consult the convenience of everybody at once: and therefore the specific prayers of well-meaning villagers, if they could be attended to, could only be attended to by a God Who, instead of being the

[1] Ps. viii. 5.

Father of all His creatures, reserved special indulgences for His favourites.

Here it is natural to remark that if God should think fit to grant a large proportion of the particular requests which would be found among the daily prayers of an earnest Christian, He would not, to say the least, thereby do any injury to others, whether they were Christians or not. Prayer for the highest well-being of any human being may be granted without damaging other human beings. If God should condescend in answer to prayer to teach one of His servants more humility, purity, or love, this would not oblige Him to withdraw spiritual graces from any others in order to do it. Nor are other persons the worse for coming into contact with one whom God has made loving, or pure, or humble, in answer to prayer. Is it not nearer the truth to say that they are likely to be much better, and therefore that a large number of answers to prayer for personal blessings necessarily extend in their effects beyond those who are immediately blessed?

But observe further that every prayer for specific blessings in a Christian soul is tacitly, if not expressly, conditioned. The three conditions which are always understood are given at the beginning of the Lord's Prayer—"Hallowed be Thy name, Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done." In effect these three conditions are only one. If a change of weather, or a restoration to health or any blessing whatever be prayed for, a Christian petitioner deliberately wills that his prayer should be refused, supposing that to grant it should in any way obscure

God's glory in other minds, or hinder the advance of His Kingdom, and so contravene what must be His Will. Every Christian tacitly adds to every prayer, "Nevertheless not my will but Thine be done." All Christian prayer takes it for granted, first, that the material world exists for the sake of, and is entirely subordinate to, the interests of the moral; and, secondly, that God is the best judge of what the true interests of the moral world really are. Therefore, if his specific petition is not granted, a Christian will not conclude that his real prayer is unanswered. His real prayer was from the first that God's Name might be hallowed among men by the advance of His Kingdom and the doing of His Will, through God's granting a particular request which he urges. He knows that his own highest object may be best secured by the refusal of the very blessing for which he pleads; and he puts his finite knowledge and his narrow sympathies into the Hands of Infinite Wisdom and Infinite Love, with perfect confidence that the final decision will be the best answer to his real and deepest prayer. It is thus that he realizes the promise, "Every one that asketh receiveth." He too receives that which he really wants, though his specific petition should be refused.

A last barrier to faith in the efficacy of prayer is really to be discovered in man's idea of his own self-sufficiency. It can scarcely be doubted that one of the excellences of our character as a nation is constantly a source of danger to our faith in the power of prayer. Pelagius, if not a Saxon, was a native of Britain; and the old heresy of substituting human

self-sufficiency for dependence on the grace and help of God is congenial to the temper which Englishmen cultivate, with such success, in individual action and in political life. "After all," we say, "do we not depend on our own efforts for being what we are, and for doing what we do?" Whatever God may see fit to do for us, our best form of prayer is work; it is the determination to secure what we want by personal efforts to get it. The indolent or the imaginative may be left to lengthen out their litanies; but practical men will fall back upon the wise proverb, that "God helps those who help themselves."

Here, however, it must be insisted on by the one side, and admitted by the other, that many objects of prayer are altogether out of the reach of human effort, and that if they are to be secured at all, they must be given freely by God. But the fact of our moral freedom, as felt in the capacity for work, to which Pelagianism appeals, is not more clear than the fact of our dependence. Do what we will, we depend on others. We are linked to them by a thousand ties; we are, all of us, acted upon most powerfully by the circumstances which surround us; the governing moods of thought and feeling within ourselves are often determined by these circumstances. This is true of "self-made men," as we call them, not less than of others. How much did not Faraday owe to Sir Humphrey Davy! And this dependence upon circumstances is in fact dependence upon things which God controls. Facts are not less facts because they seem to be incompatible; because the effort to reconcile them teaches our reason that its limits are

narrower than we wish. It is easier to say that man is entirely free, that he depends on nothing; or to say that man is simply the creature of circumstances, that he is never really free; than to say, what is the real truth, that man is, in his entire freedom, absolutely dependent, that he is, in his entire dependence, absolutely free. Yet this apparent paradox is the literal truth, which refuses to ignore facts in order to make the task of reason easier, and to enable it the better to round off its trenchant but inconclusive theories about human action. And because life is so subtle an intermixture of dependence and action, prayer is the most practical of all forms of work; it is at once the activity of man's freedom, and the expression of his dependence; and the answer which it wins is not less, in one sense, the result of human effort, than in another it is the work of God.

And thus it is in and by prayer that the two governing elements of religious life, thought and work, alike find their strongest impulse and their point of unity. Such is our weakness, that we constantly tend to a one-sided use of God's gifts. We are either exclusively speculative and contemplative on the one hand, or we are absorbingly practical and men of action on the other. Either exaggeration is fatal to the true life of religion, which binds the soul to God by faith as well as by love; by love not less than by faith: by a life of energetic service not less truly than by a life of communion with light and truth. It is in prayer that each element is at once quickened in itself, and balanced by the presence of the other. The great masters and

teachers of Christian doctrine have always found in prayer their highest source of illumination. Not to go beyond the limits of the English Church, it is recorded of Bishop Andrewes that he spent five hours daily on his knees. The greatest practical resolves that have enriched and beautified human life in Christian times have been arrived at in prayer; ever since the day when, at the most solemn service of the Apostolical Church, the Holy Ghost said, "Separate Me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them."[1] It is prayer which prevents religion from degenerating into mere speculative thought on the one side, or into mere philanthropy on the other. In prayer the man of action will never become so absorbed in his work as to be indifferent to the truth, which is its original motive. In prayer the man of study and contemplation will never forget that truth is given, not so much that it may interest and stimulate our understandings, as that it may govern and regenerate our life. And thus it is that prayer is of such vital importance to the well-being of the soul. Study may be dispensed with by those who work for God with their hands: handiwork may be dispensed with by those who seek Him in books and in thought. But prayer is indispensable; alike for workers and students, alike for scholar and peasant, alike for the educated and the unlettered. For we all have to seek God's Face above; we all have souls to be sanctified and saved; we all have sins and passions to beat back and to conquer. And these things are achieved pre-eminently by prayer, which is properly

[1] Acts xiii. 2.

and representatively the action of religion. It is the action whereby we men, in all our frailty and defilement, associate ourselves with our Divine Advocate on high, and realize the sublime bond which in Him, the One Mediator between God and man, unites us in our utter unworthiness to the Strong and All-holy God.

That prayer, sooner or later, is answered, is, for all who have prayed earnestly and constantly, in different degrees, a matter of personal experience. David, Elijah, Hezekiah, Daniel, the Apostles of Christ, were not the victims of an illusion, in virtue of which they connected particular events which would have happened in any case with prayers that preceded it. They who never pray, or who never pray with the humility, confidence, and importunity that win a way to the Heart of God, cannot speak from experience as to the effects of prayer; nor are they in a position to give credit, with wise and generous simplicity, to those who can. But, at least, on such a subject as this, the voice of the whole company of God's servants may be held to counterbalance a few *à priori* surmises or doctrines. It is the very heart of humanity itself which from age to age mounts up with the Psalmist to the Eternal Throne—"O Thou That hearest prayer, unto Thee shall all flesh come."[1] And Christians can penetrate within the veil. They know that there is a majestic pleading, which for eighteen centuries has never ceased, and which is itself omnipotent—the pleading of One Who makes their cause His own: they rest upon the Divine words,

[1] Ps. lxv. 2.

"Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in My Name, He will give it you."[1]

A time will probably come to most of us, if it has not come to some already, when we shall wish that the hours at our command, during the short day of life, had not been disposed of as they have. After all, this world is a poor thing to live for, when the next is in view. Whatever be their claims, created beings have no business to be sitting on that highest throne within the soul that belongs to the Creator. Yet, for all that, too often they do sit there. And time is passing. Of that priceless gift of time, how much will one day be seen to have been lost; how ruinous shall we deem our investment of this our most precious stock! How many interests, occupations, engagements, friendships—I speak not of the avowed ways of "killing time," as it is termed with piteous accuracy—will be then regarded only as so many precautions for building our house upon the sand: as only so many expedients for assuring our failure to compass the true end of our existence! It may not now seem possible that we should ever think thus. Life is like the summer's day; and in the first fresh morning we do not realize the noon-day heat, and at noon we do not think of the shadows lengthening across the plain, and of the setting sun, and of the advancing night. Yet, to each and all, the sunset comes at last; and those who have made most of the day are not unlikely to reflect most bitterly how little they have made of it. Upon whatever else they may look back with thankfulness or with sorrow, it is certain that they will regret no

[1] S. John xvi. 23.

omissions of duty more keenly than neglect of prayer; they will prize no hours more highly than those which have been passed, whether in private or in public, before that Throne of Justice and of Grace upon which they hope to gaze throughout eternity.

LECTURE VI.

Palm Sunday.

THE MEDIATOR, THE GUARANTEE OF RELIGIOUS LIFE.

S. Matt. xxii. 41.

Jesus asked them saying, What think ye of Christ?

At length, we reach the limits which the season assigns to our scanty treatment of a subject that is in itself inexhaustible. The relationship or bond between God and the soul of man, which we term religion, is obscured and interrupted on man's side by sin; it is reasserted and strengthened by prayer. But no human efforts can of themselves avail to establish or to restore it. If God answers the prayers of individuals, has He answered the prayer of prayers: the great prayer of humanity in all the ages? Has He deigned to grant the prayer that He, too, would on His side give some sign or pledge of real communion with us; that He would not leave us to ourselves, walking after our own ways, feeling after Him if haply we might find Him, but only feeling on, century after century, in the twilight of reason; that He would, in prophetic language, rend the heavens and come down, and bid the skies pour forth righteousness? Is religion only a human instinct or effort upon which no encouragement, no

sanction, no corresponding and invigorating acknowledgment has been bestowed from on high! Or has God spoken? Has He unveiled Himself? Have the clouds and darkness that are round about Him rolled away, so that the righteousness and judgment which are the habitation of His seat might become clearly manifest to us?

If we really believe God to be a Moral Being, we shall be prepared to find that He has not wholly disappointed us. The strength of the confidence with which we anticipate a revelation will vary exactly with our faith in the morality of God. If He were only an intelligence, or a force, there would be no reason or apology for listening to hear whether any voice breaks the silence of the spheres. But if He has, or rather is, a Heart; if the moral qualities which are discoverable in ourselves have any transcendent and majestic counterpart in Him; then, supposing the question whether He has given a revelation to be for us still unanswered, or even unexamined, we do well to traverse all the corridors of history, to take counsel with the current wisdom and experience of the living, and to cross-question the recorded convictions of the dead, until we see reason to hope that a solution is at least at hand; until "the day dawn and the day-star arise in our hearts."

Already, indeed, and almost at each stage of our progress, we have ever and anon halted our steps, and hushed other disputants around us, that we might listen to One Whose place among men, at least as a Master and Teacher of religion, does not really enter into controversy. It is He Who has

set forth in its fulness the parental character of God. It is He Who has fully unveiled to the eye of the human soul the secret of its boundless capacities, and of its disheartening impotence. It is He Who by His life of unassailable purity, and by His death of voluntary sacrifice, has lighted up the dark realities of moral evil. It is His example, His precepts, it is widespread faith in His assistance and intercession, which have popularized prayer, without degrading its idea. It is through Him that prayer has come to be the most serious and welcome occupation of the noblest and purest in the human family; the continuous expression of a desire to assert and strengthen the link which binds man to the Source and End of his existence. And thus, besides placing before us the idea of religion, He has, as no other, taught us to know the Being between Whom and ourselves religion is a bond; and what it is, call we it disease or antagonist, that breaks religion up; and what is the spiritual action in which religion is especially embodied and reasserted. Has He done more for religion than this? Is His relation towards it only an external one, such as was that of a Raphael or a Michael Angelo towards their majestic creations, such as was that of a Newton or a Cuvier towards the great subjects of their lifelong study? Or is He, besides being a Master and Teacher of religion, something more, and altogether distinct from this? Is He the masterpiece of His own art? Is He the subject of His own teaching? Does He enter into the object-matter of religion as an integral part of it? Is He not merely the greatest of religious teachers, but also

the first and greatest of religious lessons which God has given to man? Is He, in short, God's answer in history to man's constant aspiration heavenward; the impersonated bond between God and man; a "Mediator," as Scripture terms it, Who bridges over the chasm which sin had opened between earth and heaven?

In pausing to consider this question, it is natural to every Christian heart to express the joy of finding ourselves at His blessed feet, Whose Name is above every name that is pronounced, whether in His temples or elsewhere. On the last five Sundays in which you have accompanied me with your generous sympathy, it has often happened to us to stray for a while into schools of thought where He, our Lord, is either unknown, or denied His due. We have occasionally been listening to teachers and glancing at systems which profess, in whatever sense, to be able to dispense with Him. No men love home as do those whose duty has for a while obliged them to reside abroad; and the atmosphere of the New Testament and of the Church is not the less welcome, because it is a change from that of human literatures and of earthly philosophies. To-day we cease, at least in the main, to measure the forms and density of the clouds which veil the face of heaven from sad but eager multitudes. We pass into the light and warmth of the Sun of Righteousness, to occupy ourselves from first to last with His Glory and His Beauty; we advance to recognize, as I trust, in Him the living bond of unity between the great empire of souls on the one hand, and the King Eternal, Immortal, Invisible on the other.

Jesus Christ is a Name around which a vast accumulation of histories, ideas, beliefs, have gathered. Christianity has many aspects: literary, philosophical, moral, historical, political, theological, spiritual, practical. What is the religious aspect of Christianity and of Christ? What is the aspect which exhibits our Lord's relation to religion, considered as the bond between God and the human soul?

I.

"What think ye of Christ?" Is He a subject of the highest historical interest? No educated man, at least, whatever be his faith or his life, can deny the reality or the greatness of Christ's place in human history. Nothing is more certain in the annals of mankind than this, that Jesus Christ lived in Palestine, and was put to death eighteen centuries and a half ago. This fact belongs to general human knowledge, just as much as does the life of Julius Cæsar, or of Alexander the Great, or of Socrates, or of Mahomet. Nobody, indeed, does deny the general fact. Strauss, for instance, though he endeavours to distinguish between the residuary historical element in the Gospels, and the incrustation of legend, which, in his opinion, has somehow become associated with it, yet fully admits that there is history in the Gospels; he admits that Jesus Christ lived and died in the age of Tiberius. And if even this be admitted, the life and death of Jesus Christ must possess for any intelligent man the highest possible degree of interest. He must feel that, in point of social and

historical importance, it stands alone. No doubt, at the time, the Cæsar Tiberius was everywhere on the lips and in the minds of men; while the retired religious Teacher, as He seemed to be, in Palestine, was by His teaching, His acts, and the opposition which they aroused, only furnishing a little conversation and excitement to the peasantry and to the officials of a remote province. But if the importance of a life is to be measured by its results in history and to civilization, even although we should put all religious and even moral considerations aside, who would think most of the Emperor? What is the lasting and living influence which Tiberius now exerts upon the world, except it be to furnish a thesis now and then to clever essay writers, who wish indirectly to attack or to defend modern imperialism? But who can deny that at this moment, explain it how we will, Jesus Christ, His Life, His Work, His Person, lives in the hearts of multitudes as the object of most cherished and devoted homage; that He governs the ideas, the aspirations, the social and political action of millions of mankind; that the most active and enterprising section of the human family, still, in various senses, places itself under the shadow of His Name and patronage; and that if He has many opponents, there is no serious probability of His being spiritually or intellectually dethroned? All this is a matter of simple observation. The truth of it is most obvious to those who know most about human affairs and human history. And it at once invests the earthly Life of Christ, and all that illustrates and belongs to it, with the highest practical and speculative interest; with the interest

which belongs to the great problems of past history, and with the interest which belongs to those great living forces that make themselves felt day by day around us, and contribute powerfully towards determining the current of events.

Not to be interested in the life of Jesus Christ, then, is to be, I do not say irreligious, but unintelligent. It is to be insensible to the nature and claims of the most powerful force that has ever moulded the thought and swayed the destinies of civilized man. But to feel this interest, it is almost unnecessary to add, a man need not even profess to be a Christian. He may indeed be earnestly opposed to Christianity: and his opposition can scarcely in any case be formidable, unless he has given his mind to the careful study of that which he opposes. To such men as Celsus, or Lucian, or Porphyry, or the apostate Emperor Julian, or the philosopher of Ferney, Christianity was a matter of the deepest intellectual interest. Men do not write like Celsus, or act like Julian, or epigrammatize with the bitterness of Voltaire, about a doctrine in which they feel little concerned. Nay, in order to have such an interest, a man need not be an active opponent of Christianity. Looking upon it with the eye, and only with the eye, of a philosopher; jealously excluding from his estimate every trace of passion, whether it be the passion of hatred or the passion of affection; he may yet understand that it is too great, too powerful, in a word, too original a phenomenon, to be ignored, or rather not to be investigated with patient perseverance. Such might seem to have been the case with that most accomplished

of modern critics, the late M. Saint-Beuve. His History of Port-Royal betrays an intimate acquaintance with the most delicate and beautiful forms of Christian faith and Christian love. None knew better than he the claims of Jesus Christ—of His life in itself, and of His place in history—upon the attention of all earnest students of nature and of man. No pages are more marked than his by a sustained and rigid justice which is incapable of condescending to a phrase that is dictated by any but that which the writer intends and believes to be a severely critical judgment. This lofty impartiality could not but make him write at times like a devoted Christian in virtue of his moral and literary sympathies; and many men have read him without suspecting his real place in the world of thought. Yet, at his last hours, we are told, he purposely declined the ordinary consolations of a Christian deathbed: his interest in Christianity did not imply a bond to any living person with Whom, in the most solemn and critical moments of existence, there are histories to be reviewed, and accounts to be settled.

That a literary and historical interest in Christianity and Christ has its value, who would deny? It may, in union with faith and love, achieve services of no common order for the kingdom of the truth. It may, under any circumstances, enable Christians to realize the historical settings of their faith, more truly and vividly than would otherwise be possible. Thus, in a very creditable sense, it may hew wood and draw water for the sacred camp, and we must thank it with all our hearts for its services.

But it is not of itself a religious interest. It is only an intellectual and scholarly taste dealing with a religious subject-matter. It is one thing to cleanse the glasses of a powerful telescope; it is another to use them as they should be used by an observer and student of the heavens.

II.

But the question must occur, What was it in Jesus Christ which gave Him, in spite of social and political insignificance, so commanding, so unrivalled a position in history? The least answer that can be given—I am far from implying that it is an adequate answer—is, that His character made a profound, an ineffaceable impression upon His contemporaries; an impression so deep and abiding, that it moved them, peasants and paupers as they were, to achieve the moral revolution of the civilized world. And we are told that admiration for Christ's human character is still the sustaining element in Christianity; that it explains its perpetuation as it explains its original victories; that it furnishes, in fact, the true answer to the question, "What think ye of Christ?" Undoubtedly the appreciation of moral character is a higher and more religious thing than the appreciation of any external historical fact, however imposing. In order to enter into the political consequences of a decisive campaign, a man requires only a well-stored and cultivated intellect; in order to do justice to a saintly character the observer must have that which is infinitely higher in itself, though of less account among men—a

sensitive moral instinct, a tender and penetrating heart. And yet, happily, the higher gift is the more common. The questions which may be raised about our Lord's genealogies in the first and third Evangelists can only be answered by a few well-trained scholars. But every child can feel the pathos of the relief suddenly given to the hungry multitudes; of the visit to the house of mourning at Bethany; of the successive incidents of the stern conflict with the Jews of Jerusalem; of the Last Supper; of the Agony; of the Betrayal; of the Cross. A great character, even more than a great picture, or a great poem, or a magnificent mountain, speaks for itself. It commends itself to average men, even although they cannot take their sympathies to pieces and say precisely what is the feature in it that attracts them most powerfully. There is that in their humanity which responds, however imperfectly, to the form of moral beauty before them, and they surrender themselves to an instinct which they do not explain, but which they can implicitly trust.

Thus it is that our Lord's simplicity, His self-sacrifice, His love of the humble and of the poor, joined to His resistless moral ascendency, His fearless courage, His strength which is so entirely compatible with the utmost tenderness, touches us all. Nothing perhaps shows Jesus Christ more clearly to us than the circumstances under which He delivered the Sermon on the Mount. For here we are convinced that His character was so far from being a product whether of His nation or of His age, as to be in marked opposition to some of their ruling tendencies.

In the Jew of the age of Tiberius, the national feeling, intensified by the Roman conquest, had almost killed out the human. The children of the men who under David and Solomon had ruled Western Asia, beheld on every side the symbols of their political slavery. The Roman legionaries were keeping guard near the temple; the Roman tax-gatherer was making his presence felt in every home. And so the Jew wrapped himself more and more closely and sullenly in devotion to the ideas and institutions of his ancestors, and looked forward to a time when the prophecies would be fulfilled in the rigid political sense which he read into them; when the Roman invader would be driven by an indignant people, headed by their King Messiah, from the sacred soil. There were adventurers in that age who really endeavoured to meet this predominating national temper, and the effort led to some well-known catastrophes. And doubtless it was such a political expectation as this which was kindled in the breast of multitudes by the announcement throughout Galilee that "the Kingdom of Heaven was at hand." The phrase fired their imaginations. They followed the Teacher Who uttered it out of their towns and villages to a distant hill-side, that they might listen, as they trusted, to His plan for an approaching insurrection or for a decisive campaign. And what was His manifesto? He uttered the Beatitudes; He compared the Pharisaic with the true morality; He proclaimed the law and unfolded the prospects of a spiritual empire, of the kingdom of the truth.

It is not in the unrivalled exhibition of any one

form of human excellence, whether purity, or humility, or charity, or courage, or veracity, or self-denial, or justice, or consideration for others, that we best appreciate the significance of our Lord's human character. It is in the equal balance of all excellence, in the absence of any warping, disturbing, exaggerating influence, that modern writers have been forward to recognize a moral sublimity, which they can discover nowhere else in history. The subject has been handled by a distinguished living layman, who certainly cannot be supposed to have approached it with any strong ecclesiastical bias. He observes that "there are many peculiarities arising out of personal and historical circumstances, which are incident to the best human characters, and which would prevent any one of them from being universal or final as a type. But the type set up in the Gospels as the Christian type seems to have escaped all these peculiarities, and to stand out in unapproached purity, as well as in unapproached perfection of moral excellence."[1] Accordingly he argues that it can be said to belong exclusively to neither of the "two hemispheres in the actual world of moral excellence—the noble and the amiable, or, in the language of moral taste, the grand and the beautiful." It belongs to both of them, "perfectly and undistinguishably, the fusion of the two classes of qualities being complete, so that the mental eye, though it be strained to aching, cannot discern whether that on which it gazes be

[1] On some supposed Consequences of the Doctrine of Historical Progress: A Lecture. By Goldwin Smith, M.A. 1861. —P. 15.

more the object of reverence or of love."[1] This type is equally free from sexual peculiarities; it combines the strength of manhood with feminine tenderness so completely as to leave no room for a supplementary female type that should complete the ideal of Christian humanity.[2] It sets before us an image of pure beneficence, disengaged from all peculiar social circumstances which would disqualify a character from being universal and the ideal, yet adapted to all.[3] If that type of character was constructed by human intellect, we must at least bear in mind that "it was constructed at the confluence of three races, the Jewish, the Greek, and the Roman, each of which had strong national peculiarities of its own. A single touch, a single taint of any one of those peculiarities, and the character would have been national, not universal; transient, not eternal. It might have been the highest character in history, but it would have been disqualified for being the ideal." Supposing it to have been "human, whether it were the effort of a real man to attain moral excellence, or a moral imagination of the writers of the Gospels, the chances, surely," he urges, "were infinite against its escaping any tincture of the fanaticism, formalism, and exclusiveness of the Jew—of the political pride of the Roman—of the intellectual pride of the Greek. Yet it escaped them all."[4]

In like manner, the character before us in the Gospels cannot possibly be regarded as a reaction from something else: it is not an antinomian protest against Pharisaism; it is not a fanatical patriotism

[1] *Ibid.* p. 16. [2] *Ibid.* p. 17. [3] *Ibid.* [4] *Ibid.* p. 18.

protesting against servility to the Roman rule, it is not an exaggerated cosmopolitanism in revolt against the narrow patriotism of the Jew: it is the highest self-denial, without having the character of a formalized asceticism; it is, in short, "the essence of man's moral nature, clothed with a personality so vivid and intense as to excite, through all ages, the most intense affection; yet divested of all those peculiar characteristics, the accidents of place and time, by which human personalities are marked." "What other notion than this," asks the writer, "can philosophy form of Divinity manifest on earth?"[1]

These eloquent and sincere words of Professor Goldwin Smith need no recommendation or comment. And yet they suggest a question, which is in the path of our subject, and which, under any circumstances, cannot be overlooked. This ideal Character of the Gospels is, on one side, at issue with what we should abstractedly conceive to be a perfect *human* ideal. For He Who presents it to us proclaims Himself, in terms and to an extent which are altogether inconsistent with any true ideal of a purely creaturely perfection. In the words of another writer of our day, "The unbounded personal pretensions which Christ advances, remain throughout a subject of ever-recurring astonishment. It is common, in human history, to meet with those who claim some superiority over their fellows. Men assert a pre-eminence over their fellow-citizens or fellow-countrymen, and become rulers of those who were at first their equals; but they dream of nothing

[1] *Ibid.* p. 22.

greater than of some partial control over the actions of others for the short space of a lifetime. Few, indeed, are there to whom it is given to influence future ages. Yet some men have appeared who have been as levers to uplift the earth and roll it in another course. Homer, by creating literature; Socrates, by creating science; Cæsar, by carrying civilization inward from the shores of the Mediterranean; Newton, by starting science upon a career of steady progress,—may be said to have attained this eminence. But these men gave a single impact, like that which is conceived to have first set the planets in motion: Christ claims to be a perpetual attractive power, like the sun, which determines their orbit. They contributed to men some discovery, and passed away: Christ's discovery is Himself. To humanity, struggling with its passions and its destiny, He says—'Cling to Me: cling ever closer to Me.' . . . He represented Himself as the Light of the world, as the Shepherd of the souls of men, as the Way to immortality, as the Vine or Life-Tree of humanity. . . . He commanded men to leave everything and attach themselves to Him; . . . He declared Himself King, Master, and Judge of men; . . . He promised to give rest to all the weary and heavy-laden; . . . He instructed His followers to hope for life from feeding on His Body and His Blood."[1]

If this statement suggests less than the whole truth, it is true as far as it goes. It might be sustained by a hundred texts. That which is so striking, so overpowering in the Gospels, is perhaps

[1] "Ecce Homo," pp. 176, 177.

less the precise language which our Lord uses about Himself, than the consistent bearing which He assumes towards His disciples and mankind. His attitude is that of One Who takes His claims for granted; Who has no errors to confess, no demands to explain, or to apologize for; no restraining instinct of self-distrust to keep Him in the background; no shrinking from high command, based upon a sense of the possible superiority of those around Him. It is the bearing of One Who claims to be the First of all, the Centre of all, with entire simplicity indeed, but also with unhesitating decision.

Let us dwell more in detail upon some of the language which Jesus Christ really uses about Himself. He is greater than the most venerable names in Jewish antiquity; greater than the men whose greatness had been felt most widely and deeply beyond the boundaries of Israel. He is greater than Jonah, whose preaching brought Nineveh to penitence;[1] greater than Solomon, in whom not Israel only, but the whole East, recognized the wisest of men.[2] Not merely is He David's descendant; He is David's Lord.[3] When Abraham was yet unborn, He was already in existence.[4] Thus He could refer to "the glory which He had with the Father before the world was,"[5] and to the fall of the rebel-spirit, which He had witnessed.[6] God is, in an entirely unique sense, His Father;[7]

[1] S. Matt. xii. 41. [2] S. Matt. xii. 42.
[3] S. Matt. xxii. 41-46; Ps. cx. 1.
[4] S. John viii. 56, 57, 58; cf. i. 15, 27, 30.
[5] S. John xvii. 5; cf. verse 24. [6] S. Luke x. 18.
[7] S. Matt. x. 32; xv. 13; xvi. 17; xviii. 19; xxvi. 39, 42; S. Luke xxiii. 46; xxiv. 49; S. John v. 30; x. 29; xiv. 2, 6.

the Jews feel that He uses the word in a manner which implies a tremendous claim.[1] For, indeed, He is conscious of being "from above,"[2] of having "come down from heaven,"[3] of having come forth from being with the Father,[4] of having come forth out of God.[5] He knows, not merely that He lives; but that He has in Himself, that He is, the Life; Life in the deepest sense of the term—perfect, blessed, absolute, existence; eternally received from the Father, yet shared with Him thus from everlasting to everlasting.[6] Although, then, He is visibly upon the earth, He is still really in Heaven.[7] He is united to the Father not merely by a moral, but by a natural union,[8] and so intimately, that "to have seen Him is to have seen the Father,[9] to have known Him is to have known the Father."[10] He is in the Father, and the Father is in Him, by a perfect reciprocity.[11] Of the Father He only has adequate knowledge: He Himself is known only by the Father.[12] As a consequence, He has all things

[1] S. John v. 17, 18, *πατέρα ἴδιον ἔλεγε τὸν Θεὸν, ἴσον ἑαυτὸν ποιῶν τῷ Θεῷ.*

[2] S. John viii. 23, *ἐγὼ ἐκ τῶν ἄνω εἰμί.*

[3] S. John vi. 38, *καταβέβηκα ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*; ver. 51. *ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβάς.*

[4] S. John xvi. 28, *ἐξῆλθον παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ ἐλήλυθα εἰς τὸν κόσμον.*

[5] S. John viii. 42, *ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐξῆλθον καὶ ἥκω.* Cf. S. John xvii. 8; xvi. 30; Ps. ii. 7; Micah v. 2.

[6] S. John v. 26; xi. 25; xiv. 6; cf. S. John i. 4; 1 S. John i. 1, 2; v. 20.

[7] S. John iii. 13, *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ ὢν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ.*

[8] S. John x. 28–30, *ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἓν ἐσμεν.*

[9] S. John xiv. 9.

[10] S. John viii. 19.

[11] S. John xiv. 10; xvii. 21, 22.

[12] S. Matt. xi. 27. Cf. S. John vi. 46, *ὁ ὢν παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ, οὗτος ἑώρακε τὸν πατέρα.* S. John x. 14, 15.

in common with the Father.[1] Men, whom He wills to redeem, are already His own.[2] The Kingdom of God is His Kingdom.[3] The Angels are His Angels.[4] The "Church of the Living God"[5] is His Church.[6] Power is given Him not merely over the human race,[7] but also without any assigned limits in heaven and in earth;[8] and the glory with which He will appear at the last day is not other than His Father's.[9] His working in the sphere of sense and time corresponds to the ceaseless activity of the Father.[10] He too quickens and will raise the dead.[11] He too forgives sins, as to the Paralytic;[12] He too will save the world;[13] He will seek and save the lost;[14] He will give eternal life.[15] To Him all judgment is committed, and all nations shall one day be gathered before His Throne.[16] Even now all men are to honour Him, even as they honour the Father.[17]

His words are familiar to our ears; but do we dwell upon their real and awful meaning? What should we think of a religious teacher now who could permit himself to say that Eternal Life con-

[1] S. John xvi. 15; xvii. 10; cf. S. Matt. xi. 27; Heb. i. 3; S. Matt. xxi. 38; Acts x. 36; S. John i. 11.
[2] S. John x. 14, 15, 27, 28; xvii. 10–12.
[3] S. Matt. xiii. 41; S. John xviii. 36. Cf. S. Luke i. 33; Rev. xi. 15.
[4] S. Matt. xiii. 41; xvi. 27; xxiv. 31. [5] 1 Tim. iii. 15.
[6] S. Matt. xvi. 18; cf. Rom. xvi. 16.
[7] S. John xvii. 2. [8] S. Matt. xxviii. 18.
[9] S. Matt. xvi. 27. [10] S. John v. 17, 19, 20.
[11] S. John verses 21, 28, 29; xi. 25, 40.
[12] S. Matt. ix. 2–7; S. Luke vii. 36–50. [13] S. John iii. 17.
[14] S. Luke xix. 10; ix. 56. [15] S. John xvii. 2.
[16] S. John v. 22, 27; S. Matt. xxv. 31–39. Cf. Is. xi. 3.
[17] S. John v. 20–23.

sisted in the knowledge of himself as well as in knowledge of the Father;[1] that dislike of himself implied dislike of the Father;[2] that belief in himself secured eternal life;[3] that disbelief in himself involved present condemnation?[4] What, if he should tell us that without him we could do nothing;[5] that united with him, we should bring forth much fruit;"[6] that, although leaving this world before us, he was going to prepare places for us in the Eternal Home;[7] that his name would have resistless power with the Father;[8] that in his name his pupils would cast out devils;[9] that he would send the Divine Spirit from the Father[10] Who, when He came, would glorify the sender?[11] What should we say of the promise of a perpetual presence,[12] of the pretension to found an imperishable society,[13] of the delegation of power to forgive sins,[14] of the claim to be so faultless that in him the Prince of evil had no part whatever?[15]

Much else to the same purpose might be quoted from the three earlier Gospels, as well as from the last. And the question arises, how to account for this earnest self-assertion on the part of Jesus Christ; how to acquit such language of the charges to which it would expose any religious man who

[1] S. John xvii. 3; xii. 44.
[2] S. John xv. 23; S. Luke x. 16.
[3] S. John iii. 16; v. 40; vi. 47.
[4] S. John iii. 18; viii. 24.
[5] S. John xv. 5; xiv. 6.
[6] S. John xv. 4.
[7] S. John xiv. 2, 3.
[8] S. John xvi. 23; xvi. 13, 14.
[9] S. Mark xvi. 17, 18; cf. 20.
[10] S. John xvi. 7.
[11] S. John xvi. 14.
[12] S. Matt. xxviii. 20.
[13] S. Matt. xvi. 8.
[14] S. John xx. 21-23; S. Matt. xvi. 19; xviii. 18.
[15] S. John xiv. 30.

should use it at the present day? How are we to adjust it, on the one hand, with the sobriety and truthfulness of a perfect human character; on the other, with a due recognition of the rights of God?

There are men who decline to entertain this inquiry. They are not by any means forgetful of God. He weighs upon their conscience, upon their imagination, upon their life of daily thought and action, as the greatest and most solemn of all facts. They are not insensible to the moral beauties of the earthly life of Jesus Christ; on the contrary, they profess to be so enamoured of these beauties, or of some of them, as to be impatient of all other aspects of our Lord's Work and Teaching. But they do not allow themselves to reflect steadily upon the question whether their loyalty to the supreme rights of God, and their love for Jesus Christ, do not alike oblige them to "consider the relation which exists between Christ and God." Christian theology appears to them in the light of a wanton importation of worthless metaphysics into the heart of a moral history of simple and faultless beauty; but they do not reflect that their moral ideal itself must fall to pieces, unless they are prepared in some way to attempt the chief problem with which Christian theology deals.

Is our Lord's language imposture? The suggestion can only be mentioned to be condemned by the entire drift and atmosphere of His Life. Is it the hallucination of an enthusiast, so entranced in his idea as to be insensible to the world of facts around him? But even Channing has pointed out that the enthusiasm takes a turn which would be

inconceivable, for a deranged enthusiasm, under the circumstances of Jesus Christ: "I can conceive," he says, "of His seating Himself, in fancy, on the throne of David, and secretly pondering the means of his appointed triumphs; but that a Jew should fancy himself the Messiah, and at the same time should strip that character of all the attributes that fired his youthful imagination and heart; that he should start aside from all the feelings and hopes of His age, and should acquire a consciousness of being destined to a wholly new career, and one as unbounded as it was new—this is exceedingly improbable."[1] Was it, then, only the natural manner of an oriental mind; the habit of seizing truth intuitively and enunciating it authoritatively, in contrast with our western methods of demonstration and argument? But this explanation, even if on other accounts it could be admitted, does not cover the ground required. It does not justify the actual substance and contents of our Lord's language about Himself. It does not explain the fact that His language about Himself is unlike anything which we find in the Hebrew prophets. The prophets, if you will, announce truth in the intuitive manner; but they do not make themselves the subjects and centres of the truth which they announce. They draw the deepest distinctions between themselves and their Master: they are sinners and He is the All-holy; they are foolish and incapable, He is All-powerful and All-wise. The relation in which Christ claims to stand, both towards the Father and towards mankind, is utterly unanticipated by any-

[1] Channing: Works, ii. 56.

thing that can be traced in the prophetic literature of Israel; it reveals a Personality distinct in kind from any that had previously appeared in Hebrew history.

And at this point we cannot but observe that our Lord's language about Himself is entirely in harmony with the character of certain of the miracles ascribed to him in the Gospels. The miraculous element cannot be weeded out of the Gospel narratives, without altogether impugning the historical value of those documents; and to do this mainly because one department or one age of human experience does not positively correspond with what we know as yet about another, is not reasonable. Now, the Gospel miracles fall, speaking roughly, into two classes; they are acts of mercy, or acts of power. In one sense, they are all acts of power; but the motive of compassion towards human suffering apparently predominates in the one class; while, in the other, the reason for working them must be chiefly looked for in the need of demonstrating the personal power of the Agent. Thus, among the miracles of mercy, there are seventeen cases on record of His healing bodily disease; there are six cases of the cure of demoniacal possession, each of which is described in detail; there are three cases of restoration to life. On the other hand, the miracles at Cana in Galilee, and of feeding the four and the five thousand, suggest, first of all, the creative power of the Worker, although it was wielded with a philanthropic object. The element of power is more distinctly and exclusively apparent in His stilling the tempest, and walking on the sea; in His

rendering Himself invisible to a hostile multitude; in His awing by a glance the traders in the temple, and the multitude that came to take Him; in His cursing the barren fig-tree. Some of this class of miracles are, in fact, objected to by a recent writer,[1] on the specific ground that they only befit a superhuman personality. We therefore do not strain the import of such miracles in saying that they are, at least, in harmony with Christ's language about His claims upon mankind and His superhuman Person.

But our Lord's references to Himself are also in keeping with another phenomenon. He was sinless. Upon the positive side of Christ's character we have already dwelt; upon the balanced perfection, the ideal universality of the type. It was a life such as Paganism had not conceived; it was higher than, and distinct from, the unimpeachable justice, the calm superiority to misfortune, the proud self-respect, which constituted in various proportions the Pagan ideal. It was a life of love and humility, of the highest forms of holiness, expressed by example as well as recommended by precept. But the most startling moral feature in this life is that we can trace nowhere in it any—the faintest—consciousness of guilt. The best men ordinarily feel the taint of moral evil most constantly and acutely: their language about their sins and shortcomings seems even exaggerated to those who live at a greater distance from the Source of sanctity than they themselves. But Jesus challenges His enemies to convince Him of sin, if they can. He never hints that He has done or said any one thing which needs

[1] Schenkel: Characterbild Jesu. Absch. iv., Kap. 11, p. 123

forgiveness. He teaches His disciples to pray, "Forgive us our trespasses:" He never prays for pardon Himself. Sorrow makes all of us think of that in our past lives, which, as conscience whispers, has but too well deserved it: Jesus, in His sorrow, thinks only of the sins of others. Certainly He is tempted; but there is nothing within Him that can respond to the temptation: He is "holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners." And no attempts to fasten sin upon Him have had a trace of success, except so far as they have gone hand in hand with a denial of His personal claims. Strauss, for example, thinks it not merely fanaticism, but "unjustifiable self-exaltation, for a man to imagine himself so separated from other men, as to set himself before them as their future judge."[1] Strauss, we must admit, is perfectly right, if the claim of Christ to judge the world is not strictly based upon fact. It is strictly impossible to maintain our faith in the faultlessness of His character if we deny that a fundamental necessity of His Being forced Him to draw attention so persistently, so imperiously to Himself. But, on the other hand, if His words about Himself are sober truth, they only afford another illustration of His compassionate love for those whom He came to enlighten and to save.

Doubtless it has been a favourite object with a modern school, as men have said, "to bring down Jesus from the clouds, and to restore Him, by criticism, to the domain of history." This enterprise assumes that "the theological and metaphysical Christ of the creeds," is a very different

[1] Leben Jesu für das Deutsche Volk, p. 242.

person from "the living Christ of the Gospels." But when such criticism enters upon its task, what happens? If, instead of declaiming vaguely against dogma, men really wish to get to the bottom of this problem, they will find that, of two things, one becomes absolutely necessary. Either they must consent to forfeit the moral idea which they admire in the Gospels, and which, to do them justice, they are sincerely anxious to preserve; or they must fall back upon those very statements of the Creeds which, by affirming Christ's personal Divinity, really and only justify His constant references to Himself, and His unbounded claims upon mankind. His precepts about humility are contradicted by His example, unless His statements about Himself are dictated by that true humility which would rather incur the suspicion of pride than conceal the simple fact. His enforcement of sincerity ceases to awe us, if, in His language about Himself, He was indeed guilty of consistent and almost boundless exaggeration. His very charity loses its lustre, and becomes suspected, if we are forced to feel that He is ever capable of putting Himself unduly forward; its highest forms cease to represent in our eyes the Universal Love; they remind us rather of the efforts of this or that tribune of the people, who conceals a personal ambition beneath the activities of an ostentatious disinterestedness, and whose efforts are at last crowned by a catastrophe which they have really deserved.

If, on the other hand, we bow before the general impression produced by Christ's character, and He be taken at His word, He must be believed to be in

the absolute sense, Divine. There is no room for an intermediate being, such as Arianism imagined, who is neither God nor an angel, in a serious theistic creed. And our Lord's words are strictly inconsistent with what would be sober and true in any creature, however exalted. They are not surpassed; they are only unfolded by the later teaching of Apostles and of Creeds. The Christ of S. Paul's Epistles is really the Christ of the earliest Evangelist; the Christ of S. John is the Christ of S. Paul; the Christ of the Creeds and the great Councils is the Christ of S. John. He Who alone knows the Father, and Whom none but the Father knows,[1] is the Image of the Father,[2] is in the Form of God,[3] is the Effulgence of God's glory and the exact Impress of His Being,[4] is over all, God blessed for ever.[5] He, the Only Begotten Son, of God, Which is in the bosom of the Father,[6] is of one substance with the Father,[7] as being "God of the substance of the Father, begotten before all worlds."[8] The later statements may be more elaborate; but they are implied, in all their completeness, by the earlier. Just as an anatomist, from his knowledge of the animal frame, can pronounce upon the age and size of a skeleton of which he only possesses the fragment of a single bone; so with our eye upon S. John, and the Nicene confession, we can see statements in S. Mark which can only be maintained when men acknowledge the Consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. There are deep harmonies in

[1] S. Matt. xi. 29. [2] Col. i. 15. [3] Phil. ii. 6.
[4] Heb. i. 3. [5] Rom. ix. 5. [6] S. John i. 18.
[7] Nicene Creed. [8] Athanasian Creed.

truth which, from first to last, bind it in its integrity rigidly together. They cannot be set aside or trifled with; for truths which we in our narrowness deem obscure or unimportant, are often vitally necessary to the maintenance of others which we are better capable of appreciating. Our Blessed Lord's Divinity, instead of obscuring His true Manhood, is the safeguard and justification of its moral perfectness: and we do the most beautiful of moral histories a fatal injustice, if we forget that, in the words of the Creed, its subject "is perfect God and perfect Man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting; equal to the Father as touching His Godhead, and inferior to the Father as touching His manhood; Who, although He be God and Man, yet is He not two, but one Christ."[1]

This is the full and solemn truth; that Jesus Christ is not merely the Teacher, but the substance of Christianity; not merely the author of the faith which Christians profess, but its central object. For Christians the popular phrase, "the religion of Christ," does not mean, as Lessing suggested, only or chiefly the piety which in the days of His flesh He exhibited towards the Father. It means the devotion, the submission of thought and heart, the sense of obligation, the voluntary enthusiastic service, of which He, together and equally with the Father, is the rightful and everlasting Object; which, when He was on earth, He claimed as His due; and which has been rendered to Him now for more than eighteen hundred years by the best and noblest of the human race.

[1] Athanasian Creed.

III.

In Jesus Christ, then, we have the guarantee or bond of religion; He is the means of an actual communication between the soul of man and the Eternal God. "There is One Mediator between God and men, the Man Christ Jesus."[1] He is the Mediator in virtue of the very terms of His Being: His office of Mediation is based upon the two Natures which are united in His Single Person. On the one hand, as the Eternal Son, He is One with the All-Holy and Infinite God; on the other, as the child of Mary, He shares all the finiteness and weakness of our manhood; He shares with it everything except its sin. Thus He impersonates and maintains, by the very fact of being what He is, a true vital bond between earth and Heaven. To us men, He is the last and most complete unveiling of the interest which God takes in the wellbeing of His moral and reasonable creatures; the Highest Organ of the Divine Mind and Will; the only and certain channel of those "unsearchable riches"[2] which flow down from the Fountain of all goodness upon the beings whom He has made. Before the Majesty of God He is the unique and ideal Representative of our race: He represents us, not as being what we are, but as being what we were meant to be by the Great Author of our existence. And yet, although we are only weak and sinful, we may unite ourselves to Him by faith, and love, and contrition for the past, and be "accepted in the Beloved."[3] His obedience as Man,

[1] 1 Tim. ii. 5. [2] Eph. iii. 8. [3] Eph. i. 6.

reaching its climax in the self-sacrifice of the Cross, becomes ours through His free grace and mercy. His invigorating life, which restores our race to its original strength and beauty, is still communicated to us by His Spirit and His Sacraments; so that all who will, may "put off the old man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts; and be renewed in the spirit of their minds; and put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness."[1] This cannot be done by fallen man for himself, and out of the resources of his warped and impoverished nature. But "what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending His Own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh; that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit."[2] Being as He is, Divine as well as Human, Jesus is "made unto us Wisdom, and Righteousness, and Sanctification, and Redemption."[3] Thus in union with Him, those religious aspirations, which are part of our natural outfit, find their true exercise, their full satisfaction. As the Light of the world, He is the satisfaction of the intellect. As "Fairer than the children of men," He is the delight of the heart. As "Holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners," He challenges the submission of the will. Intellect, feeling, moral effort, each have their part in Him. He recognizes, He consecrates them. He leads them upwards, in and through His own Holy Humanity to the All-wise and All-beautiful. The

[1] Eph. iv. 22-24. [2] Rom. viii. 3, 4.
[3] 1 Cor. i. 30.

soul finds that in Him "is the well of Life, and that in His Light it will see light."

Does it seem inconceivable that the Eternal Son of God should have, indeed, thus come among us men, to teach and to save us; to make reconciliation between us and the Almighty Father; to bestow on us the priceless gift of a new Nature; and to lead us back, first one and then another, to our true home and peace? Certainly, it may well move our wonder to think of such grace and mercy. The Christian creed, when once it becomes precious to us, takes us altogether out of the daily range of earthly thoughts and interests, lifting us into a better, and brighter, but not more mysterious, or less real, world than this. The Incarnation and Death of the Everlasting Son seem impossible, only because we do not steadily reflect upon the simple but momentous truths which lie at the root of all religion, and which all who are not Materialists or Pantheists generally admit. Is the Incarnation so improbable, think you, if God is indeed a moral Being; if man has an immortal soul; if moral evil is inherently deadly in itself and in its effects? Do we not name "God," "immortality," "sin," without thinking what we mean; as if these tremendous words were the symbols of trivial commonplaces, which implied nothing beyond themselves? And is not this careless treatment of these solemn truths which we profess to own, the reason why many of us do not understand the truths beyond them? If the awfulness and magnificence of God, the reality of Eternity, the power and sting of moral evil, were more often subjects of our thought, would our imaginations be as

startled, as they often are, by those doctrines of grace which adjust and harmonize what else is so full of perplexity; by the Incarnation of the Blessed Son of God; by His plenary Atonement on the Cross for the sins of men; by His unceasing Intercession for us with the Father; by the sanctifying energy of His Holy Spirit; by the power of His Sacraments, to renew and sustain our life? Surely the earlier truths are just as full of difficulties for the imagination and the reason as the latter. We put them out of sight as being less importunate, but there they are. That the All-foreseeing and Holy God should have created us at all, is at least as startling as that, having created, He should have redeemed us. Or rather when we reflect upon His Morality, upon His Justice, upon His Love, must we not think that His Redemption of the fallen is really less wonderful than His Creation of a race capable of such signal failure? Must we not find in our daily experience of life, and of the crimes and sufferings, which so largely compose it, more embarrassment and distress for reverent reason than can be furnished by critical speculations upon the explanatory and consoling truth, that "God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on Him should not perish, but have everlasting life?"[1]

"Whosoever believeth in Him." It is not then, you say, a matter of strict mathematical demonstration. No; it is not a matter of strict mathematical demonstration. If it were, there would be no more room for faith than there is in the process of learning

[1] S. John iii. 16.

a proposition of Euclid. Not to acquiesce in the conclusion of a proposition of Euclid, is to be intellectually deficient; but to refuse assent to the Christian creed does not necessarily imply intellectual deficiency. Why not? Because for such assent moral dispositions are as necessary as is intellectual capacity. The evidence for Christianity, intellectually viewed, is something short of mathematical; and intentionally so. Christian truth makes a demand upon the will as well as upon the intellect; and the will, to avoid the foreseen consequences of assent, will often prevent the intellect from doing its work, honestly and thoroughly, in investigating the claims of Christ. This is a reason why so much store is set upon faith in St. Paul's Epistles. Faith is a test of the moral drift of our whole being, and not merely of the soundness or acuteness of our mental powers. If an act of faith in Jesus Christ implied no more than an act of assent to the conclusion of a demonstrated proposition; if faith were nothing higher and nobler than the forced result of a victorious assault upon the human understanding, conducted by columns and batteries of mathematical evidence; then all that is said about its moral and spiritual worth, about its purifying and elevating virtue, would be simply unintelligible. The most accomplished mathematician is not necessarily moral; and the most fervent believers, ancient or modern, have not been always Pascals and Newtons.

Our Lord did, indeed, by His miracles, and notably by His Resurrection, address Himself to the experience of His contemporaries in enforcing His claims;

and by certain portions of His teaching, He appealed no less truly to the operations of their natural reason. But, in order to accept Him as He is, reason and observation must be seconded by the heart and the conscience. There must be a true desire to know all that can be known of the Author of the law of right and wrong within us. There must be a real anxiety to escape from the moral anomalies of life; a recognition, and sense of human goodness; a strong anticipation that He Who is its Source cannot have left us in weakness and darkness to struggle alone. Why this temper is found in one man and not in another, is a question which carries us back into the deepest secrets of our several moral natures; into the varying histories of our loyalty or disloyalty to God's original gift of natural light. But upon the existence or non-existence of such moral dispositions depends our way of looking at the evidence which Jesus Christ has thought good to set before us on behalf of His claims. In one case that evidence will appear sufficient: insufficient in another. It will be held insufficient by the man who thinks to become a believing Christian, as he would become a mathematician, without any reference to the temper of his heart, or even in spite of its decided bent against the moral teaching of the Gospel. It will be deemed sufficient—nay, more than sufficient—for those who amid perplexities are "waiting for the consolation of Israel."[1] They understand that religious truth, to be embraced at all to any purpose, must be embraced, not simply by a dry assent of the logical understanding, but by a vital act of the

[1] S. Luke ii. 25.

whole inward man; by moral sympathies even more earnestly than by an intellectual grasp. Christ, our Lord, in various ways, teaches us as much as this; and Christian apologists can only make that portion of the act of faith which belongs to the understanding easier to it, by removing obstacles to the reception of truth or by exhibiting its inward harmonies. They cannot, if they would, do the work of the Divine Spirit, and control the fevers, the prejudices, the cowardice, the rashness of the heart. He only Who made the heart can soften, or subdue, or change it. He only Who made the light to shine out of darkness can so shine in the hearts of men, as to "give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ."[1]

And they to whom He has taught this great lesson will know and feel, that believing in the Divinity of our Incarnate Lord, we stand, as it were, upon the heights of Pisgah; and that a new and vast prospect, grateful to eyes that are wearied with the long glare of the desert, is opening before us. Before us is a land of vineyards and oliveyards; a land flowing with milk and honey. It is a region of repose for faith and love; it is an atmosphere where communion with God is easy and natural. It is the proper home of spirituality and benevolence, of that internal and external practice of religion, day by day, which is so altogether higher and better a thing than the profoundest study of its theory. For the Divinity of the Son of God is the adequate warrant of all His promises; of the power of His Death; of the gift of His Spirit; of the efficacy of His sacraments; of

[1] 2 Cor. iv. 6.

the converting and hallowing power of His written Word; of the Divine character of that society of souls which, by His Spirit, He has organized into His Church since the day of Pentecost. How vast in their range, how interesting in their idea and scope, how energetically practical in their bearings on all earnest life, are these great Christian doctrines which form the hills and vales of our Gospel Land of Promise! We strain our eyes; we would fain go forward to study their beauties, to try, if it might be, to understand and to surmount their difficulties. But it cannot be;—at least now. If only we sincerely cling by faith and love to our Divine and Human Lord, all else will follow. For the present, like the Magdalen, we can but hold Him by the Feet, and entreat Him to teach us that personal devotedness to Himself, which is the secret and soul of genuine religion; since without it the love of God soon dies away into an attenuated mysticism, while the love of man is eventually hollowed out into a mechanical philanthropy. Thinking of Him, praying to Him, working for Him day by day, as our living, tender, mighty, infallible Friend, we strengthen our hold upon the one certain bond between earth and heaven; upon Him through Whom, in all our feebleness and sin, we have real access in one Spirit unto the Father.[1]

Personal devotion to Jesus Christ is the exercise of thought, and of affection, steadily directed upon His adorable Person. But it is also the exercise of

[1] Eph. ii. 18.

will: it is pre-eminently practical. There is much to be abstained from for His sake; there is much to be done and to be endured; there is some danger, perhaps, of our doing nothing very definite, where the opportunities of action are so various and so complex. And therefore, that you may do something for Jesus Christ now and here, you are asked to support with your alms the St. James' Penitentiary. Its object is to carry out our Lord's work in the world as the Healer of souls, whom sin has separated from God, by bringing them back to purity and peace through a recovered union with Himself. It has been said that Penitentiaries are too costly a method of restoration from sin. They who speak thus can have thought little to any purpose about either the malignity of moral evil, or the meaning of the Self-sacrifice of the Son of God. The institution which I have named has done and is doing good, and, as we trust, lasting work among our unhappy sisters, who may well be so much less guilty in the eyes of the Eternal Justice than are many upon whom, in this present world, and often to their own endless loss, the breath of censure never falls. Be our case what it may, we surely do well to support an undertaking which honours our Lord, by its disinterested work of unwearied compassion; and which, while labouring for the social recovery of our poor countrywomen, aims much more directly at promoting the eternal well-being of their souls,—as capable as our own of enjoying, through the Divine Mediator, the present and future blessings of religion.

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PASTORS AND TEACHERS

SIX LECTURES
ON PASTORAL THEOLOGY

DELIVERED IN THE DIVINITY SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE
IN THE YEAR 1902

BY THE RIGHT REV.
EDMUND ARBUTHNOTT KNOX, D.D.
BISHOP OF MANCHESTER

WITH AN INTRODUCTION
BY THE
RIGHT REV. CHARLES GORE, D.D.
BISHOP OF WORCESTER

NEW AND CHEAPER EDITION

WITHOUT APPENDICES

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INTRODUCTION

The services of the Bishop of Coventry to the Diocese of Worcester have been such that he has an indisputable right to ask of me what he wills; and it is at his desire that I am introducing this volume of lectures on 'Pastors and Teachers' to Churchmen and others who are facing the great problem of Religious Education. Even so it would be impertinent on my part to seek to *commend* the work of an acknowledged expert in education on his own special subject. But I may at least express my thankfulness that lectures so thorough in their conception of education as a whole: so full of a ripe experience in educational methods: so pervaded by a true sense of the place which religion must take in any adequate training of the young: and, above all, so fearless in the claim which they make upon the Church and the clergy to rise to the responsibility and the opportunity in religious education which God has laid upon us, should have come from

Birmingham and, in Birmingham, from one who is both a Bishop of the Church and Chairman of the School Board. This is a fact full of hope and encouragement from many points of view. I can only trust that those who are preparing for Holy Orders, and those who, already in Holy Orders, are seeking to be more efficient in their ministry, will lay to heart the teaching of the Bishop.

I should like in particular to call attention to three points in these lectures:

1. They recall us to the principle involved in the practice of infant baptism. The Church does not baptise infants indiscriminately. She requires sponsors for their religious education; and the sponsors represent the responsibility of the Church for the infants who are being baptised. It is not too much to say that to baptise infants without real provision for their being brought up to know what their religious profession means, tends to degrade a sacrament into a charm. On this point we need the most serious reflection.

2. We are reminded (pp. 32–48) that 'all clergy' should 'make the day-school teachers their friends and allies.' This is a piece of much-needed admonition. Especially in villages, where the schoolmaster and, even more, the schoolmistress belong naturally to no *class* of society, it does, I fear, occasionally

happen that they find themselves in a sort of moral solitude. The vicarage is ready enough to use their services, but sometimes forgets their need of fellowship and sympathy—such fellowship and sympathy as the real dignity of their spiritual vocation entitles them to expect.

3. We need the Bishop's warnings as to the method of S. Sulpice (p. 115). It is very possible, in enthusiasm for this wonderful method, to destroy the organisation of the Sunday school in places where there is no real prospect of substituting for it any more excellent way. Before the new 'Catechism' is introduced it is most necessary to count the costs.

In conclusion I would say, these lectures demand very much of the Church and the clergy. But not more than God, whose providence orders the circumstances of our time, is manifestly laying upon us. I pray from my very heart that they may receive the attention which they deserve—at Cambridge, where the lectures were delivered, in the Diocese, and in the Church at large.

C Wigorn.

Easter, 1902.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

TO

CHEAP EDITION

It has been represented to me that a cheap edition of this book for circulation among Sunday School Teachers was desired in many quarters, and it is in view of this demand that the present edition is published. Work in the Manchester Diocese has convinced me more than ever that our Church has very imperfectly realised what she owes to her Sunday Schools. I was, of course, familiar, as most South Country clergy are, with the idea that adults are found in large numbers in the Lancashire Sunday Schools. But I was hardly prepared, in fact, not at all prepared, to find that the Sunday School is usually much more numerous than the congregation in Church, and that in a very large proportion of cases the Church could not hold the Sunday School; that the Sunday School is often a prosperous, and sometimes a rather independent body, which has been

known at times to assist the Day School, and even the Church, in financial difficulties. There is in many of these schools strong evangelistic zeal, sound and fervent *esprit de corps*, and a high moral tone and standard. In others there is a tendency of the social institutions to overgrow the religious, and to threaten their vitality. In almost all quarters the necessity is felt of more systematic teaching, and of better training of teachers. But without question there is still in these northern Sunday Schools, even more than in the southern, a reserve of spiritual force, which is as yet very imperfectly directed or developed.

The same experience has greatly strengthened my conviction of the supreme importance of intimate alliance, where it may be had, between the teaching of the week-day and of the Sunday. That importance lies not so much in acquainting children with scriptural facts and doctrines as in opening their minds to religious influences. A child secularised in mental attitude during the week is not likely to attend Sunday School, and is even less likely to profit by doing so. It is something more than a coincidence that Lancashire, so strong in her Sunday Schools, has been equally tenacious of her voluntary Day Schools. At present the forces which are adverse to

Sunday observance altogether are growing stronger rather than weaker ; increased facilities for travelling increasingly disturb the bond of parochial life on which Sunday Schools largely depend. This century is less able than the last to dispense with a strong religious basis for education, and with vital unity in all its religious instruction.

It is impossible in this preface to omit all reference to the Education Act of 1902, which had not been passed at the time when these Lectures were delivered. The moving principle of that Act, for the sake of which it was welcomed by all who were interested in national education, was the desire of co-ordinating primary and secondary education, and of removing the disabilities under which Denominational Schools had been placed by the Act of 1870. For the sake of improving secular instruction in schools long penalised by exclusion from rate aid, and of bringing all schools to the same standard of secular instruction, the friends of religious education made great sacrifices, and parted with a large share of their former control over the schools. But the strong desire for unification is attended by one great danger, and that is the danger of officialism. This was the danger which Dr. Thring, of Uppingham, foresaw, and against which he pleaded most earnestly.

The nation which unifies education at the cost of destroying the personal influence of the teacher, and of losing the quickening inspiration of real educationists, who cannot find their way through the net of municipal electoral machinery, is paying too dear a price for unity. There are signs that at the present moment this danger is very real. Its consequences must be the deterring of men and women of real originality from entering the teaching profession, to the infinite loss of national character. It is not inappropriate to mention this danger here, for nothing that vitally affects national education can fail to touch the sources of religious education also. The most perfectly trained and spiritually fervent Sunday School teachers will waste their strength, humanly speaking, on a generation secularised in the Day Schools, should such a generation arise. God grant that England may never see that day.

E. A. MANCHESTER.

BISHOPSCOURT: *August* 1904.

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PASTORS AND TEACHERS

LECTURE I

THE HOME AND ITS TEACHINGS

My choice of a subject needs justification. The subject is dull on the face of it. The educationist is acknowledged to be the chief of bores. Still more are we weary of religious instruction. It has been an acrimonious battlefield for at least half a century. The strength spent on discussing it might have taught generations of Christians. But while strife has been bitter, it can be questioned whether true advance has been made. Are children better instructed in the faith than they used to be? Are parents sincerely anxious that their children should have religious instruction at all? The head-mistress of an important secondary school, herself an enthusiastic religious teacher, told me that her experience was that the only parents, who made inquiries about the religious instruction which she gave, belonged to one or other of the extreme wings of the

Reasons for choice of this subject.

School supplants home

Church. Is the Church herself more sincerely earnest about teaching, or about snatching a victory from her opponents? Above all, is the subject sufficiently important to detain you for six hours of time, on which already lectures make far too frequent calls? All these are questions which may fairly be asked, and, before I enter on the subject, you will desire me to show why it should be entered on at all.

School life supplants home

The first reason which I have to suggest is this: the ever increasing importance and influence of school life. School life is supplanting home life. Children are hardly born before their names are entered on a school list. This is true not only of public schools. Children are swept out of the circle of home influence, among the poor at the age of three, in the upper classes at the age of eight or nine. Their thoughts, tastes, ideals, and aims are largely formed by schools. Parental control over our schools is almost gone. Parents used to have a voice in what their children should learn. I do not say that they always exercised it wisely. But now, after exchange of a few civilities on entering the child's name, the parent often sees little more of the teacher. As a rule there is very little interchange of confidence between the two. Yet the parent cannot, before God, shift his own responsibility on to the shoulders of the schoolmaster. It is surely the duty of the Church to revive, so far as she may, the interest of parents in the religious side of their chil-

dren's education, and, speaking generally, no one would be more thankful to the Church for activity in this direction than the school teachers: with one proviso, that the object of the activity was not to emphasise divisions, but to exalt religious life in the eyes of parents and children.

The school supplants the Church

In the next place the school, not content with supplanting the home, is supplanting the Church also. 'The school must increase, the Church decrease:' so men are saying. Everybody has to go to school, but no one is obliged to go to church. Time was when the Church, through her clergy, had a monopoly of education—when she ruled from the university down through all the ranks of schools, public and private, to the charity school and the orphanage. But those days are past. The scholastic profession is well organised. It has its unions, conferences, and associations. By examinations it guards the way to an immense amount of public patronage: by private recommendations it influences still more. No doubt it has its own trials and difficulties to adjust. But to the world it assumes an ever bolder front. We look across eastward to China, and see a civilisation built up on the power of the school, and ask ourselves, as school buildings eclipse churches, and the examination net is more widely cast year by year, whether the school is not taking the place which the Church held in the mediæval world. A power so formidable, and

increasing so continually in strength, deserves that its methods should be studied. If there is anything to be learnt from that power, by all means let us learn it.

The school has been modernised

No doubt there are many reasons to be assigned for the development of school influence. Among these might be instanced the necessity of teaching those who have been trusted with political power how to use it, the value of education as a means of maintaining commercial prosperity, the example of other nations, and many such causes. But the most potent of all factors in scholastic success has been the revolution in scholastic methods. Stated broadly, it might be called a change from deductive to inductive methods of teaching. The school has followed the lines which have proved successful in scientific inquiry. It has accommodated its principles to the philosophic thought of the day. Education no longer consists in beating into a child rules which he cannot understand, and leaving him to think them out for himself. It does not trust to loading the memory with technical jargon. It does not say to the child, 'You have no business to think.' Less trust is placed in memory and more in reason. Children are taught to observe and put things together for themselves. Reasoned error is preferred to unreasoning correctness. Although parents are still only half conscious of the change that has taken place—and the change itself is far

from complete—they have a faith that schools are going on right lines. They believe that their children are being fitted for the world, and accept the new order with perhaps too little questioning. The schoolmaster is beginning to be equipped with resources which remind us of the palmy days of the mediæval Church. In fact the Church has been spoiled in many instances to enrich the school.

It is clearly our duty to consider how far these methods of teaching are applicable to religious instruction. For as yet we have very imperfectly adopted them. The rule of theological teaching still is, first store the child's memory, then let his reason work. Supply him with definitions, explain the meaning of the words; leave it to the Holy Spirit by and by to unfold and apply the truth. Again, we have not abandoned the supposition that any half-educated or uneducated person can teach a child the things which he needs to know for his soul's health;[1] also that all the care which schools spend on discipline, furniture, and school apparatus is spent on idle and wasteful luxuries. We view with suspicion the greater part of modern biblical re-

[1] Here it may be objected that, as a matter of fact, many half-educated persons have proved themselves successful Sunday-school teachers, and have gained a really religious influence over children where the trained teacher has failed to do so. The fact may be admitted, for character naturally tells more in religious than in any other teaching. But the real question is whether training in the art of teaching would not have multiplied manifold the usefulness and power of the half-educated person.

search, and deem it our chief duty to hide its results from children. Of all which methods one result must inevitably follow. There must grow up in children's minds a cleavage between religious and secular knowledge. A child cannot really learn on two methods at the same time. He cannot keep his mind in two water-tight compartments. There is danger to be apprehended from the mere fact that religious and secular teachers are following two distinct methods in the instruction of the same children.

The Church fossilised

While the school is being modernised the Church is being fossilised. I am sorry to use the term, for it means more than I want to say; but it is hard to find any other single word to mark the contrast. Our interest as Churchmen has largely been turned in the direction of the Church of four hundred years ago. Its literature, its methods, its rubrics, and its postures are being exhumed with all-absorbing interest. No doubt there is a reason for all this. No doubt this antiquarian research has been prompted by the best of motives. We may plead also that it has been accompanied by a certain revival of Church life. But we can hardly wonder that the world, flushed with new conquests in the realm of scientific discovery, looks with something of impatience—yes, and with something of contempt—upon our never-ending excavations of the buried past. It is true that we have a heritage which we cannot afford to despise. We are heirs of the past,

partners with it, and debtors to it. But the Church was never intended to be a museum of fossils, however ancient, however well arranged. The ages until her Lord returns are hers, and she must make provision for them. She must adapt herself, her system, and her resources, to the new conditions which from time to time confront her, in such a way that the truth shall suffer no loss. Now the condition which specially concerns us in this connection is the growth of a new and independent profession, which is absorbing the teaching work that for some centuries has been in the hands of the Church. What, under these circumstances, is the Church to do? Is the Church to abandon teaching? Is she to confine herself to teaching which the profession finds troublesome? What is to be the relation between the Church and the teacher which shall secure free course for the truth? Most strongly would I urge that, because teaching has become a distinct profession, officered and staffed mainly by the laity, the work of clergy as teachers is not over, and that our domain is not absolutely distinct from theirs. No. In every previous age the Church has recognised the unity of truth, and the impossibility of cutting off one portion of it to be the province of the clergy, the rest being handed over to the laity. Such an arrangement means disaster. The priest's lips must keep knowledge. He must be a teacher, and he must know what the world of

education is doing. He cannot allow himself to be absorbed in services, meetings, and entertainments, while the march of enlightenment goes by and leaves him behind. On the contrary, he is a witness to the light, and a witness to truth. If he does not claim for theology her old domination over the whole field of inquiry, he does not on the other hand allow that the field of theology is distinct and separate from all the rest—a field with a border constantly shrinking, and to be worked by antiquated methods. The God of our fathers is the same God who reveals Himself to us to-day, and we are students of that revelation, and teachers in our own part of it. We cannot divest ourselves of this responsibility.

It may be objected that this isolation of religious from secular learning is only a part of the division of labour which has become a necessity with the advance of learning. Theology was dominant when the *totum scibile* was so small that by industry men could hope to become masters of it, and co-ordinate and subordinate all that was unknown to the supreme science. Now, the range of things knowable is beyond the most encyclopædic mind. Each science is obliged to pursue its own investigations independently of the rest. Hence it may be urged that the isolation of theology is not in any sense a dangerous symptom, but part of an irresistible tendency, which no skill or industry could avert. I am quite prepared to grant that the theologian can-

not master all other sciences, nor, as some seem to expect, can the ordinary clergyman keep abreast of all the current literature of the day. That is not at all my meaning. But there is a right and a wrong attitude of mind as between investigators in different fields of research: there are right and wrong methods of inquiry; there is such a thing as making use of good work done by others, and there is such a thing as indifference to what others are doing. And since God manifests Himself in the whole of His creation, and all real truth is in some sense a revelation of Him, those whose study is in Divine things have need of mental alertness to what is going on around them more than any other inquirers, and those who teach Divine truths should be masters of the art of teaching, lest by their unskilful setting of it they bring into contempt 'the pearl of great price.'

Danger of divorce between religious and secular teaching

I hope therefore that my choice of subject has not been determined by reasons of merely passing interest. I have no intention of entering into controversies between Board schools and Church schools. Issues vital to the Church seem to me to be at stake, and if I fail to impress you with their importance the fault will be my own. Nothing can be more important to the Church and to education than the closest possible union and alliance between religious and secular teaching. For the secular teacher, as he is called, who is debarred from or indifferent to religious instruction in

teaching, goes to his work maimed, and working at half his strength. He is cut off from a side of the child's being and interests, and powers, which cannot be starved without infinite loss to the rest. He is obliged in the last resort to erect his moral fabric, without which the mental is worthless and has no stability, on appeals to self-interest. It has been said that a child's mind is not a vase to be filled, but a fire to be kindled. He who appeals to self-interest kindles it with explosives. I know of what I speak. More than one of the teachers under our Board has said to me, 'The liberty to give religious instruction gives to the school another tone. It is the best work that we do in the day.' So Dr. Mozley says,[1] after speaking of the artist's ideal, 'That ideal in the world of school creation is the Creed. At once a school becomes something else; something it gains of an end above nature, of a supernatural end of its own work. The rank of all work is raised, and the scholar is raised with his work. The school belongs to the ages that are past, and is part of the chain of forts and defences of Christianity.' Although I dare not hope that I have much to offer to school teachers that is new, yet I shall be thankful if I can at all raise in their eyes the importance of this side of their work, if I can induce them to make any special preparation for the discharge of it. While to those who intend to take Holy Orders, a few hours spent on this part of

[1] Mozley's *University Sermons*, 6th edition, London, 1886, p. 302.

their future vocation can hardly be unimportant. No doubt many portions of your office seem to be more attractive. You look forward to the time when you will be stewards of the household of God: when your hands will minister the sacred memorials of the one Sacrifice once offered for the sins of the whole world; when your lips will proclaim the glad tidings of the Gospel of peace; when from house to house you will visit the sick, warn the careless, and seek for Christ's sheep that are scattered abroad in the midst of this naughty world that they may be saved through Christ for ever. The whole sphere of your duties is wide, the preparation necessary for it is many-sided, and every one in turn, philanthropist, social reformer, sanitary faddist, whoever he be who wants a little help in advancing his fads, tells you that you ought to study his subject. But pray remember that while these duties are optional, the duty of catechising —that is of teaching—is not optional. There are rubrics difficult of interpretation. It may take a highly trained lawyer to determine what you are to wear and where you are to stand. There may be no distinct instruction as to the number of times in the year, or the hours, when you are to celebrate the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper. But about the duty of catechising there can be no doubt or question. It confronts you on your first entry into your sacred office. 'It appertaineth,' says the Ordination service, 'It appertaineth to the office of a Deacon . . . to

Duty of catechising

instruct the youth in the Catechism.' It is the duty of the Curate to catechise the youth of the parish weekly and to exhort all parents and employers to see that their children and apprentices attend the catechising. 'The Curate of every parish shall diligently upon Sundays and holy-days, after the second Lesson at Evening Prayer, openly in the Church instruct and examine so many children of his parish sent unto him, as he shall think convenient, in some part of the Catechism.' 'And all fathers, mothers, masters, and dames shall cause their children, servants, and apprentices (which have not learned their Catechism) to come to the Church at the time appointed, and obediently to hear, and be ordered by the Curate, until such time as they have learned all that is here appointed for them to learn.'[1]

I would say to you with all earnestness, prepare yourselves for this work. Looking back upon my own ministry, I feel how ill-prepared for it I was myself. . . . If that were given which God never gives, the opportunity of recalling the past, and of starting afresh, I could not be content to seek ordination now, without giving at least six months to the study and practice of the method of teaching. We are teachers quite as truly as any others. We have the same children to handle as teachers in elementary schools. We have larger classes often than theirs. But while training is rigorously exacted

[1] Book of Common Prayer. Rubrics after the Catechism.

of the elementary teacher, and his work extends over many years, it is possible for a man to be ordained Deacon and even Priest, who has never set foot in a school, has never seen children taught, and has never read so much as one book on the theory or art of teaching. My great desire is to impress upon you in these lectures the need of such preparation and of such study. Not, however, because this generation, more than any other, is possessed of some specific by which the loss of past ages will be turned into gain. Every age has its theories of education. Every new philosophy, every religious reformation gives birth to a new educational theory. But still[1] 'that infection of nature which remaineth, yea in them that are regenerated,' asserts itself triumphantly over every device that is framed to remove it. You will not, even by training yourselves to teach, regenerate the world. But let me say, even at the risk of repeating myself, for it is what I wish to emphasise, that you will have done a very evil service to your generation if you have contributed aught to widen the breach between teachers and clergy, or if you have brought into contempt the truth which you have to propound, by indifference to the manner of presenting it, and above all if you have contributed anything to the mischievous notion that there are two kinds of truth, or that reason is the foe of religion. It would be too much to say of the past, 'Let the dead bury their dead,'

[1] IXth Article.

though there are acute forms of religious controversy to which even those words apply. But it is not too much to say that Christ calls you to possess the future; that[1] God has established strength out of the mouths of babes and sucklings; and that no amount of care spent on other parts of your duty can ever excuse you from the work of 'feeding the lambs' of Christ's flock with wholesome honest food, 'with the sincere milk of the Word that they may grow thereby.'

Outline of course proposed

My great aim will be to focus your attention on the various agencies which, directly or indirectly, subserve to a child's religious training, that you may be fully conscious that what you will have to *say* to him is only one of many forces that will affect him. This being so, you must study your relation to the other influences which bear on his religious life, first with a view of bringing your own teaching methods, so far as is right, into a line with the rest, and, secondly, that you may make the best of the opportunities which come to hand. My first lecture, therefore, will take up the child's religious life at its starting point, viz. Holy Baptism, with a view of showing you how sound the practice of infant baptism is, from the standpoint of modern educational methods, and yet how difficult it is to secure the conditions without which we have no right to administer infant baptism.

[1] Ps. viii. 2.

Those conditions are in one word the environment of the child from infancy with a living Church. From this point of view emerges the importance of the day school. In my second lecture I propose to treat of the training of teachers to give religious instruction. Here, again, are two main aspects of the subject: (1) What can be done for the teachers in our primary and secondary schools to qualify them better for the work of religious instruction? (2) What can be done to qualify clergy to undertake the work of training Sunday-school teachers?

In the third lecture I propose to treat of the History of Catechisms, their origin and their influence in the Church, that you may have a better understanding of the nature of the work to which the Church calls you, and of its vital connection with the rest of primary education.

My fourth lecture, after reviewing some objections alleged against catechisms, and examining in this light the catechism of our Church, will be devoted to methods of catechising, and particularly to the method of St. Sulpice, the object being to ascertain how far you can hope to adapt or use that method for your own work. The fifth lecture will treat of the Sunday school and of progressive religious instruction therein; how far we may borrow Kindergarten methods for our infant schools, and on what sort of lines we may arrange for the upper school such a course of religious instruction as might

easily be worked in with day-school teaching, without any needless offence to Nonconformists, and yet might, so far as Sunday schools are concerned, lead steadily and directly up to confirmation. The last lecture will treat of the aims of the confirmation class, and of the best methods of continuing religious instruction that I can suggest, in the long lifetime that follows confirmation, when so much of our careful preparation seems to lead to nothing and to be almost thrown away.

The object of the course

The object of the course, as you will see from this outline, is not to train you to teach, but to vindicate the necessity for such training. It is to focus your attention upon child life, and to induce you, if I may, to study it, with a view of using all the best aids which the past experience of the Church has suggested, or which modern practice has established. At the same time I desire very respectfully to suggest that the divinity faculties of our universities should enlarge their scope, so as to include not only the study of the science of theology, but also the giving of diplomas in theological teaching. Our universities possess the confidence of the country, and are qualified for this work as no other existing institutions are qualified. It rests with them more than with any other foundations to restore the practice of giving religious instruction to its right importance in public estimation. If in making such suggestions I go beyond the province in-

tended for my lectures, you must forgive me. Watching, as we in Birmingham to-day are watching, the birth of a new University, and rejoicing in the daring confidence with which it looks forward to a great influence on the education of the future, we see also the limitations which hamper it from its very cradle. Among these there is, I will not say the inability to teach theology, but the extraordinary difficulty that it must have in giving guidance to the sublimest aspirations and powers of man. From those difficulties you are wholly free. In the ancient universities theology has her true place as the *scientia scientiarum*. If ever that place is to be resumed outside the pale of Oxford and Cambridge; if ever England is to look on religious instruction as something else than a battle-ground of politicians; if 'the fear of the Lord is' to be 'the beginning of wisdom,' it must be through the practical teaching thereof revealing its value in the hands of trained and skilled teachers. When it is found that, in fact, religious education is the best education, the difficulties about giving it will disappear. It is my conviction—I hope you will not call it my delusion—that our ancient universities can restore the art of religious teaching to its true level; can raise it up from the position of inferiority which it occupies through want of bestowing attention upon it; can supply what I venture to call an order of catechists, lay as well as clerical, whose teaching skill shall be pro-

portioned to the excellence and importance of the subject which they have to teach.

For beginning a course of educational lectures at the point of infant baptism no apology is needed.

Importance of unconscious training

For a long time the study of education was confined mainly to conscious education. The large region of the unconscious mind was left out of sight, which every hour from our birth onwards is receiving impressions—impressions of the utmost importance, because of their influence in determining character. Powers, which neither parent nor child notice, are from the cradle helping to form the child—powers which do not all of them belong to the child's present environment. Darwin, we are told, considered the influence of education, as compared with that of heredity, as infinitesimal. And long before Darwin, Froebel and Pestalozzi and many others tried to teach us that, if we would educate a child, we must begin with its parents. This side of truth was overlooked by those who wished, rightly enough in their way, to insist upon the conscious dealing of the soul with God. Revolting from purely mechanical religion, and wishing to emphasise the spiritual character of faith and worship, they insensibly identified spirit with mind, and found it hard to believe that new birth and admission into the family of God could belong to the age of unconscious childhood. Overlooking the facts which have taught us the power of environment and

the force of heredity, and consequently all the influences that unconsciously shape our character, they, not unnaturally, could find no room for the grace of God until consciousness began, and indeed was more or less fully developed. Yet, if we believe in Divine grace at all, there is no physical reason why we should not be subject to its power long before we know Who it is that is shaping us, or why we should not begin to be moulded before we can recognise the hand of 'the Potter.' For the same reason, even those who have received infant baptism as part of the teaching of the Church have shown too little sense of its importance. Since the early days of the Tractarian movement the baptismal controversy has hardly stirred the Church. It would be difficult to mention any prosecution which in recent years has turned upon the mode of administering baptism. With all the efforts that have been made to adorn and beautify the east end of the church, how little has been done for the baptistery! How often is the font an obscure adjunct of a draughty porch, without dignity, without beauty! The service is treated as semi-private, as concerning only the child and his parents. It does not hold the position which our Reformers intended it to hold of a great object lesson, nor its position as one of the most important services of the Church. Yet the rubric is

[1] Book of Common Prayer. Rubric before Public Baptism of Infants.

most explicit on these points: 'The people are to be admonished, that it is most convenient that baptism should not be administered but upon Sundays and other holy-days, when the most number of people come together: as well that the congregation there present may testify the receiving of them that be newly baptised into the number of Christ's Church: as also because in the baptism of infants every man present may be put in remembrance of his own profession made to God in his baptism.' The practical considerations which influenced our Reformers have been strengthened and enforced by all that modern inquiry has taught us of human character and human development. We have more reason than our forefathers had for insisting on the dignity of this sacrament. For we know better than they did how far back in child-life its true beginning lies, how the babe rather than the child is father of the man. Infant baptism witnesses to truths which from an educational point of view are as important as they are well established. If we wish to be good teachers we must study the service for the baptism of infants. From it we shall learn these truths:

1. The presence of evil in all children from the very beginning of life, or, in theological language, of original sin: 'Forasmuch as all men are conceived and born in sin.' This is not the same thing as saying that all men are from the first utterly depraved—a statement which

Testimony of baptism to original sin

Froebel,[1] as I think, very justly condemns as blasphemy against the Creator. But it is the candid acknowledgment that no human being comes into the world apart from the rest of his kind, as though he were a new creation, without bias towards good or evil. The child who comes into the world is what his ancestors have made him, and the idea that, by talking to him or informing him of certain facts, you will do that which, as Aristotle[2] says, 'even God cannot do, make the things which have been not to have been,' is a pure delusion. From this point of view, however, thus barely stated, all responsibility for human action comes to an end. We are mere animals, who may be kicked or coaxed into certain habits, but whose nature cannot be changed. The converse truth must be remembered, that no one is a mere repetition of the past. Each of us is a new being, with his own individuality, his own potentialities. All that we might become, if the best that is in us had free course, is present in us in germ in our infancy. Infant baptism adds to these elementary facts the sublime hope and power of a new birth. It witnesses at once to the evil inheritance of the past, and the glorious possibility of the future. It proceeds on the two apparently contradictory assumptions of a child's innocence and his sinfulness. Because he is sinful, he is washed in

[1] Froebel, *Education of Man*, translated by W. N. Hailman; London, 1901, p. 120.

[2] Aristot. *Eth. N.* vi. 2, 6.

the laver of forgiveness; because he is innocent, made to enjoy God, and to glorify Him for ever, he is washed in the laver of regeneration. No education can ever be sound which loses sight of either of these facts. Assume that, in the child you have before you, you have a *tabula rasa*, on which you can write what you please, and you will always be thwarted by an unseen obstacle, too strong for all your efforts, till you cry,[1] '*Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.*' Assume, on the other hand, that you can do no more than check, modify, curb, and perhaps cheat passions that are too strong for you, and you will lose all that high ideals have done for men. Degeneracy, and nothing else, will be your goal. Be persuaded that, while original sin is a fact, the grace of God is a fact also, and that the grace of God must go before your teaching; then your education will be at once true to facts and hopeful.

2. Infant baptism witnesses to the unity and continuity of life. By this continuity is intended something more than the fact that we need the grace of God from our very birth. It is a fact which, as Froebel very truly says, parents are specially prone to disregard:[2] 'When the human being has reached the age of boyhood, they look upon him as a boy; when he has reached the age of manhood, they take him to be a youth or a man. Yet the boy has not become a boy, nor has the youth become a youth, by

[1] *Hor. Ep.* i. 10, 24.

[2] Froebel, *Education of Man*, p. 29.

reaching a certain age, but only by having lived through childhood, and further through boyhood, true to the requirements of his mind, his feelings, and his body. . . . Parents and fathers, in other respects quite sensible and efficient, expect not only that a child should begin to show himself a boy or a youth, but more particularly that the boy at least should show himself a man, thus jumping the stages of boyhood and youth.' The consequence, as Froebel goes on to point out, is that 'parents imagine that it is possible for a boy to do without the training which he ought to have had in childhood, and appeal to him, while he is still a boy, by motives which belong to manhood, whereas the child, the boy, the man, should know no other endeavour but to be at every stage of development wholly what that stage calls for.' Now adult baptism is quite inconsistent with this wholly true teaching of the continuity of life. For adult baptism—I mean, of course, of the children of Christian parents—is deferred until the adult is able to express, and therefore to understand, more or less, certain emotions which belong wholly to the adult. On the other hand, these emotions imply that the previous stages of life were outside the Church, and apart from God—a life without an entire surrender to God. It is only natural that Christian parents and friends should desire to shorten this unsatisfactory stage of life as much as possible, and therefore should constantly present to the child aims and motives

which really belong to manhood, and should look upon life as broken into two halves, of which the first has very little to do with the second. The true view of life is that it is a development. As Froebel again most truly says,[1] 'God creates and works productively in uninterrupted continuity.' Our great aim in education should be to secure as far as we can, in spite of original sin, that each stage of life—infancy, childhood, boyhood, youth, manhood—should be perfect of its kind; that as the first blade is perfect as a blade, and the ear perfect as an ear, and the full corn is developed at last in its perfection, so human life at each stage should be the fulfilment of the Divine idea, the working out of the image of God in that stage. We must understand that children reach Divine truth,[2] 'not through and in the thought, but through and in the heart; and that religious spirit and fervid life in God and with God, in all conditions and circumstances of life and of the human mind, will hardly in later years rise to full, vigorous life, if it has not grown up with man from infancy. On the other hand, a religious spirit thus fostered and nursed from infancy will rise supreme in all dangers and storms of life.' Pray do not misunderstand me. I do not mean that those who do not accept infant baptism are careless about the religion of their children. This is very far from being the case. They often put us utterly to shame. But they are obliged by their theory to put

[1] Froebel, *Education of Man*, p. 30. [2] *Ibid.* p. 26.

before the child, as his highest ambition, that he should outstrip the stages of earlier life as being not merely immature but positively defective, and should try to be a man before he has become a boy. Infant baptism, on the other hand, consecrates infancy, and is based on the words which are the foundation of all true education as well as of true religion, that[1] 'of infants is the Kingdom of Heaven, and that whosoever shall not receive the Kingdom of God as a little child, he shall in no wise enter therein.' This teaching of the continuity of life leads directly and of necessity to our third great truth—the solidarity of the Church.

Baptism witnesses to the solidarity of the Church

We are supposed to owe the word 'solidarity' to the French Communists. It is explained as meaning the joint interest which binds humanity together, the duty of respecting every one's part in it, and of doing justice to his efforts to fulfil that part. The word may be new, but the idea is old, as old as the Church of Christ. The fundamental idea of the Church is that of a family. It is the family of God created by Him in Jesus Christ, and it is not till we pay attention to this idea that we can grasp some of the elementary conceptions of the faith. Here lies the meaning of the sonship of the regenerate as distinguished from the sonship of God which is claimed by all the human race. There is a family of God created by faith in Jesus Christ, a family which has responsi-

[1] St. Mark x. 14, 15.

bilities to all its members and to the whole world, a family which by its laws and by its spirit of love makes it easier for all its members to live and behave as children of their Father in heaven. The same baptism which witnesses our inheritance of sin witnesses also to a heritage of grace. It makes all members of the family answerable in some degree for each new child admitted into the circle. This is the meaning of the sponsorial system. The sponsors represent the Church, not the parents. They are a pledge that the Church acknowledges its duty to the child, and will perform its part by him. The new name, the Christian name as we call it, implies that the child passes out of the worship and protection of family and ancestral duties, out of all obligation to maintain their shrine and to offer them sacrifice, into the family of God. He is a member of a new brotherhood, bound to shelter him from all evil, to which he in turn will owe duties when he grows up. Thus the Church anticipates all the ideas on which State education rests. She also places them on a firmer and truer basis. It is a serious matter at any time to interfere with parental rights, to enter the home and tear away the child from his natural guardians. We do so, however, on the ground that the child belongs to the State and to the nation, a claim which has done not a little to weaken the idea of parental responsibility. The Church has witnessed to the same solidarity, but in a different

spirit. She does not divide the duties owed to the child between the parent and herself, undertaking to educate, while the parent is to clothe and feed the child. But she recognises the unity of the whole family of Christ, and pledges herself to provide a charmed circle, a second home, so to speak, in which the child shall be sheltered from evil. Of course the question must always arise—and it is not easily answered—how far the Church is entitled to make herself responsible for the children of parents who are merely outward adherents of the Church. How far is it possible to make such children really members of the family of Christ? The Continental Reformers provided for this by a searching test of the faith of godparents. The Scotch Catechism regards infant baptism as a privilege for the children of believers. Our Church has not gone further than to require by a canon that the godparents shall be communicants—a canon which, so far as I know, is seldom enforced. But it is obvious that the idea of baptism has suffered somewhat from the refusal to face this difficulty. It is well, no doubt, that children should not be excluded for the sins of their parents. But it is not well that baptism should be treated as a mode of registration, or as an ecclesiastical vaccination. If we admit that we have a duty to children brought to the font, in God's name let us seek to fulfil that duty. The idea of the service is thoroughly sound. It accords with the truest educational teaching of the day. The

creation of a charmed circle in which the child's early years shall be spent has been the dream of all educationists from the days of Plato. But it is not just either to the Church or to the world to undertake responsibilities which we cannot fulfil. If we ask God to give the new birth, we are bound to see that the child is brought up as a child under the guidance and influence of the Holy Spirit, who dwells in the Church of Christ, God's home upon earth. If we hold the child, as we do in our Catechism, to the promises made by his godparents, we must see that we provide suitable conditions for the fulfilment of these promises. Neglecting these conditions, we need not be surprised if we are half ashamed of the baptism of infants, and huddle the service into unseemly obscurity.

Can the Church secure right conditions for infant baptism?

We seem to be brought by our argument to this dilemma: While infant baptism is due to the condition and needs of childhood, we must ask ourselves whether we are entitled under present circumstances to administer it. Especially, are we entitled to administer it where it is most needed? A very brief acquaintance with your ministerial work must raise these doubts, and I fear that fuller knowledge will only confirm them. For baptism presupposes home life. It presupposes a Christian neighbourhood and Christian environment for the baptised child. Without mentioning homes

that are no homes, but mere 'parts of the outer world which you have roofed over and lighted a fire in them,'[1] the influence of the better class of homes is but shortlived to-day. In point of fact the school is really the child's second home: in many cases the child's only home: 'its only place of peace, its shelter not only from all injury, but from all doubt, terror, and division . . . into which the anxieties of the outer life do not penetrate.' It is sad enough, when we look at the unwieldy classes of our elementary schools, and think how little of real love and tenderness the best teacher can bestow on so numerous, so motley a group, to remember that for some children the school is the only place where they can come across wise and intelligent love. It is not to the schools that we should look for our Hooligans and criminals, but to the homeless homes into which from boyhood love has never entered, for which tenderness has no meaning at all. You may say that many of the children are unbaptised, and the Church has contracted no responsibility for them. Let us go further. Let us think of the classes a little higher, though I do not understand how a Church can be fulfilling her mission when she has to confess that the poorest are beyond her reach. Let us take the artisan or shopkeeper population, and consider how few our churches are in comparison with the population, in quarters where these classes live.

[1] Ruskin's *Sesame and Lilies*, § 68.

What comforting evidence of Christian life and influence can our churches bring? Are these churches as a rule well attended? Do we seriously believe that prayer is often offered in these homes? Do the people know enough of Christian life and grace to tell their children anything about it? These are questions very painful to ask. From many towns, at all events, the answer must be more painful still. The Prayer Book was not compiled in view of conditions such as these. It is the school, and the school only, which provides anything like the atmosphere which is contemplated by infant baptism. When I say the school and the school only, I do not forget that there are other agencies at work in many parishes, and some, such as the Sunday school, practically in all parishes. But what I mean is this: the school is the only agency of which we can be sure that the baptised child will pass through it, and will stay long enough in it to be really reached by its influence. There are children who escape all but a smattering of school influence. But they are the exception, and need not be considered. The school has the right which the Church has not of compelling attendance. It has attendance officers for its apparitors, and fines and penalties, formidable as those of any archdeacon, for non-attendance. It reigns without a rival, as the Church reigned under the Act of Uniformity, or in Pre-Reformation times. It is a second home, a foster-mother for all the children of the poor.

Surely these considerations point to a close alliance between the clergy and the schools. The time will come in your clerical life when you will be tempted to look on the school as a burden. You will want to know why you should trouble yourself about secular instruction, which the State is quite willing to provide. You will see that the schools are not feeding the Church, and will be tempted to abandon them as not worth the trouble which they give. Or you will find yourself outside the Board school, hesitating to know whether you may put foot in it, and, if you do, how your advances will be received. I can only say that in parishes where you neither have Church schools, in which you can secure the presence of teachers animated with the spirit of Christ, nor can satisfy yourselves that the Board schools exercise Christian influence, you will have to take some very vigorous measures to reach the children, or else you will hardly be entitled to remove the cover from the font. In view of the extraordinary social revolution which the last century wrought, and the practical break-up in many large towns of the parochial system, it is appalling to think how the present generation must have grown up outside Christian influence but for our day schools. Never was better work done for the Church than by those who founded our training colleges for teachers; nor can we ever be thankful enough for the Christianising power that those teachers

Necessity for close alliance with the school

have exercised. There can be, in my judgment, no more fatal error than the persistent belittling of the capacity of ordinary day-school teachers to give religious instruction. Men are, on the whole, what we expect and believe them to be. I would urge all clergy to make the day-school teachers their friends and allies. The teachers have twenty-five hours every week with the children. You will be fortunate if you have two. They are trained to make the most of every minute at their disposal; you are not. You will not, therefore, if you are wise, be satisfied with trying to make your Sunday school or Catechism perfect. You will not put your whole faith in direct conscious appeals to the children. You will bear in mind the other influences which are at work upon them, unconsciously moulding and fashioning them all the day long. You will be thankful if you can secure the aid of the most potent of them all, the ordinary day school.

The sum then of what I have to say is this: that the spread of education and the growing power of the school is not something which as Churchmen we ought to regard with suspicion or jealousy, but with deep thankfulness. For we have nothing to fear from the light. What we have to apprehend is lest a spirit of timidity or conservatism (sometimes a convenient alias for indolence) should prevent us from keeping abreast with all that is best in the advance of educational method. We have no excuse for such timidity. For our Church, by the honour which she has placed

on infant baptism, has not only taken a right view of the starting-point of education, but has laid on us educational responsibilities, which can only be fulfilled by close alliance with our day-school teachers, and by trying to learn all that is best in their system. We are not to regard the offices of minister and teacher as antagonistic, but as gifts of the same Spirit. We are not, as ministers, to regard the teaching gift as one which lies outside our province; far less may we regard two gifts of the same Spirit as rivals or consistent with a spirit of rivalry. They are alternatives, but not by any means mutually exclusive the one of the other. Indeed, it would seem from the passage in the Epistle to the Ephesians,[1] from which I have taken the title of these lectures, that the two gifts were usually combined in the early Church. Our clergy, as a rule, are bound to cultivate both with all the zeal that St. Paul throws into that single word[2] 'in' or 'on'—'He that ministereth (let him be) *in* his ministry, or he that teacheth in his teaching.'

[1] Eph. iv. 11. [2] Rom. xii 7.

LECTURE II

THE TRAINING OF TEACHERS

The Teacher of teachers has warned us that the best seed will fail if sown on unsuitable soil. He has bidden us remember that the character of scholars is quite as important as the lesson which we teach. He did this assuredly not that we might comfort ourselves by the reflection that failures in instruction were not to be laid at our door as teachers, not to encourage a happy-go-lucky style of sowing, but to draw our attention to an often neglected aspect of the teacher's art. We are to learn that in every lesson we give, whether to adults or to children, but specially to children, we give two lessons: one directly to the reason, the other indirectly to the rest of the powers of the hearer. We cannot isolate the reason from the rest of man. We cannot place the reason in absolute supremacy over any one man. Every scholar is a being possessed of a composite nature; he has will, conscience, and affections as well as reason. If we do not remember the characters of those whom we teach, we can never

The parable of the Sower

be teachers. But this is not the whole meaning of the parable. It is intended also—is it not?—to prepare us for those surprises and reversals of judgment which occur to all teachers in the course of their instruction, but especially to such as have only occasional and periodical opportunities of giving it. These surprises we call conversions, and attribute them, quite rightly, to the power of the grace of God. But it must have occurred to us to ask, 'How is this doctrine of conversion to be reconciled with the parable of the Sower?' For the essential truth of conversion is that the seed sown on bad ground not only takes root and springs into life, but also bears fruit abundantly for many years afterwards. It is possible, no doubt, to speak of a sudden change of heart; but as heart means character, and character means a fixed type, it is confusing to speak of a sudden change of that which is fixed. It is not only confusing, it is also morally misleading. For it encourages the idea that conversion and repentance have nothing to do with a man's past, but that he can at any time, or that God may at any moment for him, undo all the fruit of his antecedents. A far truer account of the matter seems to be given by Dr. Mozley in his sermon on the reversal of human judgment. The passage is so apposite to the considerations which I have to offer that I make no apology for quoting it at some length:[1] 'Those who

[1] Mozley's *University Sermons*, 6th edition, p. 92.

have lived under an exterior of rule when they come to a trying moment sometimes disappoint us, because their forms of duty, whatever they are, have not touched in reality their deeper faults of character, meanness, or jealousy, or the like, but have left them where they were; they have gone on thinking themselves good because they did particular things, and used certain language, and adopted certain ways of thought, and have been utterly unconscious all the time of corroding sin within them. On the other hand, some one who did not promise much comes out at a moment of trial strikingly and favourably. This is a surprise, then, which sometimes happens; nay, and sometimes a greater surprise still, when out of the eater comes forth meat, and out of a state of sin there springs the soul of virtue. The act of the thief on the cross is a surprise. Up to the time when he was judged he was a thief, and from a thief he became a saint. For even in the dark labyrinth of evil there are unexpected outlets; sin is established by habit in the man, but the good principle which is in him also, but kept down and suppressed, may be secretly growing too; it may be undermining it and extracting the life and force from it. In this man, then, sin becomes more and more, though holding its place by custom, an outside and coating, just as virtue does in the deteriorating man, till at last, by a sudden effort and the inspiration of an opportunity, the strong good casts off

the weak and comes out free. We have a conversion.'

Now in children character is not settled. External circumstances and the influence of habit have not shaped it, though they are doing so. It is at this moment that the ordinary day-school teacher, the clergyman, and the Sunday-school teacher comes on the scene of the child's life. Of the three, the day-school teacher has far the greatest opportunities. School, as I said in my last lecture, is to many children their only home worthy of the name. To all it is their second home. The child brought up by parents who have never been so trained to study character, and who are often too careless to study it, has lived under force of rule. The object of the rule has not been development of the child's character, but minimising the parent's labour. To give no trouble has been the supreme virtue. From parent the child passes to teacher, who may of course adopt the same ruling principle, and enter on a second rule of force. If so, the child gains little by the change and acquires no moral force against the impending hour of emancipation. But I am thankful to think that a great number of our teachers have made children's character their study, and lay out their methods and discipline, so far as they can, to appeal not merely to reason and to brute force but to the whole child. They try to train the will, to inform and to stimulate the conscience,

The balance of forces in children

and to arouse the affection. They are handicapped, no doubt, by the size of the classes with which they have to deal—numbers which make individual study and individual attention most difficult. But their discipline, skill, and method remove some of these obstacles. Their earnest desire to do their work as it ought to be done and the strength gained by daily experience overcome the rest. We have teachers who study carefully and try to improve the soil in which they sow their seed. They seek diligently for the good elements in each child and endeavour to strengthen them; they study also the evil and try to destroy them. Out of the unformed contending principles they try, as well as their very limited opportunities permit, to build up good character and to make the prevailing tone in their schools a force for good. These are the best teachers, and they will tell you that experience and study have done more for them than any natural intuition.

It is no answer to these considerations to plead that the Word which we teach is, after all, the vital principle, that the seed, not the soil, contains the power of life. No one questions that the living word from our lips is the means whereby the Holy Spirit, from and through us, becomes the Teacher of children and adults. Words have a power for good and for evil which it would be idle to deny. My contention is not that instruction, information, and exhortation are useless, but that we show most faith in their power

when we study most carefully the conditions under which we give utterance to them. The orator who persuades men to go and do something is the man who has read the thought of his audience, and found the key to the springs of action in their character and will, and the successful teacher is the man who has given most attention to the natures of his class.

Religious teacher's special need of character and study

But if the teacher whom we call secular, and who addresses his teaching specially to the reason, feels the need of a good character in children, and deems it indispensable to the success of his work, how much more is such study necessary for those who give religious instruction! For us, more than for other teachers, Rousseau's words are true: 'The art which we wish to teach them is how to live.' 'That they may have life, and have it more abundantly,'[1] is the end of all our labours. We cannot give them that life. Froebel is perfectly right when he maintains[2] that 'you cannot give religious instruction unless religion is already there. If a human being could be without religion,' he goes on to say, 'we could not give him religion.' Is not this the assumption that underlies infant baptism? If a child were without the Holy Spirit, no voice of ours could quicken a life that did not exist. The sons of God are not born of the will of man. It is not the work of religious instruction to impart new birth any more than it is the work of

[1] St. John x. 10. [2] Froebel, *Education of Man*, p. 141.

secular education to give intelligence. All that we can do is to secure conditions, and to give training, calculated to strengthen and develop the life which is already there. But for this very reason we need, more than ordinary teachers, that study of character, that knowledge of the springs of action, and of the balance of forces in child life, of which I was speaking just now. For God does not give to children such a fixed and settled character that we have nothing to do but to tell them things which they did not know before. He gives them capacities which it is our business to train till they become settled habits. These capacities are so tender that by blundering work we may destroy the very plant which we seek to cultivate. And[1] 'if any man cause one of these little ones which believe in Me to stumble, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea.'[1] The responsibilities of undertaking to teach children are unspeakably great—at all events in the sight of God.

The subject is so important that I offer no apology for illustrating it at some length. My endeavour will be to show you how little the best devised and best prepared course of lessons can do for children, if you neglect the rest of your work—that is, the preparation of yourself both to know what the child's nature is, and to act upon it rightly. Our Lord Himself has taught us that for

Illustrations of this necessity

[1] St. Matth. xviii. 6.

apprehension of the truth the will is as indispensable as the reason. [1] 'If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine.' The reason is obvious enough. It is the will in us which suggests to us the very existence of God. It is the will which contradicts the idea that the world is material force and nothing more. From the will we gather the sense of our responsibility. It is not only the originator of our deliberate actions, but also the seat of any merit in our action at all. From the will come manliness and love of liberty. It is the will which must determine that 'we must obey God rather than man.' Now if the will were nothing else than reason, we might be quite satisfied with supplying right information and leaving that to do its work. But we cannot forget the words,[2] 'If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them.' And again,[3] 'To him that knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin.' Here in the will we encounter a power which may either resist and defeat all our instruction, or turn that instruction to the best account. How are we to reach it? How are we to deal with it?

On the answer to this elementary question educational systems have been divided. Some have sought to break the will by rigorous and frequent punishments. They have looked upon it as the seat of pride and rebellion against God, which must, at all hazards, be destroyed. But it is clear that this work

[1] St. John vii. 17. [2] St. John xiii. 17. [3] St. James iii. 17.

of destruction can be carried too far. We may establish a rule of force, which produces outward conformity, without touching the deeper faults of character. Then in the hour of temptation comes bitter disappointment. The seed which had sprung up quickly lacks moisture. It is withered and dried away. Our building, of which we were so proud, to use another parable, is swept away by the storm. The hearer, coerced to hear, has never become a doer of the word. Reason has been informed, but the will has not become obedient to reason. Of course it would not be difficult to allege instances in which this same system appears to have had the most salutary effect. It was avowedly the system on which the mother of John and Charles and Samuel Wesley brought up her children. Other systems, too, have had their trial, and these also with varying success. It is not necessary to mention them, for not one has been absolutely successful. If an absolutely successful system were discoverable, it would be, in effect, the removal of the source of sin. My object has been rather, so far, to shake your faith in any one system as applicable to all children, and to impress upon you the need of careful and watchful study of each child, as having his own individuality, and the need of treatment suited to the balance of forces in that child's character. Better than any system is a clearly defined aim, and the nature of that aim is indicated in the Lord's Prayer. The petition, 'Thy Will be

done,' is preceded by the prayers, 'Hallowed be Thy Name: Thy Kingdom come.' Consciousness of the Divine presence is the first step towards harmony with the Divine will.

Illustrations of the need of studying child character

Now here it would seem as though we who teach in church or in Sunday school had an immense advantage over the ordinary day-school teachers. For we bring the child deliberately, so far as we can, into the Divine presence. We try to behave ourselves as those who are conscious of that presence. If there is anything in the law of association of ideas; if buildings, vestments, music, symbolism, can teach as well as delight children, then everything is on our side. No doubt it is partly with this idea that some clergy bring children to the Holy Communion, and others have adopted children's eucharists. They know that if they have taught the child reverence they have gained more than half the battle.

The difficulty is that the impression thus made is produced at the expense of a child's natural restlessness, and avenges itself by a reaction with which we are all of us far too familiar. The last thing which we wish to convey is that God is present in church, but not elsewhere. Dupanloup is right, no doubt, when he insists on the necessity of silence, if the voice of God is to be heard: '*Fuit silentium in cælo.*' We are sure also that the bear-garden style of Sunday school and catechising must be spiritually

injurious. Yet we cannot doubt that silence and stillness may be too dearly bought, and that the sense of the Divine presence which we wish to inculcate is one that will not make the occupations and amusements of the week appear to be outside the region of Divine influence.

In other words, we want an order that shall be natural, not unnatural—a quiet produced without fuss or effort—in fact, such discipline as a trained teacher produces by a look or a word, without resort to threats or bribes; a quiet in the teacher's own manner which falls unconsciously on the children, and really makes their work pleasant to them; a quiet, again, which is not prolonged to the point at which it becomes physically distressing, but is judiciously varied with physical exercise.

Illustration from training of the will in children

It is not necessary, I think, to carry this illustration further. This instance of 'reverence,' essential to the right training of the will, and at first sight so simple to inculcate, is enough. We clearly have to deal with a most delicate balance of forces. On the one side there is the child's simple unquestioning faith in the unseen, his delight in mystery and symbolism, his natural delight in regularity and order. On the other side, the child's power of 'make-believe' so readily mistrained to hypocrisy; his natural restlessness, the difficulty with which he sustains a prolonged attention, his proneness to disgust, which may

harden into absolute prejudice. You can see how easily an unintelligent effort to produce reverence may produce irreverence, and the capacity for harmony with the Divine will become an utter insensibility to the very being of God.

You can follow out this line of thought for yourselves and understand the truth of Madame Necker de Saussure's dictum [1]—that, 'unfortunately, education tends to destroy the will; that it is often nothing but a system of means to weaken it. If it be persuasive and insinuating, it hinders the will from forming itself; if severe and inflexible, it makes it bend and breaks it. It tries to obtain good habits, and the very property of habits is to obtain actions without the concurrence of the will; it depends largely on the instinct of imitation, which has a like effect.'

Illustration from training the conscience

If these problems must be solved in each ordinary lesson that we give, every catechising that we take, and solved without effort, almost unconsciously, how much more serious are those which attend the development of conscience in children! For 'intelligence,' as Carlyle tells us, 'is the handmaid of conscience,' whereon Ruskin truly notes,[2] 'If you resolve to do right, you will soon do wisely; but resolve only to do wisely

[1] Madame Necker de Saussure's *L'Education Progressive*, vol. i., 2nd edition: Paris, 1850, p. 49.

[2] Ruskin's *Val d'Arno*, 6th edition: Farrant, Orpington and London, 1900, p. 43.

and you will never do right.' If this be true, and you will find that practice commends the maxim, how much turns on the motives which our teaching suggests! For conscience is a very tender plant in children, and of all child-life that which we most easily misjudge. We are apt to measure it by its agreement in practical effect with our own, forgetting how largely our conscience has been formed by teaching and example. The things which would be dreadful to us—such as falsehood or cruelty—are not necessarily dreadful to children. They may stand for nothing more than thoughtlessness with them. If we exaggerate our rebuke, if we threaten heedlessly and harshly, we may easily offend a child's sense of justice, which is to him a rudimentary conscience. Even a wrong use or excessive use of promises of rewards hereafter, or warnings of wrath to come, may have an effect the very opposite of what we intend. For we do not wish to teach a child to be good for the sake of what he can get, even in the life to come. Froebel[1] asks: 'Does the simple, normal child, conscious of having done right, think of any additional reward were it only praise? Should not the man be as pure and perfect in his actions toward God, as the son is toward his earthly father? Jesus says, "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me"—that is, "the consciousness of having done the Father's will gives sustenance, meaning, and joy to My life."'

[1] Froebel's *Education of Man*, p. 245.

Froebel writes as though such perfect action were possible to fallen man, which is not the case. But his hint is not the less valuable. We may so place even religious rewards and punishments before children as to stimulate the sins which vitiate all our actions. We may teach them to do what is right in the spirit of hirelings, or for the sake of praise. To put the matter quite simply, our efforts to stimulate conscience may foster priggishness.

Reasons for insisting on difficulties

You will not of course misunderstand my motive for laying such stress on the difficulty of giving sound religious instruction. I would not deter you, God forbid, but I would save you from needless disappointment. You will miss the meaning of our parable of the Sower if you say to yourself, 'God must prepare the soil.' On the contrary, in teaching children, at all events, He uses you to prepare the soil, and no ground is so hard as that which has been hardened by the feet of the sower. If you rush into this work of teaching children without studying child nature as well as your Bibles, without preparing yourselves as well as your lessons, do not lay the blame upon God. It is quite as possible to give a correct religious instruction with injurious effect as it is to give a secular lesson with a really religious effect. Nor is it the earnestness and personal piety of the teacher which will make all the difference. In teaching, as in learning, conscience must precede intelligence, and conscience

in the art of teaching includes a proper study of the teacher's trade.

'Difficulties,' they say in Lancashire, 'are made to be overcome.' It would have been worse than useless to insist on the obstacles in your path, had they been actually insuperable.

Inferences to be drawn from foregoing remarks

1. In the first place, these reflections will emphasise what I said in my first lecture upon the necessity of a good understanding between clergy and teachers. It is utterly misleading to talk of giving purely secular instruction to children. The thing is impossible. For whatever the teacher's subject may be, and whether he intends it or not, in the case of children at all events, he cannot give any lesson at all, he cannot even call registers, without contributing to the formation of character. The impression which he leaves on the children follows him at every step. He cannot be 'a shadowless man.' For every hour that we spend with children each week, the day-school teacher spends ten. He spends them in preparation of the soil on which we are to sow our seed. It is the very same soil as that on which we have to work. It is folly, and worse than folly, to regard his work with indifference, or to think that isolation and mutual suspicion are justifiable as between the two professions. My own earnest desire is that the Church should find some well-considered method of

Good relations between clergy and teachers

acknowledging the spiritual gifts of such primary and secondary teachers as are willing to receive recognition. I say 'spiritual gifts' advisedly, for the work of the Holy Spirit of God is a work of teaching, not less than of sanctifying. Is there any sound reason why we should not have catechists as well as lay readers, and these catechists women as well as men? Of the method of their training and admission I hope to say a little presently. But I have always felt that the clean sweep made of all minor Orders at the Reformation, however necessary it may have been, had one evil effect. By the unbridged gulf which it fixed between clergy and laity it tended to foster that which it wished to destroy—a spirit of professionalism not very alien to sacerdotalism in its worst sense. At the same time it obscured the sacred aspect of all secular work. Nor was it then foreseen that teaching would pass out of the hands of the clergy, and largely out of their control; that the State would usurp this function, so long regarded as a function of the Church. Since a large number of teachers is engaged day by day in religious teaching, I cannot understand why the Church, which has so profound an interest in their work, should not offer at least some formal and grateful recognition of it.

2. In the second place, it seems most desirable that the Church should take pains that the clergy, on whom she devolves the duty of teaching, should

be prepared for this part of their work with some of the care bestowed on day-school teachers. Ought not our bishops to require of all candidates for ordination some proof of their fitness to catechise the young? Further, should it not be their aim to establish, or bring about the establishment of, some means for including instruction in the method of teaching as a necessary part of the Ordination candidate's curriculum? The time is past when the village tailor or cobbler was the schoolmaster, and the least instructed B.A. shone by comparison with him. We now, as clergy, enter a teaching profession, and must be contrasted with professional teachers. Surely it is time that we took this part of our vocation more seriously.

Training of clergy to teach

3. Further, strong representations have reached me from the heads of some secondary schools that the time has come when the training of teachers to give religious instruction in those schools should be carefully considered by the Church. It is not, of course, desired that religious teachers should confine themselves to this one branch of instruction. The instincts of boys and girls to make war upon specialists is a factor which cannot be disregarded; nor is it desirable to put religious teaching on the footing of an extra subject. It is not at all in this direction that any change is desired. But, at the present time, in many schools the Scripture lesson is

Training of secondary school teachers

given by all teachers who do not conscientiously object to taking it, as a piece of work outside their ordinary qualifications, and without any special study for it or interest in it. Often it is regarded as a burden, a dull subject, in which the apathy of the teacher soon communicates itself to his or her scholars. There are cases also, it is to be feared, where 'religious teaching is degraded to the level of unintelligent history teaching; and there is no subject which can be taught so unintelligently as history.'[1] At times the Scripture lesson is no more than preparation for a divinity paper, and it is hard to conceive a lower level of teaching than that. Yet all the while in boys' schools there are many masters who are restrained only by the refinement and purity of their conscientiousness from taking holy orders, who love the work of religious instruction for its own sake, and who would gladly take a larger share in it. There are men and women qualified to be head-masters and head-mistresses, whom governors, unwilling to select a clergyman, would gladly appoint if they had any satisfactory means of knowing that they took more than a perfunctory interest in the religious side of their work. There are head-mistresses at all events, and, I do not doubt, head-masters, who would feel their staff strengthened if they knew where to find teachers who had taken pains to keep

[1] *Religious Teaching in Sunday Schools*, by the Rev. G. C. Bell, M.A.: London, 1898, p. 2.

themselves abreast of theological research, and who had made a distinct study of the best means of imparting what they knew—teachers to whom they could entrust the Scripture lesson with confidence that it would be used with the power, which it ought to have, for the formation of character and the improvement of the whole tone of school life. From all these points of view there is a demand for systematic training in the art of giving good religious instruction. How is the need to be supplied? Where are we to look for the trainers? Where are we to look for certificates that the training has been well used? What steps should the Church take to set her *imprimatur* on the teachers?

What the universities might do

For the answer to the first questions I should look to the universities, and particularly to the theological faculties. You at Cambridge have taken the lead over Oxford in establishing a school of pedagogy. It would not be difficult for you to find instructors in the art of teaching, instructors who could help to bring the methods of religious and secular instruction into line with each other. Without underrating the value of an occasional model lesson to Sunday-school teachers, I do not hesitate to say that it does not give us nearly all that we want. You can learn something from watching a professional, but you can learn a great deal more from professionals watching and teaching you. You have also here another great

advantage in the fact that your day schools are under one board of managers, who might, perhaps, be willing to co-operate in such a scheme as I am about to suggest. It is practically this: that, under the superintendence of the divinity faculty, the theory and art of giving religious instruction should be an optional subject: that it should be allowed as a substitute for pass divinity in an ordinary degree, and should be recognised in the curriculum of the theological school. I am well aware of the jealousy with which our old universities rightly regard any attempt to teach any merely technical subject, but I would submit that the art of teaching stands on a different level from other professions and occupations, and that recognition of ability to teach is a proper function of a university. It is one which is recognised by modern universities, and takes a place in their syllabus. It is also well known that it is a difficult subject, and worthy of men of the best powers. It is a subject which includes some study of psychology, and of the history of teaching. It is by no means a mere branch of technical skill. At the same time, students for these certificates might well be expected to give 'criticism lessons' in the presence of the teacher of method, and these lessons could be given during the hours of religious instruction in primary schools. The result would be the granting of two classes of certificates—one the substitute for a pass in divinity, the other of an honours

character; the one useful for teachers in schools, the other for candidates for holy orders.

Concurrently with this, there is no reason why bishops should not offer a catechist's license to persons holding either of these certificates. The bishop's license would include, what the university certificate need not, inquiry into the moral character and doctrinal views of the holder of the university certificate. It would empower the catechist to take part in public catechisings in church. Such catechisings would attract scholars in grammar schools, and their parents, if it were known that a grammar-school master would conduct them. At present the Church has done far more for the religious instruction of the poor than of the middle classes, with the result that she has somewhat lost her hold on those classes, and that ignorance of the very rudiments of the faith is far too common among them. It is not, of course, expected that the measures above indicated will work a religious revolution. Their design is not for one moment to capture the schools for the Church, or to establish a monopoly of Church instruction in secondary schools. Such aims are very far from my thoughts. My suggestions are simply a contribution; imperfect enough, I am well aware; a contribution to meet what I am sure is a very grave crisis. The Church is confronted once more with new educational conditions. I say 'once more'

What the Church might do

because it has been repeatedly her duty to adapt herself to new emergencies. At first she feared education because it was not only secular but pagan; afterwards she boldly entered the field of education and philosophy, and claimed to bring new and true light into it; then she instituted schools of her own, chiefly for the training of those who had a religious vocation; then the monopoly of education passed into her hands. Now it is hers no more. The State has entered the field with all its powers and resources, claiming all children as her own, and laying a ruthless hand on the old endowments of the Church. Education, so far as the State undertakes it, is and must be secular. But, thank God, education has not been secularised. We still have our day schools and Sunday schools, and there is religious teaching in most schools. But the character and methods of that teaching have not kept pace with the improvement in secular instruction. We are still quite content to teach in old-fashioned ways. We have not adapted our teaching to our own beliefs. We tell children one thing, and expect that by and by they will learn for themselves something else. We do not yet let into our religious teaching all the great and stirring revelations of God which scientific inquiry has laid bare. Then we wonder that unbelief seems to gain ground, that women as well as men are letting go of the faith. We fight hard for religious teaching on platforms and in Par-

liament, but we forget that, after all, neither boards of education, nor school boards, nor governing bodies teach. It is teachers who teach—a truism, but like other truisms often forgotten. As schools grow in power, as they assume more and more control of the early life of our children, there is only one sure way by which the Church can adapt herself to new conditions, and that is by sending out teachers trained, qualified, honestly believing what they teach, and teaching it as firmly and as well as secular subjects are taught.

Let me by way of conclusion try to anticipate some possible objections to the stress that I have laid on the necessity of preparation for teaching, particularly on the part of the clergy.

Possible objections to proposals

It may be urged that so much insistence on technical training implies a want of confidence in the Divine commission, in the power of the Word of God, and in the work of the Holy Spirit. There are no instructions in the New Testament for any such training; great results have been obtained by quite unlettered men and women who knew nothing of the teacher's art, but spake as the Holy Spirit taught them. Peter and John were not trained in Rabbinic schools. Our Lord Himself never was a scholar there. He spake as One having authority. Is not this, we may be asked, the way to inculcate reverence?

They imply undue trust in human agency

Ought we not to come as ambassadors rather than as pedagogues? So we may be tempted to reason; but temptations are temptations, and easily avail themselves of false analogies. From our Lord Himself we can with reverence draw only one inference. Speaking of Him only as Man, He was one of the greatest of all teachers—one of those who owe nothing to trainers, but are teachers of the world for all time. His parables were to educational method what the questions of Socrates were: models and sources of inspiration to teachers in every age. It would be the height of presumption, speaking still of Him only as a teacher, to argue from His case that training was superfluous for ourselves. His Apostles, however unlearned, were trained by Himself. We cannot argue from them; while with St. Paul we come to an instance of a trained teacher making use of his training, and the result is the marvellous influence which he has exercised on Christian thought—the fact that he was the founder of Christian theology as distinguished from the Christian faith. It is no derogation to the authority due to the Word of God to state its message in terms of contemporary thought, and the man who is to do this must have submitted himself to the intellectual training of his day. Claims to authority are not only repugnant, as they certainly are, to the indocile nature of Englishmen; they are also out of harmony with the Divine method of education. God has never at any time overwhelmed human reason

with the weight of unanswerable authority: 'In many fragments and in many ways' He has revealed Himself with gradual self-discovery. He who spake with the authority, not of a messenger, but of the Son of God, spake by parables, and so veiled His authority that only the faithful few discovered His Person, and that with great difficulty. We are guilty of no disrespect to Him, of no distrust in His power, when we use all pains to be what we ought to be—that is 'apt to teach.'

Granting, however, that training is desirable, it may be asked whether the present course of preparation is not sufficient for all practical purposes, and whether the benefits of increased efficiency are at all likely to compensate for the additional expenditure of time and labour.

Is the reward likely to be proportionate to the labour?

Taking these two points in order, the reply to the first must be that the present preparation is not sufficient for practical purposes, not even where a foundation has been laid by teaching in a Sunday school. The weakness would be far more apparent were it not for the general inadequacy of our ministerial training. In other professions the time has quite gone by when a university degree can be accepted as a sufficient qualification for professional purposes. The most notable advance has been made by the medical profession, and it is an example which we ought to lay to heart. The medical practitioner of to-day is,

speaking generally, a cultured man, and also a man who has closely studied the work which he is to do. He spends several years in study and practice. He is required to submit to severe examination tests, and the consequence is that the profession as such has advanced wonderfully in public estimation, and receives well-earned attention to its advice and requirements. We venture to think that our work as clergy or lay teachers is higher, as soul and mind are higher than the body; the patient labours of great students have immensely increased our field of study; in the subject where we teach we are no longer monopolists, speaking without fear of questioning; but our sayings are watched and eagerly controverted, the authorities on which we rely are freely questioned. Meanwhile, our case is as strong as ever it was, only it needs far more careful and thorough preparation, not so much for dealing with opponents as for the sake of guiding inquirers. But it would not be true to say that the qualifications, either for holy orders or for religious instruction in secondary schools, have made any substantial advance in the last thirty years. Clergy, especially, are not prepared as they ought to be. They have not risen to the demands made upon them by a restless questioning age. For this reason they are not conscious of their deficiencies in the special matter of teaching. But, after all, every sermon we preach is more or less an instruction, and we preach in these days to people who have received well-

prepared and well-ordered instruction. Among our hearers, not the least influential are teachers who have submitted to the fire of criticism lessons, who know what a definite aim, an illustration, an inference ought to be. We do not hear our sermons criticised: but they are criticised. Our most dogmatic utterances are questioned. Nothing would help us more in preparation of sermons than the ordeal of a course of keenly criticised lessons. Much more when we come to catechise, and instruct confirmation classes, and give lessons to teachers, is the need of training in the art of teaching felt. We can argue nothing from the past. We are not living in the past: we are living to-day, and must do our work according to modern requirements.

The second point—the question of reward—what shall I say of it? Shall I promise you unflagging attention, the delight of witnessing steady progress, pupils who, as they grow older, shall not fall away, or degenerate under your very eyes? I will promise nothing of the kind. The teacher's life is full of disappointment. The children who were most tender, most open to impression, become callous, fall away from him, are deaf to his appeals. Others go out into the world and are lost to sight. From very few do we receive the grateful acknowledgment, 'To you I owe everything, yea, mine own soul also.' The man who works for gratitude or immediate results will soon grow tired of education. It is only when we

look beyond ourselves and are content to be lost in our work that we find our reward. I say nothing of reward hereafter. We deserve none. The reward of which I am thinking is of another character. The individual teacher can do very little: a system of education in time works marvels. What would Scotland be to-day but for John Knox, or Germany but for Luther? Is not our national weakness, our want of thoroughness, largely due to contempt for education? Nor has this want of thoroughness been anywhere so conspicuous as in our religious education, and the result is a chaos which seems to be turning a race, naturally religious, into a race of agnostics. The evil will continue and increase until our Church deliberately sets herself to train her teachers for this specific work, to bring her religious teaching into line with her secular in its methods, and up to the level of secular in its qualifications for the teacher's office.

In another lecture I propose to indicate the lines which I think that our course of instruction might usefully follow. My desire in this lecture has been to set before you the importance of knowing your class. It is useless to know your lesson until you know your children. To know them is not merely to know their names, to exchange pleasant smiles, to be on terms of good fellowship with them. It is to set before you, and keep before you, the true end of education. Settle it in your hearts that every one of those children is God's child, and that God has put

him under your care with this commission: 'Take this child and train him up for Me. In each of them is an image of Myself, marred, defaced, hidden by sin, yet it is that which I would have the child one day to become.' 'The end of education is not,' as Kant said,[1] 'to develop in the individual all the perfection of which he is capable, but to supply the pupil with the will and the means of reaching the perfection of which he will one day be capable.' You have done nothing by merely informing him of certain facts and dogmas. You have to know something of the forces at war within his own soul; you have to forecast the dangers which lie before him; you have, by the help of God, to give him the impetus which will lead him on, ever striving after more perfect likeness to the image of God who created him—that image which shone upon the world in the Teacher of teachers, who has conferred on you the highest of all honours, an honour which angels may envy but cannot share, that of being a teacher of souls, and specially of the souls of little children. The angels before God may watch them: to you it is given to train them.

[1] Madame Necker de Saussure, p. 29.

LECTURE III

METHOD OF TEACHING AND CATECHISMS

I PROPOSE in this lecture to review—of course in a very summary manner—the history of catechisms. I do not say the history of catechising, for that would be a very wide field to enter. It would be the history of religious education, almost the history of education in Christendom for sixteen centuries—a subject full of interest, but quite beyond the reach of a writer or lecturer like myself, whose time for study is very limited. Mine is a much humbler aim. A certain document called the Catechism is put into your hands, and you are told to teach it. You will be better prepared for your task if you begin with inquiring 'What is a catechism?' and 'What is its origin?' and further, 'What has been the use of the catechisms of Christendom?'

What is a catechism?

For it will become apparent, if you make this inquiry, that while catechising is as old as the Church, and, probably, has its roots in the schools of Judaism, catechisms are practically not older than the sixteenth century.

Not the same as ordinary teaching

Catechising or oral teaching was, as I need not remind you, indispensable to the early Church. To such teaching we probably owe the greater part of the Synoptic Gospels; fragments of it have come down to us in the Epistles; we can trace its development almost from decade to decade, until we find it committed to writing, as to its general outlines, in the catechetical lectures of St. Cyril and St. Augustine's 'De Catechizandis Rudibus.' But a glance at either of these books will show you that, while the outline of oral teaching has varied very little in the Church, and, in its main features, is the basis of the catechisms which we possess to-day, catechetical lectures are not catechisms.

Nor are catechisms to be confounded with Catechetical schools. The first germs of Catechetical schools may be traced in the controversies of St. Stephen in Jerusalem, and of St. Paul in the Agora at Athens and in the school of Tyrannus at Ephesus. These schools represented the effort of the Church to commend her message to the cultured intellect of the world, and to show at once how 'the world by wisdom knew not God,' and yet that 'God had not left Himself without witness,' but that 'He was not far from every one of us, for in Him we live and move and have our being.'

Catechisms are not the same as Catechetical schools

The Catechetical schools claimed culture for Christ,

and their work, as I propose to show you in a later lecture, needs to be done over again, and done more systematically than ever. But the Catechism is no sort of fruit of the Catechetical school. The object of the Catechism is to reach the child and the unlearned, while the Catechetical school is for the philosopher and littérateur.

What is a Catechism

A Catechism, then, is a compendium of practical or speculative religion, or of both, in the form of question and answer, intended primarily for the use of children and uneducated persons. I say primarily, and wish to emphasise the word. For I mean primarily and not exclusively. A well-written Catechism grows upon us as we grow older, and becomes increasingly helpful. 'It is a great error,' says Bishop Ken,[1] 'to think that the Catechism was meant for children only; for all Christians are equally concerned in these saving truths which are there taught; and the doctrine delivered in the Catechism is as proper for the study and as necessary for the salvation of a great doctor as of a weak Christian or a young child.' So also Luther writes:[2] 'I must remain, and do cheerfully remain, a child and pupil of the Catechism.' A Catechism differs, however, from a creed. A creed is a confession and act of faith. I

[1] Bishop Ken's *Exposition*, Prose Works (bound), p. 339.

[2] Quoted by H. Bonar, *Catechisms of the Scottish Church*, p. xxvi.

am speaking now of creeds for the use of the uneducated, not of the Athanasian Creed. A creed has the nature of an act of worship. It serves, no doubt, to keep in mind certain cardinal doctrines. But this is a secondary aim. Its primary aim is to be a symbol or watchword whereby the faithful may make confession of the truth before God and men, and may know one another. The 'Te Deum' is to all intents and purposes a creed. It certainly is not a Catechism. In the same way Catechisms are quite distinct from primers. Catechisms and primers have indeed some common ground. Both are intended primarily for the uneducated; both contain a certain amount of common matter. But the primer is devotional rather than controversial. It may contain matter for edification, but it makes no attempt to be systematic. The exposition of the Creed, Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments in our English Catechism differs very slightly from what one might find in a primer, though not in the interrogatory form. On the other hand, the primer contains prayers and hymns which are not part of a Catechism.

The Reformation the age of Catechism

The distinctive feature, then, of a Catechism is that it belongs to an age in which it has become necessary to teach outlines of theology to every member of the Church. That age of course is the Reformation. That great disintegration of Christendom forced upon

every one responsibility for his faith. But this was not all. The heathen in earlier ages who joined the Church of Christ was using his private judgment, and was bound[1] 'to be ready to give to every one who asked him a reason of the faith that was in him.' He was bound to know and in some sense to defend the faith as contained in the creeds. Yet, if he possessed Catechisms, they have not come down to us. There was in the Reformation a further power at work, which necessitated the construction or reconstruction of Catechisms. That power was the open Bible—open because it was printed, and therefore accessible to the ordinary laity as it had not been before. There can be no appeal to a book which is not available for reference. The earliest appeals to the Bible were appeals of the learned. The learned, whose writings have come down to us from the first ages, made Scripture their authority and appealed to Scripture in support of their arguments. But, behind these, there was the large unlettered world, which can have had no conception of the Bible as a whole, for the simple reason that a manuscript Bible must be a most bulky and most expensive work. But as soon as the printed Bible comes more or less into the hands of the people, Catechisms must follow, for several reasons which I will try to indicate.

1. The necessity arose because the Reformers

[1] 1 Peter iii. 15.

felt themselves bound to show that the Bible, rightly interpreted, was not self-contradictory or misleading to the unlearned, but yielded a clear and definite way of salvation. This way it was the duty of the Church to indicate, and the lines of it were laid down especially by Calvin and his followers with extraordinary precision. They honestly believed that no other sound interpretation of the book was possible. But, for all that, when placing the book in the hands of the layman, the Reformers had no option but to place side by side with it what they believed to be its only true explanation in the form of a Catechism. A short quotation from the Catechism of John Calvin, ordered by the First Book of Discipline to be used in all the churches of Scotland, will show how rigidly exclusive was the system which he propounded; how he confronted Rome with a Church as confident of its absolute orthodoxy as her own. The Catechism was to inspire the layman with a firm belief in his absolute orthodoxy.

The necessity for Catechism. (1) Appeal to the Bible

[1] 'Wherefore dost thou make mention of remission of sins immediately after thou hast spoken of the Church?' *Ans.* 'Because that no man can receive forgiveness of sins unless he be joined in the fellowship of Christ's Body even to the end, like a true member of His Church.'

[1] Crespin's *Translation of Calvin's Catechism*; H. Bonar's *Catechisms of the Scottish Church*, London, 1866, p. 27.

'By this saying, then, without the Church there is nothing but hell, death, and damnation?' *Ans.* 'That is most certain; for all such as divide themselves from the Body of Christ, to break the unity thereof by sect, are utterly destitute of all hope to enjoy everlasting life, while they keep themselves so divided.'

Even where Churches did not trust the laity with the Bible, they found it necessary to use Catechisms, because, whether they desired it or not, the open Bible was a court of appeal, from which there was no longer any escape. For, whatever might be the authority claimed for the Church, that authority must rest on the Divine Word. So, the Romanist as well as the Protestant was bound to show that the Bible was on his side, and this meant that in the Church of Rome also the layman must be supplied with a Compendium of Theology in the form of a Catechism. In support of this view let me draw your attention to the manner in which the Penny Catechism of the Romanists upon the most crucial points goes directly to the Word of God for its authority.

Let a few instances suffice:

[1] 'Who gave the Church authority to teach?' 'Jesus Christ gave the Catholic Church authority to teach when He said, "Go ye, and teach all nations."'

'How do you know that the Catholic Church cannot err when she teaches?' *Ans.* 'I know that the

[1] See pp. 247, 256.

Catholic Church cannot err when she teaches, because Christ promised that the gates of hell shall never prevail against His Church: that the Holy Ghost shall teach her all things: and that He Himself will be with her all days even to the consummation of the world.'

(2) Growth of unbelief

2. But, besides the war of the Churches, there were other forces in the sixteenth century which made Catechisms a necessity. These were the forces of unbelief generated by the Renaissance. For, though the aspect of the Reformation which engages most attention is its controversial and consequently disintegrating character, we must not forget that it was also an attempt to reclaim the intellect of Europe for Christ. The Renaissance, even in Rome, had been frankly pagan. Unbelief had spread rapidly through all ranks of society. The faith of the Church was supposed to be worn out. Religion and the religious life had become contemptible. But for the Reformation Europe must have returned to paganism. Then the translation and circulation of the Bible turned back the flood of unbelief. The masses had no belief, because they had no knowledge of the truth. It was a tour, revealing to him the gross ignorance of his fellow-countrymen, which impelled Martin Luther to write his Catechism. [1] 'Let the people be taught, let schools be opened for the poor, let the truth reach

[1] H. Bonar, *Catechisms of the Scottish Church*, p. xxiii.

them in simple words in their own mother-tongue, and they would believe.' These facts are worth recalling in view of modern conditions. We too have to deal with unbelief largely born of ignorance. We have schools, and the great mass of the younger generation have as children received religious instruction. But there is cause to fear that this instruction has often been vague and unsystematic. Our religious teaching has not improved as rapidly as our secular. We have taught too much Jewish history, too little Christian verity. We are beginning to ask ourselves whether the time has not come to revive the art and practice of catechising.

What I have said as to the origin of Catechisms seems to be confirmed by a review of the position of the Russian Church at the present day. We have in Russia a great Christian Church, great in the number of her adherents, and in the strong control which she has for centuries exercised over them. That control, through contact with Western culture, is being called into question. It seemed to me important for a right understanding of the history of Catechisms to ask myself these questions, which I could not answer: Are Catechisms used in the Eastern Church? Are the peasantry of Russia receiving any education? If so, is it a Christian education? In my difficulty I referred to W. J. Birkbeck, Esq., who is a well-known authority on the Eastern Church of to-day, and to whom I

Evidence afforded by the Russian Church

am indebted for the following information, which I think it best to present to you in his own words. I felt that any lectures on catechising would be incomplete which left out of view one half of Christendom, and asked him to help me, as to religious instruction in Russia, the use of Catechisms there, and as to the religious life of the peasantry. His reply was as follows:—

Letter of W. J. Birkbeck, Esq.

'The late Emperor Alexander III. was the real instigator of Church schools, and started the movement in 1885. In the year 1894 a Bishop of the Russian Church told me that the Emperor sent for him, and pressed on him the necessity of starting Church schools. The Emperor's words on the subject are worth repeating: "We have," he said, "two words for what in Western Europe is represented by the word education—*oberazovance* and *prosvicshenic* (i.e. formation, or fashioning after a form, and enlightenment). But what formation is worthy of a Christian nation but that which puts in the first place the teaching of Him who said, 'I have given unto you an example (Russian, *oberaz*), and what enlightenment but that which insists that Christ is the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world?'" It will be seen from this that the late Emperor had the whole matter of Christian education very near his heart, and the present Emperor is carrying on his father's work, and there is now an immense number of Church

schools all over the empire. Of course the Catechism is used in these, though (as is obvious on the face of it) it is not learnt by heart, but used more as a guide by the clergy and schoolmasters in giving instruction. With regard to the general state of education in Russia, it is of course much behind Germany and other Western countries, but I must say that I envy Russia in her peasants. There is, of course, a great deal of superstition, and in catechising the peasants one sometimes gets very quaint answers. But, when all is said and done, they really have a firm grasp of vital Christian doctrines, such as the Incarnation; and, although they do not read the Bible much, yet they love hearing the Gospels read. Nothing is more striking than to watch the Russian peasants in the church at Matins on Good Friday, when the twelve long Gospels are read, and to stand among them, and to listen to their ejaculations as each event is recorded. I remember being so much struck in a little country town, some 200 miles north of Moscow, and thirty-six miles from any railway station, when I was travelling about a fortnight after the Emperor's coronation. Every one was talking about the terrible accident, when so many of the peasants were crushed to death while scrambling for their dole of food. The enlightened Russians were all putting the blame on this or that official; but when I mentioned the matter to that old man, he said, "Why did they not go to the holy Gospels, and learn that the right way

to feed a crowd was to divide it into companies of fifty, and tell them to sit down on the grass?" Another very striking feature of Russian popular religion is that all the private devotions of the peasants are taken from the public services of the Church. There are no books of private devotion, such as are a necessity among the Roman Catholics, who cannot understand the Latin of the public services, or are used by Protestants and Anglicans according to taste. When staying in peasants' houses, or travelling on small timber steamers, where there is only one common cabin to sleep in, I have listened to the Russian peasants saying their evening prayers, and invariably the words they used were taken out of some part or other of the public services of the Church. A very great favourite is the prayer to the Holy Ghost, "O Heavenly King, the Comforter." I doubt if there is a single orthodox peasant in the whole empire who does not know it by heart.'

Catechisms in Russia

This account of a Church which possesses a Catechism, but has hardly yet begun to teach it to the people generally, is not without interest for our study. We see that the peasant, though not possessing the Bible, hears portions of it in his own tongue, for Mr. Birkbeck in another part of his letter strongly insists that the speech of the Russian peasant is more akin to ecclesiastical than to modern Russian. We see that his devotions are taken from the service books of the

Church, and that there is not yet that prevalence of belief or of controversy throughout the nation which leads to the necessity of universal instruction in the Catechism. Yet the need for such instruction is probably not far off, and those which have been compiled have had in view the occurrence of such a contingency. Again, there is not as yet the disintegration nor the loosening of the hold of religion on the popular conscience, which makes Catechisms a necessity. But the late Emperor, who freed the serf, evidently foresaw the near approach of these troubles, and wisely made preparation for them.

The Catechism and universal education

Most interesting of all is the manifest connection between the Catechism and universal education. The Reformers of the sixteenth century were the first real exponents of the necessity of universal education. Half-hearted suggestions had been made by Quintilian and others, but they had borne no fruit. 'In its origin the primary school is the child of Protestantism, and its cradle was the Reformation.'[1] Only two motives have, till recently, been sufficient to induce nations to undertake this task. One is religion, the other the transfer of political power to the masses. To these a third has been recently added, namely, commercial rivalry. But, whatever the motive may be, universal education is of little value, so long as it is nothing more than the acquisition of the power to

[1] Compayré's *History of Pedagogy*: London, 1888, p. 112.

read and write, and of a few disconnected facts, scientific or historical. A man is not educated till he has begun to be interested in thinking out the problem of life. To the masses that problem must be a religious problem. The ordinary philosopher dwells in cloud-land for them. Now this want is exactly what the Catechism supplies. This constitutes its difference from either a creed or general biblical instruction. Even in its simplest form—and the Catechism of our Church is the simplest of all Catechisms—it presents a reasoned view of theology, adapted to popular understanding, and portable, so to speak, for popular use. The Catechism well taught gives the humblest layman a framework into which the rest of his education can be fitted. It prepares him for intelligent reading of the greatest of all literatures within his reach. It supplies him with a solution of the problems of life, which he can test by experience. Catechisms may be said to have given birth to universal education, and, rightly and intelligently used, they give value to it still.

The Cowper-Temple clause

From this point of view the Cowper-Temple clause in the Act of 1870 might be regarded as an act of parricide. By that clause, as you will remember, 'no religious Catechism or religious formulary which is distinctive of any particular denomination is to be taught in Board schools.' It is possible that, at the time, no better solution of our difficulties could have

been found. But it may be doubted whether the nation will be permanently satisfied with this settlement. I say this not as advocating any scheme of settlement at present before the public, but from a strong conviction that, in course of time, pressure from unbelief without, and tendencies which make for union within, will bring about a better understanding among Christians. From this point of view I regard the latest of all our Catechisms as being full of significance. The Catechism of the Evangelical Free Churches is a very remarkable sign of the times. It is the evidence that the need of a Catechism is felt; that there is a growing desire to insist on points of agreement rather than of difference; that the outcry against dogmatic teaching is admitted to have its drawbacks and to need some qualification. There may yet be changes of public opinion in a direction which at one time seemed impossible, and means may be devised whereby parents in earnest about the religious atmosphere in which their children are brought up may be able to reassert this simple parental right. Apart from such changes universal education is likely to prove somewhat of a mirage. For it must be a long time before study in our elementary schools can be carried so far as to give the scholars a real desire for culture, and an ambition to understand and co-ordinate the scraps of information which the ordinary school curriculum supplies. Until this point is reached the feeling of

the ordinary artisan about his education will resemble Mr. Weller's doubt as to learning the alphabet—whether it was worth while going through so much to learn so little. He will shed his school acquirements with astonishing rapidity, because they will seem to him to have no sort of bearing either on this world or on the world to come. You will generally find that artisans or labourers who make any effort to continue their education have a strong bias either religious or anti-religious. Religion, and more than that—what you may call theology or religious philosophy in a simple form—is that which sets the working classes reading or thinking, apart, of course, from any prize-winning or pecuniary motive. It would not be surprising if a sense of this need gradually made itself felt, and if the State devised some means for taking advantage of it. But the day is still very far off. Meanwhile the Church is able to help the State; the Church can give a reason for right action; it can explain the basis on which Christian civilisation rests; it can make the authority of the law stand on higher grounds than fear of the police-court; it can succour the tempted and raise the fallen. It can give a real meaning and purpose to the most elementary education, and this it effects through religious instruction conveyed by means of a Catechism.

This view of the office of Catechisms will, I think, be confirmed by a rapid survey of the chief Cate-

chisms of Christendom—a survey which makes no pretence to original research, but may be convenient to those who care to prosecute their inquiries further. My authorities are mainly Chambers's 'Encyclopædia' and Schaff's 'History of the Church.'

History of Catechisms

(*a*) The earliest Catechisms are those of the Waldenses and Bohemians. Priority as between the two is disputed, but is generally accorded to the Waldenses. The earliest extant seems to be a little older than the beginning of the sixteenth century.

(*b*) Luther's Catechism, published about 1539. The need for it was borne in upon him by the horrors of the peasant war, and the ignorance of the peasantry which that war had brought to light. It was clear, too, that as regarded Rome the parting of the ways had been reached. The Catechism was his statement of his teaching for the German people. Of its lasting influence upon the nation there can be no question. The great historian Leopold von Ranke says of it that, 'old a doctor as he was, he used it himself as a prayer.' 'It is,' he cries, 'as childlike as it is profound, as comprehensible as it is unfathomable, simple and sublime. Happy he whose soul is fed by it, who clings to it. He possesses at all times an imperishable consolation, under a thin shell a kernel of truth sufficient for the wisest of the wise.

(*c*) Calvin published in 1541 his Catechism, which

was translated into many languages, and was officially adopted by the Scottish Kirk in the First Book of Discipline.

(*d*) The earliest of the official Roman Catechisms was that of Pope Pius IV., published in 1566. This Catechism was distasteful to the Jesuits, who replied by bringing out two catechisms—one for teachers and one for children. The Roman Church has not even now any one official catechism.

(*e*) The Heidelberg Catechism belongs to the Reformed Churches of the Palatinate, and appeared under the influence of the Elector Frederick in 1562. It is a very remarkable catechism. The writers are said to have been in a measure inspired for it. The answers, however, are often far too long for the use of children.

(*f*) The great Catechism of the seventeenth century was that of the Westminster Divines in 1647, the Catechism on which Scotland was brought up being the shorter of the two Catechisms propounded by this assembly.

(*g*) In 1673 Robert Barclay wrote a Catechism for the Society of Friends, of which the chief interest lies in the fact that each tenet of the Society in turn is given in answers which consist wholly of texts of Scripture.

(*h*) Passing for the moment the Catechisms of the Greek Church, and passing by altogether several modern Catechisms, or variations of Catechisms,

which have been circulated, I will only mention these :—

1. The Penny Catechism, which is used in the Roman Church in England—a remarkably clear document, with well-constructed questions and answers.

2. The Catechism of the Evangelical Free Churches, the origin of which is indicated by its name, and which claims 'to represent directly or indirectly the beliefs of not less and probably more than sixty millions of avowed Christians in all parts of the world,' and to be 'such a combined statement of interdenominational belief as has not been attempted, much less achieved, since the memorable day when Martin Luther contended with Huldrich Zwingli. The bodies represented by its authors are Congregationalists, the Wesleyan Methodists, the Baptists, the Primitive Methodists, the Presbyterians, the Methodist New Connexion, the Bible Christians, and the United Methodist Free Church.

Out of three Catechisms of the Russian Church I have not seen, and can only describe at second hand, that of Mogilas, A.D. 1643, said to have been called forth by the necessity of protecting the faithful against the Jesuits and the Reformed Church. Translations of the other two have been in my hands, viz. Platon's Catechism, published in 1812, and Philaret's, published in 1839. With the exception of a short introductory Catechism in Philaret's, there is nothing in these two

Catechisms which would fall under the definition of a Catechism which I have ventured to offer. They are substantial volumes which could not be committed to memory. There are also Armenian and Coptic Catechisms, about which I am sorry to say I can give you no information. Horatius Bonar calls them mere pretences at Catechisms.[1]

The common basis of the Catechisms

All these Catechisms, except R. Barclay's, are mainly expositions of the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments. This is the tradition which has come down to us from the early Church. On these lines Cyril of Jerusalem based his Catechetical Lectures; on these the compilers of the Evangelical Free Churches' Catechism have worked. They do not always deal with the Creed *eo nomine*. The Shorter Catechism, for instance, only prints it as an appendix, and the Free Church Catechism makes no mention of it at all. But in both cases the substance of the Creed is there. The order also in which these three great themes are treated varies very much. The basis of the earliest Catechism, the Waldensian, is that of St. Augustine's 'Enchiridion.' It treats of (*a*) Faith, the Creed; (*b*) Hope, the Lord's Prayer; and (*c*) Love, the Decalogue. The same order is followed in the Catechisms of the Eastern Church. The Lutheran, Roman, and Calvin's Catechisms take, with slight variations in order, the Creed, the Decalogue, the

[1] Horatius Bonar's *Catechisms of the Scottish Church*, p. xxii.

Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments, Calvin adding the Word of God.

The Westminster Catechism is the most strictly logical in its order, and for this purpose cuts itself free from the old mechanical co-ordination of parts.

The Heidelberg Catechism had anticipated it in taking this independent line, and in framing a scheme of a more logical character. This Catechism is divided into three parts, following the order of the religious life, its basis throughout being the Epistle to the Romans. The first part is on Repentance, its topic being the sin and misery of man. The second is on Faith, the Redemption by Christ, including an exposition of the Apostles' Creed and Sacraments. The third is on Love, the thankfulness of the redeemed life, in which is included the Decalogue. You will be impressed, I think, by the contrast between the thoroughness of these Catechisms, and the scantiness of our own, which till the reign of James I. did not even mention the Sacraments.

Differences illustrated

Of course the variety in treatment of topics is as conspicuous as the general agreement in choice of them. How far this variety has risen from difference of national character, how far it has helped to produce them, it will not be easy to decide. But that there is a connection between the two no one who compares Catechisms can doubt. By a comparison of two questions—one speculative, the other practical—I hope to show you that a Cate-

chism is a real power in the life of a Church or a nation.

I will first take the question, 'What is Faith?'

(*a*) The English Catechism never asks this, or any other abstract question. It turns altogether aside from the field of speculation. It only mentions the Atonement very incidentally. Its aim is practice, not theory. It is true herein to the strength and the weakness of the nation.

What is Faith?

(*b*) The Moravian answers thus: 'Faith is the conviction of the heart that Jesus is the Son of God and the Saviour of the World, who has loved me and given Himself for me.' Personal assurance is here almost synonymous with faith.

(*c*) The Lutheran: 'Is that a genuine faith when a person boldly and without repentance says, "I comfort myself in our dear Lord and Saviour"? No: where there is no sincere repentance, there is no faith.' The question and answer are not quite what we want, but they are worth noting; for Luther is manifestly fighting against some of his own less-guarded utterances.

(*d*) The Heidelberg: 'The true faith is not only a certainty and knowledge, whereby I believe all to be true which God has revealed to us in His Word, but also a certain confidence which the Holy Spirit produces in my heart by the Gospel, that God will not only grant to others, but also to me, remission of sins, justification, and eternal happiness, and that

purely by the grace and only in consideration of the merits of Jesus Christ.' Here faith is identified with assurance, as in the Moravian Catechism.

(*e*) The Shorter Catechism gives a grand answer, true to some of the noblest characteristics of Scottish piety; and, remember, it was not composed in Scotland: 'Faith in Jesus Christ is a saving grace, whereby we receive and rest upon Him alone for salvation, as He is offered to us in the Gospel.' It is not self and the quieting of one's own heart which are here promised, as in the Moravian and Heidelberg Catechisms, but submission to God and dependence upon Him. This faith is consistent with a very sore struggle and effort within the soul.

(*f*) The Evangelical Free Church Catechism replies: 'To believe on the Lord Jesus Christ is to rely on Him as our Teacher, Saviour, and Lord, putting our whole trust in the grace of God through Him.' Here we miss the Divine origin of faith. It appears almost as an act of the human will. We miss also 'Christ as He is offered to us in the Gospel.' A somewhat vague description, 'Teacher, Saviour, and Lord,' takes the place of these words.

Lastly, (*g*) the Penny Catechism: 'Faith is a supernatural gift of God, which enables us to believe without doubting whatever God has revealed.' Here faith is wholly reserved to the sphere of the intellect. The element of trust in a Personal Being is absent. The word 'supernatural,' however, appears to override

even the ordinary use of the intellect. Faith becomes submissive acquiescence to doctrine imposed from without.

With these speculative definitions let us compare one of a more practical character—the explanation of the words, 'Give us this day our daily bread.'

What is our daily bread?

(*a*) The English Catechism: 'All things that be needful both for our souls and our bodies,' where the word 'needful' is vague. It is not a definition likely to fasten on the conscience of a millionaire.

(*b*) The Lutheran: 'Everything necessary to the support and comfort of existence: as food and raiment, house and land, money and goods: a kind spouse, good children, faithful servants, righteous magistrates, good weather, peace, health, honour, true friends, good neighbours, and the like.' An intensely practical and utterly unspiritual catalogue of the conveniences of life. Notice that 'our daily bread' includes all that is necessary for comfort.

(*c*) The Heidelberg: 'Be pleased to provide us with whatever is necessary for the body, that we may always know that Thou art the Fountain of all happiness, and that neither our cares nor our labour, nor even the good things which Thou hast given us, can avail anything without Thy blessing; and that by consequence we ought to withdraw all our trust in creatures and place it only in Thee.' A very beautiful answer, and suggestive of the fiery trial

through which the Church in the Palatinate had to pass.

(*d*) The Shorter Catechism: 'We pray that of God's free gift we may receive a competent portion of the good things of this life and enjoy His blessing with them.' The 'competent portion' is a very happy phrase, suggesting a strong capacity for getting on in the world, and taking care of that which falls to our lot. It is somehow redolent of Scottish industry and frugality.

(*e*) The Evangelical Free Churches: 'That God would prosper our daily labour, and provide what is needful for the body, ridding us of anxiety and disposing us to contentment.' It is curious that spiritual provision is not here mentioned. The introduction of the words 'prosper' and 'contentment' is not without a flavour of well-to-do ease and advancement.

(*f*) The Penny Catechism is throughout excellent in its paraphrase of the Lord's Prayer, and here hits a point which all the other catechisms have missed—the twice repeated 'this day,' 'our daily bread.' We pray that God may daily give us all that is necessary for soul and body.

(*g*) Platon's Catechism has the Heidelberg paraphrase almost verbatim, both no doubt borrowing from a common source. It seems to me impossible to avoid the conviction that Catechisms are a real factor in the religious life of a nation, and probably they are so in proportion to the use that is made of

them.[1] This probability becomes almost a certainty when we look across the Border and consider what Scotland has done for the Catechism, and the Catechism for Scotland.

The Scottish Catechism and Scottish character

Opinions will, of course, always differ as to types of national character, each of us being apt, very unfairly, to form our conception of the type from the few instances with which we have been in personal contact. But Scotland is fortunate in the possession of several novelists and of a poet, who have enabled us to see the Scotchman as he sees himself—to see, that is, the ideal at which he is aiming. The ideal, after all, in this case is the real. For the national character cannot be the same as the character of individual members of the nation. The national character is that to which the nation is endeavouring to rise. In this sense the Scottish character is undoubtedly one which receives and deserves the admiration of Christendom. It is equally beyond doubt that the ideal and the attempt to reach it have been, since the Reformation at all events, inspired by religion. A race, naturally heroic, has been trained to such rare and perfect use of its gifts that it has taken a foremost place in the world of thought and action; it has become as practical in execution as it is romantic

[1] For the convenience of those who care to prosecute this inquiry further, and of those who have to catechise children, six Catechisms besides our own will be found in the Appendix.

and daring in conception; it has become capable of sustained toil and patient effort; it has evinced the sternest qualities of manhood without losing the capacity for the most tender sympathy. Above all, it has become a race imbued with the fear of God, and, living in this world, as called to know God, and to enjoy Him for ever.

This character has been built up on the most complete system of universal religious education that has been attempted in Europe, and the basis of that education has been a distinctive—what would nowadays be called a 'Sectarian'—Catechism. This is how the structure was raised:—

First of all, in the spoliation of Church lands, a part of those lands was reserved in every parish for the maintenance of a school. This school was placed in the charge of the presbytery, who appointed the teacher and visited the school from time to time to see that it was in working order. Next, it was laid down in the First Book of Discipline, and became a recognised principle of national life, that no parent had any right to use his child according to his own 'phantasie,' but every one was bound to send his child to school. In school, the child of the laird and the cottar sat side by side, received the same education, joined in the same games, were liable to the same punishments. That practical equality of men as men—'a man's a man for a' that'—which seems an impossible ideal for us, was possible for Scotland

because the basis of the education was religion, and religion makes all equal. A further consequence was that the school was not a mere grinding-shop for putting through the mill of the three R's, children whose ambition was to make the earliest escape possible and forget all that they had learnt with the utmost speed; but it was a place which every child entered with the possibility of a University education before him; a place where higher education was going on side by side with primary; a place watched over by a presbytery who took interest in it, always keen to find a lad of 'pregnant parts,' and proud to start such a lad on the road to the ministry, which for most children was the goal of their highest aspirations. In this way the ministry was constantly recruited from the sons of the soil, and that without the fear which haunts us in England, that the recruits drawn from this source might be unfit to minister to the educated. The common use of the parish school by all classes bridged over the gulf between class and class, but so, in a far greater degree, did the common level of education. Children brought up on the Scottish Catechism had a philosophy which made their education fruitful, even though they continued to be peasants to the end of their days. Religious education began in the school, but it did not end there. The same First Book of Discipline which ordered[1] 'that the reader or the minister must take

[1] For these quotations I am indebted to the Rev. J. S. Dodds, D.D.

care of the children and youth of the parish to instruct them in first rudiments, especially in the Catechism as we have it in the Book of Common Prayer, called the order of Geneva . . .' requires also that 'after noon must the young children be publicly examined in their Catechism, in the audience of the people . . . in doing whereof the minister must take great diligence, as well to cause the people to understand the questions proponed as the answers, and the doctrine that may be collected thereof. The order to be kept in teaching the Catechism, and how much of it is appointed for every Sunday, is already distinguished in the Catechism printed with the Book of Common Prayer, which Catechism is the most perfect that ever yet was used in the Kirk.'

It is true that neither the First Book of Discipline nor the second obtained a place on the Statute Book of Scotland. The Book of Discipline was, however, ratified several times by the General Assembly, and may be taken as the ideal of the Church at which the Church aimed from the first. After a time Calvin's Catechism was superseded by Craig's; but that was towards the end of the sixteenth century. In 1639 the Assembly enacted that 'an uniform Catechism be used throughout the whole kingdom in the examination before the Communion. . . . That every minister, beside his pains on the Lord's Day, have weekly catechising of some part of the parish, and not altogether put off the examination of the people

till a little before Communion. . . . That the larger Catechism agreed upon by the Assembly of Divines at Westminster shall be a common Catechism.'

This enactment was fortified by further provisions in 1649 and 1720. It will suffice here to quote from the enactments of 1649. 'That every minister, with the assistance of the elders, take care that where there is any that can read, there be at least one copy of the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, Confession of Faith, and Directory of Public Worship—[*Note:* There is no mention here of a Bible]—that a weekly catechising be constantly observed in every kirk. And it is appointed that every minister so order their catechetic questions that thereby people (who do not convene all at one time, but by turns unto that exercise) may at every diet have the chief heads of saving knowledge in a short view presented to them. And every presbytery is ordained to take trial of all ministers within their bounds, whether they be careful to keep weekly diets of catechising; and if they shall find any of their number negligent therein, that they be admonished for the first fault, and if, after such admonition, they do not amend, the presbytery for the same fault shall rebuke them sharply; and if, after such rebuke, they do not yet amend, they shall be suspended.' So thoroughly was the Scottish Kirk in earnest about the work of catechising. I am informed on good authority that these regulations were not a dead letter; that 'the weekly catechisings

were largely attended, and the questions were not confined to the children. Adults, even heads of families, were expected to give an answer to any one 'that asked a reason of the hope that was in them.'

The result was that the Shorter Catechism was committed to memory by every one, and it was rare to find a Scotchman who could not defend a doctrine. My informant goes on to say that Professor Tholuck told him that the ablest defence of Calvinistic doctrine which he ever came across was from an operating barber in Greenock, with whom he had made an appointment after working hours to continue the conversation with him. The consequence has been that Scotland has been free from many of the educational difficulties which have befallen us, and when Board schools were established in 1872 she was able to wring from an unwilling Ministry freedom to retain the teaching of the Catechism in those schools. In spite, however, of this retention, ministers who remember the generations that passed through their hands before the change took place are aware of a considerable falling off in the preparation of those who come to them for admission to the Communion. This decline is attributed partly to the short time allowed in schools for religious instruction, whereas in old days the instruction was religious throughout, and under the supervision of the presbytery, who took special interest in this side of the schoolmasters' work. For my own part I should be inclined to suspect that the

falling off is not due so much to the want of time as to the fact that religious inspection, though conducted by inspectors appointed by School Boards, is delegated to other than the ordinary inspectors. An unreal and unnatural cleavage is set up which cannot but affect the minds of teachers—a cleavage which, however unavoidable, is thoroughly contrary to all true educational principles.

The weekly catechisings in church have been discontinued since the disruption in 1843, and the Sunday instruction of children is now conducted in Sunday schools, which, so far as the teaching staff goes, do not appear to differ very greatly from our own. 'The old order changeth, yielding place to new,' and it is cowardly to look upon the new as altogether evil, and in the fact of change to find an excuse for inaction. The trials of the Church are for her purifying, and it is her privilege to regard them as a visitation of her Master and as an occasion for fuller realisation of His presence. But it is impossible to review the past of Scotland without admiring the sagacity with which her Reformers linked the church and the school, and the courage with which they undertook the religious education of the people. They bought up the opportunity which God put in their hands in such a way as to mould the thought and life of more than three centuries of their posterity. What I would plead for, and that most earnestly, is a full use of such powers as God has

given us to-day, that we may present His Truth as clearly and as intelligently as we can. For no intermediate age has so closely recalled the conditions of the Renaissance as our own. The advance of scientific discovery and all-pervading use of scientific method are to us what the revival of classical learning was to the fifteenth century. Once more, coincident with new modes of thought, a great social revolution has overtaken us; once more, the faith is on its trial. Our wisdom is not to meet these difficulties in the spirit of the obscurantists of the early sixteenth century, but with the Reformers to use the fresh light, the new modes of thought, to obtain and to hand on to our successors a fuller and clearer understanding of the Faith, confident that all true light cometh from the Light of the World, and in Him and in His Word is no darkness at all.

LECTURE IV

METHODS OF CATECHISING

Theory and practice of catechising

The Prayer Book commands us to catechise. But the Prayer Book was compiled three centuries and a half ago, when Sunday schools were unknown, and educational methods were very different. Are we to obey this command, or to plead that it has become obsolete, and must be obeyed only in the spirit? It is often assumed that catechising is inconsistent with the maintenance of Sunday schools. The children cannot be in two places at once. If they are taken to church every Sunday, the Sunday-school teacher becomes a pedagogue in the literal sense of the word, a mere monitor or usher in charge of the children. This is work not likely to attract the best teachers, and I have known clergy who, in their zeal to catechise, have disbanded their Sunday-school staff. Yet a very good case can be made out for the Sunday school. It calls out, as no other institution has, the highest spiritual gifts of the laity. It has realised to some extent the ideal, of which the sponsorial system is the reflec-

tion—the ideal that the whole Church is responsible for all her children. Again, to use a favourite phrase of a former colleague of mine, so skilful in attracting children and teachers that he went by the name of 'The Pied Piper of Hamelin,' 'it catches the children in their runs.' Where they are used to go on weekdays they will readily go on Sundays. Is it worth while to break up so valuable an organisation for the sake of returning to a mediæval archaism?

If the question is put in this form there can be only one answer to it. It cannot be right to destroy the Sunday school. In spite of its grave defects—and it has many grave defects, which will be mentioned in the next lecture—the Sunday school has proved its worth many times over. To take only two instances: it has been, and still is, a great nursery of missionary zeal: it has been, and it still is, the rallying point of Church workers who mean real work. It would be culpable to destroy it. But is there the least necessity to do so? I grant that, if the Sunday school is to flourish, the teacher must have the opportunity to teach, and practically this opportunity must be given in the afternoon, which is the proper time for catechising. But is there any reason in town parishes why all the children should be catechised every Sunday? I hope to show you that the very opposite is desirable, and that Catechisms, if they are to be effective, should be limited in size, and should contain only a portion of the

children under instruction each Sunday. In small country parishes this arrangement may not be possible, but in these it is easier to secure the attendance of children in the morning, and to make the morning school the time of careful preparation for the afternoon catechising. The two systems may with a little care be combined. No slavish adherence to a method of catechising should be allowed to rob the Sunday school of its interest. No Sunday school, however well conducted, should take from the clergyman the privilege and duty which the Church assigns to him.

The Catechism a mnemonic exercise

But this objection surmounted, others take its place. The Catechism, we are told, 'is essentially a mnemonic exercise. No doubt it may be so practised as to employ reasoning powers also. It may take advantage of subsidiary appeals, through music and hallowed surroundings, to the unconscious mind. But its very essence is trust in the memory. It is constructed with this object. Children are expected to know its exact words. It is not desired that they should reason it out for themselves, but that they should accept it on the authority of others. Now that less use is made of memory in secular education, there is a danger lest the irksomeness of learning by heart should make religion repulsive to them. In any case this feature emphasises the distinction between religious and secular learning, if the two are

presented to a child by different methods. He will not know what the difference is, but he will feel that there is a difference, the consequence of which may be that his religious knowledge will appear to be unreal, or not to deal with realities.' There is a certain force in these objections, but on close inspection they do not amount to very much. It is true that less dependence is placed on memory in secular instruction, but it is quite an exaggeration to suppose that memory can ever be discarded. Recitation has its place in the exercises of all schools, and the pieces recited are chosen, or should be, for their literary excellence. So far modern school associations may even give a kind of dignity to learning by heart. There are also things absolutely necessary, and admitting of no variation, which are, and always must be, a matter of memory—the multiplication table, for instance, and certain scientific signs and symbols. Thus memory may connote the importance and exactness of the matter learnt. It is further conceivable that in its desire to make learning pleasant, modern method has gone too far. It is not necessary for us to copy those mistakes. In this connection there are words of Madame de Staël which deserve attention. She writes: 'The education that takes place through amusement dissipates thought: labour of some sort is one of the aids of nature: the mind of the child ought to accustom itself to labour, just as the soul to suffering. . . .

You will teach a multitude of things to your child by means of pictures and cards, but you will not teach him how to learn.' [1]

There is, however, a learning by heart which is of no value, and which may be even detestable. Alas! it is far too common in catechisms and Sunday schools, the careless, stumbling, inexact repetition of texts and phrases, the meaning of which is not explained, and which have no direct connection with anything else; learning just sufficient to secure an utterly undeserved mark towards the winning of a more undeserved prize. Such repetition does not strengthen but weaken the memory. It serves also to make the lesson contemptible. It is to be avoided at all costs. Memory rightly used is most valuable. Madame Necker de Saussure reminds us [2] 'that even objects present to our senses may be unknown to us if we have forgotten their names. I happen to see a person whom I distinctly remember having met before: the sound of his voice is not new: there he is in front of me: I see him and hear him, and yet the idea in my mind is so imperfect, so isolated, that I know absolutely nothing that concerns him. Suddenly his name comes back to me like a flash of light: with his name come back the time, the place, all the circumstances of our first meeting: his very

[1] Quoted by Compayré, *History of Pedagogy*, p. 495 translated by Payne: London, 1888.

[2] *L'Education Progressive*, p. 132.

history presents itself to my mind. I have found the key of a chamber in my brain, where all that regards that person was locked up. Singular and mysterious property of language; how all the accessories of an object arrange themselves with the utmost docility round his name, while they refuse to attach themselves to the object itself! The sign effects what the thing would not effect.' This passage is worth remembering in connection with the indiscriminate onslaught on the value and exercise of memory, and in connection with the charge which is sometimes levelled against us of dealing with names and not with things. Names are sometimes more than things: they are 'keys to the chambers in our brains, for want of which our treasure may be out of reach.' The fact that it trusts to memory, and exercises memory, is not in itself a condemnation of the Catechism. But we may take the warning for what it is worth, which is that memory shall not be loaded with rubbish, nor be allowed to become slovenly.

A third objection is that Catechisms are of no value unless they are dogmatic, and that in teaching children dogma should be avoided. 'Christianity,' says Professor Laurie,[1] 'is a life and can be learned through human lives. It is a story, and as a story alone should it be first learned—not as dogma, save in respect to those essential truths (the Fatherhood of God and the elder

Catechisms dogmatic

[1] Laurie's *Training of Teachers*, Cambridge, 1901, p. 228.

brotherhood of Christ) of which I have spoken, if they may be called dogmas. Educational method regards dogmas as tares that push up and choke the grain of God as it begins to grow in the heart of the child.' There is a certain vagueness in this passage about the word 'child,' but it may not be unfair to interpret Professor Laurie's remarks by the rule of the Edinburgh School Board, that the Catechism should not be taught to children under the fourth standard. It must also be borne in mind that the Scotch Catechism is very different from the English, abounding in definitions of abstract terms, such as 'faith,' 'sanctification,' 'adoption,' 'effectual calling,' which are not once mentioned in the English Catechism. Professor Laurie carries us with him when he pleads that we must not anticipate growth, nor make religion intricate to children. But it is an equal mistake to try to bring all religious truth down to what we conceive to be the level of childish minds. Mysteries of the faith are not in reality at all clearer to us than they are to children, possibly not quite as clear. Nothing is gained by dropping what we cannot understand in the hope of finding the rest more easy to grasp. [1] 'What we want is not to have a new truth taken off from our weight (i.e. of truths to be borne), but to have a new strength inserted in our belief.' Abstract terms are to be avoided not because they contain some dogma, but because they are abstract.

[1] Mozley's *University Sermons*, p. 296.

The objection to catechisms that they are dogmatic certainly does not apply to our Catechism, nor to teaching moulded on its lines.

On the other hand the Catechism certainly meets some great needs of modern child life in a way that even the Sunday school does not. The first of these is the need of some force to counteract the disintegrating anti-social tendencies of life for the poor, at all events in our great cities. We have broken to pieces all the old bonds of apprenticeship, of religious guilds, of parish life. We have left wildernesses of houses, too few of which are homes, with such other cementing influences as public-houses and trade unions can afford. For the poorest children, even the trade union is not; while to those whom it unites it is rather a force of repression and coercion than a union of affection or of hearts. 'The Union' *par excellence* to him is that which threatens to be his last home upon earth, a monster barrack, the relentless foe of all sentiment. So children grow up with no sense that they belong to any one, or that they owe any sort of allegiance to any one, at all events outside their homes. This feeling the Sunday school does little to correct, else should we see that far too common vacillation between school and school, particularly on the eves of summer treats and winter teas? Affection for a teacher is common; affection for a Sunday school, so far as my experience goes, is rare. But a well-

Catechisms meet the wants of modern life

ordered catechism presents the idea, with which our Catechism starts, of a family to which the child belongs, which has duties towards him and claims upon his obedience, a second home, a sanctuary, so that, as Mgr. Dupanloup says,[1] 'a real fraternal affection exists there, created by God Himself, between all these dear children, all these young hearts which He has blessed.' This fraternal affection between members of the Catechism will be stronger in proportion to the degree in which the Catechism definitely and fearlessly starts from a Sacrament and leads up to a Sacrament. The catechising should be associated as closely as possible with the Public Baptism of Infants. That is, for children as well as adults, but for children especially, the great object lesson of the Church.

The influence of public baptism

Looking back to my own boyhood I trace some of its deepest religious impressions to public baptism monthly administered at the afternoon service, then the most frequented service of the day. The signing with the sign of the cross, the words which accompanied it, the hymn which preceded it, were more to me than many sermons. Nor can I doubt that a catechising, based on the service that I had witnessed, would have deepened these impressions and made clear truths, which were afterwards grasped with some difficulty. Particularly such catechising might have removed a certain boyish scepticism as to the propriety of binding

[1] Dupanloup's *Ministry of Catechism*, translation, London, p. 61.

babies by promises which they could not understand Catechising might have helped me to grasp the idea of the family of God the Father's earthly home. This is the aspect of the Catechism which, in view of the disintegrating tendencies of life in great cities, makes it specially valuable for the conditions of to-day.

We need not therefore allow ourselves to be too much terrified by such terms as 'distinctive,' 'denominational,' 'sectarian,' when applied, as they are freely applied, to Catechisms. In our fear of sectarianism we have been tempted to present Christianity as a religion, which is no religion at all, if religion be indeed a bond of union. God forbid that I should seem to undervalue for one moment the reality of the common life of which the one living Spirit is the Author, and which is the vital bond of union between all the members of Christ. But for practical purposes that unity must find a manifestation. That manifestation must run on the lines of the truth, as the Holy Spirit reveals it to the Church. 'The Church hath authority to interpret,'[1] and is bound to exercise that authority. It is to be feared that our Church is conspicuously lacking in the exercise of this authority. Even intelligent laymen, if you ask them whether the Church has any sort of authority over them, are apt to answer 'No.' Translated into action, this idea too often means that each man is his own judge of right and wrong, and

Catechisms distinctive

[1] Article xx.

that it is quite sufficient justification of any of his actions that he did it to please himself. All things that ought to be bonds of union are, in the eyes of many well-meaning Churchmen, forms of bondage. Hours of prayer, habits of deference to common interest, or to constituted authority and sacraments, are mere carnal ordinances which have no claims on their allegiance except so far as they can find personal comfort and edification in such ordinances. 'Utterly spiritual' means for them utterly individualistic, which is a polite way of saying utterly self-centred.

What has all this to do with the Catechism? Simply this, that every catechism is a witness for the existence of a society which teaches it. It is truth presented in the form of authority, not of authority backed up by physical menace, but of authority resting upon the love of God and the brotherhood of man. It tells the child that he has a place, a home in the world, and a claim upon those who are members of it with himself. In proportion as that authority makes good its claim by living interest and affection, in the same proportion will it find response in a child's heart. We are always talking about the wonderful organisation of the Roman Church. The secret of that organisation in the last resort is love, and particularly love for children. 'No Catholic teacher,' said a chief attendance officer of our Board to me,

The Catechism presents idea of duty

'will ever take a child's name off the books of the school, or rest till he has got the child back within the school walls.' The fact of such individual attention impresses the poor, who feel nothing so much as being overlooked. Now, here, if we only recognised it, is the strength of our Church Catechism. It does not start from abstractions, but from concrete realities. It begins with the child's new home, his new kindred, his home life. If these be presented not as repellent duties, but in the light thrown on them by Holy Baptism, there is no Catechism, which I have seen, that can compare with ours in its fitness for the needs of child life in our great cities to-day. But the right place to teach it is the church, where the font and the holy Table impart a freshness and reality to its meaning, which is not to be found within the walls of the Sunday school. Let me add that, if we obeyed the rules of our Church and displayed, as we are required to do, the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments on the walls of the church, there would be nothing wanting to enable a skilful teacher to make the children feel that the church was their home.

Some defects of our Catechism

On the other hand, we shall not use our Catechism without remembering that it was written for an uneducated nation, and for a nation whose rulers dreamt that it was possible and desirable to forbid the discussion of any but the most elementary truths of Christianity. The

futility of that hope was evinced by the addition of the clauses on the Sacraments. But, even with this addition, our Catechism is wanting in instruction which a child ought to possess for his soul's health. Even in the sphere of religious duties there are some very grave omissions. Not a word is clearly said about the observance of Sunday, about the duty of devotional reading, about almsgiving or missionary enterprise. There is entire silence in the region of doctrine on points so essential as the Being of God, or the nature of the Blessed Trinity. Many similar defects might be easily pointed out. In a Catechism for very young children these omissions are not defects but excellences. In a Catechism for older children, intended for lifelong use, they should not be omitted. I have often thought that if the Houses of Convocation had not attempted to add to the existing Church Catechism, but had carefully prepared a Catechism for older children, they might have avoided much unhappy misunderstanding, and have done real service to the Church. For in the absence of such a work we are once more in the situation which led to the supplement added in the days of James I., who complained that 'every mother's son in these days thinks himself fitted to compose a Catechism.' The result may be found in any of the unauthorised Catechisms which are industriously circulated as specimens of the teaching of the Church of England. It is time that we had a Catechism on these subjects,

which cannot be burked, as our Reformation statesmen hoped they might be—a catechism which could be presented as having the authority of the consensus of episcopal and synodal authority on its side.

Method of catechising

In passing from the Catechism to the method of catechising, I must ask you to forgive me if in the following remarks somewhat familiar ground is trodden. The 'Method of S. Sulpice' has in the last few years attracted much attention, and not undeservedly. It is probably familiar to English Churchmen through that most attractive book, Mgr. Dupanloup's 'Ministry of Catechism,' and through works founded thereon. The 'Méthode' itself is, I think, little known, though it is well worth reading. The history of the 'Méthode' is briefly this. S. Sulpice was at the beginning of the seventeenth century what we should call a slum 'parish in the heart of Paris when M. Olier, a pupil and friend of S. Vincent de Paul, was appointed its Curé.' He set himself to reform it by catechisms. Ignorance, he believed, was the source of its moral depravity, and instruction of children the way to a better state of things. His success was so remarkable that the face of the whole parish was changed, and his system was found to be so excellent that it is maintained, with a few modifications suggested by experience, up to the present day. You will note that it was a system of catechising, not a Catechism. For this reason it is available for our use, and prejudices

founded on the fact of its origin are purely baseless. It is as well adapted to the teaching of the Church Association as to that of the English Church Union.

The secret of the method, as of all other successful methods, is infinite pains and careful study of child nature. Every detail of time, place, discipline, and method is carefully thought out and rigidly laid down. The result is a system which for its success in a large parish demands, we may say, the whole time of at least one of the clergy, and is more perfect, if he has in the actual catechising at least two assistants. The method presupposes not only a large staff of clergy or clerical assistants, but also other conditions rarely found in England. It assumes powers of almost compulsory attendance, as being a system which holds the field without fear of rivalry from competing sects and denominations. It also makes no allowance for the existence of the Sunday school, but demands that there should be at least four catechisms. The four catechisms are: (1) The little Catechism for children between the ages of six or seven and ten. Infants are refused without fear that the refusal will mean that they are taken by their sisters to the Chapel next door. (2) There is the great Catechism for the first Communion, consisting of children who must be at least ten years old, and must remain at least two years in the Catechism. (3) There are weekday Catechisms corresponding to our Confirmation classes. These are

Method of S. Sulpice

exclusively for children who are to be admitted to the first Communion. They are independent of the Sunday Catechisms; attendance on both is obligatory for catechumens for Confirmation. The weekday Catechisms last for two or three months, and only those who have been regular on Sundays are admitted to them. (4) For those who have been admitted to Communion and Confirmation there are Catechisms of perseverance, bearing a sort of analogy to our Bible classes.

Place of the Catechism

Catechisms, according to the 'Méthode,' should always be held in church—not in the nave, where it is difficult to speak so as to be heard in a natural voice, but in a side chapel. The children should be taught to look on this chapel as their home, should be encouraged to decorate it, and make it attractive in every possible way. There should be seats for them suited to their ages, and, in fact, as much care should be shown in all these particulars as is shown in a well-ordered day school. In the chapel each child has his own place, which he is never allowed to alter, the curé having, for convenience in catechising, a plan showing the place of each child, so that he can distribute his questions wisely, and keep the children alert by calling on one here and another there to answer his questions. At the end of each form are monitors, who are responsible for the attendance roll and for other little offices. The children assemble in the church at some ap-

pointed spot, and there remain in perfect silence till the signal is given to move two and two into their chapel. The catechism begins with a hymn, which is followed immediately by recitation of the appointed portion of the Diocesan Catechism. The children are called upon by name, at the catechist's will, to answer some question in the Catechism, and particular care is to be taken that the answer is said clearly and with absolute correctness. The recitation is followed by the 'Jeu des bons points.' This consists in giving one or more children a series of four or five questions, short, clear, exact, on a mystery, a proof, or a cardinal doctrine of the faith connected with the portion of the Catechism which has been recited. The questions are put with vivacity in such a way as to have the appearance of a contest between the catechist and the child, and the good mark for answering well is given with an assumed reluctance, sometimes after hard pleading on the part of an assistant catechist. There is a variety of resources to make the exercise more interesting, and to attract the attention of the children and the congregation.

After the 'Jeu des bons points' comes the repetition of the Gospel, which at S. Sulpice is sometimes said not only in French but even in Latin and Greek. For the French Catechism includes boys who with us would be at a public grammar school, and whom at present we could not hope to find in a parish Cate-

chism. As soon as the Gospel is finished the catechist gives some account of the analysis made by the children of his instruction on the previous Sunday, reads some analyses, awards praise or blame, finds fault or otherwise with the number sent in. Then comes the second hymn, and after that the serious exercise of the day, the instruction, lasting from twenty to twenty-five minutes. For this the children are supplied with cards and pencils that they may take notes of the principal points, which the catechist indicates by well-known signals. The notes of the instruction are taken home to be worked up in an analysis handed in before the following Sunday. After the instruction comes the third hymn, and then the homily or sermon, founded generally on the Gospel, and either at this point or earlier a brief admonition to press such points as reverence, diligence, or any other matter on which the catechist wishes to warn the children. A fourth hymn is sung, and during the singing of the fifth the children file out of the chapel. The time allotted for such a Catechism is two hours—two hours exactly; not more, for fear of wearying the children; not less, because otherwise it is impossible to complete all the exercises, every one of which is deemed essential to a rightly conducted Catechism. It is impossible in such a cursory review of this method as I have been able to give you to do justice to it. Fortunately it stands in no need of my commendation. Mgr. Dupanloup's

'Ministry of Catechism,' which is translated into English, gives a detailed and most attractive description of the method, which no clergyman could possibly read without being better for doing so. The work is there treated as a labour of love in a thoroughly sensible and yet devotional spirit, and one envies the audience which had the felicity of listening to so helpful a course of lectures as is therein contained. When you read the book, if you have not already studied it, you will be impressed by the completeness of the method, as a piece of educational work. In the first place it undertakes an entire course of instruction in the faith, historical as well as dogmatic, practical as well as devotional. In the next place it is a course carefully graded for pupils of different ages, and steadily progressive, a feature in which catechetical exercises are apt to be defective. Thirdly, it is based on a thorough study of child nature. It appeals to the whole child. While the mind is informed or the reason trained, pains are taken to store the memory with Gospels, hymns, and well-chosen definitions. Interest is aroused by the careful system of questioning, and various devices, such as occasional debates between the catechists. Imagination is incited by artifices which we in England should not care to adopt, such as recitations by children dressed as angels. Above all, the utmost care is spent on the surroundings, that all of them may be as attractive, as they

are calculated to produce reverence and deep, lasting impressions of the joy of the service of the Lord. Nothing is overlooked, neither the size of the benches nor the mode of entry and of departure, nor the method of sitting, standing, or singing. The method is an educational method, thoroughly well suited for the end it has in view, and no thoughtful reader who studies it can be surprised to learn that it has been successful.

Adoption of the same in England

It is not wonderful therefore that much attention has lately been paid to it in England, and that attempts are being vigorously prosecuted to transplant it to this country. It is as far removed from the ordinary children's service as light from darkness. For it is both a service and an educational agency, whereas too many children's services are neither one nor the other. At the same time it has been overlooked that the method of S. Sulpice is so complete in itself and so carefully elaborated that it cannot be adopted by mere abridgment, and that we have to ask ourselves, 'Can we really give two hours every Sunday to this form of catechising?' The Romanists in England, so far as my information goes, have answered the question in the negative, and have not attempted to use the method of S. Sulpice here. Yet they have not the difficulty which we have, of a strong Sunday-school system which refuses to be displaced for the catechising, and which demands

at least an hour or an hour and a half from the children each Sunday. This fact alone ought to have occasioned more inquiry than it has, so far as I know, excited. In the books which I have read, commending the method to English Churchmen, I have seen no allusion to it. It has also been overlooked, I think, that there is a great difference between the Continental and the English Sunday. Much as we may regret it, Sunday in large towns for the lower middle class and the poor consists of the latter half of the day, and it is in the evening that the greatest demands are made on the strength and freshness of the clergy. Now it is quite certain that no catechist who had effectively conducted a catechism on the method of S. Sulpice could hope to do really effective preaching the same evening, as a general rule. Exceptional men and exceptional occasions prove nothing. In such a work as catechising we must above all things lay our plans for permanence and regularity. The two hours' catechising is at least a good half-day's work for men of ordinary physique. The consequence is that various abridgments of the method have been recommended so as to bring the whole catechising within an hour, and I am not prepared to say that such attempts have been always unsuccessful. A good teacher will generally overcome the greatest obstacles that he is pleased to put in his own way. But the object of method is not to create obstacles but to remove them,

and I am quite sure that any catechist who tries to compress the exercises of the method of S. Sulpice into one hour creates for himself unnecessary difficulties. The rapid succession of so many different acts or actions cannot possibly have the result of leaving in the minds of children any one clear and permanent impression. I am convinced that anything like a true adoption of the method of S. Sulpice can only be obtained by surrender of the Sunday school, and by the appointment of a clergyman on the staff who is told off to catechising as his special work. In other words, for most parishes it is impracticable.

Suggestions for catechetical method

But this does not imply that we have nothing to learn from the method, or that it is not worth our most careful attention. The first question, however, which we have to ask before we adopt any method of catechising is this: 'What is the special function in the life of the parish which any catechising is to fulfil?' The needs and circumstances of the parish come before every other consideration. Catechising in a parish of 20,000 or 30,000 souls, in which there is no Church day school, will have wholly different aims from catechising in a parish of 500 inhabitants whose children are daily taught under the influence and guidance of the Church. In the former case the Catechism will probably be a means of leading a certain number of selected children on to Confirmation. In the latter it will probably be the gathering of all the Church

children weekly in their spiritual home to make them feel and know vividly what the family of Christ is. After consideration of the circumstances of the parish will come that of the clergyman's special aptitude. James Vaughan, of Brighton, for instance, fulfilled the spirit of the command to catechise in his excellent sermons to children, probably, far better and more effectually than if he had thrown his discourses into a catechetical form. But this consideration is distinctly secondary. It must not be an excuse for shirking work. There is undoubtedly far more work in a well-prepared catechising than in a written sermon for children. Because there is temptation in this direction, we must beware of it. The gift of preaching well to children is so rare that most of us may drop it out of our reckoning altogether.

Aim of the Catechism

Our first aim, then, will be to settle the proper function of our Catechism, I would venture to suggest, after full and careful consultation with all teachers of primary and secondary schools in the parish, and with our Sunday-school teachers—let us call it a council of war, or, if you prefer it, a council of education—but let it be clearly in our minds that the powers of evil are an organised force with a definite plan of campaign, and that strategy must be met with strategy, or the inevitable alternative is defeat. Let it be clearly settled, if it can be, what should be the aim and line of religious instruction in the day schools; what the

syllabus; then, where the Sunday school will come in, and where our catechising. Such a council of war would be none the worse in some parishes, but far better if it included the Nonconformist ministers. It might be a step in the direction of harmony. It might remove some very grievous misunderstandings and mutual suspicions.

Points of real importance

Having determined what you are to teach, by all means borrow from the methods of S. Sulpice and from all good teachers the following essential conditions:—

1. Perfection of discipline, both conscious and unconscious. By conscious discipline I mean that which is intended definitely to be discipline, and is felt to be discipline by the children. Children do not really love disorder. They can be trained to disorder by careless and slovenly handling, and their physical restlessness makes for disorder; but in itself they hate it. Instinctively, and before they form evil habits, they hate it. You can see in any well-ordered day school how easily they fall into rhythmical orderly movements; and a very little pains and attention will enable you to arrange the march into church and out of church, the regular sitting in the same place, the system of monitors at the end of each pew, the attentive posture, the simultaneous rising, standing, kneeling. You may not be able to secure perfection in these details for the simple reason that church furniture is constructed for adults, and is

necessarily unsuited to little children. The time is, I fear, very far off when the children will have what the 'Method' prescribes—their own chapel with their own furniture. There is no H.M.I. to compel our people to buy these things for us, and I fear we shall have to go on for a long time without them. But our ideal, for which we should work in all new church building, should be a large and roomy baptistery, in which a hundred children with some adults could be seated comfortably with the font between them and the church, and a catechist's desk beside the font, and suitable places for parents and godparents at baptism. The baptistery would be none the worse for being separable from the church by a glazed screen. It should on no account be used for stowing away children during ordinary services. It should be the children's chapel for the children's weekly service. Everything in it in the way of ornament should be bought with their own pence. Their own flowers should decorate it week by week. There should be spaces on the walls for choice pictures, and for tablets to contain names of former members who have gone out as missionaries. Easel and blackboard should be found there, and it should never be entered or quitted in a careless or unseemly way. All such precautions would save the worry and friction which comes of trying to keep order among children who have to climb on to hard high benches, sit with feet dangling in the air, half hidden by a

tall pew in front, and craning their necks to see a far-off preacher who is more than half hidden in his pulpit, and who finds it hard, once he is there, to throw off the idea that he has to preach a sermon.

Artificial arrangements materially assist discipline, but in the last resort the secret of discipline is the power of commanding and keeping attention. You must take the lid off the kettle or you will never fill it, pump as hard as you will. The lid is inattention, the abstractedness and distractedness of the child-mind, which is Nature's safeguard in a world which would otherwise overpower him by the multitude of impressions crowding confusedly upon him. Inattention is not a sin in children. If they were not naturally inattentive their minds would lose their freshness and their souls would too often lose their innocence. We must not take it as a matter of course that they should listen. We must rouse ourselves till our hearts are aflame with a threefold fire: love of God, love of children, love of the subject in hand,[1] so that we may enlist on our side the spirit of inquiry and the response to love which make it comparatively easy to children to fix their attention and to keep it fixed. Attention is the key to good discipline.

2. We may learn from the 'Méthode' that the massing of a large number of children of different

[1] '*Ama*,' says S. Augustine, '*ama et fac quod vis*.'

ages is not a Catechism. For the object of catechising is to instruct, and instruction especially in the mysteries of the faith must be proportioned to understanding. We must beware that the modern love of scenic effect does not rob us of our unique opportunity for teaching. There is not a more delightful sight in the world than that of several hundred children. Still more sweet it is to see their upturned faces and gleaming eyes when a good teacher has their attention. '*C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre.*' It is impossible to construct a series of lessons which shall keep several hundred children of different ages moving on together from Sunday to Sunday towards a fuller and clearer knowledge of the truth. The attempt to teach children of very different ages at the same time must end either in a discourse or in confusion. Discourses to children are not catechisings. Our choice in large parishes must be made between monster services and select catechisings. The occasional monster service, let us say once a month, may be a profitable variation, and have its use in teaching the children that it is an honour and privilege to go to church. But the Catechism should be presented to them as a higher honour still. By various devices it should be made an object of ambition to attain to the Catechism. And the children who are being catechised should have the feeling that not only is their past instruction being summed up, but that also they are making real

Grading of children

progress, definitely advancing towards a goal which is worth reaching.

3. In short, the catechist should take as his scriptural example this subject: 'Jesus Christ sitting in the midst of the doctors in the temple.' His uppermost idea should be—'Christ comes to me in and with these little ones, so that I can almost see His face among them. The errand on which He comes is that of search for His Father's home. The effect of His training at Nazareth has been to create in His soul a great home-sickness. He has come to the temple hoping here to find His Father's home: a shelter from all injury, a family circle to stand by Him and uphold Him in doing His Father's work. For this home He feels it right to forsake the roof at Nazareth, and even to wound His mother's heart.' From the temple, had He found what he sought there, humanly speaking, His ministry might have begun. Had the circle of boys around Him, and teachers of the law before Him, been in fact what they were in idea, His period of ministry on earth need not have been so brief nor so lonely. It is needless to dream about the 'might have been,' but it is practical to try to make things correspond to their idea. There in the Catechism you have the children in the midst of their new family, of which you are the father, in this sense that their Father's character and affection shine through you to them. All that you can do to make the Catechism

The Catechism a spiritual home

a spiritual home will be rightly done. It is in this spirit that you will teach, leaving it to the day school, where possible, to give the historical setting which is the background of all the Divine revelation: leaving it to the Sunday school to enforce the moral and practical application of Bible stories, and to make them instructive guides of conduct and life, you will try to make your Catechism a fuller, richer unfolding of their Father's Being—of His love, of His will, of His nearness, and of the means by which He makes Himself one with us. Your minds will be steeped in the last words of our Lord to His disciples, the promised home, the Comforter, the vital union, the power of prayer, and in the great prayer of intercession. For was it not in this discourse that our Lord found what He had sought in the temple at twelve years of age? Then He had said, 'I must be in My Father's home:' and at this time His final address comforted them with a vision of that home, beginning with the simpler form: 'In My Father's home are many mansions,' and rising to the sublime mystery, 'I in them and Thou in Me, that they may be one in Us.' Pray do not misunderstand me. It is not at all my meaning that this address should be even the main subject of your catechising. You might not so much as mention it, but the tone of it should pervade your Catechism. I cannot express my meaning better than in the words of Mgr. Dupanloup: 'A catechism, well conducted—that is with love—has an extraordi-

nary power over these young souls, these childish consciences. What I call the industries of zeal in the Catechism entwine them so powerfully, they move them, they work upon them in so many ways, that the children can neither resist nor escape them; all these little hearts become tender; the infinite beauty of the Saviour, His goodness towards them reflected in the kindness of their catechists, the holy songs, the festivals, the Word of God incessantly heard, the charms of piety newly and ardently enjoyed, the good examples: all this wins the hardest being back, and those who have wandered farthest; and, what is so comforting, one may say it is for all time. Yes, when a child has been touched, laid hold of in the Catechism, through all his life he preserves the undying impression of it; when Jesus Christ has taken possession of a child's heart, He remains there; and if by the distractions of life or the outbursts of passion he is for a while led away, yet at the bottom of his heart he has a something which will one day bring him back. A first Communion well made, if it does not always mean perseverance, yet sooner or later it is salvation.' [1]

[1] Dupanloup's *Ministry of Catechism*, p. 95.

LECTURE V

THE SUNDAY SCHOOL

The Sunday school is the parent of the day school. It grew out of an attempt to remedy the omissions of the past, and to supply the too long neglected duty of the Church to the poor. It revealed, further, the existence of willingness on the part of the laity to make use of their spiritual gifts without encroaching on the office of the clergy. So it spread quickly to Scotland and other countries, where the same necessity for it did not exist. It has survived the need which called it into existence. Universal education has not extinguished the Sunday school, nor is it likely to do so. But there has never been, so far as I am aware, a well-thought-out scheme for co-ordinating the work of the day school, the Sunday school, and the Catechism. Yet such co-ordination is surely desirable. Where day schools are purely secular, as in many parts of Wales, the co-ordination is simple enough. Religious teaching is relegated to the Sunday school. But the simplicity of this arrangement is its only, or almost its only,

Sunday school origin of day school

recommendation. It may claim, perhaps, that it secures for the parent complete control over the religious instruction of the children, and that it sets free the teaching profession from all religious tests. Of course, the fatal objections to the plan are: (1) the secularisation of the school, with all the loss to character and intelligence which is implied in exclusion of the highest interests and powers of children from the reach of the day-school teacher; (2) the banishment from religious teaching of the very children who need it most—that is, those who are so poor that they have no clothes fit for Sunday-school use; (3) all the harm that is involved in handing over the most important of all subjects to the least skilled class of teachers. We may set aside without hesitation the co-ordination which parts religious from secular knowledge, and hands them over to two distinct schools and two distinct classes of teachers.

Necessity of co-ordination of Sunday and day school

Another co-ordination suggests itself where religious teaching is given in Board schools, viz. that the Board school should supply the undenominational and the Sunday school the denominational instruction. This scheme is capable of one or other of two interpretations. (1) It may be interpreted to mean that Boards should teach undenominationalism—forgive the word—it is in itself portentous and barbaric—and the thing which it con-

Another form of co-ordination

notes is worse. I mean the idea that all religious belief, and all that is implied in Church membership, is worthless and fanciful, the growth of prejudice and superstition. That there is such a presentation of Christianity, and that it has found favour in some quarters, is undeniable. But it is unquestionably a contravention of the spirit of the Cowper-Temple clause to use its provisions so as to detach children from any denomination. However, I do not myself know of any case in which teachers in a day school have so interpreted their duties, and, if such cases exist, I believe them to be rare. (2) Undenominational teaching in day schools may be construed as the teaching therein of the history contained in the Bible, which is fairly common ground to all denominations except the Unitarians. This arrangement falls in with the natural inclination of teachers, which is to centre their teaching upon the Bible as an historical revelation. If we are to enforce truth by reference to the Bible, if our teaching of the Apostles' Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments assumes that our Lord and His apostles, Moses and the Prophets, were actual persons who lived and moved on the stage of history, then it is most convenient that we should find this background filled in skilfully and precisely by the day-school teacher. Of course I do not mean that the day-school teacher is debarred from making his history live with practical

and religious application. But the historical aspect is his *métier*.

The sphere of the Church day school

Where the day school is a Church school we have a right to expect further help still. Not only shall we have the letter of the Catechism taught, and its meaning explained, and a grounding given in the services of the Prayer Book, but we, as clergy, have further the right and duty of entry, and of taking some part in the instruction. Still, when full allowance has been made for these differences, it will be found that the work of the day school is to present the historic revelation mainly from the historical point of view.

The office of the Sunday school

The office of the Sunday school, on the other hand, is distinctively *spiritual*. Inquiring of a Nonconformist who was in a position to know whether there was truth in the alleged decline of Sunday schools in late years, I was told that he had reason to think that there was such decline, and the cause, he believed, was 'that Sunday schools had become too educational.' Now you will not accuse me of any sort of sympathy with indifferent education, but I think that I understand, and partly agree with, this explanation. Great pains have been taken for many years past to improve the teaching in Sunday schools. Unions and institutes have been formed, a flood of publications has gone abroad, model lessons have been given, teachers have been encouraged to sit for certificates, with the result, if I

may judge from the publications I have seen, that the Sunday school has tried to do over again the work of the day school. The two have worked in utter independence for the most part. The one has not known what the other has been teaching.

Whereas, if they had gone hand in hand, working over the same ground co-ordinately, the Sunday school enforcing the spiritual and devotional aspects of the history taught by the day school during the week, both would have been gainers. I am quite aware that this plan means reserving for the Sunday school the harder part of the work, and calling upon it to supply even a higher class of teachers. Nor do I need to be told that in many parishes such teachers are rarely to be found. But I am quite sure that no higher duty can fall to a parish clergyman than that of finding and training such teachers. No pains which he can spend in building up their spiritual life can be excessive. To turn out half a dozen such teachers is to leave a legacy to your successors which they will gratefully remember. It is to live in the parish for years after you have left it.

Office of the Sunday school

But, you will ask me, where does the Catechism come in? What is the office of catechising, as distinct from that of the two schools? My reply must be that the work of the Catechism is to bring the children into full communion with the Church. The Catechism is not only the

Office of the Catechism

compendious teaching of systematic theology, it is also the meeting of children in church to be taught what the Church is to them, and what they are to the Church. The Catechism therefore must of necessity comprise the children who will shortly be confirmed. It must claim their attention for one year at least, preferably for two years, before Confirmation. It will not be the Confirmation class, though it leads up to that class. Nor will it always exclude younger children where the circumstances of the parish make their inclusion desirable. But the great aim and end of the Catechism is to prepare the baptised for the privilege of Holy Communion. We must never lose sight of this purpose. We must never allow it to become a subsidiary purpose. This one fact so far settles to some extent the grading of our schools. The Catechism will correspond to Standards VII and ex. VII. As these prepare children of the elementary school for their life-work, so the Catechism prepares the catechumen for full membership of the Church. Whoever else is left out of the Catechism, whoever else is brought in, the Catechism exists for this as its great end and aim.

Grading of Sunday schools

Having settled this, we shall find the scope and aim and grading of the Sunday schools comparatively easy. There must be below the Catechism at least two schools—an infant school and an upper school. These two in their religious instruction will work side by side with the

day school, only that we may find it convenient to retain Standard 1—that is, the children who are eight years old, and even some between eight and nine—in the infant school.

I turn at once to the infant school, and to some axioms fatally current in school, which it must be our duty to abolish. The first is this: that 'any one can take a class of a few infants:' and, accordingly, good-natured girls, who know that they cannot teach, and who quite sincerely plead their inability, are confronted with a small class of little ones' 'vile bodies,' on whom to make their first experiments. Unless they are born teachers, or maintained by a strong sense of duty, these teachers become disgusted and vanish. Perhaps it is worse still for the school when they hold on. For the facts are, that a mother, or nurse, or elder sister living always with three or four children, and having no interference from without, can mind, and even teach, those three or four; or a trained teacher can teach some fifty children. But the average girl, put down in front of a dozen infants, with a draft of some half-dozen from a neighbouring class whose teacher is absent, may very well be proud if the children go home with their persons and clothes in fairly sound condition, having themselves learnt nothing. Infants require the best teachers. As we *must* admit them, having the fear of the chapel before our eyes, we ought to obtain

Infant Sunday schools

the best possible teachers for them. If we cannot obtain trained teachers, we ought to take steps to secure good training lessons for such as we have, and to remember that one really trained teacher can teach fifty children well, where five who are not trained will teach them all badly. Hence it should be our aim, having secured a really competent teacher, to put a large class under her, and to enlist the raw material, or the good-natured unqualified girls, to assist as monitresses or pupil teachers, until they too become instilled with some conception of the art of teaching. It is fatal to associate religion in the minds of infants with noise and disorder: for the first impressions are the most abiding. Also, by the law of association of ideas, these impressions reach further than we suspect; and it may even be that the notion of an easy-going careless God, who is neither able nor willing to correct sin (a notion which every clergyman finds to be most hampering to his efforts among the working classes)—it may be, I say, that this notion has some foundation in the laxity and incompetency which too often disfigure infant Sunday schools.

Some fatal axioms

The second axiom to be abolished is that 'it does not much matter what you teach infants: just read them a story and keep them quiet.' On the contrary, if the foundation is wrongly laid in the infant school, your work with the older children will always be more difficult and more

insecure. Infants should know clearly, with the help of pictures (as I shall explain presently), such Bible stories as are suited to their capacity, a few well known being worth, of course, more than many confused, and imperfectly retained. Three great truths ought in various ways to sink into their souls: (1) 'God made me and all the world;' (2) 'God sees me;' (3) 'God loves me.' Various texts and hymns should enforce these truths and make them beautiful and attractive. Also in the upper part of the school the Lord's Prayer and Ten Commandments should be committed to memory, and in the last year, possibly, the Creed. Our great difficulty in harmonising this teaching with modern infant-school methods will be that we are concerned with the invisible, while infants are now mainly taught by the eye and hand. But of this I have more to say presently. We shall not be satisfied, I think, unless the school has a definite aim and the children make definite progress. Further, we shall not count the teaching of a few simple habits and postures a matter of small moment. To kneel, to close their eyes in prayer, to utter words of prayer, and to sing with reverence will not, in our judgment, be matters of secondary importance. These outward signs help the children at least to understand that God is not as man is, and that there is in the world a power greater than our own. Again, these little ones may learn their first lessons of corporate life by being encouraged to give alms for children worse off

than themselves, for waifs and strays, or for the heathen. It is very hard—indeed, almost impossible—to teach principles of self-sacrifice to children who, up to seven or eight years of age, have been encouraged to be self-indulgent.

The third axiom to be abolished is that 'infant schools need no appliances save a few dirty hymn-books in the last stages of dissolution.' On the contrary, there is no school in which appliances are more needed. What will impress you most on entering any well-ordered infant day school is the wealth and variety of material of all sorts: sand for writing on, clay for modelling, pictures for object lessons, sheets for reading lessons, rocking chairs, and cradles for the baby-room; and, above all, a museum of stuffed birds or animals, or a collection of eggs or shells. If a teacher is going to teach children about a frog, she will first collect the spawn and let them watch the earliest stages of its development; or if about a bird, she will hold a stuffed swallow or robin in her hand. Everything is done to make the things real, not mere names and words. Contrast with all this the apparatus of an ordinary infant Sunday school: the torn hymn-books, the damaged Bibles, the dusty wall-pictures selected at haphazard for ornament (so called), and not for teaching; the absence ordinarily of hymn-sheets, or sheets showing the Lord's Prayer and Ten Commandments. How different the scene is, and of necessity how different the teaching!

I admit that it needs a skilled teacher to make good use of appliances, but I am anxious to make the necessity for skilled teaching in this school evident. I can conceive a well-arranged series of object lessons in the hands of a skilled teacher which should impress on children, in a way that words cannot, that simple truth, 'God made me and all the world:' a series of lessons definitely leading little children over and over again, now through teaching about the animal world, now through teaching about the heavens, now through scenes from foreign lands, now through fruit and flowers, to suspect and almost to feel the presence of God in nature, or the world's need of a Saviour, or the power and reality of resurrection-life.

Again, to prevent the monotony of too much learning by heart, is there any reason why the elder children should not be encouraged to do that which delighted us in our infancy, to use paint-brushes either to trace over printed copies of the Lord's Prayer, or even to paint first the letters, and then the words, for themselves? The Noah's Ark, the Sunday puzzle, were certainly factors in my own early religious instruction; and who can tell the joy that children have in 'playing at church'? Is there any reason why we should not make use of this instinct, so as to introduce some form of service more cheerful and more intelligible to infants than the mangled edition of Morning Prayer which is too

often assigned for their use? I can conceive morning Sunday school made so bright, so attractive, so instructive to infants by skilled teachers with good apparatus, that we should no longer have to deplore the miserable attendance at morning school. If once the infants were determined to go, their parents must get out of bed to send them, and some at least of the parents *might* begin to go to church. But you will all tell me that I am too sanguine.

Possible objection

I may be challenged with the objection that this demand for teaching through the eye and hand is almost a conception to the idolatrous instincts of mankind, and inconsistent with the purity of the Gospel. Such thoughts are sometimes entertained. But it needs only a little reflection to call to mind how late is the history of books, and therefore of book-teaching, in the order of the world. God's first appeal to man is not through the ears, but through the eyes. His first revelation of Himself, and, for the bulk of mankind, His only revelation, is in His works. There is even some truth, though perhaps it is exaggerated, in Herbert Spencer's suggestion [1] that, in approaching a man to praise him for his works, it would be offensive to be ignorant of those works when we might have known them. Think how little our town children, the bulk of our population of many millions, see of the works of God. There is little enough in court and alley, in

[1] Herbert Spencer on Education, London, p. 51.

dirty monotonous street and grimy lane, to suggest that there is a Creator of the world at all, or that He is either wise or good. It is for the sake of town children especially that I plead: 'Let us remodel our infant Sunday schools on Kindergarten methods. Let the children, if we can do so, see, as well as hear, that God is wise and good.'

Ought infants to be taken to church?

One question is sure to be asked and deserves to be answered: 'Ought the infants ever to be taken to church?' My suggestion would be that church-going should be a privilege for the elder among them, and a somewhat infrequent privilege: also let the service, when they come, be one which appeals to the eye as well as to the ear: a baptism Sunday, for which they have been allowed to decorate the font: or a great festival, for which they have been allowed to bring flowers: or some occasion on which they are allowed to sing hymns apart from the rest of the congregation, or when they have some special offering for missions or Church work to present. In this way I should let the church always appear to them as attractive as possible. Alas! I know that there are practical difficulties: how sometimes infants needs must go where their elder sisters go, and others of a like nature. But it were a hopeless task to attempt to make suggestions for all emergencies.

The great obstacle to remodelling our infant Sunday schools is the expense of so doing. Skilled

teachers mean expense, for, even if they serve voluntarily, their training will be an expense. Apparatus also is expensive. Yes, it is the painful truth that good education is expensive, but bad education is far more expensive in the long run. Of course there are cheaper ways than that which I have suggested for making children learn the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments. Canes are cheap and effective. But who would use them? A few painted texts and pictures are cheap, and go a long way towards securing bad repetition. But is the article worth purchasing at any price? And, if it were, there still remains what is to my mind the fatal objection: the discrepancy beween the two modes of presenting two kinds of truth. Modern education in the infant day school is not 'catechising;' it is rather, if we may use the word, 'reviewing.' We do not want to suggest to the children that there are two kinds of truth: and anything which tends towards such a suggestion is to be carefully avoided.

Expense of remodelling

From the infant school we pass to the upper, in which the children are, as I would suggest, being prepared for the Catechism. If I venture to outline a scheme of instruction for such a school, it is not, of course, because I think that only one scheme is possible, or that there may not be in use many schemes better than that which I propound to you. But I feel bound to make the

The upper school

suggestion, because I have insisted so strongly on a common line of teaching for both day and Sunday school, and it is a plain duty to show that such a common line is practicable. What is wanted is a course of instruction to extend over four years, from the ages of eight to twelve, or nine to thirteen, which (1) shall be progressive, not stationary, or even retrogressive, as too many courses at the present time are, (2) which shall without effort lead up to the Catechism, and (3) which may, on its historical side, be reasonably taught in Board schools and grammar schools, without any sacrifice of principle, and in the Sunday school be treated in its devotional and practical aspects. I particularly wish to insist that our scheme must be progressive. For I cannot say that I am satisfied with the ordinary diocesan syllabus, which often expects the same portion of the Bible to be studied through the whole school every year, the lessons being made a little harder or easier according to the age of the children. There is no progress at all in such a scheme as this. Children may begin with St. John in the New Testament, and the Captivity in the Old Testament, and then go back next year to St. Matthew and the Creation. This is not the way in which children should be led from truth to truth. It has always seemed to me to be quite uneducational, and in practice I find that the result is often that children look upon it as their

Course of instruction

duty to forget all that they were taught in the preceding year—a habit of mind which I believe to be a reflex of the teacher's watchful care lest the diocesan inspector should ask any question which is not in the syllabus for that year. What is wanted is a course of instruction which shall constantly recall and fix more deeply all that has preceded it. Whether I succeed or not in suggesting such a course, I am bound to show that I have thought about it, and have presented it in a practical form to my own mind.

The time available

We must first consider the time at our disposal in the Sunday school.[1] Four years being allowed for the upper school, we should have about 200 Sundays. For purposes of progressive instruction we must rule out Sunday mornings in such town parishes as come under my notice. In Birmingham, at all events, it is rare to find 25 per cent. of the children in the morning Sunday school. Consequently, the morning instruction must be quite different from that which is given in the afternoon. For the purposes of this lecture it may be disregarded. Not that it is unimportant. It is the training of the pick and flower of the children, the most regular, the most orderly, those of whom there is most hope. But it must be a special training, whereas I am dealing with general training for the great majority of the children

[1] If, as is desired, the same course is followed in the day school, the whole time available for the course is necessarily longer, and the course should be far better taught.

on progressive lines. For such training we have at our disposal in Sunday school not much more than 200 Sundays, and that is practically 200 hours. The groundwork with which the children enter the school should be the Lord's Prayer and Ten Commandments, known faultlessly, and, possibly, the Creed.

Now what can we teach in 200 hours? The question in this form disposes at once of many things which we should like the children to know. The time limit confines us within very narrow boundaries, and forces us to have a very definite aim, namely, preparation for the Catechism. By this I do not mean formal preparation to say the words or explain the meaning of the Catechism. What I mean is the creation, so far as devotional instruction can create it, of conditions suitable to respond to the Holy Spirit's awakening cry, 'Abba, Father.' This is the first voice of God in the heart. This is the dawn of spiritual intelligence. This is the position which the Catechism assumes. This must be the definite point at which all our Sunday-school teaching aims. Nor is our task an easy one. There is hardly any rank of society in which the duties and privileges of fatherhood are not slighted. Here is one of the great stumbling-blocks in the way of faith. 'We would be children of God,' cries Froebel,[1] 'and are not children of our fathers, of our parents.' 'God is to be our

[1] Froebel, *Education of Man*, p. 146.

Father, and we are far from being true fathers to our children. We would have an insight into the Divine, and we leave untouched the human relations which lead to such insight.' And, again, 'to acknowledge and live out this dependence on God as his Father is the true religion and the life-work of man.'

Our subject the Fatherhood of God

Now our work lies for the greater part among those to whom the word 'father' will in some cases have no connotation at all; in others it will connote foolish indulgence, caprice, injustice, selfishness, it may be downright brutality. To the children of the poor the providential arrangements of the world can hardly appear as beneficent as they do to us. Happily children do not at an early age question the wisdom or justice of their surroundings. But the time of questioning must come, and we have to prepare them for it. Four years spent on this one subject, 'the Fatherhood of God,' are by no means too long.

The four years' course

The first year, then, will be devoted to the Fatherhood of God revealed in the Old Testament; the second and part of the third to the Fatherhood of God revealed in Jesus Christ; the remainder of the third to the work of the Holy Spirit witnessing the same Fatherhood; and the fourth to the Church and Sacraments, the Divine Fatherhood revealed in an earthly brotherhood. Our course will therefore correspond to an instruction in the Ten Commandments, the Lord's Prayer, the

Creed, and the second part of the Catechism; or to a day-school course upon the Old Testament, the Gospels, the Epistles, and the Acts. In this last form it will be a possible course, even for the undenominational day school, as will appear when we come to the details of the course. If we could agree on some such common line of action, the difficulties of classification in Sunday schools would be lessened, and we should not see, so commonly as we now do, children of the sixth and second standards sitting contentedly in the same class, equally without expectation of learning anything. We might also escape in time from the courses on Jewish history which are now so wearisome to teacher and scholar alike. The Bible was not given to teach Jewish history, but to reveal to us the Fatherhood of God. Why should we not teach what the Bible was intended to teach?

Teaching by pictures

But here, before I go further, let me say that neither this nor any course is likely to have much impression on children taught, as children are now taught, without the help of a good series of well-chosen illustrations. We are still very far from possessing such a series. But there must be a sufficiency of pictures and cartoons by the first artists, which might be pressed into our service at a very reasonable rate, and I shall be thankful if anything said in these lectures leads to such publication. There could not be a more worthy subject for a conference between representatives of School Board

inspectors, Diocesan inspectors, Sunday-school teachers and publishers, than the selection of such a series for general use in schools. Even the secondary schools might not disdain to use them in lower forms, if they reproduced real works of art.

The first year's course

Our course for the first year will be on the Fatherhood of God as revealed in the Old Testament, and our starting point—the world without the revelation of God. Representations of objects of idol-worship from the rudest African images, ascending to the various forms of animal worship of Egypt, Assyria, and India, and of the human form as worshipped in Greece and Rome, would supply the background of Old Testament history, for lack of which it is often unintelligible. From this basis it would be comparatively simple to teach the first three Commandments. The right method of treating these and the remaining seven is surely to regard them as rules or laws given by our Father for the happiness of His children; and our object is to teach that 'Blessed are they that keep His testimonies,[1] yea, that seek Him with their whole heart.' In this connection it is worth while to notice the form in which the Commandments are given: '*Thou* shalt not,' i.e. '*Thou*' as the redeemed child of God 'shalt not;' whatever others may do, 'Thou shalt not.' This is far better than the plan followed, for instance, in the Shorter Catechism, of teaching the ways in which the

[1] Ps. cxix. 2.

Commandments may be broken. In the truest sense of the word no law of God can be broken. There is no difference really in this respect between the natural and the moral laws of God. But whereas, in the case of the natural, the consequences of breaking them are manifestly inevitable, in the case of the moral the necessity is not so obvious. Our work is to make it manifest that our Father has made no exceptions; that there are no unnecessary, no capricious rules for His children, and that all the rules which He has made are for their happiness. This truth is more easily illustrated from the history of nations than from that of individuals. For the punishments of national sin take place in this world. There is no after-life in which they can be visited. Our theme, therefore, for the first year after the introduction above sketched, is God's son Israel called out of Egypt, and provided with such a knowledge of his Father's will as might have made him a witness of God to the whole world, and failing to fulfil his calling not only by neglect of the second, but, as the Prophets show plainly, by neglect of *all* the Commandments. Forgive me if I go so far into detail as to outline the actual course which I have in mind. Its main topics would be these: (1) The world without the revelation of God; (2) the child of God as described in the Ten Commandments; (3) the calling misapprehended, and the attempt to establish a world empire in the name of God, the

mistake of Saul, David, and Solomon; (4) the inevitable downfall of worldly religion as exemplified in the house of Ahab, and the sins of Samaria and Jerusalem as witnessed by Amos and Hosea; (5) the duty of evangelising the world as seen by Isaiah; (6) the discipline of chastisement, or lessons of the captivity taken from Ezekiel and Daniel; (7) the fresh start, the elder son Israel in Jerusalem failing to realise his sonship, and the prodigal, or 'the dispersion among the Gentiles,' realising among the heathen the famine of his soul.

No doubt we shall be told that this course is too difficult for the ordinary Sunday-school teacher, and for children from the ages of nine to ten. The first objection I freely grant. But I plead for remodelling of Sunday schools, and for giving the work of teaching only to teachers who will condescend to learn their trade. The second objection I do not allow. What I aim at is the telling of the old story with its true aim kept steadily in view. God used the national historians and prophets of Israel while telling their tale, and doing their own work from their own point of view, to reveal the failure of Israel to realise his calling as the son of God. So the world was prepared for the coming of the true Son of God. So the true character of our Father was declared, just in proportion as false presentation of Him met with the fate which attends all disobedience to the will of God. I admit that for

Two possible objections

children from nine to eleven the course requires illustration by pictures, and that for want of these it may be at present an impossible course. I admit also that, as treated in the Sunday school, it will not be a continuous historical course, but the illustration of a few great truths from Bible history, taught in the day school from the same point of view. But I believe such a course as this to be a true and necessary preparation for right understanding of the New Testament. The details of the course will no doubt be forgotten. But it should leave clearly the impression that the path of obedience is the path of happiness, and it should leave the memory stored with the Ten Commandments, and one or two carefully selected chapters of the Old Testament, of which the fiftieth Psalm should be one and the fifty-third of Isaiah another. The explanation of the Ten Commandments from the Catechism would accompany the course throughout the year.

For the second course more time would be needed, seventy lessons being given to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Our aim, I think, should be not an entire life of Jesus Christ, built up on a harmony of the four Gospels, but such a choice of incidents, miracles, and parables as should throw light from many sources upon the children's prayer, until the children should be compelled, with the centurion at the foot of the Cross, to exclaim, 'Truly this Man was

Second year's course and part of the third year

the Son of God.' The children under instruction would of course have learnt in the infant school the story of the Divine birth. For the purpose of this course I should be inclined to take it not as the starting point, but as the crown and confirmation of the whole, working towards it as the second Christmas Day came round. It is remarkable that 'the beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ the Son of God' opens not with the Nativity, but with the preaching of John the Baptist. At that point we might start our first Advent lessons, and endeavour so to present the Man Jesus Christ, heralded by the Baptist, in conflict with the Tempter, dependent on His Father for daily bread, needing no forgiveness, but taking on Himself the sin and sorrow of the world, that at the second Christmas the mystery of the Incarnation should be felt to be almost a necessity; not a burden upon the intellect, but the solution of a mystery of Being otherwise inexplicable.

During these courses children should have drunk in unconsciously, and without attempt to force it on them, the greater part of the Apostles' Creed. They should, of course, have learned the Creed by heart also. Our desire must be that the Creed should be the expression of their heart's loyalty rather than of bare intellectual assent.

Teaching of the Creed

To believe in God, to believe in Jesus Christ, is a great advance on believing

The third course

that there is a God, or that Jesus Christ is the only begotten Son of God. Such faith is not wrought by man but by the Holy Spirit of God, and our third course is on the Fatherhood of God as revealed to us by the Holy Spirit. It may be urged against this course that it is difficult for the Sunday-school teacher, and quite beyond the sphere of the day-school teacher. But is this so? Are there not chapters in the Epistles, such as 1 Cor. xiii., Romans xii. and xiii., Gal. v., and many like them, which could be taught in Board schools with great advantage to both teacher and scholar? Such chapters do contain the revelation of God in our souls by the Holy Spirit in a very real and profound manner, and yet they are common ground for all professing Christians. The Sunday-school teacher might well add such aspects of Divine mysteries as that of the Incarnation in Hebrews i., of the death and burial of Christ in Romans vi., of His resurrection in 1 Cor. xv., and of His coming again in 1 Thess. iv. Nor would it be out of place, if in the day school advantage were taken of this reference to the Apostles and their teaching, to give a short outline of the history of the Bible itself. The very barest sketch of such a history would be of immense value in depriving the infidel of his favourite weapon, which is to hold God responsible for the sins and errors of those whose lives are recorded in the Word of God. It has always seemed to me a great pity that children are

taught so seldom the simple story of 'How we got our English Bible.'

The fourth year's course

In the treatment of the fourth year's course there will of necessity be a considerable divergence between the day and Sunday schools, though there should be no antagonism. To put the different points of view concisely: the Board school would treat the Acts of the Apostles mainly as the life of St. Paul, to which might be added, to the great delight of children and benefit of teachers, a few lives of great missionaries, or scenes from their lives. Livingstone, Gordon, and other heroes of the Cross would be witnesses to the children that the heroism of the Gospel is not extinct to-day. The Church day school, on the other hand, would teach the same history as Church history, and the story of Augustine, of Chad, and of Boniface, with others like them, would fill in the gaps which the Board school must leave, and would make the witness of the Church continuous to this day. The Sunday school, having only fifty-two hours at its disposal, must be content to take the same course far more briefly, and with a view of presenting from the same, as clearly as possible, the Communion of Saints, the holy brotherhood into which we are enrolled by baptism, its strength, its continuity, and, above all, the demands which it makes on self-denial and self-sacrifice.

You will have felt that, without definitely saying

so, I have assumed all along that children up to the age of thirteen receive their chief Sunday instruction in the Sunday school and not in the church. This is the case, and my reason for doing this must be made apparent before I go further. My great desire has been to secure that the Catechism shall be as effective, as homelike, as great a drawing of children into the fold of the Church as possible. A necessary consequence of this desire is that the numbers of the Catechism should be limited, and yet that it should be a continuous exercise going on Sunday after Sunday without intermission. It should consist of children who are being prepared for Confirmation, and they should remain in it one year, preferably two, possibly even three years, until they know quite thoroughly the course of instruction designed for them. Now there can be no satisfactory combination of the thorough teaching of these boys and girls with catechising of younger children. At one time I thought that such combination might be possible, but I am satisfied that it is not. If you are to do justice to your catechumens, you must give them their own hour, their own course, their own personal and individual attention. If your heart still pleads that children ought to be taught the way to Church, and have some insight into Church worship, and it will plead very strongly for these things in our great city parishes, then there is only one course possible. The

The Sunday school for children up to the age of thirteen

children, after instruction in the Sunday school, must have their Church service, conducted by some other person than the catechist. The most suitable person, if he be a licensed catechist or lay reader, and he should always be so, is the superintendent of the Sunday school. Of course, if some other member of the clerical staff is available for this duty than the curate who has catechised, by all means let him do the work. But no curate who has conducted a Catechism as it ought to be conducted should have a children's service as well. It is impossible that he should do justice to both. I had rather, therefore, that the children's service, where the clerical staff is small, were conducted by a layman. But once a month, at least, the children's Sunday should be the Baptism Sunday, and then the clergyman's presence is a necessity. It should be felt to be a privilege by his superiority to the rest of a well-trained Sunday-school staff in the art of teaching.

Another and far more serious obstacle to the course which I have outlined is that it implies that five different lessons are in course of preparation for each Sunday. This objection is, in the present chaotic condition of religious instruction, an utterly insuperable objection. While we have Sunday-school teachers who cannot teach unless they are 'spoon-fed' with the actual words of their lessons; while we have day-school courses and Sunday-school courses as independent of

Another objection to the course

one another as the orbits of the heavenly bodies—or rather far more independent—it is out of the question that children should receive progressive instruction—that is, in my humble opinion, that they should be taught as they ought to be taught. But I have found it quite useless to endeavour to think out a scheme for the continuation of a system or want of system which, rightly or wrongly, I regard as almost pernicious. I should have wasted your time and my own in any such endeavour. I dare not assume that the solution which I have offered you is the right solution. But its very audacity may perhaps set others to work, who will be more successful than myself. For my own part I am satisfied that in a certain sense our endeavours to give religious instruction have not been successful in proportion to the time and strength spent upon them. I doubt whether there is any country, outside the British Isles, where children receive between four and five hours' religious instruction every week, where the army of teachers, trained and untrained, clerical and lay, is so large—where the intentions and desires to do good are so ardent—and the net result, as judged by the ordinary artisan's or unskilled labourer's attitude to religion, so unsatisfactory. But an examination of our present methods makes the anomalous result less wonderful. The most sacred of all inquiries demands the best of all teachers, and the most patient and systematic of all methods. We need to associate children with

ourselves in the discovery of the greatest of all truths, for revelation does imply that its receiver makes the truth revealed his own by discovery. We need teachers who will associate themselves with the children in that rediscovery. We need not so much to impart facts as to form habits of inquiry, and to encourage dispositions and characters favourable to the reception of the Truth. If God is thrust upon children *ab extra*, the result is to kindle the atheistic tendencies of the human heart—for such tendencies there are—and to awaken the spirit of rebellion against authority. Whereas our desire must be, by the best teachers and best methods at our disposal, to lead children to the foot of the ladder let down from heaven to earth, with the angels of God ascending and descending thereon, and to make them feel that this world of ours is all the work of one Author, and that it is, whether in revelation or in nature, none other than the House of God and the Gate of Heaven.

LECTURE VI

THE CONTINUATION SCHOOL

Continuation schools

CONTINUATION schools, even for secular purposes, have unfortunately not yet taken any strong hold upon national life. In trying to induce people to continue the religious teaching of their childhood, we are confronted not only with religious indifference, but with a deep-rooted national dislike of all serious application to study. As a nation we are amateurs, with an instinctive horror of all professionals, except such as are athletic. It is not surprising, therefore, that the reluctance to learn, save under compulsion, should manifest itself in religion. As long as national character is what it is, we must be prepared for a certain leakage between the Sunday school and the Catechism, and for a further leakage between the Catechism and the Confirmation class, and for the chief difficulty of all—in retaining those who have been confirmed. Remembering this primary obstacle, we shall have, I think, some guidance as to our best attitude towards continuation classes, whether under school boards, schools

of art, or technical schools. Our first impulse is to think that all these schools come between us and our people, just at the very moment when we wish to lay hold of them, and therefore to view such classes with indifference, or even with veiled hostility. But it will be wiser to join hands with those who are trying in their own way to cure a radical defect in national life. Even if the attractions of these schools fight against us for a time, we shall be gainers in the long run, when once an Englishman begins to understand that school-life is only the beginning of his education.

The Catechism and the continuation schools

This is the view which must dominate our treatment of the Catechism. It should not, in my judgment, aim at being complete in itself. It should not be a mere anticipation of the work which has to be done in the Confirmation class. It should be felt to be the introduction to a more serious and systematic study of the Bible. Not that the time has yet come to take any one book and to work systematically through it. But it is time to take our stand upon the threefold summary of the Creed, and to lead children to see Who God is, and what He has done for them. The Father, and the home which He has made for me; the Son, and the deliverance which He has wrought for all mankind and for me; the Holy Spirit, and His dwelling in the Church of God and in me; in fact, the Creed treated carefully, systematically, devotionally, and in living relation to the Bible—this should

be the great work of the Catechism, the Creed as studiously taught, enforced, unfolded, as it is in the ordinary Board school shunned and avoided. Especially we should try to make children feel the atmosphere of intense and living devotion which is so specially characteristic of the first part of the Catechism. We have in the Catechism to deal with children at the age when they are most susceptible of such impressions, and it behoves us to use our opportunity with all diligence. You may depend upon it that they will love the Church, if by God's mercy it becomes to them the place where they first 'got good.' Do not be afraid of the phrase. You will hear it often enough. You will hear it too often of the chapel rather than the church. Remember that there is no attachment like that which hallows all the surroundings of the first awakening of the soul to God. 'Golightly,'[1] says Thomas Mozley, 'was the first man who spoke to me about my soul, and that is a debt which one can never forget.' Precisely the same confession I heard Sir John Conroy make in a diocesan conference with reference to Canon Christopher—two men between whom there was little else in common. You, in Cambridge, with the great traditions which with all his weaknesses attach to Charles Simeon, should never be at a loss to understand what is meant by real personal religion, or by directness in dealing with

The Catechism and its teaching

[1] Mozley's *Reminiscences*, p. 109, Longmans, London, 1882.

souls. The Catechism, while it teaches systematically, methodically, accurately, must above all things be the place where religion becomes to children a living thing, where they learn to know what it is to believe in God.

Passing from the Catechism to the Confirmation class, I cannot escape the feeling that many of you might well have wished that our all too short time had been spent on this one theme. At first I had the same feeling myself, and was not far from laying out my course with this one object. But I was deterred by several considerations, and not least by this—that while I have been engaged in preparing Confirmation classes for thirty years, and in addressing Confirmation candidates for seven, I am still profoundly dissatisfied both with my classes and with my addresses. With the classes especially, the bad habits contracted when I tried to teach without knowing how to teach cling to me still. It seemed more important to warn you against some of my initial errors, than to suggest to you outlines of a course, of which no one could better understand the defects than I could myself. I will only briefly pass in review some of the chief aims of the Confirmation class as I understand them, leaving you to do what, after all, each of us must do for himself, and that is to compose his own manual for Confirmation.

The Confirmation class

But, before I begin, one or two very practical hints

may not be amiss. I will give them as briefly as possible. They are these: Invite to your classes, but do not drive. Where it is possible, grade your classes as carefully as you can, according to their intelligence. Always require each candidate to find out when and where he was baptised; never be content with the mere assertion that they have been baptised, but ask when and where. Have a clear scheme of the work which you mean to do—if possible, a printed analysis—so that those who care to do it can follow your line of thought. Give written work to be done at home; there are very few who cannot do it now, and the written work will often be a most valuable guide as to the earnestness of your candidates. Let your questions lead always to the use of Bibles and Prayer Books, especially at home. Let every class definitely aim at leading candidates to feel the need of being increased in the Holy Spirit. There is no Confirmation subject rightly treated of which this is not the practical conclusion. Let no candidate come to the end of the classes without learning by heart as much as possible of the Confirmation Service, and especially without being able to say what he means by the words 'I do.' Unless your classes meet in church on Sundays, do not mix the sexes; and in the country, as far as possible, hold all classes for girls in the afternoon, and avoid, where you can, the same day for both boys and girls. In the final interview

A few practical hints

which you have with each candidate privately, put this question very seriously and solemnly to each: 'Do you know of any reason why you should not be confirmed?' That one question has led to more fruitful results than any others that I have used. Where it is possible, two private interviews—one halfway through the instruction, and the other at the close—are better than one. Above all, encourage the candidates to pray; if you help them with very brief written or printed prayers, be careful that the prayers are suited to the needs of those to whom you give them. Try to go over in your mind every detail of the Confirmation Service, and explain each, as clearly as possible, to the candidates. At many Confirmations it has been quite obvious to me that the candidates did not even know that they had to kneel before the Bishop, and that they were not prepared for the laying on of hands. These are a few general rules. Excuse me if they seem to be superficial and obvious. I am a slow learner myself, and apt to think that other people will find the same trouble that I have in accumulation of experience.

Now as to the aims of the Confirmation class. The first and most important of all is *conversion*.

Aims of the Confirmation class: Conversion

The Catechism most wisely makes no attempt to probe the feelings. It assumes that children are what their baptism gave them the right to be, and made them, so far as the love of God could do so, without

their conscious co-operation. From this point of view it presents repentance, faith, obedience, and prayer as plain duties growing out of the goodness of God. It makes no direct appeal to the emotions. It deliberately avoids all abstract and perplexing questions. In short it deals with children as children. But the question of the Confirmation Service carries the child into a new world. In substance and form it is indeed only the fourth question of the Catechism with a very slight alteration. But the alteration is as important as it is apparently slight. It challenges the child to speak out his inmost heart before angels and men, or rather before the very throne of God. 'Dost thou, in the presence of God and of this congregation, renew the solemn promise and vow (mark the word *solemn* used here for the first time) made in thy name at thy baptism?' This is a distinct confronting of the child with God; it is the most solemn of all adjurations.

The reason of this new departure is twofold. In the first place it is a recognition of the fact that, in the life most sheltered and most carefully guarded, there comes inevitably a soiling by contact with the world, the beginning at least of a departure from God: and if that be so in the most sheltered homes, what are we to say of childish lives, exposed, as many are, to the furnace of temptation, where Satan's seat is? This is one reason why our Church takes a new tone at Confirmation, being anxious to make it a living

ordinance. The other is, that children are assumed to have come to years of discretion, and to be putting away childish things. Life is no longer purely external. Children are beginning to be self-conscious, to think and reason about themselves. They are acquiring new powers. The half-animal affections of home life are passing into capacity for love, admiration, and worship. These new powers need to be turned Godward, and fortified with grace from above. Therefore, again, Confirmation should be a work of conversion.

But most of all, because Confirmation is the completion of baptism, is conversion its first aim. For the adult who is baptised is of necessity, and *ex hypothesi*, a convert. There never has been, there never could be, any pretence that infant baptism was a sort of back door by which men could gain admission to the Church on cheaper terms, as infants, than as adults. Therefore the Baptism Service speaks plainly of the need of a new birth, and of the power which makes the font the laver of regeneration; it treats the soul as having a direct and vividly conscious relation to God; the baptised repudiates utterly the whole body of sin; he is admitted to fight manfully under the banner of Christ crucified against sin, the world, and the devil. The time when these engagements are seriously considered and embraced *ex animo* may be very rightly termed a time of conversion. In fact I know no better name for it. It is

the dim consciousness of this fact which makes many persons reluctant to be confirmed, and causes many parents to keep back their children from Confirmation. It is far bettter that there should be this hesitation than that Confirmation should be treated as a mere form.

Instruction

2. The next great aim of our classes should be *instruction*: and what shall I say about this, when the variety of attainments among those who present themselves is so very great? Perhaps we feel the difficulty more in Birmingham than elsewhere, because we have been for twenty-seven years without instruction in our Board schools. There are found among our candidates, not infrequently, some to whom the commonest facts in the life of our Lord are unknown; who will hunt for the Book of Genesis in the New Testament, or for St. Matthew in the Old; some whom we must despair of ever instructing to *say* the Catechism. Fortunately they are required only 'to be further instructed' therein. Other candidates, of course, are more or less competently prepared, and the first step is to divide and to grade them. But, when this is done, our difficulties are not over. For you will not be satisfied even with such members of your class as have written you out in careful note-books a well-ordered analysis of your syllabus, if they regard this as the end of their religious education. What you want to do is to inspire them all, the most forward and the most

backward, with a strong desire to carry on their own spiritual education. Your work will not be done till they have acquired a taste for devotional study of the Bible, and have begun to pray in spirit and truth. The short twelve weeks of a Confirmation class will not go far towards achieving such an end as this. Still I think that, at all events with the more educated, five or ten minutes given to showing your candidates what the Bible has to say to them in a passage which they have been asked to read will not be waste of time. Better still if you can persuade them to bring you notes of their own on such a passage as the 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th of St. John. It is just possible that this practice, begun during the Confirmation classes, might induce some to agree to read some part of a book of the Bible each month, and to meet periodically to discuss it. I wish I could suggest to you commentators whom you could safely recommend for this purpose. What would one not give for an English Bengel written to-day in view of modern needs?

Instruction in prayer

As for an instruction in prayer—that is, in the habit of worshipping God, and 'calling at all times diligently upon Him for His special grace that we may serve Him'—there is much to be learned from the reticence of the Catechism, and still more when we compare it with our Lord's reticent response to the appeal, 'Lord, teach us to pray.' It is not difficult to collect 'manuals of devotion,' and out of these to select that which seems most suitable

for those whom we wish to help. But there is grave reason to fear that the books so lent are seldom used. In the clean sweep made at the Reformation of images and pictures, and the determined effort to substitute spiritual for mechanical worship, there perished things useful, things most difficult to restore. Among these was the habit of using churches for purposes of private devotion. It is to be feared that about half of the population of England, if they were disposed to pray, could not secure in their homes the conditions which we find indispensable to prayer—privacy and quiet. I have never been able to trace, save in the rarest instances, anything like family prayer among the poor in towns, nothing at all resembling the devotions of the Russian peasantry, which I described in a former lecture. Our churches are open now, at all events more than they used to be, and they are used for prayer, but still far too infrequently. It is easy to multiply services, and to persuade a certain proportion of our people to attend them; but public worship cannot take the place of private prayer. We must hope that there is more prayer in secret than ever comes to our knowledge; but you will find the inquiries which you make of your Confirmation candidates on this point very, very unsatisfactory. Nor do I think that by simply giving 'manuals of devotion' you will rouse the spirit of faith and intercession. But you may make a great point of the necessity of prayer in your Confirmation instructions, and help

those who continue to place themselves under your guidance, by constant reference to this point. If they ask you for help, a great step has been gained. It is surely significant that our Lord did not teach His disciples to pray till they asked Him to do so.

3. I spoke of *devotion* as the third great end of a Confirmation class. By this I meant the spirit of self-surrender to God, and to the service of His Church. A very important aspect of Confirmation is that it is consecration to the priesthood of the laity. Recall for a moment the symbols that accompanied dedication to the priesthood: the bodies washed with pure water and anointed with holy oil; the sin-offering significant of the duty of intercession; the burnt-offering that told of entire self-surrender; the third victim, whose blood was sprinkled on the ear that was to be open to the voice of God, on the hand and foot that were to be active in His service, and then think of the hand filled with the wave-offering, the token of praise and thanksgiving. Surely, if Confirmation is consecration to the priesthood of the laity, we have here the lines which that dedication is to follow. Remember also the capacity of youth for self-devotion. Through the stolid reserve which is characteristic of Englishmen, through the selfishness too often bred of luxury and early separation from home (for home can teach unselfishness in a way that school cannot), through the icy bonds of fear of ridicule, and of imputations

Devotion

of hypocrisy, the spiritual courage, the ghostly strength of the Comforter will break its way, and lay at the foot of the Cross the life which the Redeemer has saved. But it is ours to convince our learners, so far as we may, that the sacrifice is worth making; that we have found the cause of which we speak worth living for—yes, and worth dying for. Here lies one of the great secrets of spiritual power. He that has the spirit of self-sacrifice, the martyr spirit, alone can inspire the spirit of martyrdom, which is the spirit of Christianity. 'Ye[1] shall be witnesses (martyrs) for Me.'

Practical devotion

Do not imagine that I am speaking of anything impractical, of anything like a call to each member of the Confirmation class to be a missionary, or a clergyman, or even what is ordinarily called a lay worker. What an enormous stride we should have made towards practical Christianity if each Confirmation candidate who passed through our hands became imbued with the idea that his ordinary work was a Divine priesthood to which God had called him; the employer of labour with the idea that he had some greater and more important calling than that of amassing a fortune; the workman with a sense that God took a pride in the work which he did; each and all with the sense that the life of Jesus Christ may be lived out in the conditions of modern life and society!

[1] Acts i. 8.

But, if I am not mistaken, you will find it very difficult to put this spirit of devotion in a very practical form before your Confirmation candidates, either when they are confirmed or afterwards, on account of the specialisation of callings and occupations in modern social life. A clergyman cannot really cover the wide range of knowledge which would enable him to answer the question, 'You tell me to do my duty in the state of life to which it shall please God to call me. Well, what is my duty?' Now there are two ways of answering this question. Our Lord's reply was the parable of the Good Samaritan, a very sufficient reply to those who ask, 'tempting us,' and not really desiring spiritual guidance. John the Baptist's reply was founded on a knowledge of the trials incident to the ordinary life of those who consulted him. But the answer does not lie on the surface now, as it did in the comparatively simple Eastern life of nineteen centuries ago.

Difficulties in the way of inculcating devotion

To help men to a right understanding of their calling, we must know something of that calling. In a dim half-conscious way the world is asking for that help, and in various rough-and-ready ways the Church is trying to answer the call. We have gone so far as to recognise that the modern twenty minutes' sermon addressed to a mixed congregation is a very imperfect answer to the appeal. If we had the time allowed to

Attempts to meet the difficulty

Hugh Latimer for his 'Sermon of the Plough,' we might perhaps use sermons more than we do for purposes of practical guidance. But for the needs of special classes we resort to a variety of organisations, Bible classes, adult schools, mothers' meetings, addresses to business men, and the like, which correspond more or less to Catechisms of perseverance, and which may be regarded as the Continuation Schools of the Church. A further help some clergy have from that which is, under other aspects, a great hindrance to their work—I mean the tendency of certain trades and occupations to settle down in particular neighbourhoods or districts. When this is the case a sympathetic clergyman, who is a diligent visitor by night as well as by day, may learn not a little of the special needs and temptations of those whom God has committed to his care. Otherwise the call to minister to the spiritual troubles of some eight or ten thousand persons of very varied occupations is a call which cannot be answered on the lines of the sufficiency of the parish to meet all the demands which arise within the parish. In what I have to say about Continuation Schools of the Church, I wish to put in a plea for greater specialisation of agencies, and for a little more boldness in organising city work on non-parochial lines. There was wisdom in the mediæval practice which assigned special chapels to special guilds and occupations; this wisdom, at all events, that the practice suggested the consecration

of each particular service or trade to Almighty God. We have parted with this organisation only to find how strong the spirit of union on trade lines may be, as exemplified in the purely secular trade union. Let it not be imagined that I am advocating, if such a thing were possible, the capture of trade unions for the Church. But I desire to plead for a recognition of the fact that each calling has its own trials, temptations, and spirit of camaraderie, and that in ordinary cases the parish organisation is not strong enough to make use of this spirit so as to consecrate the work of each calling to God. Very briefly, then, let me enumerate some of the principal agencies at present in the field, which may be found in most well-worked city parishes, with a view of showing you what they can and cannot do as continuation schools of the Church. You will not blame me, I hope, for confining myself to those which are intended for men, for it is in the field of working men that our difficulties chiefly lie.

Early morning school

Following the lines of the time table, we have, first of all, in the Midlands, the Sunday Early Morning Adult School, an institution which owes its birth to Birmingham and to the Society of Friends. It is undoubtedly a stirring sight to see some hundreds of men at 7.30 A.M. on Sunday mornings standing outside a large Board school, dressed in slightly glorified working clothes, clean shirts, but not black coats, smoking their short

pipes and waiting for the bell to summon them into school. In a very businesslike way they pass the checker at the door and take the brass ticket, which is to prove presently their punctual attendance, and make their way each to his own class, there to wait for the giving out of the hymn and the opening prayer. But, instead of settling, as we might expect them to settle, to study their Bibles, we shall find that the tradition of the early morning school still holds its ground. It is still largely educational, as Sunday schools used to be. Men learn to read and to write, sometimes reading from the Bible, sometimes copying texts, but by no means invariably. Once a month the school closes with a short address from a clergyman or minister, and here and there teachers are found who manage to use the whole time each Sunday for distinctly Bible teaching. In these ways a certain proportion of the men filter through the early morning school to the afternoon Bible class, and even to the Confirmation class. But, so far as I have seen, religion is a subject tenderly and carefully approached in the school, and, for most of the men, the school ending about 9 A.M. is the whole of their Sunday observance. It is whispered even that some of the men return to bed, but for the truth of the whisper I cannot vouch. Under the management of the Friends, the early morning school often does a great work of benevolence and mutual help, and I must repeat that the best teachers have made it, here and there, a distinctively

religious power. But this is not its ordinary reputation. If it were, it is possible that men would view it with more suspicion. It does put a mark on Sunday for working men, and in the Midlands it does so for working men more than any other agency. It cannot yet claim to have consecrated work for God.

The P.S.A.

The Pleasant Sunday Afternoon may be dismissed more briefly. It is sometimes an *alias* for a Bible class, and then what I have to say about men's Bible classes applies to it. But, when it is true to its name, it is a gathering of a social or political character interspersed with hymns, sacred songs, and solos. Prizes being awarded for attendance and for introduction of fresh members, it is very active in the work of winning adherents, and succeeds often in gathering large crowds. But, as a teaching, instructive agency, it has, I fear, very little value. It is rather an accommodation on the part of the Church to the pleasure-seeking spirit of the age. It wants seriousness and backbone.

Men's Bible class

The men's Bible class is a very different institution, though it sometimes disguises itself under the name of its rival. It has, of course, its plentiful share of hymns and its occasional solos. It has often its amateur band, quite as stirring as the bagpipes, and, to an unmusical ear, quite as melodious. It has its prizes, its annual tea-party, its benevolent fund, and other subsidiary agencies which are supposed to keep it together.

But in the hands of a good leader it is a real teaching power. The Bible is in the hands of the men; they read it, and they enjoy a very straight talk about it. In the Midlands, at all events, you cannot be too frank, too outspoken. You cannot be too fearless in inviting questions, or too honest in admitting that you do not know the answer, but will bring one next time. Above all, you will value it for warm friendships which you will form with the pick and flower of the working men who act as secretaries and in other official capacities. It is by far the best Continuation School of the Church that I know. But if you think of the numbers of working men who never come near it, then your heart sinks. Then you feel dissatisfied with the provision which, as a parish clergyman, you are making for the working men of your parish.

Want of provision for business men

But if we are not satisfied with the provision made for our working men, if the number of these whom we reach is as nothing compared with the masses who stand aloof from us, what shall we say as to the hold of the Church on business men, on the professions, and on the men of culture generally? When I speak of the hold of the Church upon them, I am not so much thinking of their attendance at church, or absence from it. I am rather thinking of the practical help which we are able, as clergy, to give them towards a reasoned view of life, such as shall make it a continuous and willing consecration of their powers to

God. Now I am not one of those who blame the ordinary parish clergyman for not being as well read as the most cultured and thoughtful men of the congregation. Ordination does not make a man cultured, nor impart literary tastes, and many a parish priest does very useful work in his day and generation, and commends the Gospel by his life, who can never hope to do the spiritual work, or attain the intellectual gifts, which make a man a leader of thoughtful minds. We do not allow our clergy even the leisure which a Nonconformist minister has for the careful preparation of two sermons a week. All the more is it necessary that we should frankly recognise that the work of the parish priest needs supplementing, and that in all our large towns there should be centralised provision to meet extraordinary and special emergencies. We need in fact a revival of catechetical schools, and the nature of those schools is so well expressed by Dr. Bigg in his Bampton Lectures[1] that I make no apology for here quoting his words:—

The catechetical school

'A large and rich community, existing in the bosom of a great university town, could not long submit to exclusion from the paramount interests of the place. (Dr. Bigg is here referring to the attitude of hostility to pagan teaching which characterised the early days of the Church.) Their prominent young men attended

[1] Bigg's *Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, Oxford, 1886, p. 43.

the lectures of the heathen professors. . . . It was necessary to recognise, and, if possible, to profit by, the growing connection between the church and the lecture room. Hence the catechetical instruction which in their communities continued to be given in an unsystematic way by bishop and priest, had in Alexandria developed about the middle of the (second) century into a regular institution. This was the famous catechetical school. . . . At the outset the student's powers of reasoning and exact observation were strengthened by a thorough course of scientific study embracing philosophy. The writings of all the theological poets, and of all the philosophers, except the godless Epicureans, were studied and expounded. The object of the teacher was no doubt in great part controversial. He endeavoured to prove the need of revelation by dwelling on the contradiction and imperfection of all human systems, or he pointed out how the partial light vouchsafed to Plato or Aristotle was but an earnest of the dayspring from on high. But the attitude of Clement or Origen towards Greek thought was not controversial in any petty or ignoble sense. They looked up to the great master-minds of the Hellenic schools with a generous admiration, and infused the same spirit into their disciples. . . . The characteristic features of the Christian seminary were found in the consistency and power with which virtue was represented as a subject not merely for speculation, but for practice—

in the sympathy and magnetic personal attraction of the teacher—but above all in the theology to which all other subjects were treated as ancillary. It may be doubted whether any nobler scheme of Christian education has been projected than that which we find in actual working in Alexandria at the end of the second century after Christ.'

Dr. Bigg's picture of these catechetical schools is worthy of our most careful consideration. I do not mean, of course, that we can secure in each large town a school of philosophy which shall make the vast field of modern thought and inquiry its own, and treat all as subsidiary to theology. History is of little value if we use it for the reproduction of archaisms. But we see, first of all, similar or not dissimilar conditions: the threatenings of divorce between culture and ordinary theological teaching. We see also that which prevailed outside Alexandria, theological instruction given in an unsystematic way by parish priests who have not time, and have not always gifts, for advanced study. We see further the rapid growth of a demand for higher literary and scientific education. Other cities are following the lead of Birmingham in establishing universities, and that means, in attracting to themselves a strong group of cultured men who must lift up the standard of thought and culture, not only in the university cities, but also in the large towns which lie around them, from which the new univer-

Can they be adopted?

sities must be fed. One cannot avoid asking the question: 'What is our Church doing to meet these new conditions?' What provision is she making to help those who are seekers after truth, to expose mere flippancy and pretence of learning, and to commend the truth and the faith delivered to her keeping to the thought and culture of the day?

Our cathedrals

We have seen, by the examples of St. Paul's and of Westminster Abbey in London, how cathedrals may do something towards providing this strong specialised teaching and preaching, which it is not fair to expect from the ordinary parish priest. We see enough there to make us feel how sorely we lack a really good Cathedral system. For such a work as this is pre-eminently the work of a Cathedral staff, not of a staff which is tied to attend services and to do showman's work in the dreary backwater of a stagnant country town, but a staff in close touch and sympathy with the needs, temptations, and aspirations of city life. It makes one's heart ache sometimes to be shown a Cathedral school; a small grammar school where choristers and a few boys from the country-side receive a secondary education, and occasionally make bold to send out some pupil of exceptional promise to wrestle for a close scholarship at the university. Such schools were well enough when the only educated persons were clergy or hangers-on of the clerical profession. A Cathedral school in these days ought merely to be

something like the Catechetical School of Alexandria, a college affiliated to some modern university, in which canons of real theological and literary attainment supplied instruction to men in training for holy orders, gave lectures worthy of a place on the notice-boards of the university, and preached in the great cathedral of the city. Our Cathedral reform occurred in the very worst age of Church restoration. Revenues, which should have been available for the highest literary and educational service of the Church, were used to supplement parochial incomes. By all means let those incomes be supplemented. I am the last man to quarrel with such work as that. But let them be supplemented from the resources of the laity. Or let us at once do over again the work of the founders of our great Cathedrals. There are three institutions which ought to be the heart and core of higher education in every diocese, with this proviso, that they be where the heart is, in the centre of the human frame. Those three are the Cathedral, the theological college, and the Church training college for teachers. They should be in closest alliance with the University or University college, which in the course of the next twenty years will be a necessary part of the life of all our chief towns. From them should radiate all the educational work which is indispensable to the life of the Church. This work is (1) the continuation and constant perfecting of the instruction of the clergy, which might

without any injury be made a little more systematic. I do not wish to rob you of the joy of looking forward to your priest's examination as the last examination which you will have to face. Nor am I ignorant how difficult it will be for you to find time for reading. But is there any reason why each rural deanery in turn should not be visited by a Canon competent to instruct the clergy, or why the clergy should not be summoned for one week in the year to lay aside their ordinary engagements and receive instruction at some easily accessible centre? Or if this is expecting too much, at least we might hope that regular instruction would be provided for those who were willing to receive it.

Cathedral reform

(2) From the Cathedral staff should proceed the continuation of the theological teaching of the laity. I have before me the scheme of summer readings provided for the Society of Friends, which is not unlike that which is provided in Oxford and Cambridge during vacations for lay readers and others. I have nothing to say against the charms of a week in the long vacation at either University, except that it must needs be the privilege of a favoured few. On the other hand, I think of all the large classes of persons who need teaching which ordinary parish clergy cannot give them: students at local universities; teachers in primary and secondary schools; scholars of secondary schools who have gone into business; or of girls' schools who are at home with a considerable

amount of leisure at their disposal; and, further, business and professional men, such as those who were drawn by the spell of Harnack's lectures on 'What is Christianity?' (3) There is the training of clergy for holy orders which hitherto has the monopoly of the ancient Universities, or of theological colleges for the most part under the shadow of somewhat somnolent cathedrals. The consequence is that we are complaining of a lack of men, and must continue to feel this dearth until our theological colleges are in close touch with grammar schools on the one hand and local universities on the other, and can provide an entrance to holy orders for men of small means without dubbing them as 'literates.' (4) There is the work of training school teachers to give religious instruction, and of training Sunday-school teachers in the art of teaching, for which the close connection of the Day Training College with the other two agencies would be most valuable. How changes are to come about which imply so large an expenditure of money and so much educational enterprise it is not easy to say. But it is worth while to remember that Churchmen have for many years past spent more than a million a year on elementary education. In some form or other that money will no doubt continue to be spent on elementary education. But surely the same zeal applied to the higher education of the Church might do something towards providing the funds without

which the foregoing suggestions must be to a large extent impracticable.

Conclusion

In drawing these lectures to a conclusion—for you will surely say to me, 'Enough of your impracticable dreams'—I cannot but be conscious how far I have fallen short of the aim with which I set out. Yet I have never felt any misgiving as to the real importance of the subject itself, which is simply the necessity which has come upon the Church to confront, and to deal with, an educational revolution. It is not the first time that this necessity has fallen upon her. The same call reached her in the Jewish dispersion after the Babylonian captivity; again, when she went out to conquer the world in the name of Christ; again, in the days of Neo-Platonism; again, in the days of Augustine, of Anselm, and of Aquinas. But most of all her trial came in the age of the Renaissance. Had she shown herself unequal to all that was involved in the discovery, as it might be called, of a new heaven and a new earth; had she not been able to bring forth from the Bible a treasure both old and new, her candlestick must have been removed, and her witness to the nation silenced for ever. But of all the crises which she has passed through, the present is not the least exacting. She is confronted with universal education, for which she has so long pleaded; but the methods of that education are not those which she inherited as a vehicle for

the conveyance of truth, and her educational resources are not equal to the demands made upon them. She has to deal at the same time with a social revolution, the growth of city life, which has dislocated all her ancient resources.

On the other hand, we have that to impart which the world cannot do without. Only we must beware lest we neglect to do justice to our deposit. Such a danger can hardly befall us if we honour little children as our Lord honoured them. For their sakes we are to humble ourselves, and learn from them in their lessons and their play, in order that we may teach them. For their sakes we are to make their surroundings, so far as we can, both at school and at home, eloquent of the love of God. For their sakes we are to watch with special care over the age when childhood passes into manhood, and to arm it for conflict with the trials and temptations of the world. When we can no longer give our scholars all the help they require, we are not to be jealous if they pass to teachers more skilled than ourselves, but to count it all honour to have been allowed to lay a foundation on which others can build. For, after all, it is to that foundation that they will return in earth's moment of greatest need. We shall pass into eternity resting, not on the many things which we *think* we believe, but on the few things which in our heart of hearts we actually believe. Those things are for most of us the lessons of our childhood.

Happy shall we be if, in that hour, the far-off echoes of a loved mother's teaching and prayers, the fragments and texts of a patient teacher's catechising, melt insensibly into that great revelation which will discover to us that the simplest truths were, after all, nearest to the Truth, and that the entrance into the Kingdom of Heaven is through the little children's gate.

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BY

J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON, D.D.

DEAN OF WESTMINSTER

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PREFACE

THE three lectures here printed were delivered in Westminster Abbey on Saturday afternoons in Advent, 1903. I have added to them a sermon preached before the University of Cambridge on the first Sunday after Trinity, 1904, and also some words spoken at the London Diocesan Conference in 1901 in deprecation of a proposal for the re-translation of the Athanasian Creed.

My principal aim has been to assert the high value of the exposition of the Catholic Faith which is offered to us in this great Confession, and to distinguish between that exposition and the guarding clauses which accompany it. When the Confession was compiled in the fifth or sixth century, the exposition contained nothing that was new, for all its great phrases were well tested and familiar. What was new was the language in which the extreme malediction of God was denounced upon all who do not keep the Faith thus set forth. I have indicated my desire to preserve the exposition for the instruction of the members of our Church, and to release it from the guarding clauses which at present so gravely discredit it.

Since these lectures were delivered, a remarkable

statement has been drawn up by the Bishops of the Southern Convocation, sitting in committee of the whole House. While reaffirming their belief in the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation as set forth in this creed, and recognising that its guarding clauses were intended to express the conviction that a man is responsible in the sight of God for the faith which he holds, they proceed to declare "that in their *prima facie* meaning, and in the minds of many who hear them, those clauses convey a more unqualified statement than Scripture warrants, and one which is not consonant with the language of the greatest teachers of the Church."[1] Whether this utterance will be confirmed and promulgated in the name of the entire episcopate of England remains to be seen: but as an expression of opinion it is gravely important in its bearing on the present situation. For in a large number of churches this creed is now only used in deference to the express requirement of the Bishop, and we can hardly suppose that a Bishop will continue to insist upon the repetition by an unwilling clergyman of words which in their *prima facie* sense are not fully warranted by Holy Scripture. Even if he should feel justified in the interest of Church order in doing so for a time, he will stand pledged to secure some release from so intolerable a situation at the earliest possible moment.

If it be asked what change might advantageously be sought by way of legislation, I would venture to

[1] *Chronicle of Convocation of Canterbury*, 1904, No. 391.

lay stress on two important considerations. First, it is desirable that, if possible, the Church should maintain for the purposes of instruction the strictly credal portion of this Confession of Faith. Secondly, it should be made plain that the Church insists no less firmly than hitherto on the responsibility of the individual for the faith which he holds.

With these considerations in view I would suggest (1) that those portions of the Athanasian Creed which declare "the Catholick Faith" in regard to the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation of our Lord be set forth in the Form which I have given in the Appendix; and (2) that a Note be drawn up stating that whereas when this Confession of our Faith was first set forth it contained certain clauses intended to assert the necessity of a right belief for all who would be saved, and whereas the terms in which this necessity was declared have been a stumbling-block to many members of the Church, it has been thought good to set forth anew, without these clauses, but otherwise unchanged, the Catholick Faith concerning the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation, as most necessary to be believed of every Christian man to his soul's health. If this Form were adopted and followed by such a Note as is suggested, the present Rubric as to recitation might be retained; or it might be so altered as to direct that the new Form be used on certain days, not instead of the Apostles' Creed, but in the place of the Anthem.

As time must needs elapse before this or any

legislative change could be made, it is necessary to say something as to the possibility of a relief to conscience in the meanwhile. I have expressed the belief (p. 65) that "when a rubrical direction has from some reasonable cause become an intolerable burden to conscience, and yet for the time legislation cannot be had in relief, the true ecclesiastical remedy lies in dispensation, and it is the function of the Ordinary to intervene."

It may perhaps be held from the legal point of view that the function of the Ordinary is to see that the services are conducted in accordance with the rubrics, and that, except where it is expressly laid down that he shall use his discretion, he has power to bind but not to loose. Without entering upon a general discussion of the limits of the power of dispensation in the Church of England, I would venture to offer some considerations which bear on the particular matter now before us, craving indulgence for any want of legal precision in the use of terms. It may be observed that the performance of an ecclesiastical act in the Church of England has two kinds of sanction: (1) the pains and penalties attached to a breach of observance by legal enactment; and (2) the censure which follows disobedience to a spiritual superior. This may be illustrated by the direction of the Prayer Book as to daily Morning and Evening Prayer. This direction had come to be regarded as obsolete by the great majority of the English clergy. No legal penalties were likely to be inflicted for the breach of it. But

at the present time it has been enforced again, in many churches in which it would not otherwise be observed, owing to a direct episcopal request which the clergy are unwilling to disregard. This illustrates the practical power of the Ordinary, where law is quiescent. The second sanction avails, though the first is not applied.

In the case of the Athanasian Creed it is almost inconceivable that legal pains and penalties would now be inflicted upon clergymen who refused to recite it. The public conscience would revolt against prosecutions to enforce the recitation. Here, then, law is quiescent; and the second sanction, the requirement of the spiritual superior, alone secures obedience in many instances in which a strong conscientious objection is felt. The withdrawal of the insistence of the Bishop would in such cases be an implicit dispensation.

The principle which I have been endeavouring to state is that in cases where the law is (as I have termed it) quiescent, dispensation, whether explicit or implicit, may at the discretion of the Ordinary rightly be used to release distressed consciences from the second of the two sanctions, so as to remove the sense of disobedience to the living spiritual authority. It is not hereby claimed that the dispensation of the Ordinary should release from legal consequences, if the law should at any time cease to be quiescent and reassert its demand for obedience to the direction in question. Only those cases are at present in view in which the public interest

appears not to require a strict enforcement of a rubrical direction by legal penalties. The principle seems to me to be of importance, and to be capable of application to several matters in which for various reasons the letter of ancient rubrics has come in course of time to be no longer insisted upon by the law, and yet as being the Church's requirement may press upon consciences unless they are relieved by dispensation.

In conclusion, I would say that I am in complete sympathy with those who feel that the warning voice of the Church needs to be heard as loudly now as at any time in the past: but the warning to be effective must be such as appeals to men's consciences as truthful. The warning clauses of the Athanasian Creed do not so appeal to the consciences of the majority of Englishmen ; and for this reason they are not only ineffective, but even perilous.

WESTMINSTER ABBEY
January, 1905

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE ATHANASIAN CREED

I

THE venerable document which we are accustomed to call the Athanasian Creed enshrines and safeguards a series of doctrinal statements which it speaks of as "the Catholick Faith." It is important to distinguish from the outset between these doctrinal statements and the surrounding clauses by which they are protected; between what I may call the picture itself and the frame in which it is set for its safe-keeping. The frame is rude and strong, the product of a rough age, which valued ascertained truth but had no mind for further speculation. There is no doubt that in the present day the frame does grave injustice to the picture; so much, indeed, that most observers hardly see the picture at all in their preoccupation with the frame. I propose in my first two lectures to unframe the picture

and ask you to consider it on its merits, and in my third lecture to come back to the consideration of the frame.

The document opens, as you well know, with the words, "Whosoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholick Faith: which Faith except every one do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly."

That is part of what I have called the frame: what is the picture which it protects? The document proceeds to tell us: "And the Catholick Faith is this." Then follows, in language of remarkable lucidity, a statement concerning the Holy Trinity followed by a statement concerning the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ. At the close we come upon the frame once more: "This is the Catholick Faith: which except a man believe faithfully, he cannot be saved." It is the Catholic Faith, then, in regard to the being of God and of Christ, that I ask you to consider now, leaving the guarding clauses till our third lecture.

Before we enter into particulars it will be useful to go back in thought to the Apostolic time and to ask, What was the earliest demand in this matter of faith from those who desired to be saved? We may recall a few familiar passages: "What must I do to be saved? . . .

Believe on the Lord Jesus, and thou shalt be saved." Or, again: "If thou shalt confess the word with thy mouth that Jesus is Lord, and shalt believe in thy heart that God raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved." Moreover, we read in many passages of the Acts of the Apostles, that those who believed at once gave expression to their faith by being baptised "in the name of the Lord Jesus." And St. Paul says: "No man can say Jesus is Lord, but by the Holy Ghost."

"Jesus is Lord." "Believe in the Lord Jesus." These simple formulas summed up the whole matter. This is our first sight of the stream which, as it flows ever onward, becomes at last the broad and deep river of "the Catholick Faith." Many persons at the present time are exceedingly impatient of elaborated formulas, and desire to send us back to the most elementary statements of Christian truth, ignoring the whole process of their subsequent development. You may as well try to force the oak back into the acorn. The Divine revelation is a living thing: it is a seed which grows as soon as it is planted in a congenial soil, and which cannot but grow in accordance with a law contained within itself. The formula, "Jesus is Lord," held within it the future creed of the Church. It could not be wholly understood until the questions were asked and the answers

were given which led to the careful formulation of the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

There is indeed but one escape of a rational and intelligible kind from the result of this process of development. It is to declare, as some eminent scholars abroad are now declaring, that the true substance of Christianity consists solely in the recorded words of Jesus Christ as we find them generally in the first three Gospels, and to regard the whole of the teaching of St. Paul and St. John about the Person of our Lord as a subtle corruption which began in the very first age to mar the simplicity of the original Gospel. The religion thus defined and limited includes the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God and the duty of universal love; but it excludes the Trinity and the Incarnation, and the Atonement made between God and man through the death and resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ. It rejects the formula "Jesus is Lord"—at any rate, in the full Pauline sense of the words: and rejecting the seed, it can logically ignore the whole of its subsequent growth.

Here I am not concerned to examine this view. It is enough now to say that the Christianity which does not concern itself primarily with the Person of Christ, which can reject the formula "Jesus is Lord," is not the Christianity of the

great teachers of the Apostolic age; it is not the Christianity of the martyrs; it is not the Christianity which conquered the persecuting heathen world.

I come back to this formula, "Jesus is Lord," and ask you to think of its meaning in the light of St. Paul's epistles. "The Lord" was the title which the Jew was accustomed to use in order to avoid the necessity of pronouncing the unutterable name of the Divine Being, when he read his ancient Scriptures. It was his ordinary equivalent for the word which we call "Jehovah," and which occurs nearly seven thousand times in the Old Testament. St. Paul knew full well what he was doing when he applied this title to Christ. He declared that God had given to the risen and exalted Jesus "the Name which is above every name"—that is, the name of "Lord"; and that, as Jehovah had said, "To Me every knee shall bow," so it was ordained that to Jesus "every knee should bow, and every tongue should confess that Jesus is Lord"—not indeed to the depreciation of the one true God, but on the contrary "to the glory of God the Father."

Remember that St. Paul was a Jew, and that Judaism stood for absolute monotheism; for the truth that God is One, and that He is a jealous God who can brook no rival. St. Paul was a Jew, a most learned and most devout Jew, who

had inherited the Jewish doctrine of monotheism, and could as soon have parted with his life as with that supreme truth. Yet it is St. Paul who applies the title and dignity of the Jehovah of the Old Testament to Jesus. He can now say, "Jesus is Lord," and say it "to the glory of God," who is revealed through Jesus Christ His Son under the new name of "the Father."

Nor was this the whole of the mystery concerning the Being of God which was implied by the teaching of St. Paul. Jesus had promised the coming of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit is the Spirit of God; sometimes called the Spirit of the Father, and sometimes the Spirit of Christ; not an influence, but a Spirit, a Divine Agent. For just as St. Paul speaks of our being "in Christ" and of Christ dwelling in us, so he can speak of our living and walking "in the Spirit," and of the Spirit dwelling in us. The Spirit, too, he speaks of as "the Lord." So that the Father is Lord, and the Son is Lord, and the Holy Spirit is Lord; and yet with St. Paul (who would deny it?) there is but one Lord. St. Paul does not attempt a logical explanation of any kind. He simply records and enforces what were to him the facts of spiritual experience.

From St. Paul we might turn, if time allowed, to St. John, who by an independent spiritual experience reached the same results; exalting in

equal terms Father, Son, and Spirit as Divine Persons, and yet never for a moment supposing, Jew as he too was, that he was dividing the eternal unity of God. But at present we may content ourselves with the witness of St. Paul.

What I have said may help you to understand why St. Paul should declare in so emphatic a manner, "No man can say Jesus is Lord, but by the Holy Spirit." Without a spiritual experience to justify it, no man could attain to a conviction of so marvellous a truth. The formula involved so much: to utter it sincerely, to be baptised in the name of the Lord Jesus, and to live accordingly —this was indeed to be a Christian.

At this point a question will arise in the minds of many who have followed me thus far, which I may put into some such words as these: If the formula "Jesus is Lord" implies so much, if baptism "in the name of the Lord Jesus" is spiritually undistinguishable from baptism "in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost," as it clearly was in the most primitive days, then why should we not be content with so simple a statement of the faith? Why should we not fall back upon this, and eschew the later amplifications, especially when they aim at such a rigorous precision as we find in the doctrinal clauses of the Athanasian Creed? Is not the language which meets us there an unwarrantable

intrusion into the mysteriousness of Divine things; a claim to a knowledge which man cannot truly and certainly have; a parcelling out of the infinite and incomprehensible; and a presentation of human speculations as if they were necessary Divine truth? Is it really needful, or even justifiable, to enter into these minute distinctions? Why may we not be satisfied with words of Holy Scripture, or, at least, with the Apostles' Creed and its simple phrases grouped under the three great heads—"I believe in God the Father," and "in Jesus Christ His only Son our Lord," and "I believe in the Holy Ghost"?

First, I would say: Do you think that you can stop people asking such a question as this: If God Almighty have a Son, is His Son God, as truly as He is God? and, if so, are there, or are there not, two Gods? A child can ask a question like that—could you stop men from asking it, especially men of those early days, who were so terribly in earnest that they cheerfully faced death itself rather than offer a few grains of incense to a false god, and rather than renounce their allegiance to Jesus Christ as the Divine Lord of their lives? This question and similar questions were bound to come, and the Christian Church could not escape the necessity of thinking out the various suggested answers and discriminating between them.

Possibly, if Christianity had remained with the Jew and with the kindred Semitic peoples, the strain of such questioning might not have been so intense; for Eastern minds might have accepted the mystery on the ground of spiritual experience, as it came to them, for example, from hereditary monotheists akin to themselves like St. Paul and St. John. But, as a matter of fact, Christianity at once moved westward and entered a new domain of human thought. The Hebrew set the problem to the Greek and Latin world. In that keener intellectual atmosphere questions could not be hushed. The silent contemplation of insoluble mystery was not in accordance with the natural genius of the Western mind; and to the men of the West the Church had come, to make her home with them. There was no looking back. It was vain to sigh, "My own East, how nearer God we were!" The seed was planted in a new soil, and if it was not to perish utterly it must necessarily grow.

A problem then, or rather a whole group of problems, was of necessity propounded by the Apostolic teaching as to the new revelation of God in Jesus Christ. As that teaching passed from Jews to Greeks, it was inevitable that discussion should arise as to the manner in which it should be intellectually conceived. The mind of the Western world had been providentially

trained for the task which was thus set to it. It showed no reluctance to enter upon its task ; and the history of the earlier centuries of Christianity is largely made up of eager and conflicting endeavours to explain and systematise the teaching of the New Testament as to the Being of God and the Incarnation of Jesus Christ. One great teacher after another thought that he had found a solution of the problem, or of some part of it : he believed that he had discovered words in which it could be reasonably expressed. But definitions are always limitations ; and when we are speaking of the infinite and immeasurable Being of God, we become narrow and limited in proportion as we become precise.

Accordingly, the chief part which the Church was called to play all through this period consisted in the refusal of these limiting definitions and narrowing explanations. Her duty was to insist on the fulness of the mysterious teaching which had been committed to her trust. As regards the Person of the Lord Jesus Christ, she proclaimed that He was *at once God and man*, *perfect God and perfect man*. Any explanation, however tempting by its apparent simplicity, that implied that He was not completely God must be rejected : and likewise any explanation that implied that He was not completely man. So again, as regards the Three Divine Persons she said :

Their Godhead is one, Their glory is equal, Their majesty is co-eternal: *The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God; and yet they are not three Gods, but one God.*

That was what she had received from the Apostles: no explanation that limited the Godhead of any of the Three Persons could be listened to. It might seem to solve a difficulty here or there, but it limited the truth which she had received and which she lived by. That truth in its fulness she knew and had proved by experience. She could not indeed explain it so as to remove its intellectual difficulty. But she knew that, though itself inexplicable, it explained what could not be explained without it. It justified itself in experience, and she clung to it as to her very life.

This is the history in general of what is called heresy, in contradistinction to what is called the Catholic truth. The heresy—and we will not be too hard on heresy: heresies, it has been said, arise from the wish to understand, and, we may add, from the desire to explain — the heresy offered an explanation of some special difficulty as to the two natures in Christ, or as to the three Persons in the Godhead. The Catholic truth refused the explanation, because it degraded one element or the other in Christ, or because it dishonoured one or other of the Persons of the Trinity.

So it came about that the Church was always saying "No" to the keen minds who evolved subtle explanations and thought they were solving the mystery. One party said: Christ is wholly God, and only in appearance man: that is the solution: that is conceivable, whereas your doctrine is inconceivable. No, said the Church: He is perfect God and perfect man; for, if He be not truly man, His temptations and His sufferings were not real, and so His life and His death could be no help to us. Another said: Christ is truly man; but a man peculiarly inspired by God, so as to be in a unique sense the Son of God: that is a conceivable view, yours is inconceivable. No, said the Church: He is perfect God and perfect man: otherwise it is a demi-god whom we are worshipping, and that were blasphemy.

And so with the truth of the Trinity. Some said: We cannot conceive of three Persons as being one God: we can conceive of one God as manifesting Himself in different modes; so that seen as it were from one side He is Father, from another Son, and from another Holy Ghost; these are but external aspects, or modes of activity, of one Divine Person. No, said the Church: there are three Divine Persons, and yet there is but one God. Another said: If Christ is the Son of God, then He is later in being than God the

Father, as every son is later in being than his father: in other words, "there was once when He was not." No, said the Church; for then He would not have the eternity of God: the Father is eternal, and the Son is eternal; there is no before and after in God.

And so it went on; always a new explanation was suggested, and the great theologians of the Church had to show that the explanation limited the truth, and that the whole mystery must be accepted as alone worthy of the nature of God.

At last, when all the most obvious questions had been asked, and all the most tempting explanations had been offered in response, and had been sternly set aside as limiting the truth and as fertile in new difficulties if pressed to their logical conclusions; then came the time for summing up the results of all these controversies, and setting out in clear language such statements as should guard the future from the errors of the past. For Western Europe this was done in the great Hymn of the Catholic Faith which is now before us. There the old mystery is stated in the plainest terms, involving the sharpest antitheses. Not a phrase that is used is new; each phrase has been tested in the long fight, and has been found needful to protect some portion of the truth. Almost every sentence is the tombstone of a buried error. All the subtle explana-

tions are ruled out: the mystery remains mysterious: God is Three, and God is One; Christ is God, and Christ is man.

It is for this that the Church of to-day has to thank the Church of the first five centuries. They refused to limit the truth: they passed it on with all its inconceivable wonder, as the truth by which they lived, as the light by which they saw, as justified by an ever-accumulating witness of Christian experience. These early fathers were the champions of the integrity of the revelation which came to man through Christ. They would not give up a portion of it because it was difficult to reconcile with the rest. For they recognised that when we try to think of the nature of the Godhead we come up against the inconceivable. God is more than we can measure: God is outside our definitions: God is unlimited, and we can only understand the limited.

The mystery wakens wonder; and wonder is not only, as Plato said, the beginning of philosophy, it is also an indispensable element of worship. Worship has even been described as transcendent wonder. A religion without mystery would not meet the need of our yearning spirits. There must be more to know than we can know here and now. It is by wonder that we advance in knowledge: and wonder is itself a promise.

The wondering child has the light of the future in his eyes. There is an old saying recently brought to light in a fuller form—a saying attributed in early times to Christ Himself, apocryphal indeed, and yet not wholly unworthy to have fallen from His lips: "Let not him that seeketh cease from his search until he find; and when he findeth he shall wonder; wondering, he shall reach the kingdom; and when he reacheth the kingdom he shall have rest."

II

IN my former lecture I attempted to show that the message of the Apostles, based on what they had themselves seen of Jesus Christ and heard from His lips, and also on the facts of their subsequent spiritual experience after He had ascended into heaven, contained elements of startling antithesis, and set a problem of thought to the Western mind as soon as Christianity was accepted by it. "Jesus is Lord" was the formula which first summed up the message; and this formula involved the mystery of the relation between Christ and the Father, and also of the relation between Christ and man. The Apostolic teaching both of St. Paul and of St. John recognised the personal existence and operation of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, while at the same time it everywhere maintained the unity of God. So, too, it recognised the true divinity and also the true humanity of Jesus Christ. Such seeming contradictions necessarily awoke a host of eager questions, and the answers offered by way of explanation were constantly found to limit the

fulness of the truth on one side or the other. The Church's task was to refuse such limitations, and to hand down unimpaired the mysterious wonder of that revelation which she had received from the Apostles, and had tested by the most strenuous experience of life.

It was not that the Church refused to think upon the mystery, or to listen to questionings. Her great teachers, Tertullian, Origen, Athanasius, Augustine, were the strongest intellects of their times. They faced the problems eagerly, and allowed themselves great freedom of speculation. They offered important hints and suggestions in illustration of the Catholic Faith; they showed its reasonable claim on human minds. But they would not abandon a portion of it in the hope of making the rest more easily intelligible. They upheld the mystery of the Three in One, and the mystery of the God-man. Mysterious as the teaching was, it was the deposit which had been handed to their keeping, and it was the very foundation of their spiritual life.

During some four or five centuries all the chief questions which the mysterious truth suggested had been eagerly discussed. Gradually it had become clear that certain assertions must be made to safeguard the integrity of the teaching, and that certain suggested modifications must be refused as being wholly inconsistent with that

integrity. For the Latin world the work of interpretation which Tertullian had begun was completed by St. Augustine; and the Christian phraseology in regard to the Trinity and the Incarnation became definitely fixed. It was the work of the fifth and sixth centuries to make these tested phrases current coin, and that work was mainly accomplished in Southern Gaul, and by the great preachers who sprang from the monastery of Lerins, a small island on the south coast of France.

It was a period of exceptional anxiety. The barbarians were pressing in upon the Latin civilisation. The lamp of knowledge was to burn low in the coming centuries. New races had to be trained and disciplined for Christ, and the missionary task was to leave small space for new intellectual efforts. It was well that the main work of thinking had been accomplished, and that it was just now possible to sum up its results in terms which would secure the fundamental truths. The Catholic Faith could now be stated in well-tested phrases, which should hand down the mystery intact to the next period of active thought.

It is this statement of the Catholic Faith which we have before us in the splendid hymn which sprang into existence at this critical period. I ask you now to look at it, and to underline with

me some of its most notable phrases. And first I would have you observe the word *worship:* "The Catholick Faith is this: that we worship . . ." The word marks the attitude of the Church towards the deep mystery of the Faith. It seems to say at the outset: We cannot wholly understand these things: for they are in their nature higher than the sphere in which we live and think as mortal men. We must look up to them: our true attitude is the upraised face of adoring wonder. "The Catholick Faith is this: that we *worship* one God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity." And lest you should think that I lay an undue stress on a single word, look again at the middle of the hymn, where the first portion reaches its close: "So that in all things, as is aforesaid, the Unity in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity is to be *worshipped.*"

The heart of this first section is to be found in words which I have quoted several times already: "So the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God; and yet they are not three Gods, but one God." All that precedes or follows is but commentary on this central statement. It is this which is more elaborately expressed at the outset by the words, "One God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity; neither confounding the Persons nor dividing the Substance." "The Persons" is the term by which we try to express the distinct-

ness of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit: "the Substance," or Essence, is the Godhead which They have in common. These are the words which the long experience of centuries has chosen as conveying the most of truth and the least of misconception which human words can convey in such a subject as this. The One-ness in the Three-ness and the Three-ness in the One-ness is to be reverently recognised, if it cannot be adequately explained. We may not confuse the Persons, and we may not break up the one essence or existence of the Godhead.

The words which follow are, for the most part, so plain that no comment can make them clearer. There is one, however, which is sometimes challenged as an incorrect translation of the original Latin. "Incomprehensible" means not to be comprehended within any conceivable limits. The Latin word is *immensus*, or "immeasurable." When we apply such a word to ideas which are beyond space or time it loses its material reference. The thought which it here expresses is that God is absolutely unlimited. When we have said the highest and the deepest that we know of God, immeasurably higher and immeasurably deeper is the undefinable and unutterable Godhead itself. The "incomprehensible" is not the same as the "unknowable," though the words are often confused in popular speech. We

may know, at least in some limited degree, that which we cannot in a strict sense comprehend. It is this thought surely that Browning must be uttering in the words:

> Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp,
> Or what's a heaven for?

I do not, therefore, quarrel with the translation "incomprehensible." What other word should we prefer? We want something more than "immeasurable," which at once suggests the measures of time or space. We want something clearer than the word "infinite," though that is used for the same Latin word in the *Te Deum* ("the Father of an infinite majesty"): for "infinite" means to most of us little more than indefinitely large. We want to say that the Godhead is beyond the measures of our minds, that it cannot be comprehended or grasped by our limited faculties. We can reach out and touch, as it were, what we cannot grasp in its completeness. We can apprehend, as some have said, what we cannot comprehend.

In speaking of God as the Incomprehensible, we are asserting a great truth, which is needed to deepen our awe and to aid our worship. We are apt to be superficial in our thought and speech about God, and to produce in others the impression that we have an exactitude of knowledge

which serious thinkers feel to be inconsistent with the mysteriousness of the Divine Being. The natural reaction from this irreverent temper of our minds is seen in such a form of belief as has been expressed by that remarkable man whose long and strenuous life has just reached its close.

Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his systematic survey of all objects of knowledge or of thought, was led to postulate an "Unknown Reality" as the First Cause of all phenomena. He firmly believed, if I understand his position aright, in the existence of this ultimate Cause; but he believed also that it lay beyond our knowledge, and so he named it "the Unknowable." He differed from us in his inability to believe that the First Cause had chosen to reveal itself under conditions which rendered some measure of human knowledge possible. We hold that God, who in many portions and in many fashions spoke to men of old, at last revealed Himself yet more manifestly in His Son, that so we might learn some necessary lessons of His Being and His Character. But even so, we do not imagine that the whole Being of God can be comprehended by the mind of man. The very revelation which has been given to us in Christ is full of mysterious difficulties. We know something indeed, but we cannot comprehend; the thing is beyond us. It is too large

for our minds to measure. To us God is not indeed the Unknowable; but yet he is the Incomprehensible. Our common thoughts about God are so utterly unworthy of the "incomprehensible majesty," that we owe a spiritual debt to those earnest seekers after truth who are revolted by our superficiality and easy knowledge, and plunge at any cost into the deep again, determined to assert no more than they can strictly prove. Unconsciously they offer us a gift—at how great a sacrifice we cannot measure—for they teach us, if we will but learn, a new lesson of the greatness and the mystery of the Being whom we worship. We have been ourselves largely to blame if they have isolated this lesson from other lessons which we believe that we have learned.

I have digressed; but you will forgive the digression. For your thoughts must in any case have gone out to that bold and upright English thinker who strove to present the unity of all human knowledge, and whose insistence on the great principle of evolution has profoundly, if sometimes only indirectly, influenced the thoughts of the men of science and of philosophy, of the historians, and not least of the theologians of our time. He saw not the truth as we think we see it; but he devoted his life to the search for truth; and we have been taught that the search for truth is never unrewarded. If we cannot,

perhaps, know that through his "honest doubt," as Tennyson speaks—

> he came at length
> To find a stronger faith his own,

yet we may trust that the Father of incomprehensible majesty, who is also the Father of all mercies, did not forsake His child;

> And Power was with him in the night,
> Which makes the darkness and the light,
> And dwells not in the light alone.*

I return now to the thought of that mysteriousness of the faith which the Church protected against those partial and misleading explanations which were inconsistent with the integrity of the teaching which she had received. It must not be inferred from what I have said on this point that the Church discouraged reverent speculation upon the profound mystery of the Holy Trinity. On the contrary, the early fathers offered many suggestions by way of commending it to intelligent minds. Some of them were crude suggestions, fanciful analogies, which were challenged by other writers and dismissed as perilous or unhelpful. Others were pregnant suggestions, pointing to the necessity of such a teaching, if the Being of God is to be a vivid reality to our minds. But the Church's care has always been to insist on two

* *In Memoriam*, xcvi. Mr. H. Spencer had died shortly before this lecture was given.

things. First, that no suggestion should be allowed to pass into current teaching which tended to lessen the mystery by narrowing the truth. And secondly, that even the most helpful suggestions should not be lifted into articles of faith; for these suggestions have often been the product of the special mode of thinking of a particular period, and they have ceased to be helpful when that mode of thinking has passed away.

What has been done in this way of suggestion in the past may rightly be done with modesty and reverence to-day. Without pretending to offer proof of such a doctrine as that of the Holy Trinity, we may pave the way towards a position from which we may catch some glimpses of the truth, and understand to some extent how it harmonises with what we learn from our own life. In two directions it appears to me that the characteristic thoughts of our time assist us towards an intelligible view of this great mystery of the inner life of God.

1. The first aid comes from the teachings of natural science. The past half-century has been a period of unexampled advance in our knowledge of that strange force which in plants and animals alike we call by the name of *life*. We have learnt much of what life can do, what development it may attain, what a wonderful course it has run. We have learnt to describe it in its manifestations by

Mr. Herbert Spencer's phrases of adaptation to environment, or the continual adjustment of internal relations to external relations. But what is it in itself, and what is its origin? We can trace it where once we did not suspect its existence; we can watch its ordered advance, in accordance with laws which are partly known and partly conjectured, as it climbs the ladder of evolution from the lowest slime to the perfected man. But what life is remains a mystery. We cannot find a real beginning of it; all the life we know is from an antecedent life. We cannot make it where it was not before; we cannot find a bridge to pass from mere mechanical force to vital force. Ultimately life is a mystery, insoluble so far as we can tell.

More than this: as life rises in the scale of evolution, we observe that it becomes more complex. The lowest is the simplest in its activities; the highest offers the strangest variety in unity. Look at man, with his physical vitality and his intellectual vitality—each capable of acting on the other with astonishing effects. Think, moreover, of his self-consciousness; and of his power of checking his desires by his will; and of his capacity for unbounded, even self-sacrificing, love. Think of his imagination and his aspiration, of his powers of faith and hope. His faculties—classify them as you will, bodily, mental, spiritual—so different and yet shading off so imperceptibly

one into the other, are all combined and harmonised in the mysterious unity of a human life. There is a variety in unity, which we could never have anticipated from observing life in its lower forms. It is only our own human experience that enables us to recognise it: and, even so, we are unable to explain it.

What I desire to bring out is this: First, that all life is mysterious, and though we may learn much about its processes and laws, it must, so far as we can see, remain mysterious in itself. Surely this helps us as we approach the mysteriousness of the Divine life. And secondly, that the higher in the scale of life we look, the more marvellous is its complexity without loss of unity. May not this thought help us, as we are confronted with the revelation of a most marvellous complexity within the Unity of the Divine Being? I do not at all wish to urge, as some have urged, that there is a trinity of elements in man which lends support to a belief in the Trinity of Persons in God. I do not press my argument beyond what I think you will allow to be a legitimate conclusion. My point is simply this: just as when we come as high as man in the scale of life we find his being more complex than anything we have observed before, so, if we are to think of the life of God at all, we must expect to find in it a yet more wonderful complexity—a com-

plexity which we cannot hope to comprehend, because we can only think of it and speak of it in terms which are drawn from our own limited experience. If then we ought to expect such higher complexity, it cannot be denied that it is offered to us in no grudging measure by the Christian revelation of Three Divine Persons in One Divine Being. It is beyond our experience, which is limited to human life and to as much of the Divine as can be rendered intelligible through human life. But if we are ready to admit of a life which is higher than our human life, we have no cause to deny, we have every reason to believe, that this higher life will contain a more marvellous variety in unity than our own.

2. I pass on to say a few words in regard to a further aid which comes to us to-day from another branch of human inquiry, namely, the investigations of philosophy. I speak, as before, with no claim to special knowledge more than any intelligent onlooker may have: and I use popular language at the risk of offending the expert. One of the questions which chiefly exercises philosophic thought at the present time is the meaning of personality. What at bottom do you mean when you speak of yourself as a person? We are apt to say offhand that a person is one who is conscious of a separate existence of his own, who knows that he is *not* someone or some-

thing else. But we are warned that this negative mode of definition takes us but a little way. It over-emphasises our separateness, or independence, which is largely illusory.

Let us try, then, for a more positive description of what a person is. One who wills is a person; one who knows is a person; one who loves is a person. But if willing and knowing and loving are spoken of in connection with a person, we imply that there is something on which his will can act, something of which he can have knowledge, something which he can love. Thus we begin to feel that a person cannot be conceived of in isolation; that for his personality to realise itself at all there must be something besides himself.

And, yet further: will at its highest is manifested in its effect on another will; knowledge at its highest is knowledge of persons; love is scarcely more than a metaphor unless the object of love is a person. This last point is the clearest from our own experience. You cannot love a bird, or a dog, quite as you can love a human being. Perhaps you cannot love it at all, except in so far as you attribute personality to it. But in any case it is not on your level of personality; it is not adequate to receive and to return the whole gift of your love.

Now to us the idea of a Personal God includes

at least those elements of personality which we know so well by our experience—will, wisdom, love. Consider in particular the last of these, so strongly emphasised by St. John that he declares twice over, not merely that God loves, but that "God is love." In eternity, let us reverently ask, what does God love? or rather, since love at its highest loves a person, and a person adequate to receive and return the love, In eternity whom does God love? Can we escape from saying, A Person eternal as Himself? for otherwise His love would not be eternal: a Person adequate to receive and return love at its highest: an eternal Person, therefore, not less than God. And here the Christian revelation meets us with the declaration that the Father loveth the Son, and the Son loveth the Father. "Love is not love," it was said long ago in this connection, "if there be no beloved." God is eternally Love: there is an eternal Beloved.

This, then, is a thought which I specially commend to you. To be isolated is not to be a person; to love is to be a person. Personality is not mere separateness: it has even been described as the capacity for fellowship. The Christian truth harmonises with this larger conception of personality, harmonises with it more completely than any other view of the Being of God. Mr. Herbert Spencer argued that, since

all intelligence of which we can conceive presupposes existences objective to itself, it was impossible that there could have existed a Personal God before what we call Creation had come to be. This argument holds as against deism, the doctrine of a single, simple, isolated unit of Deity. It does not hold as against the Christian truth of the Holy Trinity, which declares that within the mysteriously complex Being of God there is from all eternity that which can know and also that which can be known, that which can love and that which can be loved.

Thus we come back to the thought that while the Christian truth is itself beyond our complete comprehension, yet it explains much that cannot be explained without it. And once more we own our obligation of gratitude to those who in early times preserved the integrity of the Catholic Faith.

III

OUR attention in these lectures has been principally directed to the former section of the Athanasian Creed, which deals with the mysterious truth of the Holy Trinity. The latter section sets forth with a like simplicity and directness of language the truth of the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, maintaining the mystery of the perfect union of deity and humanity in Christ. The central statement here is found in the words, "Our Lord Jesus Christ . . . is God and Man . . . perfect God and perfect Man." These are the golden words which preserve the mystery intact. We cannot, indeed, conceive how it should be possible to unite in one person the infiniteness of God with the finiteness of man. Yet the Church has never wavered in her declaration that nothing less than the perfect Godhead of Christ could correspond to the lessons of her spiritual experience; nor has she hesitated to assert that His absolutely real manhood is of equally serious importance to her faith.

It is not possible for us now to enter on the

consideration of the union of the two natures, Godhead and manhood, in one Person, or to explain the hope which it offers for the future of the human race. I said something of this in the course of lectures which I gave last Advent under the title of "Some Thoughts on the Incarnation." I must now endeavour to fulfil the promise which I made at the outset, and having spoken, all too inadequately indeed, of the Catholic Faith as it is here pourtrayed, I must proceed to say something also of the frame in which it is set.

It is the monitory or warning clauses, with which it opens and concludes, which have rendered the whole document distasteful to the majority of intelligent Englishmen. "Whosoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholick Faith; which Faith except every one do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly." I do not think that it is fair to plead that these words are addressed only to the Church's children, as a solemn reminder that they who have been baptised in the faith must keep it to the end. That is not the obvious meaning of the words "Whosoever wishes to be saved," nor of the phrase "every one" in the following clause. They are a world-wide challenge. I can think of no more inclusive words. Certainly when they were written they were intended as a statement of the

universal condition of salvation. They were designed to make it clear to the Arian conquerors of Southern Gaul that in the opinion of the Catholic Church they were on the certain road to perdition. They were very bold words, and they were meant to be absolutely uncompromising. The men who used such language were saying at the same time in their sermons, "He who is not in the unity of the Church, be he clergyman or layman, male or female, free man or slave, shall have no part in the kingdom of God": and what that involved was interpreted by saying that he would rise again in the resurrection with every limb, every bone, every hair of his present body, all strangely endowed with immortality, in order that he might suffer everlasting pains.* There is no possibility of mistaking their meaning. That is what they believed, and that is what they felt bound to say. There is no doubt at all, as a matter of history, that the words were intended to apply to every human soul. "This is the Catholick Faith," so the document ends as it began, "which except a man believe faithfully he cannot be saved." It is vain to quarrel with the translation. The Latin is not a whit less terrible than the English. They knew what they were saying, and they meant it.

* See Caspari, *Anecdota*, i. 286: a sermon now attributed to Caesarius of Arles.

I would not have you suppose that the whole Church throughout her history had held such tremendous language. The early Greek Fathers in particular had cherished a hope for Socrates and other good heathens, whom they called "Christians before Christ." And Origen reminds us that the Shepherd in the parable seeks His lost sheep "until He find it." But to the time and place to which our document historically belongs such larger thoughts were alien. The peril of heresy was the uppermost idea: its danger to the individual soul as well as to the whole Church was keenly realised. The language in which it found expression was exaggerated; but yet it was honest language at the time to those who used it, and we have no reason to think that it was intended in the least degree to be uncharitable.

It has been asked by those who shrink from this language to-day, and who yet value beyond all price the clear phrases in which the Christian truth is set forth in this document, whether there is any historical ground for thinking that this great exposition of the Catholic Faith ever had a separate existence without these warning clauses. Thirty years ago, when public sentiment was deeply moved in the matter, a Cambridge theologian believed that he had discovered evidence to show that certain parts of the document

had existed separately, and were only combined in their present shape as late as the ninth century. But further discoveries have rendered this interesting position quite untenable, and there is scarcely a single scholar living to-day who would deny that the document as we know it was written as a whole in South Gaul in the fifth or sixth century. There is not now the slightest reason for supposing that it ever existed without these monitory clauses.

It may, however, be rightly said that all the great phrases of that part of the document which describes the Catholic Faith, and to which we attach so high a value, were current before they were brought together here. They had been already minted and circulated as current coin, and were familiar not only to theologians, but to all well-instructed Christians. It is as though the picture, as we called it at the outset, were a mosaic composed of precious stones, each of which had been recognised and valued before it was selected to be combined with the rest in order to give a systematic representation of the Catholic Faith. In this sense it is true to say that the statements of the Faith are older than and independent of the clauses to which exception is taken.

Indeed, it is just this wide currency of the individual phrases that makes it so difficult to

date the creed or to discover its author. So many of its phrases occur in the writings of St. Vincent of Lerins at the beginning of the fifth century that some scholars have maintained that he wrote the creed; while others have held that he knew it already and was quoting from it. Again, so much of it finds a verbal parallel in St. Augustine that scholars have even been tempted to attribute it to him. The fact is that when it was set forth it was not intended to seem new. Every theologian, as he read that portion of it which describes the Catholic Faith, recognised that it was the old faith set out in the old and approved language with which his reading had long made him familiar.

The most recent effort of criticism to assign a date and possible author to the document is that of a learned Benedictine scholar in Belgium.* He has shown that its Latinity corresponds in a striking manner to the style of Caesarius, a great Gallican Bishop, who was once a monk at Lerins, the chief centre of theological learning in those days, and whose episcopate falls between 503 and 543. The language of the introductory and closing sentences finds frequent parallels in the sermons of this most popular and effective preacher. Caesarius was not an original thinker,

* Dom Morin, of Maredsous, in *Revue Bénédictine*, October, 1901.

but he was a well-read practical theologian, who had learned what the Catholic Faith was, and knew how to present it in the settled phraseology and to enforce it with the most emphatic warnings. It is too early to pronounce a judgment on the view that the creed belongs to the period of Caesarius and may even have been compiled by him; but there is much to be said in its favour.

I turn from these historical topics to the practical question of the use of this ancient document in the public services of the English Church. I have contrasted the beauty and preciousness of the picture with the repellent character of its frame. I need not dwell on the change in Christian conviction which has made it exceedingly difficult for an educated believer to read over this detailed statement of the Catholic Faith, and then to say, "Which Faith except every one do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly." We have learned much of the wideness of God's mercy since those words were written. We are not now prepared to say that even heathen men who hold nothing of the Catholic Faith, who have never heard of it at all, must without doubt perish everlastingly. And we are confident that many of our own countrymen who through intellectual failings "confuse the persons" or "divide the essence" of the Godhead will nevertheless find their love

of Christ answered by His love for them. While we desire to hold the Catholic Faith with the same tenacity as the great teachers of the fifth and sixth centuries, we cannot reaffirm their language as to the certain damnation of all who fail to hold it as it is here set forth.

Why, then, do we go on repeating the words? The answer is in part historical. The creed has been known and valued in the English Church for more than twelve hundred years. Picture and frame alike are an heirloom of immense antiquity. The Bishop-elect of Worcester in the year 798 presented to the Archbishop of Canterbury a confession of faith prior to his consecration, which contains many clauses of this creed. Since he desired to be brief he does not cite the whole, but he begins with the words, "Whosoever will be saved before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholick Faith," and proceeds to add, "and the Catholick Faith is this: that we worship . . ." and so forth. In the tenth century we find that it was sung antiphonally in England, and it was soon translated into Anglo-Saxon for the instruction of the people. It belonged to the ancient office of Prime; but at the time of the Reformation it was given its present place in the Prayer-book and ordered to be sung or said at Morning Prayer on six great festivals in the year, the number being raised to thirteen in the Second

Book of Edward VI. For 350 years the English Church has required its recital at one of the principal services of her greatest festivals; and though some of her divines have challenged the wisdom of this practice in almost every generation, she has not changed her order, though it has come to conflict with the consciences of an ever-growing number of her children.

The reason for this ultra-conservatism is two-fold. In the first place, the Church values so highly the exposition of the Faith which this document contains, as a summary of the thoughts of her greatest teachers expressed in firm and lucid language, that she has been unwilling to remove from her public services so powerful an instrument of popular instruction. The value of the picture has been set against the repellent character of the frame.

Secondly, the clogged condition of the legislative machinery of the Church has made it almost impossible for the Church herself to revise the orders which she gave 350 years ago. The common mind of the Church has no adequate means of making itself effectively heard. This is only a particular instance of the general condition of paralysis from which in this respect the body of the Church is suffering. We need not blame Parliament here, for we have never got as far as Parliament in this matter. We must blame

our own timidity, and especially our suspicion of one another, which makes us fear that if a single rubric were altered the whole Prayer-book would be liable to change. These are, indeed, unworthy fears—utterly unworthy of a living Church, whose duty is to step forward boldly where the truth leads.

What, then, is the wisest policy for the Church to adopt at the present time? Are we to go on saying these awful words, and explaining when we are pressed that we do not really mean what we say? that we use them only in a broad and charitable sense as a solemn warning to those who wilfully reject the truth? But, alas! it is the words, and not our interpretation of the words, that we are bound to say and to call upon our congregations to say. Or should we aim at such legislation as would withdraw the creed from public use and consign it to the position of seclusion which it holds in the Roman communion, where it is practically used only by monks and priests in the service of Prime on Sundays? The American Church and the Irish Church have both withdrawn it from public use, and there are many English Churchmen who would desire to do the same.

Or is there a middle course by which the picture may be preserved without its compromising frame? The suggestion which I venture to

offer is this: that the creed should no longer be said in the place of the Apostles' Creed; but that its unequalled exposition of the truths of the Trinity and the Incarnation should be separated from the rest of the document and sung in the place of the anthem. It is, of course, always legitimate to take a selection of words from the Bible or Prayer-book for use as an anthem; and few would deny that by adopting this course the spirit of the present rubric is honoured, though its letter is not complied with. This, I believe, is the best solution of the difficulty even now, where proper authority can be had for it; and I think that we should aim at getting the Church to alter her order in some such sense as this.

Meanwhile—for I can hardly avoid the question—what is to be done by individual clergymen and congregations, who feel that the present position is intolerable? As it is, they have largely taken the matter into their own hands, and in very many churches, as you know, this creed is never said at all, and in many more it is said but once a year. This is anarchic, and anarchy is deplorable. I venture with all modesty to submit that in the case of parish churches the Bishop, as supreme Ordinary of the diocese, is alone in a position to meet the present need. In cases where rules press hardly and where legislation cannot at once be had, dispensation, as a

temporary measure of relief to troubled consciences, is the true method of the Church. I am confident that the Bishops would be supported by the general conscience of English Churchmen, if they boldly put this principle into operation for the relief of clergy and laity where the burden is felt to be seriously oppressive. And even where a Bishop might hesitate to take so bold a step, I should still venture to hope that he might see his way to say to any clergyman who at present on account of strong conscientious objection never uses the creed at all, "While I do not feel able to sanction your omission of the creed, yet, if your conscience really forbids you to recite it, I would urge you at any rate not to deprive your people of the great teaching which it contains. The alternative of using the substance of it as an anthem, though irregular, is in every way preferable to your present course of entire omission."

I speak with a sense of deep responsibility in a grave matter which affects, as no other does to the same extent, on the one side our obedience to a plain rule, and on the other side our truthfulness of utterance in the solemn act of worship. Every clergyman is bound to obey the rubrics of the Prayer-book "except so far as shall be ordered by lawful authority." I believe that this "lawful authority" for making

exceptions in urgent cases is lodged in what I have called the supreme Ordinary of the particular Church. Such authority is exercised not unfrequently already in regard to rules of less importance. I plead for its exercise to afford temporary relief until the Church can by legislation remove what is very widely felt as a burden on the conscience of her earnest and law-abiding sons.

A SERMON

PREACHED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE ON SUNDAY, JUNE 5TH, 1904

"NO man hath seen God at any time. If we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and His love is perfected in us" (1 St. John iv. 12).

The festival of Trinity, the octave of which we keep to-day, is the festival of the knowledge of God, which is our eternal life. It sums up for us all that the Christian revelation has taught us about God. Christmas, Easter, Pentecost—each in turn contributes to our knowledge of God. Christmas declares to us the Father, who gives us His Son; Easter declares to us the Son, who in our human flesh has vanquished sin and death. Pentecost declares to us the Holy Spirit, who comes to dwell in us and build us up together into a temple of God. Then Trinity lifts our thoughts away from ourselves and from what God has done for us to what God is in Himself, and bids us praise Him for what He is, and say: Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of hosts: the whole

earth is full of His glory: Glory be to the Father and to the Son and to Holy Ghost: for the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God; and yet they are not three Gods, but one God.

There is nothing which we need so much to-day as a noble and inspiring conception of God. The conception of God has undergone a great change in recent times. In the first half of the nineteenth century the prevailing thought was that God was a Sovereign Ruler and Judge, before whom men must give a solemn account, from whose stern justice which must condemn us all the merciful Jesus had found a way to deliver us. Thus a contrast was made between the sternness of God and the love of Christ. Imperfect as was this view of God, it had one important advantage: the name of God was a name of fear and awe. Our fathers were brought up "in the fear of God." On the memorial of a great Indian administrator in Westminster Abbey there is written: "He feared man so little, because he feared God so much." That marks the height of this feeling, which has been on the wane ever since. It was stern, and it made strong men—men who feared God and did their duty.

But it had another effect on many minds. It was repellent to less heroic souls. It presented a severe view of God. It seemed to leave little

room for the love of God. And presently by its side a new conception arose: the conception of our Lord's parable in which the father sees his prodigal son a long way off, and runs to meet him, and falls on his neck, and welcomes him home in spite of all. That God was a Father to men flashed out like a new discovery. A speaker in Parliament actually referred with admiration to "what had recently been called, in beautiful language, the fatherhood of God." The term is now so familiar to us that we find it difficult to imagine that fifty years ago it could strike men as new. It was an old truth that had slept and awaked; and when once pointed out it was seen to be everywhere in the New Testament. Had not Christ said, "The Father Himself loveth you"? Had He not taught us to pray, "Our Father . . . give us our daily bread, forgive us, deliver us"? The result of this new proclamation of the love of God was to attract many souls whom the sterner aspect had discouraged. A Christian poet, one of my predecessors,* sang:

> I say to thee, do thou repeat
> To the first man whom thou mayest meet
> In lane, highway, or open street—
> That he and we and all men move
> Under a canopy of love
> As broad as the blue sky above.

* Richard Chevenix Trench.

It is true—eternal truth—that God is love. But it was easily misinterpreted in an unworthy sense by those who could not distinguish between love and mere goodnature. For those who did not know that in reality we fear most the person whom we love most and who loves us most—that reverence and love are inseparable: for those who could not understand that love is very jealous and demands complete surrender, and therefore that the holy love of God is awful and constraining: for such the notion grew that God was too kind to punish. The fear of God was weakened: the strain of duty was relaxed: a softness came over religion; it might attract, but it had lost its power to compel.

We are told to-day that, in spite of all our efforts (and never have the efforts been so great) to make religion attractive, its hold on all ranks of society is weakening. If this is so, and I fear that it is, the remedy is not to be found in any change of methods, but only in a larger and nobler conception of God. In the knowledge of God standeth our eternal life.

The festival of Trinity invites us to contemplate God as He is. It assures us that He is not a mere force of inflexible righteousness, that must bear down in the end all that opposes it. It assures us that He is not a barren singleness, isolated in lonely grandeur,

looking down from a height on puny mortals, either to mark what is done amiss, or to smile with indulgence at our human weaknesses: but that He is eternally in Himself a being of love: an eternal Father loving and loved by an eternal Son: a life of love within Himself, which is realised in an eternal Spirit, the Spirit of fellowship. God is love: from all eternity He finds within Himself an object to which His love goes forth, the Son who loves Him in return: and this love of Father and Son has been from all eternity realised in and shared by a Third Person, the Holy Spirit of fellowship, who is one with the Father and the Son.

We cannot indeed understand it: it is too hard for us. "No man hath seen God at any time." It is the mystery of mysteries. But the mystery makes clear what would otherwise be beyond comprehension in our own lives. We find it hard to see how Three Persons can be One. And yet, if we know anything of ourselves, we know that each of us, though a single person, is always yearning to come into nearer relation with other persons. We want to enter into other lives. We cannot live alone. We feel that isolation is death. We are made for love; and love is the giving of ourselves to others, the losing of our life in others' lives, and the receiving back the lives of others into ours. Nearer and nearer

we seek to come to those we love. The highest love is the completest union of the persons who love. And all this is so because we are made in the image of God, and God is love. In God that is realised for which we yearn, towards which we strain, and which we necessarily fail to reach—the unity of persons in perfect love: Three Persons in One God.

We have on earth a pattern of the life of God in the unity of a true family. In the family each lives for the other, each gives his own life in some measure to the rest, and in doing so finds his own true life again richer than before. The family is a perpetual effort after oneness. The perfect ideal of family life is in heaven. In God there is Father and Son, and They are One. God *is* the unity which we strive to be. Here is our hope. Our longing to enter into the lives of others, to get away from the death of selfishness into the life of sacrifice, is due to that which is of God in us. And because it is of God it shall yet be realised. We are made for oneness—oneness with our brother men, oneness with God Himself. God in Christ has made Himself one with man, pouring out His life for us and into us; and man shall at last be made one in Christ and taken up into God.

We cannot understand it. It is the mystery of the life of God. But it interprets our deepest

yearnings. We must love: for God is love, and we are in the image of God. And God loves us; that is to say, He goes out towards us, yearns after oneness with us, cannot be satisfied until we return His love.

If we could grasp and hold this thought of God, our lives would be a ceaseless endeavour to respond to every call of love. So writes St. John, the apostle of love: "Beloved, if God so loved us, we ought also to love another. No man hath seen God at any time. If we love another, God dwelleth in us, and His love is perfected in us."

It is to protect the mysteriousness of the truth about the being of God, and to guard us from easy and inadequate explanations, that doctrinal formularies are perpetually needed. The justification of such formularies in the present day is to be found alike in the historical enquiry into their origin, and in the exposition of their compatibility with modern modes of thinking. Men would not talk lightly of the elaborated exactness of the Athanasian Creed, if they were familiar with the controversies which long ago minted the phrases which this formulary keeps in circulation. They would understand that this was no *tour de force* of a single mind, no first attempt to propound a mysterious system of doctrine and to force it upon the Christian consciousness; but that, on the contrary, it was a summary of

positions gradually reached by the long process of discarding false answers to questions which, once raised, could not be dismissed without reply. All its familiar phrases had been hammered out by disputation long before they were gathered together into this great Confession. It was nothing new that was offered to men's acceptance. This was the Catholic Faith: it was recognised as being such; and we recognise it as being such to-day. That is the historical line of defence. The creed was not the fine-spun product of a mind which was ensnared by the delusion of systematic completeness: it was a simple recitation of the results reached by the great Christian thinkers from Athanasius to Augustine.

The further justification of our doctrinal formularies lies in their applicability to new situations of thought at any period. When we have done our best to think out the doctrine of the Incarnation and to express it in terms which correspond with the present tenor of our thinking, we feel satisfied that no statement can so fully guard the mystery as the great clause, "Perfect God and perfect Man," and we are more than ever thankful that these simple words are current coin. Again, while we fancy that the new philosophical conception of personality helps us to understand that in God personality is found in its highest realisation, in which distinction

of persons does not necessarily involve separation, we rejoice anew in the simple greatness of the antithesis which declares: "So the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God: and yet they are not three Gods, but one God." And we feel that so long as those words ring out in English ears, we are safeguarded at once from tritheism and from a Sabellian view which contradicts what we have learned of the inner life of love within the being of God. It is for these and other great phrases of the Athanasian Creed that I value its public recitation in our congregations, and that I should deplore a change which would thrust it into a corner out of common knowledge. If it still stood in the Prayer-book, but with no rubric for its use, it would soon be as unfamiliar to most of us as the Prayers for use at Sea.

The practical problem of the recitation of this creed is once more before the consideration of the Church. An honoured bishop has declared in Convocation that its present use is productive of "more harm than good." And during the past week the Archbishop of Canterbury has been approached by a small but important deputation, led by a distinguished son of this University, who pleaded in language of admirable caution for some mitigation of the present obligation. The Archbishop's reply was characteristic and encouraging.

He recalled the past efforts made in this direction, and fixed attention upon the real objection which makes the recitation of this creed intolerable to many minds. It was especially satisfactory to observe that he did not consider that its doctrinal statements of the Catholic Faith were inseparable from those terrible warnings which condemn the misbeliever to eternal ruin.

There are hundreds of churches at the present moment in which inability to recite these clauses with a good conscience has caused the entire disuse of the creed. I could wish that, until legislation might be had, the Ordinary of the diocese, even if he felt unable to sanction the omission, would yet declare that the spirit, if not the full letter, of the Church's direction would be honoured by singing in the place of the anthem those portions of the Athanasian Creed which set forth the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. This is the course which as Ordinary I have felt bound to take in a church in which there is no episcopal jurisdiction to relieve me of the ultimate responsibility of decision. I can no longer say, or require others to say, clauses which I believe to be in their plain sense not only misleading, but false. We therefore omit the Athanasian Creed on the appointed days, and say the Apostles' Creed in its place: but the great utterances of the Catholic Faith in regard to the

Holy Trinity and the Incarnation are sung entire and without change, and with more than the usual solemnity, in the place of the anthem. This procedure on its positive side is of course as fully legal as the singing of any words of Holy Scripture or of the Prayer-book in the form of an anthem. I do not dispute the technical illegality of the omission of the creed at the prescribed place. But I hold that where a rubrical direction has from some reasonable cause become an intolerable burden to conscience, and yet for the time legislation cannot be had in relief, the true ecclesiastical remedy lies in dispensation, and it is the function of the Ordinary to intervene. This is frequently done in the case of other directions of the Prayer-book which are no less explicit, and where there is far less justification for intervening on the ground of moral pressure.

I have felt that it was due to those with whom I have worked for so many years in this place that I should take this opportunity of explaining the actual character of a deviation from rubrical practice which has sometimes been represented as other than that it is. I venture to add that in the present reopening of the whole question it would be of service that Cambridge opinion, both clerical and lay, should find some means of public utterance. For it will be a very grave injury to the Church if the history of thirty years ago be

allowed to repeat itself. We are bound to insist that the Church shall now, in the light of all that God has taught us, refuse to give her sanction any longer to the words, "which Faith except every one do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly." It ought not to be possible to-day to point to these words as the authorised utterance of the Church. In their plain sense they were believed once: in their plain sense they are disbelieved now. No one should be allowed to repeat them in the Church's name.

At the same time, for reasons which I have already given, and for the further reason that it should not be open to any man to suggest that the Church is receding from the exposition of the Faith itself, it is of great importance that the substance of the creed should continue to be recited by our congregations. By the substance of the creed I mean those portions only which deal with the Trinity and the Incarnation, apart from all the eschatological statements which are superadded to emphasise the danger of rejecting the Faith.

I turn from this controversial topic to remind you that your offerings are asked for the sacred and peculiarly Christian cause of the hospital of this town. I will not urge its pressing need of

funds, or its special claim on the University as a school of medicine. I plead to-day the love of God which finds expression in the love of man. "Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God . . . for God is love."

ON THE PROPOSAL OF A NEW TRANSLATION

(*London Diocesan Conference, June* 4, 1901)

I DO not myself share the dissatisfaction frequently expressed in regard to our present version of the Athanasian Creed. The fathers of the Church in the sixteenth century were peculiarly well versed in Augustinian Latin, and no one will question their power of expressing their meaning in appropriate English. I will take two of the points which have been specially referred to. It has been suggested that *Quicunque vult salvus esse* would be better rendered, "Whoever willeth to be in a state of salvation," or to be "safe" or "perfectly whole." A distinction is thus sought to be made between *salvus esse* and *salvari*. But a study of Christian Latin leaves, in my opinion, no room for doubting that these phrases are identical in meaning. *Salvus esse* is classical Latin, *salvari* is low Latin; they are constantly interchanged in the versions and in the manuscripts. Those who still read their St. Augustine may remember that he apologises for the use of the convenient word

salvari. I believe, therefore, that *salvus esse* can only be rightly translated "to be saved."

The second point I would mention is the rendering of *immensus* as "incomprehensible." The word *immensus* conveys the idea that the Divine nature cannot be measured by any measures which we can apply to it, and cannot be grasped in its completeness by our human faculties. No word expresses this to the scholar's mind more completely than "incomprehensible"; but it may be that to the popular mind "incomprehensible" only expresses a portion of the truth. That portion of the truth, I believe, we are more ready to admit now than our fathers were twenty-five years ago: I mean the incomprehensibility (even in the more modern sense) of the nature of the Divine Being. Yet if "infinite" should be thought to be a better word for to-day I should be ready to accept it.

Taken as a whole, the present version admirably represents the meaning of the original framers of the formula. The intention of the Church of the fifth century was to condemn in the severest language those who departed from a certain intellectual standard of doctrine, which she had laboriously elaborated as a safeguard against heresies. The temper of the time is photographically reproduced in those magnificent anathemas. No translation can soften what was meant to be as hard as adamant. You may say, "let him thus think" for "he must thus think of the Trinity"; but that will not relax the stringency of the next words, "Furthermore it is necessary to

everlasting salvation." Nor will it affect the singularly expressive admonition of the second clause of the creed, "which Faith except every one do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly."

If retranslation is offered as a solution of the problem, I will resist it, for it suggests that the difficulty lies where the difficulty does not lie. And it means that the Church in the twentieth century solemnly reaffirms in a more modern dress the anathemas of the fifth century, which we tolerate only as part of an historical record, and do not desire to utter anew as our own.

APPENDIX

A HYMN OF THE CATHOLICK FAITH

Fides Catholica

THE Catholick Faith is this : That we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity ;

Neither confounding the Persons : nor dividing the Substance.

For there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son : and another of the Holy Ghost.

But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one : the Glory equal, the Majesty co-eternal.

Such as the Father is, such is the Son : and such is the Holy Ghost.

The Father uncreate, the Son uncreate : and the Holy Ghost uncreate.

The Father incomprehensible, the Son incomprehensible : and the Holy Ghost incomprehensible.

The Father eternal, the Son eternal ; and the Holy Ghost eternal.

And yet they are not three eternals : but one eternal.

As also there are not three incomprehensibles, nor three uncreated : but one uncreated, and one incomprehensible.

So likewise the Father is Almighty, the Son Almighty : and the Holy Ghost Almighty.

And yet they are not three Almighties : but one Almighty.

So the Father is God, the Son is God : and the Holy Ghost is God.

And yet they are not three Gods : but one God.

So likewise the Father is Lord, the Son Lord : and the Holy Ghost Lord.

And yet not three Lords : but one Lord.

For like as we are compelled by the Christian verity : to acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and Lord;

So are we forbidden by the Catholick Religion : to say there be three Gods, or three Lords.

The Father is made of none : neither created, nor begotten.

The Son is of the Father alone : not made, nor created, but begotten.

The Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son : neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.

So there is one Father, not three Fathers; one Son, not three Sons : one Holy Ghost, not three Holy Ghosts.

And in this Trinity none is afore, or after other : none is greater, or less than another;

But the whole three Persons are co-eternal together : and co-equal.

So that in all things, as is aforesaid : the Unity in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity is to be worshipped.

Furthermore the right faith is that we believe and confess : that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and Man ;

God, of the Substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds : and Man, of the substance of his Mother, born in the world ;

Perfect God, and Perfect Man : of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting ;

Equal to the Father, as touching his Godhead : and inferior to the Father, as touching his Manhood.

Who although he be God and Man : yet he is not two, but one Christ ;

One ; not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh : but by taking of the Manhood into God ;

One altogether ; not by confusion of Substance : but by unity of Person.

For as the reasonable soul and flesh is one Man : so God and Man is one Christ.

Who suffered for our salvation : descended into hell, rose again the third day from the dead.

He ascended into heaven, he sitteth on the right hand of the Father, God Almighty : from whence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead.

Glory be to the Father, and to the Son : and to the Holy Ghost ;

As it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be : world without end. Amen.

[The Form here proposed ends with the words, " to

judge the quick and the dead." The reasons for this are:—

(*a*) This is the natural close of the exposition of the doctrine of our Lord's Incarnation, and corresponds exactly with the close of the second section of the Apostles' Creed.

(*b*) The words which follow in the original, "At whose coming all men shall rise again with their bodies, and shall give account for their own works: And they that have done good shall go into life everlasting, and they that have done evil into everlasting fire," are of an eschatological character, and were doubtless introduced to explain and emphasise the terms of the monitory clauses, "perish everlastingly," "cannot be saved." The doctrine of the General Resurrection is out of place otherwise at this point; for it belongs to the third and not to the second section of the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds. When the monitory clauses are removed the words do not form an appropriate close to the Confession. The juxtaposition of the words "everlasting fire," and the "Gloria Patri" would be somewhat painful.

(*c*) It is true that this language is largely taken from Scripture; but in Scripture such statements are balanced by others which point to a final issue in which God shall be "all in all." It may not be in our power to reconcile the two sides of the antithesis, but it is misleading to emphasise one without any reference to the other.]

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DEAN OF WESTMINSTER

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PREFACE

THE three lectures here printed were delivered in Westminster Abbey on Saturday afternoons in Advent, 1904. I have appended to them an Address which I gave a few weeks before to a select body of Sunday School teachers who had gained the prizes offered by the Church of England Sunday School Institute, as this Address evoked an unexpected interest and so determined the choice of the subject for my Advent lectures. I have also suggested in a Note, in answer to an inquiry which is constantly reaching me, a few recent books which may be helpful to the layman who desires some further guidance in regard to the Old Testament.

WESTMINSTER ABBEY
Christmas Eve, 1904

SOME THOUGHTS ON INSPIRATION

I

THE purpose of these lectures is to suggest some thoughts in regard to the Inspiration of Holy Scripture, which may possibly be helpful to two classes of minds, which, while approaching the question from different sides, are alike perplexed by the conflict between modern knowledge and traditional views of the Bible.

There is a large and constantly growing body of men who have come to recognise that the facts of physical science and of the early history of our race are at variance with the conceptions which they learned in their younger days as to the creation of the world and the origin of mankind. They are profoundly assured of the general uniformity of nature, and though they do not in the least wish to deny the possibility or reasonableness of a miraculous interference with it for some adequate purpose, yet they feel that each recorded miracle challenges an ever-renewed investigation

of its historical evidence, and can only win their acceptance when they are able to perceive something of a spiritual necessity for it which reinforces and confirms its external testimony. To such men the historical criticism of the Old Testament comes as a kind of relief, weakening (as it undoubtedly does) the historical evidence for some of the recorded interferences with the course of nature which involve the most serious scientific difficulties. But the process which affords this relief plunges them, at the same time, into a new perplexity. If the Bible is inspired by the Divine Spirit, how can it record what did not actually take place? If an element of human misconception and mistake is to be recognised in the Bible, how can we regard it any longer as an inspired book, or use it as an infallible guide of life? An uncertainty prevails which, as a matter of fact, closes the Old Testament to them, and leads them to doubt whether their whole position in regard to the Christian religion itself is not seriously affected with unreality. They do not wish to disbelieve, but the mainstay of their faith seems to be broken, and there are many voices around them ready to proclaim that they have forsaken the truth and have no part or lot in the Christian Church.

Another class of persons is no less anxiously perplexed. They have hitherto regarded as unquestionable the literal accuracy of the whole

Bible from beginning to end. They have indeed noted some difficulties in the apparent contradiction between certain statements in different parts of the Bible, some discrepancies hard to reconcile. But these things have not really troubled them; they have supposed that a fuller knowledge would in every case provide a satisfactory solution. They are profoundly convinced of the Divine character of the book; they owe to it their very souls; they rest their whole hope for the future on its sacred promises; they know by experience its spiritual power. They are not much impressed by the considerations which make difficulties for others. Miracles, for example, are no stumbling-block to them; confident in God's power to intervene at any point in His own universe, they readily accept all recorded miracles without distinction. By devout and prayerful reading they derive spiritual nourishment from all parts of the sacred book; it always responds to their need, and is its own perpetual justification.

Their perplexity only arises when difficulties are urged upon them from outside; when they see earnest and devout men questioning what to them seems absolutely certain; when the date and authorship of various books is disputed on literary grounds, or when narratives which they have always taken as plain records of facts are interpreted as allegorically, but not literally, true.

Then it seems to them as though the choice had to be made between the Bible as they have received it and no Bible at all. They cannot distinguish degrees of inspiration in the different portions of Holy Scripture, and they cannot understand an inspiration which does not carry with it the entire accuracy of every detail of historical narrative. They are inexpressibly pained by suggestions of human infirmity and ignorance on the part of the sacred writers, suggestions which they consider dishonouring to God's Holy Word and to the Divine Spirit who has inspired it.

Persons who represent each of these classes are doubtless sitting side by side in this church this afternoon. They are, it may be, equally earnest and equally perplexed. Each is holding fast by truth which he knows in his inmost being to be true; each is liable to underrate, or even deny, the truth which the other holds, because he cannot at once reconcile it with what he himself has found to be true.

The Christian teacher who stands face to face with these two classes of persons has a task of no ordinary difficulty. It is well for him if, in his own experience, he knows something of the reality of the truth on either side; if he can recognise the sincerity of both positions; because, on the one hand, he is absolutely convinced of the inspiration of Holy Scripture, and, on the other

hand, he has gladly welcomed the new light which has been thrown upon it by modern science and modern scholarship. He cannot hope to draw into complete accord minds which are so differently constituted, but he may hope, by God's help, to lessen, if he cannot remove, the barrier which keeps them apart.

Two considerations I would beg those who hear me to bear in mind from the outset. The first is what I may call the educational value of difficulty. Every advance in knowledge has been gained at the cost of a great perplexity. The Greeks knew that truth is heaven's response to man's inquiry, that Message is the child of Marvel. We must be patient with the perplexities of our own and of other minds. We must be prepared to take trouble. More than half of our present difficulty arises on both sides alike from an indolence of spirit which refuses the painful task of serious thought.

The other consideration is this: Behind and beneath the Bible, above and beyond the Bible, is the God of the Bible, the God in whose presence we are. The whole purpose of the Bible is to guide us to Him. If the Bible fails to do that for each one of us, it is of no avail that we should accept every syllable of it as infallibly true. If it does lead us to Him, we come in touch with the eternal; our spirits are calm, our minds are free;

we can accept all truth that comes to us from any side, and we can work and wait in faith and patience for the larger truth which will reconcile apparent contradictions.

I shall now invite you to inquire what is the meaning of the word Inspiration, and how as a matter of history it has come to be applied to the books first of the Old Testament and then of the New. Inspiration literally means Inbreathing. It is specially used of the Divine Breath or Spirit of God. It denotes the process by which the Spirit of God reveals to the spirits of men the nature and the will of God. It is primarily used of persons, and only in a secondary sense of the words spoken or written by inspired persons.

Spirit works upon spirit: the Divine Spirit upon the spirit of man. So the old Hebrew writer says of the Divine Wisdom that "in all ages entering into holy souls, she maketh them friends of God and prophets" (Wisd. vii. 27). So a New Testament writer says that "prophecy came not at any time by the will of man, but moved by the Holy Spirit men spake from God" (2 Peter i. 21). So, too, one of the earliest of the prophets himself declares that "the Lord God will do nothing, but He revealeth His secret unto His servants the prophets" (Amos iii. 7).

It has always been the Divine method to select certain men, to enter into peculiar intimacy with

them, to reach their spirits by the direct operation of the Divine Spirit, to purify their hearts, to quicken their perceptive faculties, and to intrust them with a special knowledge of the Divine will and purpose in order that they may be the teachers of their fellow men. This is the primary meaning of inspiration; men are inspired by the contact of the Divine Spirit with their spirits, not for their own sakes merely, or even chiefly, but that they may interpret the will of God to the men of their time.

In a secondary and remoter sense their words, when they come to teach either by speech or writing, may be called inspired words, but only as being the words of men who themselves are "moved by the Holy Spirit." When we understand this we can clearly distinguish between inspiration and dictation. It is conceivable that God might have chosen to inscribe His own words on tables of stone, or to have dictated His messages to man by the hand of any competent scribe, whose intellectual, moral, and spiritual character would have been of no importance, if only he had the pen of a ready writer. But that was not the Divine method. God has always revealed Himself to man through man; "speaking to the fathers in the prophets, He has spoken to us in His Son"; speaking at first in an imperfect and only at the last in a perfect utter-

ance; but speaking always through human lives and human minds. The message was not written by the Divine hand, nor dictated by an outward compulsion; it was planted in the hearts of men, and made to grow in a fruitful soil. And then they were required to express it in their own language, after their natural methods, and in accordance with the stage of knowledge which their time had reached. Their human faculties were purified and quickened by the Divine Spirit; but they spoke to their time in the language of their time; they spoke a spiritual message, accommodated to the experience of their age, a message of faith in God and of righteousness as demanded by a righteous God.

Surely, when we thus contemplate the work of the prophets, we gain a truly noble conception of inspiration. We see it as a process not compelling from without, but guiding from within. The prophet is brought into living contact with the eternal, and he utters as much of it as is possible to be uttered in terms of time. His human faculties are not suspended, but rather they are quickened into fuller activity; his human knowledge and his human intelligence are employed as the medium through which a spiritual message is interpreted to his generation. We are justified in supposing that such inspiration would save him from all mistakes which would obscure

the meaning of his spiritual message. Whether it would equally preserve him from misconception as to facts of natural knowledge or of past history we cannot argue beforehand: we can only learn this from the examination of what he actually has said. It might conceivably be so, or it might not be so. What we are sure is that the spiritual purpose would be safeguarded, that he would rightly recognise the power of God in the processes of nature, and that he would clearly trace the hand of God in his nation's history.

When we pass from the consideration of the utterances of the prophets to their written words, it is important to observe that the Hebrews did not confine the writings of the prophets to the books which at present bear their names. The first part of the group of prophetical books included the books of Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and Kings. These gave the authoritative record and interpretation of the history of the people after they had come into the Holy Land. Even more sacred to the Hebrew mind were the five books of the Pentateuch which dealt with the Mosaic legislation and the story which led up to it. These came to be connected with the name and authority of Moses, the Lawgiver, who was the very greatest of prophets. It was natural also to include among the inspired writings the wonderful Hebrew Psalms, which had gradually

been gathered together in the course of many centuries, as the expression of public and private devotion; and also the moral precepts or proverbial philosophy, the treasured wisdom of many generations, which attached itself to the name of the wise king Solomon, just as the Psalter was connected with David, "the sweet psalmist of Israel."

Presently the sacredness of every fragment of the ancient literature was so strongly felt that in the same category of inspired writings were included, not only a great dramatic poem like Job, but even a story like Esther, in which the name of God is never mentioned, and a Song of Love by an ancient Hebrew poet. The justification of the inclusion of books such as these is to be found when we regard the people as in some sense an inspired people, and consequently their national literature as an inspired literature.

When the great era of prophetic inspiration was past, and no voice any longer dared to cry, "Thus saith the Lord," pious Jews fell back on these old writings, and found in them what they could not find elsewhere. The book took the place of the living voice.

Later still, when the silence had again been broken by the advent of Christ, but when Judaism had refused the new voice which spoke directly from God, the Rabbis fell into a bibliolatry, which

counted every letter of the Hebrew Scriptures, and converted the whole of the Old Testament from being a record of the progressive revelation of God into an infallible utterance of God Himself.

Christianity received the Old Testament from Judaism before this last stage was reached; and the book was claimed by the apostolic writers as the record of the preparation for the Gospel. Their reading of it was dominated by the New Message, which God, who had spoken in the prophets, had now declared in His Son. So far as it could be interpreted as pointing to Christ, the Old Testament received a new and added value: but so far as it gave commands which were inconsistent with the New Message, it was regarded as antiquated, as having served a temporary purpose and as being no longer binding.

In the second century the words of Jesus Christ, so far as they had been remembered and recorded, and the letters of His Apostles, were regarded as a sacred treasury of inspired teaching destined to serve for the permanent guidance of the Christian Church. And not only the words of Christ, but naturally also the record of His life and work, and the record of the early life of the Church itself, under the title of Acts of the Apostles, gained the same character of inspired writings. So by the end of the second century our New

Testament, practically as we have it to-day, had become accepted by the general consciousness of the Church, and lifted to the same level of canonical sacredness as the Old Testament of the Jewish people.

There was, indeed, wide difference of opinion among Christians as to the permanent authority of the Old Testament. Its lower standard of morality distressed many earnest Christian minds. Its anthropomorphism, that is, the way in which it represented God as acting like a man and even appearing in human shape; as being moved by anger and regret, and specially as "hardening Pharaoh's heart" in order to destroy him—these things, and many others, led some Christians to reject the Old Testament altogether, and to declare that the God whom it represented was not the good God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, but an inferior power, just rather than good, from whose dominion Christ came to deliver us.

But the Church was vitally concerned to retain the Old Testament, because it showed the oneness of the Divine purpose through the ages, which had issued in the Incarnation of the Son of God. So a battle was waged round the ancient Scriptures. In order to gain a standpoint from which all adversaries could be resisted, many Church teachers followed the precedent of Jewish

writers, and of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and applied the method of allegorisation, and so justified the ancient narratives as typical of Christ.

The greatest champion of the ancient Scriptures was Origen of Alexandria. After his immense labours the position of the Old Testament was secure. He found a spiritual meaning everywhere, and thus he could place a high value on every word of the inspired books.

It is worth while to pause a moment upon Origen's work. He was one of the most learned and most entirely devoted students of Holy Scripture that the Church has ever known. He learned Hebrew from a Jewish teacher, and soon found that the common Greek version of the Old Testament was very imperfect as a translation, and also differed much from the Hebrew Scriptures, because (though perhaps he was not aware of it) it had been made from older MSS than those which were preserved in his day. He compiled an enormous work called the Hexapla, or six-fold edition, in which he wrote out in six parallel columns the Hebrew text and various Greek translations. The work was so vast and unwieldy that probably it was never wholly copied out again, and we know it now only in fragments. It was a mighty witness to his devotion to the letter of the sacred text.

Besides being the earliest textual critic he was also the earliest systematic commentator. His comments on many passages were rendered into Latin by Jerome, and so they passed through the whole Western Church, and are still to be found reproduced in the commentaries of our own time. No man has ever done so great a work for the preservation and the interpretation of Holy Scripture.

Moreover, he was the greatest advocate of Christian truth in his day. He faced the difficulties of his own age with a mind far beyond that of his contemporaries, a mind which in some respects is strikingly modern. In dealing with Old Testament difficulties, he laid the greatest stress on the witness of the Old Testament to Christ. He said that no one could be firmly and reasonably convinced of the inspiration of the Old Testament until Christ came; and he found Christ in it everywhere, in type and symbol and prophecy. He pressed allegory too far, no doubt, and he was often fanciful in his interpretations. But his instinct was true, and it lifted him high above many obvious difficulties.

I shall close this lecture by reading to you a passage from his book on First Principles—a passage which is so modern that it is hard to realise that it was written sixteen hundred and fifty years ago.

He has been explaining how sometimes "the Scripture has woven into its narrative that which never actually occurred," in order that we might not rest content with the superficial sense, but might be forced to search diligently and prayerfully for the underlying spiritual lesson. He goes on to give illustrations of his meaning, and says :—

"For example, what man of sense will think that there was a first and second and third day, evening and morning, without any sun, moon or stars? And who would be so silly as to imagine that God after the fashion of a human gardener had planted a garden in Eden towards the east, and set in it a tree of life, that could be seen and felt, so that one who ate of its fruit with his bodily teeth should acquire life; and again that one should partake of good and evil by eating what he took from a tree of such a character? Moreover, if God is said to walk in the garden in the afternoon, and Adam to hide under the tree, I cannot suppose that any one would doubt for a moment that these things were a declaration of mysteries by means of what seems to be a history, but yet never in bodily fact occurred. Then, again, 'Cain going out from the presence of God' is plainly seen by those who pay any attention to be a statement which forces the reader to investigate the meaning of 'the presence of God' and of 'going out from it.' Why need

I say more, when any one who is not blind can collect multitudes of such examples, written down as though they had occurred, and yet never having occurred in the literal sense."*

These are the words of a man who devoted his whole life to the loving study of the Bible, and who valued every word of it, but whose spiritual instinct released him from a slavish literalism. In his view the Old Testament was a closed book till the Spirit who inspired it gave us the key to its meaning; but then it was luminous indeed with the glory of the coming Christ.

* *Philocalia*, i. 17.

II

IN my former lecture I endeavoured to discuss the meaning of Inspiration, and to trace the process by which the books of the Old and New Testaments came to be regarded as inspired. I wish to say something now of the methods and results of the modern critical study of the Old Testament and of the light which that study throws on the inspiration of it as a whole. It will, of course, only be possible to speak in general terms, and to illustrate a few particular points. At the outset I wish to say something as to the motive which prompts this critical study. Those who condemn it altogether frequently regard it as originating in a dislike of the miraculous: they connect it in their minds with the so-called conflict between the Bible and Science; and they think of it as offering a series of concessions to the supposed results of scientific discovery. Thus we are constantly being warned that many of the discoveries of science are uncertain; that one generation sets aside as obsolete the confident conclusions of its predecessor; that evolution is only a hypothesis, and that Darwin's theory is challenged by later workers; so that in the end

it is quite likely that the biblical account of Creation will prove to be right, and those who have discarded it at the bidding of the science of to-day will be convicted of their irreverence and folly by the science of to-morrow.

Now, it is quite true that astronomy and geology and biology and anthropology have each in turn revealed to us facts which are plainly inconsistent with a literal interpretation of the early chapters of Genesis, and that the recognition of this inconsistency has led the majority of intelligent Christians to fall back on the allegorical interpretation which, as I showed you last week, was so boldly proclaimed by Origen of Alexandria in the third century. It is also true that the recognition of the general uniformity of nature, which is the fundamental principle of modern science, has raised new difficulties in regard to certain of the miracles recorded in the Old Testament. For, while this principle of general regularity cannot reasonably be so far pressed as to exclude the possibility of a miraculous intervention of the Supreme Will on some adequate occasion, yet it does lead Christian men to ask themselves whether the historical evidence for all the recorded miracles of the Bible is in every case equally strong; and consequently most thinking persons have come to admit that there is a vast difference between the historical evidence

for our Lord's miracles, for example, and the historical evidence for many of the Old Testament miracles. In the one case we have practically contemporary testimony for the most part, whereas in the other the testimony is often hundreds of years later than the event.

In ways like these, no doubt, natural science has stimulated the study of the Bible from a new point of view. But though this is obvious, and bulks very large in the popular mind, it has really very little to do with biblical criticism in the proper sense. For biblical criticism proper claims to be an application of the principles of another branch of science altogether—the science of literary and historical investigation. This is the science by which in all directions we arrive at the facts of the past in regard to man's intellectual, moral, and social life. It proceeds by methods exactly analogous to those of the natural sciences —collecting facts, testing appearances, and forming hypotheses which it retains or discards according to their ability or inability to account for ascertained facts. It is progressive, as all science is progressive; it is always ready to modify its conclusions in presence of new facts. But its ultimate results are sure with a scientific certainty.

This science is as much a growth of modern times as most of the branches of natural science. It is being applied with ever-increasing accuracy

to all monuments and documents of the history and literature of the world. We know the immense results which it is yielding for the reconstruction of our own national history. It has also done splendid service in explaining to us the life and growth of the early Christian Church. The criticism of the Old Testament is but a particular application of this science to the literature and history of the Hebrew people; and, if its results are somewhat surprising, they are not to be ruled out because they conflict with our former views, but are to be tested with the utmost frankness by those who understand the processes by which they are reached.

The Christian Church takes its stand on truth, and therefore invites inquiry. Such inquiry is not, indeed, the task of the multitude; but it is the burden of the Church's teachers, who must neglect no investigation which may throw light upon the documents which she holds in her hands, and must welcome every indication which the sacred Scriptures give of the providential process by which they have come to be what they are. Obviously, if the Old Testament is a divinely inspired literature, it must not only bear, but it must challenge, the strictest scrutiny. And that scrutiny must not be conducted only by adversaries or by indifferent judges; the Christian student must be foremost in the investigation,

using all the instruments of scientific research, fearless of consequences, sure that the deeper we probe the more certain we are to arrive at the truth. When the Hebrew priests stepped down fearlessly bearing the sacred vessels into the waters of Jordan, the people followed and entered the land of promise. But when the high priest trembled for the Ark of God, it was a sign that the battle was being lost, and that the glory was departing from his people.

I may, perhaps, make my point clearer if I state it in another way, and offer a simple illustration. It is not, I think, sufficiently observed that the criticism of the Old Testament which has marked the past quarter of a century has been pre-eminently an internal criticism. It is the weighing of Scripture by Scripture, not the judging of Scripture by some external sources of information. Light has come, no doubt, from outside the Bible, and so new questions have been asked of the Bible. But the criticism which seriously concerns us is biblical criticism proper—the minute comparison of verse with verse and word with word, in order to learn what the Bible has to tell us of itself.

Take an example from the story of the Flood. We read a command to Noah to take *two* of each kind of animals into the ark. Lower down we read another command, that he is to take *seven*

pairs in the case of all clean animals. Lower down, again, we read that of all sorts there went in *two and two*, male and female. Our interest is awakened, and we find on closer observation that in the first and last of these three groups of verses the Divine Name is *God* (Elohim), but in the middle group it is *the Lord* (Jehovah). "Thus did Noah; according to all that God commanded him, so did he" (Gen. vi. 22). "Noah did according unto all that the Lord commanded him" (vii. 5). "There went in two and two unto Noah into the ark, male and female, as God commanded Noah" (vii. 9, comp. 14, 15).

Within these same groups we have corresponding differences of words and phrases, as when one group contains the expression "all flesh" again and again, and consistently uses different Hebrew words for the phrases "male and female," and "every living thing," and for the verb "to destroy." In this way we discover that two earlier accounts, written by writers of a different style, have been welded together by the final author of the book of Genesis. Now this we learn from the Bible itself. We can see it in the English version; it is still plainer in the original Hebrew.

A wider survey shows us that the work of these two authors can frequently be traced with undeniable certainty by the recurrence of the same characteristics. For example, Gen. i. to ii. 3 is

the work of the writer who uses the Name *God*; whereas Gen. ii. 4 (and following) comes from the writer who uses the Name *Jehovah*; and you will remember that the first writer gives a very different account from the second writer of the creation of man and woman.

These facts, then, we have from the Bible itself; two narratives which are hard to reconcile in two styles so different as to be obvious even in a translation. We need not be dismayed; we may trust the Bible; we may be sure that when we know it enough it will give a proper account of itself. Already it is telling us that it contains a historical process; that it has grown to its present shape; that there were at least two accounts of these early stories circulating among the Hebrew people; that the Divine Spirit had been using them already for the instruction of previous generations before they were welded together into one complete narrative.

If I am to be true to the Bible, I have no right to shut my eyes to what it has to tell me of itself. Problems indeed are raised, and in some instances very difficult problems; but it is the Bible itself which raises the problems. When I turn to the Gospels, I find a parallel in a part of the Bible of which it has fallen to me to make a serious study during many years, employing just the same literary processes and reaching somewhat analo-

gous results. I take, for example, St. Luke's Gospel. I can trace differences of style in some of the sections; I can even find corresponding differences in some instances in the names given to our Lord. And here I am not left merely to the guidance of such literary signposts. St. Luke himself tells me that others had written already. I find, as a fact, that he has welded narratives from St. Mark with materials taken from another source, and that his own careful hand has constantly modified what he has thus embodied. I cannot always reconcile his statements in detail with those of St. Mark or St. Matthew; but I do not find that these discrepancies affect the character or the work of our Blessed Lord—the message which all the Evangelists together bring us of Jesus Christ—any more than the divergencies within the book of Genesis affect the revelation of the truth about God and man which it is the purpose of that book to teach to all generations.

This is my point: the problems are primarily raised for me within the Bible itself. I have no lurking incredulity as to the possibility of miracles which makes me desire to prove them unfounded. But I do desire to know the true history of the past, and to learn all that the Bible can teach me of the method of its growth and of the manner of its inspiration.

When we extend our inquiry, and compare

Genesis and the other books of the Pentateuch with the Prophets and the Psalms, we gain still more light on the composition of the whole Mosaic history. There is nothing in the books of the Pentateuch to give us the dates of their writing. We can see by their style that they belong to various authors; but to date these authors we must look to the other books of the Old Testament. Then we learn that Deuteronomy, for example, corresponds in teaching and language with the prophetic work of the age between Isaiah and Jeremiah, while other parts of the Pentateuch are later and tally with the work of Ezekiel and the Exile. Here, again, we are still learning from the Bible itself.

But we may not refuse to learn from other sources as well. The Hebrew race was an offshoot from an older stock. The monuments of Babylonia, written in cuneiform, that is, wedge-shaped characters, on tablets of brick, of which the most important are now in the British Museum, have preserved to us stories of Creation and Flood which are parallel to the Hebrew stories, but inferior in morals and polytheist in religion. These are the stories of the world's childhood, by which men strove to interpret the beginnings of things and to utter their beliefs as to the relation of man to the spiritual forces which govern his life. They are ruder in concep-

tion and earlier in date than the Bible stories in the form in which we know them. They are, as it were, the raw material out of which the finished product was one day to be fashioned in the literature of the Hebrew people.

The existence of such stories is a world-wide phenomenon. Every ancient people is seen to have shaped for itself stories of this nature. The first beginnings of a nation's literature are regularly of this kind. With this thought, then, we come back to the Bible. It is the national literature of a chosen and inspired people, whom God was educating to become the moral instructors of the world. We can understand now that its literature begins with stories of the remote past —stories not essentially differing from the Babylonian folk-lore, but purified and elevated by that Divine inspiration which was fitting the Hebrew people for their appointed task.

We are not now surprised to find two widely different stories of Creation, one following the other, in the opening pages of the Bible—one showing a marvellous insight into the order of the universe, the other interpreting human relationships in a spiritual sense: both alike conveying a Divine message uttered in the picturesque language of primitive men. We see how the Divine Spirit speaks to man through a human medium. He does not suspend the natural law

of the earliest human literature, but claims it for His purpose, and remoulds the ancient stories of the people's ancestors and makes them the vehicles of eternal truths.

So soon as we recognise this principle of the purification and adaptation of the ancient folk-lore of the Semitic stock, in order to provide in a natural way a series of religious stories by which (to use Tennyson's words) "truth embodied in a tale shall enter in at lowly doors," many of the old difficulties disappear. We see that much of the original drapery of the stories remains, where it could well be allowed to remain without obscuring the religious lesson. Thus we are no longer so surprised to read that "the sons of God (*i.e.*, angels or other beings of more than earthly nature) saw the daughters of men that they were fair," and that the result of their lawless intercourse was a race of giants, whose violence consummated the wickedness which led to the Flood. We are no longer perplexed by the immense ages of the patriarchs, and their gradual diminution as a part of the punishment of sin. We can see how with a growing knowledge of God the Hebrews, in telling the old national tales to their children, were led gradually to remove the mythological and immoral elements, and to introduce everywhere true thoughts of righteousness and of the providence of God. We find in this a sign of

the Divine inspiration working in the people as a whole from very early times, and then at last inspiring priestly and prophetic writers to combine these stories and preserve them in books for generations to come. A purified folk-lore was gradually fashioned into an inspired lesson-book; and thus in their ultimate form these narratives became sacred and unalterable; and appeal could be made to them in all time to come as embodying in a picturesque form indisputable expressions of the will of God.

We cannot now go into the later periods and show what the Bible, when carefully studied in a scientific manner, has disclosed to us of its own growth. But I would briefly call your attention to one great gain which has come from the reconstruction of Hebrew history. We are able to see, as we could not before, the steady development of moral and spiritual ideas under the influence of the inspiring Spirit.

All around the Hebrew nation were other nations more or less closely akin to them, with low moral conceptions and gross idolatries. It is the great miracle of antiquity that this one small people should have been lifted to sublime thoughts of the true God, supreme over the universe, the righteous Judge of all the earth. How came this to pass in history? Their surroundings per-

petually tended to drag them down; how is it that they steadily rose?

The stock from which they sprang, the neighbours by whom they were encompassed, found objects of worship in sacred caves, sacred trees, sacred stones; they practised tribal rites like circumcision; they commonly practised child-sacrifice, especially of the first-born in time of war; they sacrificed to their gods whole towns of their enemies by indiscriminate massacre; they had many wives and concubines, and a low standard of sexual morality, turning even their religion to the service of their lusts. Into such a world the inspiring Spirit entered to lift a chosen race for the sake of all the rest; to implant new thoughts of God, issuing by degrees in new ways of worship and of life; teaching not all at once, but here a little and there a little, as the nation could bear the teaching and assimilate it in practice.

We can trace the remnants of the old ways in a hundred little details. The trees of Abraham and Deborah, the cave at Hebron, the stone at Bethel, show how the old usages are being transformed; the rite of circumcision is still allowed, but as a covenant with the nation's God; the story of the sacrifice of Isaac shows how child-sacrifice, which sprang from the true desire to dedicate the best and dearest to God, is gently set aside,

and the sacrifice of a ram allowed to be substituted; even as the law presently prescribed the redemption of every male child "that opened the womb." Longest, perhaps, lingered the terrible practice of sacrifice by massacre, which was at least tempered by the view that it was the execution of God's judgment upon sin. So the gradual lifting of the people proceeded; marriage was guarded by a law against capricious divorce; though it could not yet be as strict as God's ideal required, "because of the hardness of their hearts": polygamy was still permitted, and other social customs which a more advanced morality has come to condemn, such as concubinage and slavery. But the trend was ever upwards.

The greatest advance was all the while being made in the knowledge of God and of His will. Jehovah, the God of the tribe, appears at first, as it were, a stronger rival of other tribal gods; Israel is to have no mingling of worship; Jehovah is a jealous God; "*Thou* shalt have none other gods but Me." Many human actions and human thoughts are at first attributed to Him, and even a human form. But in time these grosser attributes are refined, and "the mighty hand and the outstretched arm" are phrases spiritualised by the prophets which we do not shrink from using to-day. Moreover, it was revealed to the prophets that Jehovah was Judge of all the nations, as

well as of Israel; that He was the supreme God of all the earth. But with this exaltation of their thought remained in wonderful juxtaposition two features of their earliest religion: (1) a deep reverence, "the fear of the Lord," and (2) an unequalled familiarity of personal intercourse, "O God, Thou art my God." The enlargement of the thought of God left both of these intact; and the result is for ourselves to-day the sublimest utterance of human devotion, the book of Hebrew Psalms, which has been and ever will be the prayer-book and the hymn-book of the saints of all countries and all ages.

Such, in most imperfect outline, was the process and the issue of the revelation of God through the inspiring Spirit to the people of His choice. The Old Testament is the record of that revelation. The revelation was still imperfect; it was a preparation only, and it waited for its consummation. Still larger and more tender thoughts of God were yet to come, and with them larger and more tender thoughts of the relation of man to man. A purer worship and a higher morality, and a fuller knowledge of God's eternal purpose, were to be revealed. God, who had spoken in the prophets, would speak again; the same God, and by the same method brought at last to its perfection, would speak to human ears by human lips, when the Son of God for us men was made

man. So at length the Old Testament achieved its purpose, and found its justification and its fulfilment in the coming of the Christ to whom it had pointed and led up. Read afresh in the large light of modern study, it is more wonderful than ever before. It tells us more of God, of His long patience and His gentle guiding, of His eternal purpose and His gradual fulfilment of it. It is less difficult because it is more natural, and in no respect is it less Divine.

III

I HAVE been chiefly concerned in these lectures to release the idea of Inspiration from a popular misconstruction, which has never been authorised by the Christian Church, and which brings the Bible into a wholly unnecessary conflict with the knowledge which we gain from other sources. This lower conception of the work of the inspiring Spirit, this supposition of a dictated book every statement of which must needs be historically and scientifically accurate, has gradually fastened itself on the minds of Englishmen since the middle of the seventeenth century, notwithstanding the silent protest of the Church of England and the open protest of such spiritual reformers as the early Quakers. It is this conception which, as knowledge has increased, has produced so grave a perplexity that many men have closed the Old Testament altogether, and to vast multitudes, unless some help is offered them, it will presently become a sealed book. The laborious researches of a generation of biblical scholars have paved the way for a larger conception such as I have been endeavouring to indicate to you. Nothing that I have said claims to be new; I have only

sought to bring to those who have little opportunity of serious study some thoughts which have frequently been expressed already by others. I stand here to try to help men by telling them what has been helpful to me. My hope is that you who hear me will open your Bibles again and read them with a new interest and a restored confidence. If you will bring an intelligent and reverent mind to the sacred books of the Old Testament, you will find God everywhere in it, choosing a people to bear His name, training them out of ignorance and superstition to an ever-increasing sense of His majesty and His righteousness, not suddenly stripping them of their ancient inheritance of thought and custom and worship, but patiently purifying and sanctifying it for His purpose, educating them by the vicissitudes of their national life, speaking to them through the human lips of their inspired leaders, and planting in their hearts a splendid and indomitable hope that by their means in days to come "the earth should be filled with the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea." Above all, you will learn how God was thus preparing a fitting medium for the Incarnation, a home for the Christ, whom the prophets dimly foresaw as the Divine King of all mankind, and again, by a startling paradox, as the suffering Servant of Jehovah, bearing His people's sin.

I know that there are many who welcome what I have said as a release from old difficulties and an encouragement to faith. I know also that some earnest and devout minds, who do not feel these difficulties, have heard me with painful alarm. For to them it seems that the foundations are shaken when that which is familiar and helpful to themselves is called in question. It has been always so since the Church began, whenever some larger and unexpected vision of truth has come in sight. I would earnestly remind them of the apostolic word of consolation, spoken to the first generation at a similar moment of distress, concerning "the removing of those things that are shaken, that those things which cannot be shaken may remain" (Heb. xii. 27).

I have spoken thus far chiefly of the Old Testament, for it is there that difficulty is most commonly felt. Before I speak more particularly of the New Testament, something needs to be said of the use of the Old Testament in the New. I have maintained the principle that literary and historical investigation of the Old Testament is a duty which rests upon Christian students, and that the secure results of this investigation must be welcomed as an aid to the understanding of the method and meaning of inspiration. But it is sometimes claimed that there are certain fixed points which the Christian student must regard

as indisputably determined beforehand by references to the Old Testament which occur in the New. Certain books are cited by the names which Jewish tradition had come to assign to them. The great personality of Moses had caused the later generations not only to say with truth that "the Law was given by Moses," but also to refer to his august name the whole of the subsequent development of the living and growing code of social and religious legislation: the Law and "Moses" were interchangeable terms, and Hebrew tradition assigned to him in the end the whole of the Pentateuch, even though the last book contained the story of his own death. In similar fashion the Psalter, though it contained psalms to which other names were expressly attached, was known as "David," and to the great psalmist were assigned all anonymous psalms of the collection.

Again, certain narratives are used by speakers and writers in the New Testament to illustrate parallel events or circumstances under the new dispensation. Some of the most obvious of these will spring at once to your minds.

Now, it is asserted that these books must be by the authors named in the New Testament, and that these narratives must be historical accounts of what actually occurred. Here, then, is a region fenced off from criticism, except so

far as criticism can be used to confirm the conclusions already drawn from the New Testament.

In reply to this assertion we are bound to maintain that criticism cannot be fettered by any such prejudging of cases which must be tried on their merits. We must seek the facts by the proper processes of literary investigation. Some of them we shall find with certainty; others with a high degree of probability. We shall not neglect the evidence that comes from the prevailing view of New Testament times, for that may sometimes be an important factor in the literary argument. But we shall not rule out beforehand facts which the sum total of the evidence goes to prove, because they are not in accordance with the Jewish tradition which prevailed when the New Testament was written; we shall, on the contrary, use them to help us to understand the New Testament in its turn.

Let me show you by a few examples how impossible it would be to press the opposite principle to its logical conclusions. St. Matthew's Gospel (xxvii. 9) quotes the passage of Zechariah (xi. 13) concerning "the thirty pieces of silver," as "spoken by Jeremiah the prophet." St. Mark's Gospel (i. 2, according to the true text) quotes Malachi's words, "Behold, I send My messenger," as "written in Isaiah the prophet." But we shall not surely regard these

two Gospels as saying the final word about the authorship of these quotations.

St. Paul says (1 Cor. x. 4) that the Israelites in the wilderness drank of a rock "that followed them" in their wanderings. But we read no such statement in the Old Testament, and we do not feel ourselves bound to believe the historical truth of the Rabbinic legend to which he was referring, even though he has included it among other scriptural narratives of which he says, "these things happened unto them for examples, and they were written for our admonition" (*v.* 11). We are content to say that he used a familiar Jewish tradition, which he had no reason to dispute, and which provided him with an illustration of the spiritual lesson which he sought to enforce. We might find further illustrations, if it were necessary, in the Epistle of St. Jude, where we have a quotation from the apocryphal book of Enoch, and a reference to the legend of "Michael the archangel, when contending with the devil he disputed about the body of Moses." The fact that a story of the remote past of Israel's history is appropriated for purposes of instruction does not by itself prove that the story narrates an actual historical event. It shows only that it was commonly accepted and contained a useful lesson. Critical investigation is free to inquire into its historical accuracy.

But it is further urged that our Lord Himself is represented in the Gospels as attributing certain words to Moses and others to David. Does not this at least foreclose the question of authorship? To touch on such an argument is to enter upon the holiest ground, and to approach the deep mystery of the nature of the Incarnation of the Son of God. Let us pause to remember that we are in the presence of the Divine Lord of whom we are speaking together.

I must first repeat that Moses and David were great literary names to the men of that generation. "The Law" was "Moses"; "the Psalms" were "David." The whole of the New Testament shows that the question of authorship was not then raised; it is inconceivable that it should have been raised either by the Galilean apostles or by St. Paul, who was trained in the schools of the Rabbis. As our Lord used the popular tongue, so He spoke in the phraseology of His day, which it would have been only confusing to have set aside. He naturally referred to the sacred books by the names which at once conveyed His meaning to His hearers. Is it right to argue that He thereby incidentally determined the question of their literary authorship?

If it is affirmed that our Divine Lord must have known the exact facts as to the origin and

composition of all the books of the Old Testament, it is those who hazard such a statement who are leaving the paths of reverent reserve. Surely it is more consistent with reverence to search patiently for the facts by the due processes of literary investigation, and, when they are ascertained, to bring them to help us to interpret the Lord's words as recorded in the Gospels. If it is found that Moses or David did not write certain words attributed to them by the ordinary Jewish tradition, then we may be sure that our Lord did not intend by what He said to decide a question of literary authorship. And if it should appear that He did not transcend the best knowledge of His time in these literary details, we shall learn from this something more of the condescension by which the Son of God in becoming man for our sakes entered into certain of the natural limitations of a human life: we shall learn that in this, as in all points, He was made like unto His brethren, save in so far as their faculties were clouded by sin. We know already that in His sacred boyhood He "increased in wisdom" (St. Luke ii. 52): we know, for He has told us, that something of the future was hidden from His knowledge (St. Mark xiii. 32): why should we be unwilling to learn that something of the past as well, which had no obvious bearing on His earthly mission,

should have remained unknown to His human mind?

We answer, then, in the spirit of humility and reverence, that instead of using the Gospels to foreclose inquiry, we must use the results of inquiry to interpret the Gospels. Once again, therefore, in the name of truth we hold open the door. Let inquiry proceed: the light shall help us, as we reverently welcome and use it. We shall not accept every new hypothesis as bringing the light of truth. We shall test the hypotheses with a rigorous scrutiny; or, if we cannot test them ourselves, we shall wait till others whom we trust have tested them. We shall accept for our guidance the considered verdict of the ablest and most devout of the scholars of the Christian Church. We shall ask them to be honest, fearless, and grave, well weighing their responsibility to guide those who cannot undertake the inquiry for themselves.

When we require that the Old Testament must be submitted to the most searching and scientific investigation, do we make the same demand for the New Testament? Is this to be scrutinised with the same freedom of spirit, and are we prepared to accept here also the ascertained results of literary and historical inquiry? Certainly yes; there can be but one answer.

For we claim that Christianity appeared in the

world as a historical movement, at a time when history had begun to be understood and recorded, not indeed with the precision of modern investigators, but with a general sense of the difference between fact and legend. The Christ comes on the world's scene as a historical personality, crowning the historical development of Judaism, summing up the past and opening a new era. We claim that at a certain moment in history God united Himself with man in the historical figure of the Incarnate Son of God. Such claims are a challenge to historical investigation. When we add that Christ carried on His work through a society which He founded to represent Him as His Body on earth, we are pointing again to history and making a further challenge to historical investigation. The New Testament is the literature of that society in its earliest stages, and as such it must be interpreted by the aid of literary criticism. Here are our primary documents: they must be examined and tested by the best apparatus that each generation in its turn can provide.

They are not, of course, the only historical monuments of the Christian history of those days. The very symbol of the Cross, which has been changed from the sign of a felon's death into the sign of supreme self-sacrifice and of victory through defeat—from a symbol of shame to a symbol of glory—is a historical monument of the death

of Jesus Christ which brought about that unparalleled change. The most solemn worship of Christians, the Holy Communion, is a historical monument connecting all the ages that have followed with "the night in which He was betrayed." The Christian Church, above all, is the living monument of the life and death, the resurrection and continual working of its Founder. We are not dependent for our historical certainty solely on a book. The Church is the witness to Christ, as the river is the witness to its source.

The New Testament is the group of early documents which give the historical explanation of these abiding monuments—the Cross, the Communion, the Church itself. These independent testimonies reach back to a time before a word of the New Testament was written: the New Testament is the literary record which helps us to interpret them; and as a literary record it must be tested by the methods of all literary investigation. The results of such investigation must then be used to help us in determining the method and meaning of inspiration as applied to the New Testament. When we have got our facts, we may begin to frame our conclusions as to what inspiration does or does not involve in this particular sphere of its working.

We may view the question here as we did in the case of the Old Testament. We may begin

with the inspired persons, and then pass to the secondary conception of inspired writings.

In Christ the Divine Spirit rested in fulness on the Son of Man. The writer who chiefly emphasises this is St. Luke. If you will trace the word "Spirit" in his Gospel, you will see how at the outset he notes that Zacharias was inspired (i. 67), that his son John the Baptist was inspired (i. 15), and that the aged Simeon was inspired (ii. 25). A new life had come into a select group of holy souls who were "looking for the redemption of Jerusalem": the Holy Spirit was at work afresh. The same Spirit was at work from the beginning in the life of Christ—in the wonder of His birth, in His baptism, in His temptation, in His preaching at Nazareth, and again and again in the course of His ministry. Christ is pre-eminently anointed with the Holy Spirit. If we do not ordinarily speak of Him as inspired, it is only because that word has received a technical sense which seems too limited to express the fulness of the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Incarnate Son. Yet the Epistle to the Hebrews suggests that all the inspiration of the past reached its climax in Christ, when it says that "God having spoken in the prophets . . . hath spoken to us in His Son" (i. 1 *f.*).

When we read St. Luke's second volume, the Acts of the Apostles, we see that the work of the

Holy Spirit still dominates his thought. Pentecost is the first fulfilment of our Lord's promise of the Spirit; and the whole book is the story of "men moved by the Holy Spirit" and "speaking from God."

Among the inspired men of the primitive Church the most conspicuous is St. Paul. No man ever claimed inspiration more boldly. He does not, indeed, claim inspiration for his writings: these took the form of letters, written on special occasions, and with no idea (so far as we can tell) that they would be preserved and regarded in the future as canonical Scriptures like the books of the Old Testament. But his doctrine and his judgments on grave matters he frequently claims to have directly received from the Spirit of God; though sometimes he takes pains to make it clear that he is only using his own best wisdom, and not speaking at the command of the Spirit.

What St. Paul claimed for himself in the matter of inspiration, he claimed also for the Christian society as a whole—the Body of Christ inspired by the Spirit of Christ, the "one Body" with the "one Spirit." We have here an analogy with the position of the ancient chosen people, which, as we have seen, was inspired as a people to receive and preserve the Divine revelation for the instruction of the world. God still has His elect people, specially trained for the benefit of the

whole of mankind. They are the special sphere of the Holy Spirit's operation—the divinely inspired people of God.

It is their earliest literature which is gathered together in the New Testament. If we ask why the New Testament closes where it does, and consequently excludes such books as the Epistle of Clement and the "Shepherd" of Hermas, both of which were at one time read in some churches; we reply that the general Christian consciousness, after much experience of reading the early books side by side with the ancient prophets in the Christian assembly, gradually reached a unanimous decision under the direction, as we believe, of the inspiring Spirit. As to the Four Gospels and the Pauline Epistles, that decision was reached by about the middle of the second century. As to other books, like the Epistle to the Hebrews, 2 Peter, Jude, and the Revelation, the various branches of the Church held different opinions for a longer time; but at length all agreed in the inclusion of these and the exclusion of certain other books such as those which I have mentioned. Presently this decision was registered by the acts of Councils, and so at last made formally authoritative. It has commended itself to the general mind of the Church, and no attempt of a formal kind has ever been made to reverse it.

The question naturally arises whether inspira-

tion ceased at the point at which the New Testament closes; and if not, why are no further books pronounced canonical and inspired. In view of the perpetual presence of the Holy Spirit promised to the Christian Church, we cannot admit that at any one time the inspiration either of the body or of individual leaders was withdrawn. But we may rightly affirm that such a body of literature belonging to the first age was a providential gift, necessary to the Church as providing an authoritative account of the beginning of Christianity, which might always be appealed to in order to arrest any Church movement which could be shown to be out of harmony with the original foundation of Christ and His Apostles.

As a matter of fact a line does occur in the literary history of Christianity which practically coincides with the line of canonicity drawn by the Church. Consider the most eminent examples of New Testament inspiration, St. Paul and St. John. They were great personalities claimed by the Divine Spirit for the enunciation of truth. As we read the literature of the second century we find to our surprise that, while they still exercise a general influence, they have left no great successors at all comparable with themselves in spiritual or intellectual power. The work of the Church is not continuously carried on by great men; it falls to a number of good men of inferior

attainments. Paul is not succeeded by a great Pauline teacher who develops his master's theology; John leaves no great Johannine teacher to carry out his line of thought.

The most striking figure of the next age is the mystic martyr-bishop Ignatius, who has made a mark in literature by his burning zeal; but his thoughts are a strange medley of St. Paul and St. John, and, though he claims at times to speak by the Spirit, he expressly disclaims the right to teach like the great Apostles. He recognises that their words carry another authority from his own. It is this lack of immediate successors comparable with the great teachers that peculiarly characterises the succeeding generation of Christians. When great teachers come next into sight—as Irenaeus at the close of the second century, who is the first writer to show any clear appreciation of the thought of St. Paul, and especially of the wide purpose of God for the world as St. Paul had conceived it—then they look back over a comparatively sterile tract in Christian literature. It had been an age of great progress in organisation and expansion in numbers, of noble testimony by martyrdom, and of defence of the Christian position by apologies addressed to the world's rulers; but it was not an age of new thinking, and men looked back to the Apostolic age as the great originating period, and they regarded the docu-

ments of the Apostolic age as standing on a higher level of spiritual value than any subsequent writings.

Of the results of the application of critical principles to some of the most important parts of the New Testament I have spoken at some length in previous courses of Advent lectures on the study of the Gospels and on the Incarnation; and these have since been published.* I have there sufficiently indicated, as the outcome of many years of particular study, my own firm conviction of the general historical trustworthiness of the representation of Christ which we find in the Gospels, and my view of the complex literary processes by which the Gospels have taken their present form. It is impossible here to say more, save this one general remark: If when the same methods of criticism are applied to the New Testament as are applied to the Old Testament the results are very different, it is only because the material under examination is of so different a kind. The distance of time between the record and the recorded events in the New Testament is nothing as compared with the distance between the record and the events in many parts of the Old Testament, where it varies from, perhaps, a hundred to a thousand years. For when the

* *The Study of the Gospels* (Longmans, 1902); *Some Thoughts on the Incarnation* (Longmans, 1903).

earliest Gospel records were written down many persons were living who might have been present as eye-witnesses of the events of our Lord's ministry. I repeat that, if the same processes of investigation produce very different results, it is only because the literature to which they are applied is of so different a kind.

But it is time that I should draw to a close. It is difficult to define inspiration. It is always to be remembered that the Church has never attempted a formal definition. It would be as unwise now as at any time in the past to make such an attempt. But inspiration can be known, while it cannot be defined. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof." So is it with the operation of the Divine Spirit. We cannot confine it within the limits of our definitions. It is beyond all that we can venture to say of it. We can know it, because spirit answers to spirit—the human spirit to the Divine. Let any man who desires to assure himself afresh of the truth of inspiration read over in some quiet hour the fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth chapters of St. John's Gospel, and ask himself, Is there anything anywhere more convincingly Divine? Or let him read the plain and homely narrative of St. Mark, till the figure of Jesus Christ seems to rise from the page, and then ask, Was not this

evangelist divinely guided to select and combine these simple stories, so as to give us a transcript from the life, and to enable the reader of to-day to take his stand by the peasant folk of Galilee and see what they saw of the living Saviour? Or, once more, let him study the Epistle to the Ephesians, and ask, How came St. Paul by his spiritual vision of the ultimate destiny of the human race, of the revelation of God to all intelligent existences "through the Church," of the glory to God which is yet to be rendered "in the Church and in Christ Jesus"?

Brethren, we have not lost our faith. We move fearlessly forward towards the growing light of a larger day: confident that the Bible will always prove its own inherent power; that its further study will reveal its deeper truths; that as the human element in its composition is more clearly ascertained its Divine element will be more intelligibly recognised: remembering always that it claims an authority over the human spirit such as no other book can claim, and that by our use of it, or our neglect of it, we shall be judged in the day when God calls us to our account.

Note to page 43.—In St. Matthew xxvii. 9 the name "Jeremiah" is omitted by the Old-Syriac palimpsest on Mount Sinai, by two Old-Latin copies (cent. iv.), and by the Peshito (or Vulgate) Syriac. Three Greek manuscripts omit it, an uncial (cent. vi.) and two cursives (cent. ix.-xii.). There is slight evidence of another attempt at correction by the substitution of the name Zechariah, and even in one manuscript of the name Isaiah. But we cannot reject the overwhelming testimony of all the Greek manuscripts (with inconsiderable exceptions), the remainder of the Latin evidence, and the Egyptian, Armenian, and other versions. No doubt the omission was an early one, intended to remove a difficult reading.

It has been suggested that the latter part of Zechariah, which is generally agreed to be the work of some other prophet, may have been written by Jeremiah, so that St. Matthew may be right after all. But I cannot find that serious critics of the Old Testament accept this view. It is better, with Origen and Augustine, to admit the difficulty; and then we may try to learn its lesson.

APPENDIX A

AN ADDRESS TO SUNDAY SCHOOL TEACHERS

THE importance of the work in which you are engaged may be measured by the extraordinary anxiety which is being shown throughout the whole country as to the teaching of religion to children. I will not enter into that controversy further than to say that to me the vital point is to secure that whoever teaches the Gospel story to children shall believe that Christ is what the Gospel represents Him as being. The religious lesson should be given by a teacher who believes what he is to teach. I do not in the least wish to substitute a clerical for a lay teacher. Whatever part may be taken by a clergyman, the main work should rest with the school teachers. It is their great privilege, and they must not be robbed of it.

Whatever may be the issue as to the teaching of religion in the Day School, the work of the Sunday School teacher will still be necessary, and every year seems to make it more important. But every year also makes it more difficult. Questions arise now which an earlier generation was not called upon to face in the same way. A higher standard of knowledge and of thoughtfulness is required, and

you do well to fit yourselves as fully as you can for your work.

The Book which you hold in your hands as teachers has not changed. We have changed. Much new light has been given to us by God in regard to our own constitution and the constitution of the world in which we live; and in this new light, which is shining all around us, and which comes to all of us at least in scattered rays here and there, we read the Bible differently. Our whole conception of the method of its inspiration has been altered. A great deal which our forefathers took literally we cannot take literally to-day. The first chapter of Genesis no longer means to us that the world was made in six days. The second chapter of Genesis no longer means to us that God moulded clay into a human figure and breathed upon it, or that He took a rib from Adam and made Eve. These are allegories or parables to us.

They still proclaim their original spiritual lessons. They teach that God is the source of all creation; that God works in patient, slow development; that the lower comes before the higher; that the highest and the best is man; that man is akin to the beasts that perish, but also akin to God; that he is God's image in the world. All this is untouched by modern discovery; it is the underlying spiritual truth, taught in the form of what was at first literally believed, but for us is a parable. And so, again, we believe that God made man out of dust, not by moulding clay, but through a long process of

development which followed a course which He had marked out, and in every step of which He was working His will. So we believe that through holy marriage man and woman become intimately one, in a union which God has made and which man must not break. This is the underlying truth of the old-world story which makes Adam say, "Bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh." These and many other stories, like that of the talking serpent and the talking ass, we do not now take (or, at any rate, most of us — I do not) as literal statements of historical facts, but as imagery which clothes certain spiritual lessons.

For ourselves this is not, perhaps, very difficult; but when we come to teach it is not easy. With quite young children there is very little difficulty, for stories are the natural vehicles to them of moral lessons, and they do not often ask, Is it true? or, Did it really happen? But older children want to know, and we must be prepared to give them an honest answer. It is not merely at the time that we must retain their confidence, their confidence in us as teachers and confidence in the spiritual truths we are teaching them; but we must so teach them that when they go away from us they will not be overthrown by the first question they hear, as, for instance, where Cain got his wife from. We must teach them in such a way that they will not at any time have to unlearn their lessons. We must be prepared to say to them that these are the old-world stories which God allowed to be told, to teach

certain great lessons, which were easiest learned and easiest remembered so: for us they are parables —earthly stories with a heavenly meaning.

I give these as illustrations of difficulties that are to be met with. There are many more and many greater difficulties in connection with the Old Testament and the New Testament than these. I have spent most of my life in the study of these matters, and I feel that there is a mass of difficulty which has not yet been solved; but those other difficulties do not so directly concern the teaching of children, and even our learned theologians are not clear about a good many. What I would say to you is, Do not expect that everything is going to be cleared up and made absolutely plain. The Bible is a much more wonderful book than we have sometimes thought. Much of it is plain and stands out clearly, but much is difficult of interpretation. Welcome all the light from nature and from study, from science and from criticism; and do not despair because the problems will not come out.

After all, your chief work is not with the difficulties of the Bible. It is to teach Christ to the children; to take the incidents of the Gospel, and show what Jesus was like, what He did for people to help them and give them new hope and save them from their weaknesses and sins; and then to say, He is the same yesterday and to-day and for ever; He loves you, as He loved children then; He has shown His love even unto His death upon the Cross; He ever lives to help and save you.

This is your message, and no new difficulties need obscure it. If you can say, It is not only in the Book, but I know it in my own life—then you will carry conviction, and your work will live in the lives of others.

APPENDIX B

NOTE ON SOME RECENT BOOKS

I DESIRE to commend to the thoughtful English reader the recent *Commentary on Genesis* (Methuen, 1904) by Dr. Driver, whose *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament* (T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh) is already well known. I would further commend an elaborate article, which is really a treatise, in Hastings's *Bible Dictionary* (supplementary volume), by Professor Kautzsch of Halle, entitled: "Religion of Israel."

A small book by Dr. R. F. Horton of Hampstead, entitled: *The Bible a Missionary Book* (Oliphant and Co., 1904), is a striking illustration of the new interest which the Old Testament can awaken when devoutly read in the light of modern studies.

Those who are responsible for the education of the young will gain help from Mr. Cyril Bickersteth's *Letters to a Godson* (Mowbray and Co.); and also from two volumes in Messrs. Longman's series of "Simple Guides to Christian Knowledge"; namely, *The Early Story of Israel*, by Mrs. Thomas (a daughter of the late Dean Farrar), and, *The Work of the Prophets*, by Miss Rose E. Selfe.

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SVMMA · REVERENTIA

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DECANVS · WESTMONASTERIENSIS

TO HIS GRACE

THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY

My dear Lord Archbishop,

I welcome the opportunity of dedicating this little book to your Grace, as a token at once of sincere respect and of gratitude for personal kindnesses which can never be repaid. The three lectures here printed were given on the Saturday afternoons of last Advent from the pulpit of Westminster Abbey to a congregation which consisted largely of men. I was unwilling to publish them at the time, because, though they were the result of much study in the past, they were rapidly written and appeared to me to deserve no more than a passing report. I specially feared lest, if they appeared as a book, they might be regarded in some quarters as intended for a complete historical defence of the article of

the Creed to which they chiefly refer. But the persistent cry of some of the clergy for an authoritative pronouncement of the Bishops of our Church, by way of meeting the questionings of recent times in regard to the Virgin-birth of our Lord, appears to me so greatly to mistake the temper of the questioners and to militate against the interests of sober enquiry, that I venture now to offer these lectures as an indication of the lines on which I think the subject may most advantageously be approached, and to preface them with a brief statement, addressed by permission to your Grace, in deprecation of the appeal for an official utterance of reasseveration.

No one will dispute the fact that in the minds of thoughtful men there is a very serious disquietude in regard to the doctrine of the Virgin-birth. It is only necessary to ask any doctor, any student of natural science, or any man who interests himself in scientific enquiries and their apparent conclusions, and endeavours to frame for himself a reasonable interpretation of the problems of life—to ask him not only what he himself thinks and feels, but what other men of

his profession or class are saying to him, in order to discover that there is a real unsettlement of their minds in regard to a matter which hardly occurred to their fathers as a subject of enquiry. If we are to know how this grave disquietude is to be met, we must first understand what it is that is producing it. I think that there are two concurrent causes.

One is the spread of what would perhaps be called the scientific habit of mind. I mean more especially the temper which seeks everywhere for natural causes, and believes that they may yet be discovered where at present they are not obvious ; which even when it will not deny the possibility of miracle is exceedingly jealous of what it regards as an unnecessary intervention of the miraculous. Many men of this temper can see the moral necessity of the miraculous in the case of our Lord's resurrection from the dead ; but they cannot discover a like moral necessity for the Virgin-birth as the indispensable mode of the Incarnation. They are inclined to think that the union of God with Man might conceivably have been effected in some other way. They regard this particular

miracle as accordingly making a demand upon their faith less reasonable than is made by any other miracle of the Gospel. Moreover, their professional or scientific training, or their scientific way of thinking, as they would put it, has absolutely disqualified them in their own judgment for any real belief in this miracle. These opinions spread far beyond the region in which they originate, and they constitute a genuine and widely-felt difficulty of belief, which deserves to be treated most sympathetically by Christian teachers.

Now, secondly, to men who live in this atmosphere there has come the knowledge that the belief from which they shrink has been called in question from another side. They are learning for the first time that it finds no direct expression in the writings of the two great teachers who above all others have expounded to us the doctrine of the Incarnation—St Paul and St John. They are, indeed, confronted by the first and third of our Gospels. But here they discover that criticism has been at work: that it tells us without ambiguity that the earliest

stratum of the evangelic narrative contained no statement at all as to the mode of Christ's birth. They learn that careful and orthodox critics do not attach from the historical point of view the same weight to narratives peculiar to St Matthew as to other parts of the Gospels. They find themselves left with St Luke as the strongest historical evidence within the New Testament. They begin to wonder whether, after all, the tradition may not be an after-growth. They learn, too, that German scholars of the highest eminence have done what English scholars of the highest eminence in the same studies have not yet done—have definitely rejected the narratives of the Virgin-birth as in their judgment historically incredible. As the result of all this, they are confirmed in the position to which they had come on other grounds.

This is the situation, and these are the two principal causes. What ought to be the method to be pursued by the teaching office of the Church at such a moment? That is the question which profoundly interests us all.

In regard to the difficulty on the scientific side

little, I think, can be directly attempted. The intellectual temper of the age is beyond our control. The moment is one of peculiar interest: for the problem of the origins of life is being eagerly studied; and, though it is not our part to judge in a scientific controversy, it cannot be without interest to observe the admission in a very high quarter that the problem appears to be insoluble without some special intervention, which, whatever others may name it, we must speak of as the Hand of God. We welcome the indication, and wait in hope. Meanwhile we can urge upon such minds as I have been describing the meaning and the importance of the doctrine of the Incarnation as offering an interpretation of life, a philosophy of the whole of human history. We can explain the distinction in thought between the Incarnation and the special mode of its manifestation on the stage of our earthly life. If we can at all help men to realise the moral and intellectual necessity of the one doctrine, we may pass on with some hope to explain the unique appropriateness of the other.

On the critical side we can work, and are

working. The whole problem of the Gospels is being dealt with by the scholars of the Church in a way which promises the best results. There is a keen interest in it which is widely felt. The atmosphere is at present calm. Passions have not been aroused as they were by Old Testament criticism, and extravagance in consequence is comparatively rare. We are being trusted by the Church, and we recognise the responsibility which that trust brings with it. This quiet confidence is, I believe, the strongest testimony which the Church can at this moment offer to the whole class of minds which I have described.

Now, what is the new departure which in certain quarters is being urged upon us, and what will be its effect? We are asked to meet the disquietude of men's minds by appealing for a pronouncement from the episcopate to the effect that the Virgin-birth is a cardinal doctrine of the Christian faith. This pronouncement is, I gather, to take one of two forms. Either it is to be a formal reassertion of the truth of the Virgin-birth on the highest ecclesiastical authority, a statement that our Bishops really believe what we

say twice a day in our Creed; or it is to be such a reassertion accompanied with a summary of the main arguments on which that article of the Creed rests.

What will be the effect of the first method on minds such as I have described? It will be regarded as an attempt to close the door of enquiry by the hand of authority. That, I take it, few of us would desire. It is utterly alien to the spirit of the English Church. It is a fundamental principle that criticism must be met by criticism, not by counter-assertion. We shall inevitably give the impression that we are using in despair our last available weapon. We shall thereby create a greater anxiety than that which we seek to allay.

What will be the effect of the second method? I believe that it will be still more disastrous. The argument for the Virgin-birth cannot be presented in a summary form without suggesting that it is far weaker than in reality it is. If the Bishops should quote, for example—and I have heard the suggestion made—the testimony of St Ignatius, they would at once raise the question,

Why do they not quote his great masters, St Paul and St John? If they make a summary defence, they will set up a target at which many a shaft will be aimed. For this will fairly be accounted the statement of the Church's case. It will be examined as such, and pronounced wholly inadequate as an argument for so astonishing a miracle.

If what I have said be at all grounded in reason, it follows that nothing can be more untimely than an appeal from the clergy to their Bishops to make at this moment an authoritative assertion that the doctrine of the Virgin-birth is a cardinal doctrine of the Christian faith. I might indeed take objection to the loose employment of the term 'cardinal doctrine' in such a connexion. If the Bishops were asked to declare that the Incarnation is a cardinal doctrine of the faith, such a statement would be superfluous indeed, but it would be true. But to say that the historical fact of the Virgin-birth is a cardinal doctrine of the faith is to use language which no Synod of Bishops, so far as I am aware, has ever ventured to use. It is to confuse the

Incarnation with the special mode of the Incarnation in a way for which Christian theology offers no precedent. But I let the point of phraseology pass: for it is the act of reassertion by authority of that which is questioned by criticism which I deprecate. Such an act is bound to produce an injurious effect upon enquiring minds. And it is likely to stir afresh the public discussion of a subject which does not gain by being publicly discussed.

There is a natural reserve of the English mind which has saved us hitherto from the interminable and most painful canvassing of this question which has gone on elsewhere. I believe that almost all of us desire that the subject should drop out of the arena of publicly canvassed questions. A pronouncement of the Bishops would only push it to the front again. It is quite another thing that some of the theologians amongst them should take natural opportunities of presenting the argument in a way that may reach doubtful minds. Some of them have done so already. But can any one believe that, to

offer a single example, the signature of the Bishop of Worcester to a joint episcopal declaration on this matter could effect anything at all for perplexed enquirers in comparison with the writings of Charles Gore?

Briefly, then, I would say: At the present moment anxiety is rife, but open discussion is rare. The action urged either would seem to stifle enquiry by invoking authority, or would challenge disputation by offering a summary of arguments. There is anxiety, but we need not manufacture a crisis, we need not fall into panic. There is a true way of meeting this doubt. Our scholars and theologians are quietly taking it. I would implore the Church not to hamper and prejudice their earnest labours by interposing an utterance of authority which will rouse intellectual resentment and will not allay disquiet.

Your Grace will pardon me if I have written with needless urgency on a matter in which I might be confident that I should have your hearty sympathy. But when voices of alarm are raised, it is sometimes important that an expression should

be given to the view of those who, while no less eager to maintain the truth, are opposed to alarmist action.

I remain,

Your Grace's sincerely devoted servant,

J. Armitage Robinson.

Westminster Abbey,
Ascension Day, 1903.

SOME THOUGHTS

ON

THE INCARNATION

I

The season of Advent is intended by the Church as a preparation for the great festival of Christmas. Christmas brings joys peculiar to itself. It brings the re-union of families; it calls on the middle-aged and the old to forget their years, and give themselves up to join in the pleasures of the little children. It calls the world to generosity and peace: it invites the rich to share their substance with the poor, and the injured or aggrieved to lay aside their resentment and seek reconciliation. It is a joyous time of innocent mirth and bountiful good will. It is the festival of the Holy Child, who was born to be the Prince of Peace.

Yet Christmas has its shadows for many of us as the years go on. It brings sad memories of happy gatherings for ever past, and vacant chairs that can never be filled. It reminds us how far we have travelled on the path of life, and how distant are the voices of our own childhood. All this may have its compensations indeed for those who with a strong faith look forward joyously towards the eternal future. But to many a man Christmas itself brings a fresh sense of haunting doubts as to the security of his belief in the very truth to which Christmas is intended to witness. Easter presents less difficulty to his mind than Christmas. From the earnest contemplation of the Passion, he is led on by a kind of necessity to believe that such a life and such a death must have been followed by a resurrection, if the power of goodness to triumph over evil was to be manifested to the world. But Christmas seems to offer a more incredible and a quite needless miracle. He feels the beauty of the Gospel story, but he finds himself, year by year, further removed from any serious belief in it. He would like to enter heart and soul into the religious as well as the social side of the Christmas festival: he dares not stay away and let his children go to

church alone: but the Christmas hymns are no longer real to him, he feels as though the foundations of his faith were undermined, and in the midst of others' joy he is perplexed and sad.

It is such men as this that I have had in my thoughts in planning this short course of Advent lectures. The Church must have a message to give to them, if she is to continue to assert, as she has from the beginning asserted, that her faith is in accord with the highest reason. It may not indeed be possible to remove the whole of the difficulty that they experience: for the spiritual world is not wholly to be interpreted in terms of the world of sense, and again and again our faith leads us up towards a region of insoluble mystery. But I believe that it is possible to propose some thoughts on the Incarnation which may help such men as I have spoken of to understand that the Christian belief is not at this point so unreasonable as at first sight, and without enquiry, it appears to them to be.

My design is a simple and an unpretending one. I shall try to state in plain words what we mean when we speak of the doctrine of the Incarnation, and why we attach so great importance to this doctrine. I do not propose to examine

the philosophical foundations of the doctrine, or to trace the history of its development, or to justify the safeguards by which it was found necessary in early times to protect it from misconception. These are fascinating enquiries: they are among the highest tasks of the Church's theologians. They are also tasks most necessary to be undertaken: for the Church is bound in every age to give an answer concerning the faith she holds which shall correspond with the best thought and the most advanced knowledge of the age. But they require a special gift and a special training. Even to understand where the true difficulties lie, and to judge of the solutions which are proposed, demands no ordinary measure of intellect as well as a long course of patient preparation.

My present task is a humbler one. I wish to set out in terms which any thoughtful man who will take reasonable trouble can understand, first, what we mean by the Incarnation; secondly, what led up to it and made it possible; then, how as a matter of historical fact it was realised on the stage of the world; and lastly, what are its chief lessons and its most important issues.

First, then, what do we mean by the Incarna-

tion? Let us begin with the word itself. It is a Latin word, to which no one English word exactly corresponds, and therefore we have borrowed it and made it our own. The root *carn-* means 'flesh.' Incarnate means embodied, or more strictly 'made to be in flesh.' The Incarnation signifies the coming of the Son of God in human flesh. The word 'incarnate' is well explained for us in our Nicene Creed in the words: 'Who for us men . . . was incarnate . . . and was made man.'

Here then is the doctrine of the Incarnation. In the language of the Gospel, 'The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us.' In the words of the Creed, 'The only begotten Son of God . . . very God . . . by whom all things were made . . . for us men . . . came down from heaven, and was incarnate . . . and was made man.'

Let us be clear about this at the outset. What we are now speaking of is the doctrine of the Incarnation: not the method by which the Incarnation was realised or manifested in human life. Let us keep to the order that we have laid down. What the Incarnation in itself is, that is the first question. In what way the Incarnation

was brought about is a different question: and we shall gain much in clearness of thought if we take the first question first.

It is not unnecessary to insist upon this point of distinction. A man came to me not long ago, and said that he wanted advice as to how to help a friend of his who had great difficulty in believing in the Incarnation. I said: 'Do you mean the Incarnation itself—the fact that the Son of God became man for our sakes? or do you mean the mode of the Incarnation—the miracle of the Virgin-birth?' 'Of course,' he said, 'I mean the Virgin-birth.'

This confusion of thought is what I want to clear up at the outset. I do not myself see how a man who does not believe the Incarnation—that the Son of God was made man—can be expected to believe the miraculous birth of the Incarnate. If he cannot say in his Creed: 'Who came down from heaven, and was incarnate,' he cannot go on to add: 'By the Holy Ghost, of the Virgin Mary.'

I do not for a moment say that the two things can be separated: but I say that they can be distinguished and ought to be distinguished in our thought upon the subject. We must keep

the true order of thought, if we are to arrive at a reasonable presentation of the faith.

It is from neglect of this principle of distinction that there are many men found to say offhand: 'I am asked to believe in a thing which my special knowledge of physiology together with my general scientific training has rendered me incapable of believing. Tell me of the noble character of Christ, tell me of His unrivalled self-sacrifice, and I will join you in the most loyal admiration. Indeed I have tried however distantly to follow Him, and His cross fills me with shame whenever I look upon it: it is at once the condemnation and the inspiration of my life. But the Incarnation—no. It has been credible in the past, but to-day it is credible no longer. We must reconstruct our beliefs, and cease to demand the impossible.'

May I speak just to such men for a moment, and not to the full believer in the Christian Creed, who finds nothing impossible or too hard for God? I would say: Make the distinction in thought to which I have referred. Leave, for the time being, the question of the mode of the Incarnation in the background, and consider only the doctrine of the Incarnation—that the

Son of God took human flesh, was incarnate and was made man. If you can once get reasonably clear about that, you can come on later to the consideration of the mode in which the Incarnation was divinely brought about. If you are convinced that an incarnation of God in human flesh actually took place, then and then only can you approach the evidence for the scriptural narratives and the Church's belief as to the mode of it with a mind that is open to the possibility of its acceptance. If the Son of God was made man in the birth of Jesus, that was an event absolutely unique, utterly miraculous. If you find that to be a belief which is justified, as explaining what is otherwise inexplicable, and as giving the key to the mystery of human life; then you have reached a point at which you will be free to ask further whether, the event being unique and miraculous in itself, the mode of its manifestation may not conceivably have been unique and miraculous also.

I propose then to invite you, first of all, to consider the doctrine of the Incarnation in itself, apart from the question of the miraculous method of its realisation. If I am challenged for allowing this distinction, even in thought, I must

reply that I have the highest authority on my side. The two greatest exponents of the truth of the Incarnation, and of its world-issues, are St Paul and St John. Though we have no right to conclude from their silence that they held any other belief than that of our first and third evangelists, yet their extant writings do not, as a matter of fact, tell us anything of the miraculous birth. I draw no conclusion from their silence but this : that we are justified in speaking of the Incarnation itself by itself, and without introducing at the moment the question of the particular mode in which it was realised in history.

I have made a long introduction : but it was absolutely necessary to do something to clear the ground in order to enable what I believe to be a large class of minds to approach the consideration of the Incarnation with a free and unfettered judgment. In the short time which is still at our disposal this afternoon, I shall enquire to what extent the revelation of God and of man's relation to God, which was made to the Jewish people, prepared the way for the doctrine of the Incarnation, the manifestation of God in human flesh.

I ask you to consider that great first lesson about God and man which is taught at the open-

ing of the book of Genesis. It does not matter for our purpose who wrote that chapter, or whether he was adopting more ancient materials, or was describing a kind of vision, or composing a kind of prose-poem. All I want you to observe is the spiritual lesson which he was enforcing—a lesson which lifts this particular account of Creation high above all the cosmogonies anywhere to be found in ancient literature.

His purpose is to explain the relation of man on the one side to the animals and the inanimate creation below him, and on the other side to God above him. He writes with no scientific knowledge, but with the wisdom of a true observer of nature, as it presented itself to his eyes and mind. He begins with God: 'In the beginning God . . . .' All that is, is from God. But it is from God in due order, in an ascending scale, beginning with darkness and chaos, and passing gradually into light and harmony. This conception is profoundly scientific, and it is worked out in detail according to the most accurate observation possible at the time.

First comes inanimate nature: earth and water; sun, moon, and stars. Then comes vegetation; then various forms of animal life,

fishes and birds and beasts ; and last of all comes man. The general idea is wholly in harmony with our latest scientific thought. The details may be slightly out of order here and there : but the conception is that which we now speak of as evolution—a ladder of being, rising step by step from the lowest to the highest. The stages are marked off somewhat conventionally by adopting as a framework the days of the week—six days of work in which new developments are observable, and a day of rest in which no such vast changes are to be traced. This is merely the literary setting of the thought, and need not detain us. Yet in passing we may note one feature which is surprising. If any of us were to attempt for ourselves to arrange the various steps in the development according to the days of the week, we should almost certainly keep one day all to itself for the ultimate stage of the appearance of man. Not so the Hebrew seer : he puts the higher animals and man together on the sixth day, not fearing in the least to suggest the intimate connexion between man and the animals which come next beneath him. On the bodily side of his nature man is but little removed from the animals, though even in this respect he stands

at the head of all. His true distinction is of another kind: it is a spiritual distinction, which is described in the words: 'the image and likeness of God.' Man is made in God's image. He is set at the head of creation as God's visible representative. He is to rule as God's vicegerent. 'Let them have dominion' is the charter of his authority. Man is the link between nature and God.

What nobler conception of human life has ever been offered in any literature, than is given in this simple picturesque parable of the world's beginnings? It is in a chapter like this that we *feel* inspiration, even if we cannot define it. We are sure that it was the Divine Spirit who taught this early writer the sublime lesson which is embodied here.

His first and immediate purpose may have been to lift the Jewish people high above the nature-worships of surrounding nations—the Chaldean worship of the heavenly bodies, and the Egyptian worship of sacred animals. But I am now concerned to show that this teaching is the intellectual and moral preparation for the doctrine of the Incarnation. The story of the human race declares how sadly man failed to

realise this great ideal: how, instead of reigning as God's visible representative on earth, he sought to be independent of God: how he sinned against the order in which he was placed, and chose to follow his own will, instead of the Divine will: how he degraded his human nature from its likeness to the Divine.

Had man not thus failed, we can conceive that by the education of the Divine Spirit, the image of God would have been more and more clearly manifested in the steady progress of the race; until at last the Incarnation of the Son of God as man might have crowned the whole history, and the perfect man would have manifested the perfect image of God.

But we have to do with a world in which man as a fact has failed: has fallen short of his own human nature and its proper destiny. In the midst of this failure, and with a view to its ultimate remedy, God taught one nation in plain terms that human nature is essentially God-like, that it is capable of presenting the very image and likeness of the Divine.

This, then, is the great first lesson which we must never let go. There is something in man which is naturally akin to God. In virtue of

that, man is in some sense at least God's child. Human nature is a fit medium for the visible manifestation of the Divine. The way is open for the Incarnation, the union of God and man, the appearance on this earthly scene of one who is both perfect God and perfect Man, who is the express image of the Divine, who can truly say: 'He that hath seen Me, hath seen the Father.'

I am deeply conscious that this is but an imperfect statement of what has been nobly called 'The Gospel of Creation.' There are doubtless other ways of setting forth the natural capacity of man for the manifestation of God, which might appeal with greater force to more philosophic minds. But I feel that my best hope of helping you is to present the matter in the way in which I am myself accustomed to conceive of it. And what I may call the naturalness of the Incarnation, as the reasonable sequel to the revelation of God and man which was taught to the mind of the Jewish people, has always seemed most helpful to me. It is for this reason that I commend it to you to study and work out for yourselves.

But I must rapidly conclude. I have been

able to dwell on one element only—though, perhaps, the most important element—of the preparation of the Jewish people, and through them of the world, for the Incarnation. I should have wished to go much further in this department of the subject, and to show how God taught the Jewish people by their history, first, that Israel was in a special sense the son of God ; and, secondly, that Israel should one day be summed up and represented in a single person who should crown her history and bring in the kingdom of God.

That little people to whom God was so near witnessed, as no other people has witnessed, to the instinctive belief of humanity in its Divine origin and its glorious destiny : uttered as no other people has ever uttered the instinctive cry of humanity for a Deliverer, who should of necessity be Divine as well as human.

But all this I must pass by, with a mere mention to show that I have not forgotten its importance ; and in my next lecture I must endeavour to consider the historical manifestation of the Incarnation on the stage of a sinful human world.

II

In our first lecture we considered the meaning of the word Incarnation. We saw that it meant 'embodiment,' or, more strictly, 'coming to be in flesh': and that it was used as a brief summary of the truth expressed in St John's Gospel by the statement 'The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us'; the truth declared in the Creed that the eternal Son of God 'came down from heaven . . . and was made man.' I specially invited you to draw a clear distinction in thought between the doctrine of the Incarnation itself and the particular mode in which the Incarnation was realised in history; and to examine the first of these matters in the first place apart from the second. We then passed on to show that in the fundamental teaching of the Old Testament there was a preparation for the doctrine of the Incarnation. For the Old Testament teaching about man is tha he stands at

the head of the Creation, as being made 'in the image of God': that is to say, that human nature is by its constitution capable to some extent of manifesting God; that it is a fit medium for the incarnation of the Divine: whence it follows, that there is nothing inherently inconceivable in the union of God and man.

I did not enter upon the philosophical justification of this teaching. I merely called your attention to it as an actual teaching by which Israel (and the world through Israel) was being prepared for the Incarnation. The Fatherhood of God to man is not expressly declared in the Old Testament: but a certain kinship between God and man is suggested, so that in time God came to be spoken of as 'a Father unto Israel,' and Israel came to think of itself as 'the Son of God.' Similarly, the coming Incarnation of the Son of God is not expressly declared in the Old Testament; but the fundamental relation of human nature to the Divine is so taught as to pave the way for what was to follow, and to prepare earnest Jewish thinkers like St Paul and St John to understand and interpret the Incarnation when it came.

It is an inevitable disadvantage of a short

course of lectures on so great a subject, that thoughts can only be thrown out, and cannot be followed up and justified in detail ; and also that difficulties which suggest themselves to the hearers' minds must be passed over without notice. There is one difficulty, however, which readily arises, and which, as a matter of fact, has been pressed upon me by a correspondent who heard the first lecture : and on this I should wish to say a few words.

I may state it in my own language as follows. An early observer of nature and of man may reasonably have regarded man as vastly superior to all else in the world, and so nearly akin to God as to be a worthy object of the Divine favour in the highest degree : and an earlier age than our own may have found no special difficulty in believing that God should unite Himself with man, the foremost of His creatures, for whose sake Creation itself appeared to have been originated and wrought out. But the whole tendency of modern scientific enquiry has been to depress the relative value of man. Is it then equally reasonable to hold these beliefs to-day, when the telescope has revealed myriads of other worlds, and our earth has dwindled to an inconsiderable speck ? When we reflect on the littleness of man,

as modern science has declared it to us in a hundred ways, are we any longer justified in regarding humanity as of such importance, as so central to the universe, as to call for an incarnation of the Divine in human flesh?

This is a real difficulty. How much it cost the greatest of our modern poets is known to students of the *In Memoriam*. The immensity of the universe oppressed Tennyson like a nightmare. He felt it as only a poet could, and a poet of our time in full sympathy with the advancing studies of natural science. But, to use his own words spoken of another:

> He fought his doubts and gather'd strength,
> He would not make his judgment blind,
> He faced the spectres of the mind
> And laid them: thus he came at length
> To find a stronger faith his own.

But the difficulty is not a new one, though it has received a new emphasis. It was a Jewish poet, with the teaching of Genesis full in his mind, who wrote in the eighth Psalm:

> When I consider Thy heavens, the work of Thy fingers;
> The moon and the stars, which Thou hast ordained:
> What is man, that Thou art mindful of him?
> And the son of man, that Thou visitest him?

The distance between God and man was infinite then: it is neither more nor less to-day. For the fuller revelation of the physical insignificance of man has been counterbalanced by the fuller revelation of his intellectual and moral greatness. The mind that takes in so much is greater than the material universe which it takes in. And the greatness of moral character has come to be recognised as the true human distinction, and as a ground of superiority which is not affected by any disclosure of man's physical insignificance.

The wonder remains exactly the same. The condescension of God is infinite. The reasonableness of this condescension depends on factors in the problem which are to us unknown. This earth may be but a stage on which a drama is being enacted which beings of another order may be observing to their eternal profit. So at least thought St Paul when he wrote in the Epistle to the Ephesians, that 'to the principalities and powers in the heavenly region' there was being 'made known through the Church the very varied wisdom of God.'

It requires after all an act of faith—and not an act of reason by itself—to say 'He came

down from heaven, and was incarnate, and was made man.' Faith, I say: and I mean faith in the condescension of God, faith in the essential kinship of man to God; faith in a Shepherd who seeks one sheep of a hundred until He finds it, faith in a Father who cannot forget that He has a prodigal son. It comes after all to this: that we believe in a love which is beyond our understanding:

> For the love of God is larger
> Than the measures of man's mind:
> And the Heart of the Eternal
> Is most wonderfully kind.

I pass on now to offer some thoughts on the historical manifestation of the Incarnation as it is taught us in the New Testament.

Our earliest Gospel is St Mark's. We shall do well to ask in what form he depicts the incarnate life of the Son of God. He begins where the first disciples of our Lord began. He begins with the self-manifestation of Christ to the people at large. While John the Baptist is preaching his mission of repentance, Jesus, now thirty years old, suddenly comes on the scene. He fulfils the sign which John had given: 'a stronger than I am is coming after me.' He

presents Himself as 'a prophet, mighty in word and in deed.' At the very outset He promises to fulfil all hopes, declaring that the long looked for time is come. He turns all eyes towards Himself. He heals the sick, He raises the dead. He proclaims that a new power is at work in the world—a little seed only as yet, but a seed that must certainly grow. He calls men to follow Him. He demands that they shall devote themselves to Him utterly and at any cost: the dearest earthly ties, even life itself, must be sacrificed for His sake. His demands, like His promises, are such as no man had ever made, or ever had the shadow of a right to make. He aroused an indescribable enthusiasm in the simple folk of Galilee, and the deadliest hatred in the envious and hypocritical leaders of Judaism. He was hunted to death, and crucified in Jerusalem. It was an unexampled tragedy. But it did not end there. It had an unexampled sequel. On the third day His tomb was empty, and an angel said that He was risen from the dead.

That, in the briefest outline, is St Mark's picture of the incarnate life of the Son of God. It derives its astonishing force from its simple realism. The language is bare and rude; it is

often brief to obscurity. The wonder and the beauty lie in the facts. The brilliant light and the deep shade belong not to the art of the narrator, but to the events which he allows to speak for themselves.

As we read the story we ask ourselves: If indeed the Son of God 'came down from heaven and was made man,' can we conceive that His incarnate life could have been other than this which is here described? Must He not have lived so? Must He not have worked and spoken so? Must He not have suffered so? Must He not have risen so? Is it not all essentially appropriate? Can we conceive of a more appropriate life? Can we think of another issue? Must He not have displayed the new power in miraculous acts of helpfulness and restoration? Must He not have been crushed at last by human sin, if He refused to use that power to save Himself? Must He not, when the worst was undergone, have shown that the new power was stronger than death itself?

There is the picture. The existence of the picture is a fact. Account for the existence of the picture otherwise if you can. The simplest account, and to my mind the only intelligible

account that can be given, is that the doctrine of the Incarnation of the Son of God is true: that 'the only-begotten Son of God for us men came down from heaven, and was incarnate, and was made man; suffered, and was buried, and the third day rose again.'

The picture is like nothing else: it is admittedly unique. It has filled the world with new ideas. It has taught us that character is the supreme measure of worth. It has taught us that self-sacrifice for others is the ground and basis of the highest character. It has changed our whole estimate of what is failure and what is success in human life. It has secured to us that which was an insecure guess before, the hope of immortality beyond the grave. It has secured to us above all the certainty that God loves us. In itself, and in its effects upon the world, the picture is unique. What imagination could have drawn it, if it does not correspond to facts?

And, mark you, the whole story is full of surprises. It is never what the people expect. It is not a natural product of the Galilean fishermen's minds. The people were astonished at the teaching which it records. At every miracle they were beyond measure amazed.

And it is full of miracle. And the miracle is always appropriate, though never anticipated. For if it was to be shown that a new power had come into human life, then the miracles are appropriate: for they manifest that new power as surmounting all obstacles, and repairing all losses, and supplying all needs, and bringing life everywhere in place of death. And the resurrection, the crowning miracle, is indispensable. 'He saved others, Himself He cannot save' was a truer taunt than they who flung it knew. Self-sacrifice for others must know no bounds: the cross was a Divine necessity in a world of sin. But goodness cannot in the final issue be defeated by sin; otherwise our human hope is blotted out; and so 'God raised Him from the dead.' The picture is full of miracle; but the miracle is demanded by the uniqueness of the situation.

This is the incarnate life which I would have you study first. Go to it again and again when problems beset you. Open your mind to the influences of that simple story. Again and again you will rise from the reading of it with a fresh conviction that it tells you of One who came down from heaven and was incarnate and was made man; who, in other words, by a voluntary act of

self-limitation stepped out as it were of the invisible world and accepted the limitations of time and space for our sakes, taking our manhood upon Himself: of One who as man has conquered sin and death, and has lifted our humanity into union with God.

My brothers, if I have carried you with me thus far, then and only then can I hope to be of any help to you as we approach the peculiar miracle which attended the birth of Him who was at once God and man: who was, in the words of the ancient Christian hymn, 'God, of the substance of the Father, begotten before all worlds; and Man, of the substance of His Mother, born in the world: perfect God, and perfect Man.'

I shall not attempt to offer any naturalistic explanation of the facts recorded in the Gospels. I quite agree that in many so-called miracles what once seemed miraculous has ceased to seem miraculous, because a hidden law has come into sight which offers an unexpected explanation. A man would be bold who should deny that all miracles may some day be seen to be only results of higher laws which are at present hidden from our imperfect knowledge. But at present the

Gospel miracles are all miracles for me. Except, perhaps, in the case of the demoniac cures, I cannot see that any advance has been firmly made towards what would be called a natural explanation. But my faith is not staggered by miracles in a life which is altogether unique, and which I believe to be the Incarnation of the Divine. My reason asks that the miracle shall not appear to be a needless miracle; that it shall serve a worthy purpose; that it shall be in harmony with my whole conception of the incarnate life. If such it be, then I am prepared to weigh the historical evidence for it with a mind undisturbed by any desire to get rid of the miraculous element.

Can you go with me thus far? If so, let me ask: If a wholly new departure in human history was being made, is it unreasonable to suppose that this departure might be marked by a signal miracle? If miracle is ever in place as a witness to the intervention of a new power, challenging our attention and manifesting the 'finger of God,' was not the coming of the Son of God in human flesh a fit occasion for miracle? If a Divine life was entering into our weakened and death-stricken humanity, can we think it inappropriate that

from the outset this life should manifest its power to transcend the natural order by which we are limited?

Believing as I do that the eternal Son of God, by whom all things were made, in the fulfilment of the eternal Father's will 'came down from heaven' (that is to say, came out of the unseen world) and clothed Himself with flesh, uniting Himself to our manhood, I am ready to believe that so unique an event might fitly be ushered in by the unique miracle of a Virgin-birth.

I am not asking now whether it was so, for that is a question of the historical evidence: but whether it might fitly be so. I am not trying to prove that it must necessarily have been so, in order that the fatal link of hereditary sin might be broken: I feel no satisfaction in arguments of this kind. I am asking, I repeat, whether it might fitly be so; whether such a miracle would be appropriate to such an occasion? And I reply that, so far as I am capable of judging, if miracle be admitted at all, this is a point at which it might reasonably and appropriately come in. The infinite significance of the moment might fitly be signalised by miracle.

My argument is a long one, and perhaps to

some minds a difficult one. Let me briefly state its chief heads up to this point.

The Incarnation—that is, the coming of the Son of God in human flesh—was prepared for by the teaching of the Old Testament as to the original constitution of man in the Divine image. This teaching witnessed to a certain kinship between man and God, and so to the fitness of humanity for union with Deity.

In the earliest Gospel story we have a picture of a human life more perfect than ever we could have conceived for ourselves: a life which our deepest instincts tell us is the most God-like thing that has ever been seen: a life which presents an insoluble mystery, if He who lived it was not more than man; for He made both promises and claims which are inconceivable in a good man who was no more than a man: a life which admits of one explanation only, namely, that it was—as it was believed to be—the incarnate life of the Son of God.

We saw further that this life was full of miracle, and of appropriate miracle: of miracle that was a fit exponent of a new life-power manifesting itself in the world.

We then asked whether it would be appropriate

that such a life should be ushered on to the stage of history by a miraculous beginning? Whether this would not be in harmony with its miraculous course and its miraculous sequel? And I answered for myself, that in my judgment, if miracle were admitted at all, this was a point at which miracle might appropriately come in.

That it would be appropriate at this point does not, of course, prove that it actually took place. But it sets our minds free to consider without bias the historical evidence which supports the miracle: and on this subject I shall have something to say next time.

Meanwhile let us bow in adoration of Him who has made us for Himself, who has lifted us out of our fall, who has 'so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son' to be incarnate and made man for us men and our salvation. Brothers, how sacred is our manhood since God has taken it to Himself in Jesus Christ!

III

The point which we reached at the close of the last lecture was this : If the Incarnation of the Son of God be accepted as true ; if indeed He came down from heaven and was incarnate and was made man ; if the whole story of His life is full of miracle, and of miracle which is always appropriate to its purpose of declaring the new power which had entered into human life : then it would not appear to be inappropriate that this incarnate life should be marked at the outset by a signal miracle. As a matter of fact the two only records which we possess of the circumstances of our Lord's birth agree in describing it as a miraculous birth from a Virgin Mother.

It is exceedingly easy for those who approach the matter from a different side to discredit the accounts of the miraculous birth which are contained in our first and third Gospels. Let me give you an example of the way in which this has

lately been done. A recent critic writing for English readers says: 'When one compares the two narratives together, one finds not only that they come from different sources, but that they are inconsistent one with the other.' He proceeds to disparage the first narrative on account of the story of the Star which follows it, and the second on account of an apparent error in chronology. Each writer is shown to be untrustworthy in certain particulars: their credit as witnesses is thus undermined.

It is really astonishing that language of this kind should be used by persons who in other departments have done valuable historical work, and who claim a hearing on the ground of their acquaintance with historical method. That the narratives come from different sources is provable only in one way: namely, by their apparent inconsistency of statement. That they are inconsistent one with the other, and that they come from different sources, are surely not two counts in the indictment: at most they are an observation and a conclusion based on the observation.

Moreover, that an event is attested by two stories coming from different sources is usually regarded as affording a presumption of truth, not

of falsehood. When two narratives differ in certain points of detail, and yet agree in the main topic which they undertake to set forth, historical criticism usually regards the point of agreement as having the stronger claim on our acceptance, just because of the divergence in the accessory details.

Indeed this contrast between the two stories is the first point to which I should myself desire to direct your attention. We have, as a matter of fact, two notably different narratives of the Virgin-birth. One is shown by internal evidence to come from the pen of a devout Jew, who is firmly convinced of the Messiahship of Jesus, and eager to find Old Testament parallels to all the events of His earthly history. Thus, when he has mentioned a number of miraculous cures, such as he found recorded in St Mark's Gospel and copied thence into his own book, he adds the words of the prophet Isaiah, as though they were the very ground for the working of these miracles: 'In order that it might be fulfilled which was spoken through Isaiah the prophet: He took our infirmities Himself and carried our diseases.' That shows you the type of mind of this writer. He is always seeking a sanction for the event which has come to his knowledge, and his sanction often

seems to us to be fetched from far. Yet we feel that he has a reverence for truth, which finds expression in a way that appealed to his fellow-countrymen, if it does not equally appeal to all of us.

The other narrative comes from a writer of a wholly different temperament and of quite other antecedents. He is not a Jew of Palestine, if he is a Jew at all. He is a writer who is familiar with Greek literature and Greek modes of thought. He professes to have made careful enquiries in order that he may write accurate history. Where we can test him, as in the Acts of the Apostles, by such historical evidence as inscriptions afford, we find him astonishingly exact in minute details. We discover that he was an unusually careful observer; and at this we are the less surprised when we learn incidentally that he was a medical man: for then, as now, the practice of medicine trained the faculty of observation and promoted a reverence for fact.

Each of these writers, then, has a reverential mind, which encourages us to believe that he would not record anything of which he was not profoundly convinced. The second of them appeals to us of to-day with by far the greater force. To

speak of historical and scientific method in regard to a writer in ancient times would be an anachronism: but, if habitual accuracy of observation be a recommendation in an author of any period, we may indeed be thankful that in the case of this particular miracle we are not without the testimony of the one writer of the New Testament who most clearly displays the historical instinct, 'Luke, the beloved physician.'

I would next ask you to notice the remarkable way in which these two writers undesignedly supplement each other's account. There is not the least reason for thinking that either had seen the work of the other: if he had, he must almost of necessity have endeavoured to bring his own narrative into greater harmony with it.

Now, presuming that the event which they both record really happened, we can see that two persons must have been impressed by it in a way that would leave a permanent mark on their recital of the story. The husband to whom the Virgin was betrothed would be thrown into the most painful perplexity. As a pious Jew he would be in an agony as to the right and religious course to adopt. On the other hand, the betrothed Virgin must of necessity have been

prepared in advance by some special revelation; and to accept such a revelation would require an act of extraordinary faith.

It is surely a noteworthy coincidence that, whereas we have only two narratives of the events, and whereas the two writers have obviously no conscious intention of supplementing each other, they do, as a matter of fact, answer the very questions which our instincts require to have answered. One shows us Joseph's anxiety and the Divine admonition by which it was relieved. The other tells of Mary's simple faith, which accepts the angelic announcement when it is enforced by the reminder that 'nothing is too hard for God.'

There were two persons only who could offer valid testimony as to the wonderful event; two ultimate sources only of trustworthy information. It is no small satisfaction to be assured that neither source of information fails us, and that our two independent narratives represent respectively the story as told from the standpoint of St Joseph and the story as told from the standpoint of the Blessed Virgin herself.

Let us again, for the sake of clearness, resume the heads of our argument. We saw last time

that, if the Son of God indeed entered into our human life, a miraculous mode of entry might well be regarded as appropriate. We have seen to-day that we have two independent records which describe such a miraculous entry: that they come from writers of very different habits and temperaments: that, while the surrounding details differ so much that to our limited knowledge they present an appearance of inconsistency, yet they are absolutely in agreement on the central and essential matter of the Virgin-birth, and that they tell the story as we should most have wished to have it told, from the two points of view of St Joseph and St Mary.

Of course, this is not by itself complete historical proof; it is not offered as such. But if anything can lend credibility to an event of this nature it is the simplicity and the supplementary character of the only two narratives of it which we possess.

It may be well in passing to emphasise the fact that we have no other narrative at all which is independent of these two. The apocryphal Gospels are sometimes referred to as if they discredited the canonical Gospels. I could wish that these apocryphal Gospels were half as much

read as they are alluded to. Those of us who have most carefully investigated them know that they are not independent of our Gospels, that they pander to a curiosity for information as to points on which our Gospels are silent, and that the study of them sends us back to our Gospels with the profoundest reassurance. The frigid miracle-mongering of the so-called Gospels of the Infancy, when compared with the transparent honesty and the delicate reserve of our evangelists, offers one of the most instructive contrasts in all literature.

It is impossible in such a lecture as this to present that part of the evidence for the early belief in the Virgin-birth which is to be collected from primitive Church writers. I refer you to a little book on the Apostles' Creed, published by Dr. Swete, which gives an admirable and accurate summary.[1] I may add a quotation from the adverse critic whom I quoted at the outset: 'The story of the Virgin-birth was certainly widely spread in the Church before the end of the first century.'

[1] *The Apostles' Creed: Its Relation to Primitive Christianity*, by Professor Swete. (London: C. J. Clay & Sons, Ave Maria Lane.)

Let us return to consider the general character of our evidence. The earliest of our Gospels was written about 60 years after the birth of Christ. St Mark had no occasion to refer to this matter, for he begins his story 30 years later, at the Baptism of John. There is nothing to show whether he knew of the miracle or did not know of it; and it is quite idle to speculate on this point. About ten years later St Luke wrote his account, the nature of which suggests that his information came ultimately from the Blessed Virgin. I see no reason for thinking that he used any pre-existing document at this point: he was probably putting the story into writing for the first time, as the result of his own enquiries; and his style is modelled on the old Hebrew stories which he was familiar with through the Greek translation of the Old Testament. St Matthew's Gospel was written, I think, later. The account there given appears to be derived ultimately from St Joseph.

This is the natural explanation of the existence of these two accounts. If there were no miraculous element involved, this would be regarded as unusually good historical evidence. The story is told from the points of view of the two persons chiefly concerned. Neither writer knows of the

narrative of the other, and, as we might expect, the surrounding details are very divergent. But the central event is a matter of complete agreement between them. Therefore in an ordinary case we should say that, whatever uncertainty attached to these details, the divergence only strengthened the certainty of the matter of agreement.

On the testimony of these two narratives, supported possibly by a tradition preserved in the circle of the descendants of our Lord's brethren, early writers like Ignatius accepted the miracle; it found a mention in the Creed which gradually shaped itself in the second century; and it retained its place both in the Eastern and Western forms of that Creed.

If this miracle never took place at all, two serious problems confront us.

(1) The first is a problem of literary criticism. How are we to account for the words 'Virgin Mary' in the second century Creed? How are we to account for such a sentence as that of Ignatius in A.D. 110? 'Hidden from the prince of this world were the virginity of Mary and her child-bearing, and likewise also the death of the Lord—three mysteries to be cried aloud, which

were wrought in the silence of God.' It is a passing allusion: but how are we to explain its occurrence?

The only reasonable literary explanation is that the early Church accepted the Gospel narratives as true. But then, what of those narratives themselves, if the thing never happened? How did they come to be? Were the two evangelists deceived? for no one will now allege that they were conscious deceivers. And if so, how were they deceived? Can a myth have grown up and have gained such currency as to deceive St Luke within forty years of the death of Christ? You must give the story time to develop into the two striking narratives which we possess: you must put it back to a date at which probably the Virgin was still living: and you must further find a ground for its origination.

There appears to be no doctrinal ground for its invention in these early times. St Luke was a follower of St Paul; but St Paul never bases the Incarnation upon it—indeed, never so much as mentions it. And neither St Matthew nor St Luke puts it to any doctrinal purpose.

It has been suggested that legends of partheno-

genesis are found in heathen mythology ; and the story of Buddha is given as an example of the growth of such a legend. But the whole atmosphere of the Judaism of the time appears to me to be unfavourable to the transplantation of heathen myths. And if there is one characteristic of the first Christian teaching, it is the proclamation of *truth*. The shadows of superstition are scattered : figments are thrust aside on every hand : 'children of light,' 'children of day'— these are the epithets of new converts. Where are we to find the dark corners in which these new superstitions grew ? And even if they did grow in some obscure place, was St Luke the writer who was likely to be imposed upon by them ?

I cannot myself accept a tissue of improbabilities as affording a reasonable account of these early narratives. If I felt absolutely precluded from believing in the possibility of the miracle of the Virgin-birth, I should find myself faced by a literary problem utterly insoluble by any intelligible process. I could not account for the origin of these narratives, nor for the acceptance of the Virgin-birth by the early Christians.

(2) A second problem faces me when I con-

sider the situation, not now as a literary critic, but as a member of the Christian Church. I believe that the Church is the Body of Christ and one with Himself. I believe that it is His representative in the world, the instrument of His working, the witness of His truth. I believe that the doctrine of His Incarnation is the central teaching of Christianity and the peculiar treasure entrusted to the keeping of His Church. I believe that the Holy Spirit is promised to guide the Church into the truth about Christ.

How then can I explain the witness of the Church to the Virgin-birth, given in her briefest Creed, proclaimed by all her great theologians, reverently cherished by her simplest saints, if after all it is a figment of superstitious imagination? Has she unconsciously repeated a lie at every baptism since her baptismal Creed took shape—i.e. at least from the middle of the second century to the present day? She with her mission of truth which dispersed the black night of the heathen religions, driving them off the face of the earth because they were false?

I have no answer to such questions as these. I can conceive of no adequate reason why the Church should have been permitted to include

this miracle among the sacred mysteries of the Creed, if it never took place—if the Virgin Mary were not the Virgin after all.

I have kept this consideration apart. I have treated the literary problem by itself. But the one difficulty is reinforced by the other difficulty, and the two together effectually bar the way for me. They make it impossible for me to explain the story of the Virgin-birth as a legend of the pious imagination of the first generation after the crucifixion of our Lord.

I know that there may be some who will not feel as I feel that, in view of the literary history, and in view of the history of the Christian Church throughout the ages, it is easier to believe than to disbelieve this special miracle. But those who have followed the whole of my argument will at least understand that, if the possibility of miracle be admitted at all, a belief in the Virgin-birth is not inconsistent with loyalty to the principles of literary and historical research, and that it cannot be dismissed off-hand as a relic of primitive superstition.

But, as I said at the outset, it is the wonder of the Incarnation itself, and not the wonder of the mode of its manifestation, that I desire to com-

mend to your special attention. It is more wonderful that the Son of God should come down from heaven and be incarnate and made man, than that His incarnate life should have begun with a Virgin-birth. Let us fix our faith on the greater wonder, and seek to understand how much it has wrought for the exaltation of the humanity which Christ has taken to Himself. I had hoped that I might have been able to have treated this last point at some length. But our time has been occupied, not unprofitably, I hope, with matters which seemed to press at this particular moment. I can, therefore, only indicate briefly a few thoughts for your own further study.

First, in the light of the Incarnation, we see a glorious destiny for the human race. These are days in which the most earnest minds look away from the problem of their own individual future, and are fascinated by the larger consideration of the purpose which God has with the world of men. Humanity as a whole must, we feel, have a meaning and destiny. The reason why Tennyson appeals to many of us in a way that Browning never can is that, while Browning is interested in the perfecting of the individual, Tennyson looks to the perfecting of the race. To quote one illustra-

tion from a poem of his later years, entitled 'The Making of Man':

All about him shadow still, but, while the races flower and fade,
Prophet-eyes can catch a glory slowly gaining on the shade,
Till the peoples all are one, and all their voices join in chorie
Hallelujah to the Maker, 'It is finish'd. Man is made.'

It is this conception of the unity and solidarity of mankind that is specially illuminated by the Incarnation. Christ took man upon Him. He united Himself with humanity; not with the fortunes of a chosen race, as the Jews had fancied, but with the destiny of the whole of mankind. He came 'that the world through Him might be saved.' He showed that the true human life was the life of self-giving, not self-saving. He took our humanity on to His cross. He took it through the grave and gate of death to a joyful resurrection. He took it up to the throne of God. And thereby He endowed it with an immortal hope.

But again, He asserted the sacredness of that humanity which was thus capable of union with

God. He claimed the whole of our common human life. No factor in its progress is excluded from His claim. All that is truly human is consecrated by the Incarnation. The human body has gained a new sacredness, since 'the Word became flesh.' All life is seen to be sacred, because Christ lived a human life. Every highest faculty, every noblest achievement, is a crown to be cast at length at the feet of the Christ. Need I urge this thought in a place which has gathered to itself in holy consecration the memorials of every form of service which man has rendered to his fellow-man?

Lastly, each individual life has gained a measure of ennoblement to the eye of faith by the Incarnation of the Son of God as Man. How can we despise any the least or any the most fallen of these sons of men whose human nature Christ has shared? He has claimed them each and all. They are 'brothers for whom Christ died.' We may not despair of one of them. We may not despair of ourselves. Utterly unworthy though we be, He beckons us along His own pathway. He says, 'I know you: I know what is in man: his weakness and his strength: his temptations, and his capacity to rise above them in union with

the Divine. You need never despair. Rise and follow Me. Go and sin no more.' He has made Himself one with us, in order that we may find a new strength in Him. He calls us to be consciously one with Him : and His call is our hope.

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BY

CHARLES GORE, D.D., D.C.L., Hon. D.D. (Edin.

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PREFACE TO THE NINTH EDITION

IT has been thought worth while to publish a cheap edition of this book. So much has been written from time to time, since it was first published, on what is called the Roman controversy, and some of it has been so good, that I should have been disposed to treat this little book as antiquated. But probably because it attempts to deal more or less comprehensively with the different aspects of the controversy, it continues in some demand. The chief point, as far as I am aware, on which it will now be regarded as not up to date, is in its dealing with biblical criticism in the Roman Church. The present situation, created especially by the most recent writings of the Abbé Loisy, is not dealt with. In fact, we do not at present know exactly what the attitude of the Roman authority towards M. Loisy is going to be, what ground it is going to take up, or what distinctions it is going to draw between what is and is not permissible. As far as the utterance of Roman authority goes, the situation remains where it was left by the Encyclical of 1893.

ADVENT, 1904.

FROM THE PREFACES TO FORMER EDITIONS

It is always important to explain what exactly is assumed at starting in every book, or in other words, for what class of readers it is written. This book then is written for persons who accept, or are disposed to accept, the Catholic position; that is, who believe that Christ instituted a visible Church, and intended the apostolic succession of the ministry to form at least one necessary link of connection in it: who accept the Catholic Creeds and the declared mind of the Church as governing their belief: and who believe in the sacraments, as celebrated by a ministry of apostolic authority in its different grades, as the covenanted channels or instruments of grace. Further, this book is addressed to catholic-minded persons who are members of the Church of England, or Churches in communion with her. Such persons find themselves attacked from the side of Rome, and hear it denied that it is possible to be Catholics without being Roman Catholics. It is against such claims made upon us from the side of the Roman Church that the following pages are intended to be a defence, mostly in the way of explaining positively the Anglican position, and showing it to be both Catholic and rational. For the Roman Catholic claims may be dealt with by those who cannot accept them, in one of two ways. They may be examined and shown to be in themselves in conflict with history, and untenable. This has been often done.

* * * * *

But there is another method of dealing with the Roman claim. It is by strengthening the fabric of a positive Catholicity, which is not Roman. Such a defensive method it has been my aim to follow in this book. So far as attack is a necessary part of defence, it has not been possible to avoid it. But my purpose is positive, not negative—to build, not to destroy.

I believe, with a conviction the strength of which I could hardly express, that it is the vocation of the English Church to realise and to offer to mankind a Catholicism

which is Scriptural, and represents the whole of Scripture: which is historical, and can know itself free in face of historical and critical science; which is rational and constitutional in its claim of authority, free at once from lawlessness and imperialism. That the English Church for her many sins will need the purification of much discipline and suffering before she can in any adequate measure realize her vocation, cannot be doubted. There will be trials calculated to test the loyalty of the staunchest hearts: but only through such trials is any great vocation realized. And those who continue with the Church of England in her temptations have surely appointed to them a position and a work of privilege and fruitfulness in the kingdom of Christ.

It was then in the belief that no labour is lost which goes to strengthen the fabric of the English Church, and enable her to realize with security her catholic polity and life, that this book was written (in 1888), and has been several times corrected and amplified.

* * * * *

Thus Chapter I. is a general explanation of the Anglican position as the "*via media*," and a general statement of our attitude towards the Roman Church. After that follows an answer in detail to each article of the Roman assault. Thus Chapter II. vindicates the Anglican or Catholic conception of Church unity as against the Roman modification of it. Chapter III. endeavours to explain the true or primitive conception of Church authority, and Chapter IV. the true relation of the Church to the Bible. Chapter V. examines the Roman interpretation of our Lord's promise to St. Peter. Chapters VI. and VII. bring to the test of history the modern claims of the Roman see. Chapter VIII. expounds the meaning of schism, and clears the English Church from the charge of it. Chapter IX. is occupied in vindicating the validity and jurisdiction of the Anglican episcopate; and Chapter X. in defending the Anglican Church on the charge of heresy. Chapter XI. deals with some more recent topics; and among the appended notes is a paper dealing at some length with the Roman theory of development.

C. G.

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CHAPTER I.

THE *VIA MEDIA* AND THE ROMAN CHURCH.

THE English Churchman is constantly liable to be told—and to be told from very opposite quarters—that if he were only 'logical' he would join the Roman Church: that belief in a visible Church and in its authority, in the apostolic succession, and the jurisdiction of the episcopate, leads legitimately and logically to the conclusion of submitting to the see of Rome.[1] Thus Anglicanism is represented as an impossible *via media* between pure Protestantism and Rationalism on the one hand and Roman Catholicism on the other.

We are perhaps a little encouraged to meet these claims made in the name of logic with a good heart by the consideration that logic, in the sense of argument, is apt to be most efficacious when it is most one-sided, and content to ignore everything in the facts which does not suit its case. "Reason" it has been most wisely said "is wide, and manifold, and waits its time; and argument is partial, one-sided, and often then most effective, when least embarrassed by seeing too much."[2]

[1] This is the argument not only of Roman controversialists but also of Dr. Hatch in his reply to Dr. Liddon *Contemporary Review* June 1885, p. 864. In fact, as is pointed out on p. 124—the theory of the Papacy involves a quite different principle from that of the Episcopate. See also an excellent argument in *The Guardian* of May 15, 1889, p. 758.

[2] Church *Human Life and its Conditions* p. 85.

The most plain case is by no means always the most true. Thus Hooker remarks about the early heresies on the Incarnation that "because this divine mystery is more true than plain, divers having framed the same to their own conceits and fancies are found in their expositions thereof more plain than true." So in effect in the early centuries it was the heretics who were notorious for one-sided appeals to 'logic,' while the Church was for this very reason called the 'via media' because she held on her way between opposite extremes, persisting in holding together a complex scriptural idea or truth which one-sided heresies would have torn asunder.[1]

[1] This has been drawn out by Professor Mozley in a passage which has become famous: see *The Theory of Development* pp. 41-43: "In this way the logical controversy proceeded on the great doctrines of Christianity in the first centuries: different sects developed these in their own way; and each sect appealed triumphantly to the logical irresistibleness of its development. The Arian, the Nestorian, the Apollinarian, the Eutychian, the Monothelite developments, each began with a great truth, and each professed to demand one, and only one, treatment for it. All successively had one watchword, and that was, 'Be logical.' Be logical, said the Arian: Jesus Christ is the Son of God; a son cannot be coeval with his father. Be logical, said the Nestorian: Jesus Christ was man and was God; he was therefore two persons. Be logical, said the Apollinarian: Jesus Christ was not two persons; he was not, therefore, perfect God and perfect man too. Be logical, said the Eutychian: Jesus Christ was only one person; he could therefore only have one nature. Be logical, said the Monothelite: Jesus Christ was only one person; He could therefore only have one will. Be logical, said the Macedonian: the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of the Father, and therefore cannot be a person distinct from the Father. Be logical, said the Sabellian: God is one, and therefore cannot be three. Be logical, said the Manichean: evil is not derived from God, and therefore must be an original substance independent of him. Be logical, said the Gnostic: an infinite Deity cannot really assume a finite body. Be

We have in fact no cause to be ashamed of this phrase the *via media* which common consent has fixed upon Anglicanism. It was a phrase in which the Church of old gloried as a proper description of her position. And in what sense? It did not mean the way of modera-

logical, said the Novatian: there is only one baptism for the remission of sins; there is therefore no remission for sin after baptism. Be logical, to come to later times, said the Calvinist: God predestinates, and therefore man has not free will. Be logical, said the Anabaptist: the Gospel bids us to communicate our goods, and therefore does not sanction property in them. Be logical, said the Quaker: the Gospel enjoins meekness, and therefore forbids war. Be logical, says every sect and school: you admit our premisses; you do not admit our conclusions. You are inconsistent. You go a certain way and then arbitrarily stop." . . . "The whole dogmatic creed of the Church has been formed in direct contradiction to such apparent lines of consecutiveness. The Nestorian saw as clearly as his logic could tell him, that two persons must follow from two natures. The Monophysite saw as clearly as his logic could tell him, that one nature must follow from one person. The Arian, the Monothelite, the Manichean, saw as clearly as their logic could tell them on their respective questions, and argued inevitably and convincingly to themselves. To the intellectual imagination of the great heresiarchs of the early ages, the doctrine of our Lord's nature took boldly some one line, and developed continuously and straightforwardly some one idea; it demanded unity and consistency. The Creed of the Church, steering between extremes and uniting opposites, was a timid artificial creation, a work of diplomacy. In a sense they were right. The explanatory Creed of the Church was a diplomatic work; it was diplomatic, because it was faithful. With a shrewdness and nicety like that of some ablest and most sustained course of statecraft and cabinet policy, it went on adhering to the complex original idea, and balancing one tendency in it by another. One heresiarch after another would have infused boldness into it; they appealed to one element and another in it, which they wanted to be developed indefinitely. The Creed kept its middle course, rigidly combining opposites; and a mixed and balanced erection of dogmatic language arose."

tion, the 'middle way' of steering clear of all thorough and intelligible and free statement of principle. It meant rather the way of combination, the way of comprehension and synthesis. The Church held together what a hasty logic would have torn asunder. In 'the Word made flesh' we have a complex or double fact —a union of Godhead and manhood—and the Church had to be true to both parts of her creed, to the Divinity *and* the humanity, letting neither be ignored in the interest of the other. The same duty presented itself in regard to the doctrine of God: here again she had to maintain both God's unity as against Tritheists, and the Trinity as against Unitarians. Thus the *Quicunque vult* is a document full of balanced and antithetic clauses, just the sort of clauses which are irritating to a hasty logic. "Like as we are compelled by the Christian verity to acknowledge every Person by Himself to be God and Lord, so are we forbidden by the Catholic religion to say [what seems the 'logical' consequence] there be three Gods, or three Lords." But this principle of combination holds beyond the area of theology proper. When we are considering the function of the Church and the relation of the Church as a society to the individual, we have to guard the same principle. You may press the claims of the individual to freedom to the extent of annihilating all real unity, or you may press Church authority so as to annihilate the free development of the individual. The former extreme we call individualism, the latter imperialism or absolutism. Both are 'logical,' that is to say both are the logical application of a true principle,

but they are the one-sided applications of it, and we should be inclined to call Protestantism on one side individualistic, and Romanism absolutist, on the other: while the *via media* undertakes the more difficult but not the less necessary task of preserving the balance by keeping hold of both terms. The case is just the same with authority and private judgment—it is in fact only the same problem in the intellectual sphere. The ideal state is a *via media* in which the due authority of the Church nourishes the spiritual judgment of the individual into mature life and freedom till "he that is spiritual judgeth all things yet he himself is judged of no man." The extremes are represented by a dogmatism which crushes instead of quickening the reason of the individual, making it purely passive and acquiescent, and on the other hand by an unrestrained development of the individual judgment which becomes eccentric and lawless just because it is unrestrained. If there is much of this latter extreme in modern life, there is also in the Roman Church a great deal of the former. Once again and for the last time, the life of the soul is intended to be nourished by a due correspondence between external gifts of grace, of which the sacraments are the visible channels, and the internal action of faith. Now in this case also the doctrine of the sacraments has without a doubt been preached and accepted in such a way as to lead to their being treated as charms, or substitutes for personal spiritual effort; and on the other side the sufficiency of faith has been proclaimed in a way that made men ignore the necessity of the sacraments. The mean lies in the belief both in the validity of sacra-

mental grace and in the necessity for the responsive action of faith. Thus in all departments of religious life we come upon this principle of the *Via Media*, and the English Church may well be proud of the title. It is not indeed the case that we could reasonably claim to have realized this ideal standard with any degree of completeness: but it represents the ideal which the providence of God has made it our special responsibility to maintain, because circumstances have linked us at once to the ancient organization and authority of the Church and to the freer life and scriptural appeal of the Reformation, and have thus given us the special opportunity of showing that Church authority is not incompatible with the appeal to Scripture and to reason. We are invested to an exceptional degree with the responsibility of being true to the *whole* of the deposit of truth: of resisting the fascination of one-sided developments: and thus standing ready with the whole treasury of Christian truth unimpaired to meet the demands which a new age makes upon it with its new developments of character and circumstance.

So, speaking broadly, the complaint which we should make of the Roman Church is—not that she is heretical—nor that she does not represent a real development of principles which are truly Christian, but that she represents a one-sided development, and by this very one-sidedness has been prevented, both in our time and at the epoch of the Reformation, from expressing at all adequately the whole of Christianity, and that thus in claiming (as in fact she does claim) to be the whole, she has taken up a position which is essentially schismatic:

for that is essentially schismatic which makes for a part the claim of the whole.

Broadly, it is very easy to justify this view of the Roman Church. Each race has had in the Catholic Church its own particular function. It was the function, for instance, of the Greek race with its peculiar intellectual subtlety and philosophical power to bring out into clear light the 'treasures of wisdom' which lay hid in Christ, to grasp and enunciate the principles of the Incarnation and the Trinity—in a word, to be the theologians of the Church. In theology proper the Roman Church has been by comparison weak, but her strength lay in the gift of government. It was hers to bring out all the wealth of authority which the facts and forces of Christianity contained within their scope. The faculty of empire passed from pagan to Christian Rome transformed in purpose and motive, but fundamentally the same. In the exercise of this power lay the glory of the Papacy but also its danger. Just as the danger of Greek Christianity had been the tendency to degenerate into an aimless theological accuracy—a barren subtlety of intellectual or verbal distinctions, so the danger of Roman Christianity lay in imperialism. The whole idea of the Church becomes under her treatment in a measure secularised. The Church becomes a great world-empire for purposes of spiritual government and administration. Hence, for instance, the primary conception of her unity becomes that of unity of government, the sort of unity which most readily submits itself to secular tests and most naturally postulates a visible centre and head ; and the dominant

force in all religious questions becomes authority rather than truth. Indeed all the needs of the early mediæval period tended to add strength to this tendency. The untamed, undisciplined races which formed the material of our modern nations were subjected to the yoke of the Church (mostly at the will of kings or chiefs) as to an external law, which was to train, mould, restrain them. The one need of such an age was authoritative discipline, and the Church became largely a 'schoolmaster to bring men to Christ.' She had in fact to do with children in mind; with children whose one religious faculty, which was in full exercise, was faith, in the form of a great readiness to accept revelations of the unseen world and to respect their ministers—the sort of faith which asks for nothing but a sufficiently firm voice of authority. Christianity thus became, by a one-sided development, a great imperialist and hierarchical system. The peremptory needs of government tended to overshadow earlier conceptions of the Church's function even in relation to the truth. Compare the Roman Leo's view of the truth with that of the Alexandrian Didymus or Athanasius, and the contrast is marked. Both Easterns and Westerns insist on the importance of the Church's dogma, but to the Easterns it is the guide in the knowledge of God, to the Westerns it is the instrument to subdue and discipline the souls of men. Thus the authoritativeness of tone which becomes characteristic of the Western Church makes her impatient of the slow and complex methods of arriving at the truth on disputed points, which belonged to the earlier idea of the 'rule of faith.' The comparison of traditions, the elaborate

appeal to Scripture, these methods are too slow and too indecisive: something more rapid and imperious is wanted. It is no longer enough to conceive of the Church as the catholic witness to a faith once for all delivered. She must be the living voice of God, the oracle of the Divine Will. And just as the strength and security of witness lies in the comparison and consent of independent testimonies, so the strength of authoritative oracular utterance lies in unimpeded, unqualified centrality, and Christendom needs a central chair of truth, where Divine Authority speaks and rules.

Such has been broadly the Roman development of the Christian religion. It has been a real and powerful development of principles really Christian, but a one-sided, and for this reason an incomplete development, and one which, as soon as it claims to be the whole, becomes schismatic.

That Roman Catholicism is an incomplete development is plain to us at the present time, as we look at the matter from outside, on several grounds.

(1) It is unscriptural. Scripture says a good deal about authority, and therefore there are certain passages of Scripture with which Rome is thoroughly at home—which she has thoroughly made her own. But with the whole of Scripture she is not at home. This is shown by the immense gulf between practical current Romanism and the general tone of the New Testament—a gulf which is partly the cause and partly the effect of the prevalent ignorance and disuse of Scripture, as a whole, which is notorious and admitted amongst Roman Catholics. Thus M. Henri Lasserre who has made a

name by his devotion to our Lady of Lourdes, recently published, with the imprimatur of the Archbishop of Paris and under the special benediction of the Roman Pontiff, a translation into French of the four Gospels. He did this, he tells us in his preface, on account of "a fact notorious and universal"—a fact which is regarded as "the primary cause of the diminution of the Christian spirit"—namely, that the Gospel "is very rarely read even by those who profess to be fervent Catholics. Never at all by the multitude of the faithful." "In fact," continues M. Lasserre, "ask your neighbours and your friends, all who make up your circle; ask yourself, my dear reader:—and you will not hesitate to affirm, not perhaps without a profound astonishment, that for a hundred persons who practise the sacraments, there is often not a single one who has ever opened the Gospels, except at hazard, and to go through or to meditate here and there upon a few isolated verses." Anything like continuous knowledge of the Gospels, he goes on to explain at length, simply does not exist.[1] Such a state of things Cardinal Manning appears not only to recognise as a fact, but to justify. "Catholics readily admit," he says, that "they do not go to the text of Scripture for their devotion, as others do who are out of the unity of the Church." "The Church puts into the hands of its people books of devotion which represent the whole order

[1] I quote from the twenty-third edition. Shortly after, this book was suppressed, on the ground of inaccuracies of translation. If this had been the only ground, we should, of course, have expected that another translation, freed from such inaccuracies, would at once have appeared with the same *imprimaturs* and benedictions. There was an obviously boundless demand for a version of the Gospels in French. [1889.]

and completeness of revelation, and not the partial and unordered aspect of Scripture."[1] Now we English Churchmen feel that there is a very natural reason why Roman Catholics should not know more than select passages of Scripture. Their favourite devotions to the blessed Virgin and the Saints, the doctrines of indulgences, and of purgatory, as commonly held amongst them, find no countenance at all in the New Testament. A man cannot be at home in the current Roman doctrine of 'good works' and in St. Paul's Epistles. And this unscripturalness of the Roman Church has a further result: we do not, we cannot, look to her for much help in interpreting the New Testament as a whole. Immense progress has been made in Scriptural interpretation within the last thirty or forty years,[2] but how singularly little has the Roman Church helped in it, or is she likely to help in it. We go to older Roman

[1] Manning's *Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost* pp. 210, 211. P. 208 he speaks of "the level and dim surface of the Sacred Text." There may be eyes to which the surface of nature is level and dim; otherwise it would be inconceivable how any one could apply such epithets *e.g.* to the Epistles and Gospels.

[2] I do not, of course, mean that we should not desire in many modern commentators, and expounders of Scripture, a much greater reverence for the mind of the Church, but I do say that such commentators as Westcott, Lightfoot, Trench, or—out of Presbyterian communities — Milligan, Godet, Delitzsch, and others,—with such preachers and writers as Benson, Holland, Liddon, Keble, Church, Mozley, Pusey, and Newman (almost wholly in his Anglican days), represent for our age a really fresh and genuine drawing out of the meaning of the inspired books, and give us as a result immense help in understanding them. By the united labours of many devout spirits, Holy Scripture is being gradually made to live again. [1888.]

commentaries (such as that of Cornelius à Lapide) for accumulated information on the various opinions, good, bad, and indifferent, which have been held as to the meaning of Scripture, and sometimes for valuable suggestion: we go to Father Coleridge and others for a great deal of suggestive practical commentary on the Gospels —but for the legitimate and critical and real interpretation of the New Testament, especially of St. Paul or St. John, we look with very little hope to the Roman Church.

(2) It is unhistorical. The Roman Church has dragged along with her as a heritage of the past, from which she cannot break, a 'rule of faith' which makes a new dogma once for all equivalent to a false dogma. It has therefore been forced upon her to maintain that dogmas which have been rendered necessary by the accentuation of authority or by the exigencies of popular devotions which it was not possible or expedient to restrain, such as Papal infallibility and supremacy, the Immaculate Conception and the doctrine of Indulgences, are portions of primitive Christianity, at least in substance. This hopeless task she can only accomplish by a treatment of antiquity which is absolutely inconsistent with any honest attempt to read its record. Thus practically Roman writers deny that antiquity has a real record which we can read, and ought to read freely. Cardinal Manning says: "the appeal to antiquity (*i.e.* the appeal behind the present teaching of the Church) is both a treason and a heresy. . . . I may say in strict truth that the Church has no antiquity. It rests upon its own supernatural and perpetual consciousness. . . . The only divine evidence to us of what was primitive is the witness and voice of the Church

at this hour."[1] Roman writers generally bid us use the living voice of the Church as a witness to what the Church of the past did think, and appear to suppose the argument of the 'difficulty'[2] of reading the past records of the Church a sufficient reason for ignoring them. Thus almost the whole of their recent literature has become saturated with a spirit of unfaithfulness to historical fact. There is a great deal of Romanism in the Church from the fifth century downward, and this they produce with an excessive willingness—they have it at their fingers' ends. But we have ceased almost to hope to find in a modern Roman writer a candid review of the whole facts of a case where the Roman Claims or dogmas are in question. Candour, an attempt to fairly produce the whole case, a love of the whole truth—this seems to have vanished from their literature,

[1] *Temporal Mission*, Third ed. 1877, pp. 238-240. Elsewhere, p. 29, he calls the appeal to Scripture and antiquity whether by individuals or local Churches "essentially rationalistic." We on the other hand should hold that the Church is the primary teacher of the individual, but that her teaching, because it is Catholic and nothing more, must admit of being verified by the individual for himself, if he has adequate knowledge and patience, in the field of antiquity. Morinus' work *de Sacris Ordinationibus* is a magnificent instance of a current church doctrine in the Roman Church having been in former days altered by a free examination of the past records. See *The Church and the Ministry* p. 68, note 1.

[2] Rivington's *Authority* p. 29. P. 56 he quotes a remark of St. Francis "that the early Church," on the Protestant showing "must have had a long speaking-tube indeed to make itself audible to Luther across the centuries, without these centuries hearing what it said." Luther put his ear very little to the speaking-tube, and perhaps there was too much noise during the Reformation to make it very easy to listen to the voice, but I should have thought that the revival of the knowledge of Greek among other things was of the nature of a speaking-tube from the early centuries.

and its place is taken by an abundant skill in making the best of all that looks Romewards in Church history, and ignoring the rest. Indeed it seems to be not only in dealing with the Papal claims that the Roman Church is disqualified from dealing broadly and frankly with facts. She has adopted a fatal tone of distrust towards the critical reason altogether, so that she seems by her whole method to put herself at a disadvantage in dealing with some of the most pressing problems of our time which are coming up for solution.

For example. Some fifty years ago a very powerful attack was made on the genuineness of New Testament documents, and consequently on the historical character of the Gospel record. On the whole we can claim that this attack has been met and repulsed, and that the cause of the New Testament history and records—the authorship, for instance, of St. John's Gospel, the historical trustworthiness of the Acts of the Apostles, and the genuineness of St. Paul's and St. John's Epistles—stands now on stronger ground than ever before, in proportion as the attack was more scientific, more radical, and more searching. It has been met by men who combined with a strong faith in the Christian Creed and Scriptures a courageous belief in evidence, a fearless love of frank inquiry, and it is not therefore surprising that the victory has been won with little aid from the Roman Catholic Church. Now the attack has moved backwards, and is directed against the Old Testament. On this field the whole problem is still in solution, and the victory is still to be won. But it will be won, we are sure, by students who, on the one hand, hold with a sure confidence to the Inspiration of Scrip-

ture, and take a careful view of what the Church seems actually to have committed herself to on this subject; and, on the other hand, face with a determined boldness, and patience, and accuracy the critical problem, the evidence as it actually is. This field of controversy is still in the main before us, but the experience of the past leads us surely to expect the champions of Holy Scripture in the fray to come from some other quarter than amongst Roman theologians—for this reason, that instead of the temper required for dealing with the problem, they seem to exhibit a mixture of exaggerated dogmatism with undue scepticism as to our faculties for the discovery of truth. And it cannot be pretended that the question is one only for the learned. There is no question which more cries out for solution amongst the working classes than what they are to think about the historical truth of the whole Bible. Hitherto, certainly, the Roman Church, as it has not done much to help us on the ground of the New Testament, so again has no ready answer as to the Old. For while Cardinal Manning declares that the authoritative teaching of the Holy Catholic Church "excludes the supposition that falsehood and error can be found" in any of the Canonical books, on the other hand an able Roman layman[1] has vindicated his liberty to maintain in the

[1] I allude to Mr. St. George Mivart's articles in the *Nineteenth Century* of July and Dec. 1887. It does not seem as if the Roman Church was in fact more committed on this subject than our own. There is the same variety of opinion. The Vatican Council has expressly defined that the books of the Old and New Testament "have God for their author." Newman, however, *Nineteenth Century* Feb. 1884 p. 188, makes 'author' (auctor) mean no more than 'primary cause.' Most recognized Roman writers

public press an acceptance of the conclusions of 'advanced critics' on the Old Testament, and even of conclusions which would go far to undermine the historical trustworthiness of the New Testament documents.

I have been endeavouring to indicate two points in which the Roman development of Catholicity, because it is one-sided, has had the effect of maiming Christianity, and disqualifying it from dealing with some of the tasks assigned to it. The over-development of authoritativeness has led to the Roman Church becoming both unscriptural and unhistorical. Thus we Anglicans are sure that to accept the Roman Church as being the whole Catholic Church would be to betray a great trust, and to make ourselves instrumental in letting Christianity become narrowed as it comes down the ages. "There are more things" in Scripture and in Catholicism "than are dreamt of in her philosophy." The Church of the first ages was richer in possible developments of character and power than the Church of Rome.

I may then attempt to put the case of an Anglican Churchman at starting in this way:

We find ourselves by our baptism members of a Church which claims to be part of Christ's Holy Catholic Church, and which, at the same time, has become separated from the rest of Western Christendom by a refusal to submit to the claims of the see of Rome.

e.g. Cornely *Hist. et Crit. Introd. in V. T. Compendium* Paris 1889 pp. 273-278, appear to regard themselves as bound to defend the historical truth even of Judith and Tobit. [1889. The above paragraph contains an element of prophecy. For later events, and the Papal Encyclical on the subject, see Chapter XI.]

We do not find on examination that we fail to comply with any of the conditions of catholic communion which the ancient and undivided Church recognized.

We cannot in the face of history treat the present claims of the Papal see as tenable or just. In particular, the force of these claims is broken, as by an immense breakwater, by the whole Eastern Church with her millions of Catholic Christians, long before it reaches us. For history forces us to recognize in the Roman claims the main cause of the schism of East and West: it forces us to see in the Papal system a development of Christianity which is less than catholic.

On the other hand, we see in the ancient and undivided Church a coherent system of beliefs and institutions and practices, which has been continuous under the development of Rome and in the traditions of the East, and which is richer and fuller in possibilities of life than either the one or the other taken apart. To this richer and completer life of the undivided Church we make our appeal. From it we would start afresh. For while we thankfully recognize that, in God's good providence, nothing occurred in the English Reformation which broke the continuity of our Church in any essential matter with the Church of the past, it is not to the Reformation we wish to appeal so much as to antiquity. The Reformation was a time of reaction rather than of settlement. We see the 'fresh springs' of a life constantly new rather in the principles of the ancient Church and in the present power of the Holy Ghost. And to reassure us in appealing back to the undivided Church and claiming our continuity

with her, God has blessed with results beyond what its first leaders would have dared to ask, the revival of religious life amongst us, which, during the last fifty years, has stirred and taken form on the basis of this very appeal. Just in proportion as the Anglican Church has been content to act as if she were Catholic, and to stir up the gifts within her, in that proportion we find she is so and has the living Spirit in her body.

What is reassuring is not merely that the faith of individuals, whether priests or people, finds its response: it is not merely that we are allowed to realise our catholicity in this or that parish, this or that institution: it is not merely that all the prophecies of evil which those who left us forty years ago ventured to utter, have been signally falsified[1]—it is true further and beyond this, that our Church is driven in her formal and corporate action more and more to take her stand on the only basis which is tenable and enduring, the basis of catholic principle. It is surely remarkable that in the Conference of Bishops of the Anglican Communion in

[1] Cf. for instance Dr. Newman's *Loss and Gain* p. 288. "They [Catholic-minded people] will keep going one by one as they ripen." . . . "Their Catholic principles lead them on, and there is nothing to drive them back." On the other hand, in the articles by the Editor of *The Month* (July 1885 p. 350), we discern a different tone after a lapse of many years, and in the light of the experience they have brought. "Their eyes [*i.e.* of those who represent the Tractarians now] are no longer turned to the city of God. . . . They are quite content with their position. Cf. Rivington *Dependence* p. 157: "Of late years this attitude [of preference for Rome] has very much disappeared. It is now taught that it is a comparative blessing to have been born in the Anglican Branch, as it is called, and not in the Roman Communion."

the year 1888, a proposal which was made (if report speaks true) subversive of the principle of the apostolic succession,[1] should not have been able to get a hearing; or be allowed to appear in the official report. It is surely remarkable how the bishops take their stand not so much on the Articles, as on the Catholic creeds and Ecumenical Councils[2]—not, that is, on a document which represents rather the best compromise which could be arrived at locally, at a time when questions were not ripe for settlement, but upon the mature and abiding decisions of the whole Church.[3]

Forty years ago Cardinal Newman made the fol-

[1] A proposal (in effect) to recognize Nonconformist orders as 'valid' in some sense, though irregular. It was sufficiently notorious to be the subject of public sermons.

[2] See *the Conference of Bishops at Lambeth* 1888. *Encyclical letter and reports* pp. 18, 28, 105 ff., esp. p. 110. It was especially the real adherence of our Church to the ancient dogmas and apostolic succession, as having still a living meaning, which could be doubted fifty years ago. "You are so few" (who hold to such things) "that we can count you." See *Loss and Gain* p. 214. In spite of many fears entertained about the 'Pan-Anglican Conference,' it has wrought much good in this way—that the bishops present were in large majority members of unestablished Churches in different lands, and thus the whole basis of discussion was taken off the temporary and accidental basis of an English Establishment.

[3] The Creeds represent decisions. Their whole purpose is to determine. There is no doubt, on the other hand, that, except where the Articles simply express over again the mind of the ancient Church (as in 1-9, 33-34), or pointedly exclude certain mediæval abuses (as in 30 and 32), or Reformation excesses (38, 39), the purpose which governed their wording was to avoid an issue rather than to seek it—to shelve questions, leaving a large tract of open country, rather than to decide them. This characteristic of the Articles is at once their weakness as formulas and their strength as temporary safeguards.

lowing enumeration of the steps which would constitute a 'mortal operation' upon the Anglican Church and destroy its essence or definition: "Take its bishops out of the legislature, tear its formularies from the Statute Book, open its universities to Dissenters, allow its clergy to become laymen again, legalize its private prayer-meetings." Since then three of the contingencies contemplated have actually occurred. Would any one now imagine that the occurrence of the first two would make the operation mortal? Truly God hath done great things for us already, whereof we rejoice.[1]

I shall hope to show in succeeding chapters that Anglicanism is not a mere appeal to precedents—that a real and intelligible groundwork of reason and principle underlies our action and our hopes. For the present I have only two brief remarks to make in order to bring this introductory chapter to a conclusion.

It would be a fatal mistake to suppose that the atti-

[1] See Newman *Discourses to mixed Congregations* p. 251. I am sure that so far as there is wilfulness amongst us or within us, we shall all be grateful to Mr. Rivington for making public the private warnings of so great a teacher as Dr. Pusey (*Authority* p. 11). Such warnings we always need. Shall I return good for good, by recalling to Mr. Rivington's notice a *public* warning of Cardinal Newman's of a similar character to his own fellow-clergy? "There are those among us" he wrote (*Letter to the Duke of Norfolk* 1875, p. 4) "as it must be confessed, who for years past have conducted themselves as if no responsibility attached to wild words and overbearing deeds; who have stated truths in the most paradoxical form, and stretched principles till they were close upon snapping; and who at length, having done their best to set the house on fire, leave to others the task of putting out the flame." He goes on to allude to "the chronic extravagances of knots of Catholics."

tude we maintain is that of "Romanism without the Pope." The Roman temper has coloured all her doctrine. It is not only the case that certain doctrines and practices are wholly destitute of authority, except in the Papal system—such doctrines as those of the Treasury of Merits and the Immaculate Conception; but the temper of Rome has coloured further her use of doctrines and practices that are really catholic, not least, perhaps, her doctrine and practice with reference to the sacrament of the Eucharist.[1] The whole logic of Anglicanism forces us, not indeed—God forbid—to

[1] See further p. 176. It will surprise many of us, I think, to read the following statement by Cardinal Newman (1877) of the authoritative Roman doctrine of the Real Presence (*Via Media* ii. p. 220):

"Our Lord is *in loco* in heaven, not (in the same sense) in the sacrament. He is present in the sacrament only in substance, *substantivè*, and substance does not require or imply the occupation of place. But if place is excluded from the idea of the sacramental Presence, therefore division or distance from heaven is excluded also, for distance implies a measurable interval, and such there cannot be except between places. Moreover, if the idea of distance is excluded, therefore is the idea of motion. Our Lord then neither descends from heaven upon our altars, nor moves when carried in procession. The visible species change their position, but He does not move. He is in the holy Eucharist after the manner of a spirit. We do not know how; we have no parallel to the 'how' in our experience. We can only say that He is present, not according to the natural manner of bodies, but *sacramentally*. His Presence is substantial, spirit-wise, sacramental: an absolute mystery, not against reason, however, but against imagination, and must be received by faith."

We cannot but feel as we read this, that this supra-local, spiritual, presence which is not susceptible of change of place—while it agrees very well with the ancient use of the Eucharistic mysteries, agrees very ill with some modern practices, attractive as they are, connected with the Tabernacle and the Monstrance.

ignore the great record of mediæval Christianity, or to cease to venerate the mighty saints of those ages, but to make our appeal on all points behind Roman and mediæval churchmanship to the 'rich depositary' of Scripture and the ancient Church, and make a fresh start from these.

Secondly, it needs to be emphasized that supposing true principles do not force us to accept the present Roman claims, they by that very fact do make the acceptance of them by individuals a grievous betrayal of trust. God has, we must believe, special tasks in store for the Anglican Church, tasks for which the Roman temper and the Roman theology are by their very character and tone disqualified. To some of these we have alluded. It seems likely that it will belong to us, rather than to Rome, to work out the relations of religion to critical knowledge, and to vindicate the true character of inspiration in its relation to historical research. And if these are intellectual problems, there are others in the missionary field and at home of a much more practical sort, over and above the ordinary work of conversion and edification which belongs at all times to all Churches. Now these special tasks of the Church belong to special men. God will raise up, He is raising up, specially gifted men to fulfil them. But we can only do our special tasks through our special men, if we ordinary churchmen and churchwomen are playing our ordinary parts manfully and well. These special vocations, intellectual and spiritual, require a strong background of ordinary church life. It is this thought which ought to enable us all to feel almost

equally responsible for the general work of the Church —equally bound to merge our individual interests and fears and hopes, even for our own salvation, in the larger interests and fears and hopes of the kingdom of God. Christ, Who said "what is a man profited if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul (life)?" said also, and immediately before it, "whosoever would save his soul (life) shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose his soul (life) for my sake shall find it."[1] Nothing can be so important as to save our soul, our true self, our true life, but we are to look to save it not by selfishly isolating it and sparing it, but by abandoning it to burdens which Christ would lay upon us, and giving it up to His work and His kingdom. The call of Christ to salvation comes not in the way of panic 'amazement' and failing courage, but in the way of endurance, and patience, and forbearance, of greater hope, and firmer ventures of faith and love.

God has a great work to do in reviving the catholic

[1] St. Matt. xvi. 25-27. See Revised Version. The word for 'soul' or 'life' is in all cases the same in the Greek and in the Vulgate. I have been led to make the remarks in the text above by Mr. Rivington's intimation (p. 59) that he went to Rome to save his soul from hell. I cannot think that the Bible leads us to suppose that we should save our soul by submitting to the loudest voice, which threatens us with the severest penalties, but rather by following the path of imposed duty with the greatest possible measure of patience and hope, and the venture of faith which holds on to God through all darkness. I should desire a Nonconformist to be brought to the Church by the increasing sense that in proportion as he became unselfish, and threw himself upon the body he belonged to, he became conscious that as a body, as an organization, it did not represent the Divine kingdom, but human self-will.

and free life of the Church of England, and He needs, in different ways, every member of the Church to play a part in it by patience and faith. Who would not rather have stayed in the Church of England forty years ago with Dr. Pusey, patient and faithful, than have left it with others less stable, if more brilliant? The strain, thanks to the faithfulness of him and others like him, has become much less in our day, and the burden less severe. But yet there is much more to be done than God can do in our lifetime, and we meanwhile must see that no cowardice or faintheartedness or impatience of ours hinders its progress.

> 'List, Christian warrior, thou whose heart is fain
> To loose thy mother from her present chain,
> Christ will avenge His Bride—yet ere He save
> Thy lot shall be the grave.'

CHAPTER II.

THE UNITY OF THE CHURCH.

It is a question often asked of English churchmen 'In what sense do you believe in *one* Holy Catholic Church? You do not claim that the English Church is of itself and alone the whole Church; you admit the Roman and Eastern branches to be, equally with your own, parts of the Church: that is to say, you admit permanent and apparently radical divisions in the Church in matters of doctrine no less than of government, and yet you say the Church is one. Surely you are here giving words an unreal meaning. Surely the Romanists can call the Church "one" in a much more intelligible sense. What they mean by church unity is plain and tangible. Their Church is one.'

Thus Mr. Rivington has recently said[1]: "I saw that the *plain, obvious* meaning of our Lord's words to St. Peter involved the institution of a visible Head to His visible Church, *besides* the fact that His Church is described as an organized body, and that the talk of a body without a head *in the same order of life* as the rest of the body, is to use words without meaning. An invisible body may have only an invisible head; but a

[1] *Authority* p. 5.

visible body, to be a body at all, must have also a visible head."

In this argument, just quoted, and in the sort of questioning described above, we have specimens of the way in which we are pressed in the English Church to acknowledge that 'logically' the belief in the visible Church leads to Rome; and we make our reply to this solicitation, first, by endeavouring to explain positively the primary sense of church unity, as taught in Scripture and held by the Fathers, so as to show that it covers our position and enables us to give a rational account of it: and then, negatively, by pointing out in what we consider the weakness of the Roman conception of church unity to consist, considered as a *primary* conception.

Primarily, then, the Church is the Spirit-bearing body, and what makes her one in heaven and paradise and earth is not an outward but an inward fact—the indwelling of the Spirit, which brings with it the indwelling of Christ, and makes the Church the great 'Christbearer,' the body of Christ. The principle of unity in any institution or object depends on what it is—on what its essence consists in. The unity of a stone and the unity of a state are different things. The House of Commons is one, and Nature is one; but in different senses. A family again is one, however much brothers may be separated by oceans or kept apart from all intercourse by bitterest feud, because of a community of descent, a common heritage of nature, which runs in the blood and physical constitution, and makes it one. Once more, the Church is one, in a sense to which other unities may

supply analogy and illustration, but which is none the less special and unique. She is one because she alone of all societies of men possesses a supernatural indwelling presence and relation to God in Christ. This is a unity which underlies all external separations of place or time, all external divisions and hostilities which result from the marring of the sacred gift by human sin. It is consistent with anything which does not break the channels down which the Church's essence is conveyed from the centre and source of life to all who share it.

Of course this fundamental unity of life is not the only unity. There is a unity of faith, and a unity of love or fellowship also, which we shall have to take into account shortly, but a little examination will show us that this is the principal sense in which Scripture speaks of the Church as one. She is one as the branches are one with the vine[1]: that is, one because the sap of Christ's Life is derived into her, and to be in connection with Christ the source of life is therefore the condition of being in the unity of the Church. Again, Christ prays that His disciples "may be perfected into one" by being taken up through Himself into the fellowship of the life of God.[2] Again when St. Paul speaks of the unity of the Church, he makes it depend—not on subordination to one external government, but—on the

[1] St. John xv. 1-5.

[2] St. John xvii. 22-23 [R.V.]. It should be remarked that Christ did not, strictly, speak of *one fold*, but of *one flock, one shepherd*: 'They shall become one flock.' St. John x. 16 [R.V.]. This is worth notice, though it is sometimes quite unduly insisted upon.

reception of one food, which is the Life of Christ.[1] Partaking of one Bread we become one Body, 'holding the Head' we share His Life.[2] The unity of the Church is specified to *consist* in 'one body' thus understood, 'one Spirit, one hope, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, over all, through all, in all.'[3] It is because the Church possesses this unity that she ought to express it in outward fellowship and peace amongst her members: because we have been "baptized into one body and made to drink of one Spirit," it is incumbent upon us to avoid "schism in the body"[4]: it is because we have the "unity of the Spirit" that we are to endeavour to maintain the "bond of peace."[5] But the unity does not *consist in* the bond of peace: it does not *consist in* outward fellowship, though it ought to result in it.

Metaphors must not be pressed without a very strict regard to the sense in which they are used, and I have been trying to show what is the primary sense in which the one life of the Church is compared in Holy Scripture to the one life of the body and of the vine: it is in the sense that it transmits one life from one source into all its limbs or branches. It is a natural consequence of this way of thinking of Church unity that in Scripture and the early writers it is spoken of as progressive. If the unity of the Church were primarily a unity of outward government it could not *grow*. It would be an external bond once for all imposed. But a unity which is the result of an infused life increases and grows as this new

[1] 1 Cor. x. 14-17. [2] Eph. iv. 13-16. [3] Eph. iv. 4-6.
[4] 1 Cor. xii. 13 25. [5] Eph. iv. 3.

life gains force and absorbs the older elements: so Christ prays that His disciples may be "perfected into one"; and St. Paul speaks of the whole Church growing up "into a perfect man" *i.e.* into a closer and completer unity of life. So in the *Shepherd* of Hermas, sometimes reckoned as Scripture in the early Church, the picture is presented to us of the Church becoming one by gradual purification: "so also shall be the Church of God after it has been purified and the wicked and hypocrites and blasphemers and double-minded have been cast out; after these have been cast out the Church of God shall be one body, one purpose, one mind, one faith, one love" (*Sim.* ix. 18).

The unworthy lives of Christians prevent the Church from manifesting the life of Christ in her, as she is meant to do, and from being the light of the world, but all Christians who believe in a visible Church must admit that there have been times when the Church has been extraordinarily corrupt without losing that intrinsic holiness which belongs to her, because she has the Holy Spirit within her. Again the Church's indolence in Mission work has kept her back from showing to the world that she is truly Catholic and truly adapted to all races. In the same way the divisions in the Church prevent her from bearing the witness she ought to bear to the one life by which she lives; but she no more ceases to be 'one' by outward divisions, than she ceases to be 'holy' by tolerating sin, or 'catholic' because she has so slothfully put up with two-thirds of the world remaining in heathendom. Indeed no one who studies church history can be surprised that a Church which

has often looked so utterly unholy, which had even in the fifth century to be described by Salvian as a "sink of vices," should also have grown to look disunited. It would be wonderful if sin had not been as busy to spoil the beauty of the bride of Christ in one way as in the other. The vision of the Church utterly holy, actually catholic, utterly one, is the *vision* of heaven and the *hope* only of earth.

We maintain then that, *primarily*, the unity of the Church is in Scripture a unity of inward life, an invisible fact: it is in this that her essential unity primarily consists. 'But then' it will be said 'you are saying that Church unity is primarily invisible.' We reply that even at this primary stage the unity is external as well as internal. It is quite true that every one who possesses a certain inward gift so far dwells in the unity of the Church. But it is the sacramental principle that the spiritual is imparted (since the Incarnation) through the material. This inward life depends on outward means. Without Baptism, without the "laying on of hands," which gives the gift of the Holy Ghost in His personal indwelling, without the Eucharist, without absolution, we cannot have or retain the inward gift; and those external channels depending, as we all acknowledge they do, on the apostolic ministry, connect the inward life of the Church at once with her outward organization. Every one who has a certain inward gift is in Church unity, but none can, I do not say possess but, make good their claim to possess that gift in its fulness[1] save those who

[1] All baptized persons are in a subordinate sense inside the Church.

dwell within the unity of the apostolic organization which is the visible Church. It is only through this visible organization that God has covenanted to give us this invisible Life.

"We have from Holy Scripture," wrote Dr. Pusey, "as means and conditions of the unity of the Church, one all-perfect Author, the 'One God and Father of all'; one end to which all tends, the 'one hope of our calling'; 'one Head,' the Head of the Church, our 'one Lord'; 'one Spirit,' giving life to every living member; the same sacraments, 'one baptism,' and 'one bread,' by which we are all ingrafted into or maintained in the one Body of our one Head; one apostolic descent of the bishops and pastors of the flock, coming down from One; 'one' common 'faith,' that which was given once for all with the anathema that we hold no doctrine at variance with it, although an angel from heaven were to preach it. Of these we are receivers only.

"These, if any wilfully reject, they reject Christ. They sever themselves not only from the Body of Christ, but directly from the Head, loosing the band which binds them unto Him. These while Christian bodies retain, they are, so long, like the river which 'went out of Eden to water the garden; and from thence it was parted and became into four heads.' They come from the fountain of blessedness; they flow down to the ocean of the Eternal Love of God; they water the parched land; they cool and refresh the weary and the thirsty in the places which God has appointed for them with the one stream coming down

from Him. They are one in their one Original, from which they continually and unchangeably derive their being. They adore God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, with the same new song of the Gospel; they confess Him in the same words of apostolic faith; they offer to Him the same incense of praise, and the same holy offering whereof Malachi foretold, 'from the rising of the sun to the going down of the same,' pleading on earth to the Eternal Father that one sacrifice, as presented in heaven; they receive the same 'bread which came down from heaven to give life to the world.' Unknown in face, in place separate, different in language, opposed, alas! in some things to one another, still before the throne of God they are one holy catholic apostolic Church; each several portion praying for itself and for the rest, united in the prayers and oblations which it offers for all, by the one bread and the one Spirit which dwelleth in all. 'In which mystery' (the holy Eucharist), says St. Cyprian, 'our people are shown to be united, so that, as many grains collected and ground and mingled together make one bread, so in Christ, Who is the heavenly bread, we may know that there is one Body wherewith our whole number is conjoined and united.'"[1]

It will appear plainly enough that this conception of Church unity does not confine it to this world, but includes within it the departed who are, like us, 'in Christ.' It does not allow us to separate off the Church

[1] Dr. Pusey's *Truth and Office of the English Church* pp. 56, 57. A number of patristic passages will be found collected by him p. 45 f. See also in this volume, App. note ii. p. 211.

Militant and treat it as a separate entity.[1] Further it does not suggest a Head on earth. As the instrument of this unity is the Spirit, as its basis is Christ the Mediator, so the source and centre of it is in the heavens, where the Church's exalted Head lives in eternal majesty human yet glorified. As the bishop is an essential element of the organization of each local Church on earth, so he is the centre of local unity. "There is one flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ," so cried the father Ignatius, who had lived in the apostolic age, "and one cup unto union in the blood: there is one altar as there is one bishop, together with the presbytery and the deacons." But as the Church in each place exists only to bring man into relation to Christ and to the redeemed humanity which Christ is gathering to Himself in the unseen world, so the catholic Church, the society which each local Church represents, has its centre of unity in Christ. "Where the bishop appears, there let the people be; as where is Christ Jesus, there is the catholic Church."[2] Each local Church exists to keep open the connection of earth and heaven: to keep the streams of the water of life flowing. Of course each has a necessary connection with all the others in the witness of truth and in the fellowship of love—we will go on to think of that—but their primary point of union,

[1] F. Richardson *What are the Catholic Claims?* p. 46, complains of me for refusing to treat the Church on earth as a separate unity, complete in itself. He might as well complain of me for refusing to treat of One Person of the Trinity apart from the others.

[2] Ignatius *ad Smyrn.* 8. "The bishop is the centre of each individual Church, as Jesus Christ is the centre of the universal Church."—Lightfoot.

the centre to which they all converge, is nothing lower than Christ. The matter cannot be summed up better than in a typical quotation from St. Augustine, which puts this thought in vivid simplicity: "Since the whole Christ is made up of the Head and the body—the Head is our Saviour Himself, who suffered under Pontius Pilate, who now, after He has risen from the dead, sits at the right hand of God: but His body is the Church; not this Church or that, but the Church scattered over all the world; nor that only which exists among men now living, but those belonging to it also who were before us and are to be after us to the end of the world. For the whole Church, made up of all the faithful, because all the faithful are members of Christ, has its Head situate in the heavens which governs this body: though It is separated from their sight, yet It is bound to them by love."[1]

When therefore Roman Catholics speak thus[2]: "There are two intrinsic notes of the Church, *viz.*, one regarding its constitution, *viz.*, that *unity* of government which excludes all schismatical divisions within the body of the Church; and one regarding its life, *viz.*, *holiness* of government"; when they speak of the Church as "'compacted and fitly joined together' with a head appointed by Christ Himself" in virtue of an ordered hierarchy centering in the Pope[3]; when they argue that

[1] St. Aug. *on the Psalms* Ps. lvi. 1.

[2] *The True Basis of Christian Fellowship*, Bishop Meurin, S.J., D.D., p. 32. (It was this book in view of which these papers were first written.)

[3] *The True Basis* etc. p. 70. Cf. Father Gallway's *Lectures on Ritualism* v. p. 175 f. He challenges us to say that "the Head"

two parts of the Church permanently diverging must at last annihilate unity, as a civil war carried to its bitter end makes one nation two—when they argue thus, they are making the unity of the Church primarily an external one, a unity of visible association, the unity which comes of subordination to the same external rule. That this is thoroughly unscriptural has been shown above. That it is inadequate will be seen sufficiently from the consideration that it would exclude the faithful departed from the unity of the Church in its primary sense. For the faithful departed are beyond and above the visible hierarchy on earth. They are in the unity of the Church because that unity is not only of this world—because the Body of Christ has, so to speak, but its lower limbs here on earth. The Church on earth is but the visible portion of a great invisible whole bound all together in the same order of supernatural life.

> "One army of the living GOD,
> To His command we bow;
> Part of the host have crossed the flood,
> And part are crossing now."

Mr. Rivington again is making the same mistake when he postulates in the passage quoted above a visible head to the Church on earth. He implies that the unseen Christ and the faithful departed belong to a different "order of life" from the visible body. He would make the Church on earth a complete thing in itself.

whom St. Paul exhorts us "to hold" is the Invisible Head, Christ! Only 'a Low Churchman or dissenter ought to say so.' Then we may safely be low churchmen or dissenters in company with St. Augustine and the fathers, and the best Roman Commentators.

It is enough to point out how blankly his words contradict what was just quoted from St. Augustine. The Pope becomes, according to this idea, not a *primus inter pares* among bishops, but a quasi-sacramental head, as being the mediator between Christ and His people. Mr. Rivington, indeed, so describes him.[1] I shall have occasion in a later chapter to trace the growth of this quite unprimitive and uncatholic idea. Meanwhile I think enough has been said to show that the true idea of Church unity makes it consist *primarily* in the derivation of the life of the Spirit from Christ, down the channels of His organized society; not in subjection to an external hierarchy centering in the Pope. And this true theory as logically excludes a "sacramental" headship on earth, as the false theory certainly postulates it.

[1] St. Peter (as Head of the Church) is "the sacrament of the administrative power of the one Lord over all" p. 72. "The Papacy is, as it were, the Eucharist of Christ's government in His Church," p. 21. Cf. the *Primary Charge* of the Bishop of Lincoln (Parker), p. 28: "though we would grant the See of Rome her ancient primacy, yet we cannot accept it as it is now offered, transformed into a *quasi*-sacramental Headship."

CHAPTER III.

THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH.

HITHERTO we have been brought to the conclusion that the primary constituent of Church unity is that inward supernatural life, that life of the Spirit, which she derives through sacramental channels from Christ her Head. But besides this unity of life there is a unity of truth, for truth, as well as grace, came by Jesus Christ. There is not only 'one body' but 'one faith.' There is a 'tradition,' 'a form of sound words' committed to the Church in the persons of the Apostles, which is to be the 'mould'[1] of the Christian character so long as the world remains. To the holding of this truth every Christian person or community is bound, and its wilful rejection is what constitutes heresy.

It follows that the Church is not only, through her sacraments, the household of grace: she is also the "pillar and ground of the truth": she has the authority of a divinely authorized teacher, and her legislative enactments in the sphere of truth, no less than of discipline, have a divine sanction. What she binds on

[1] Rom. vi. 17: "The mould of truth into which ye were delivered" (literally).

earth is bound in heaven. And thus Tertullian[1] has *two* questions to ask of any claimants to represent the Church—not only 'have you the apostolic succession?' but also 'do you hold the apostolic truth?' It is then our present task to inquire what this teaching authority of the Church means, in order to be able to answer the question whether the infallibility of the Roman bishop is its logical outcome.

First let it be clear that the Church's function is not to *reveal* truth. The revelation given once for all to the Apostles cannot be either diminished or added to. It is a "faith once for all delivered,"[2] and the New Testament emphasizes the Church's duty as simply that of 'holding fast' and teaching what she has 'received.' The apostle St. Paul claims that his converts should repudiate even him—should treat him as anathema—if he were to teach anything else than what he taught at first.[3] It is thus of the very essence of the Christian revelation that as originally given it is final. Whatever is new to Christian theology in substance, is by that very fact proved not to be of the faith. This is a commonplace of patristic theology, and it is admitted by the modern Roman Church. "First of all" says Dr. Newman "and in as few words as possible, and *ex abundanti cautela*: every Catholic holds that the Christian dogmas were in the Church from the time of the Apostles; that they were ever in their substance what they are now; that they existed before the formulas were publicly adopted, in which as time went on they were defined and re-

[1] *de Praescrip.* 32. [2] St. Jude 3 [R.V.].
[3] Gal. i. 8, 9.

corded."[1] Even the Montanists in ancient time who had a theory of development in discipline, maintained the unchangeableness of the 'rule of faith.' On this subject the 'Reminder' (*Commonitorium*) of Vincent of Lerins has been commonly taken as a summary of patristic teaching, and it is this recognised ancient text-book on the question of Church authority which elaborates the famous formula to express the true creed—that it is what has been held in the Christian Church 'everywhere, always, and by all.' Vincent, then, is never weary of reiterating that novelty is the test of error, antiquity of truth. "To teach anything to catholic Christians[2] besides what they have received, has never been allowed, is nowhere allowed, never will be allowed": "St Paul repeats and reiterates that if any one announces a new dogma, he is to be anathematized."[3] An inquirer who would know the truth when any novel error tries to spread its contagion over the whole Church at once, is "to cling to antiquity, which is quite beyond being seduced by any deception of novelty."[4] He is, as Cyprian says,[5] when the stream of present Church teaching becomes in any way defective, to go to the *source* and repair what

[1] *Tracts Theol. and Eccl.* p. 287. We have it on Lord Acton's authority *English Hist. Rev.* Oct. 1890, p. 723, that 'after sixteen years spent in the Church of Rome, Newman was inclined to guard and narrow his theory [of development].' Cf. Keenan's *Controversial Catechism* ed. 1846 p. 117. "Can a General Council frame new matters or articles of faith?" "No; a General Council can only explain what has been already revealed: it belongs to God only to reveal new articles of faith."

[2] He excludes not only what is *contrary to* (*contra*) but what is 'beside' the original deposit (*præter*), cc. 20 and 28.

[3] C. 9. [4] C. 3. [5] Ep. 74, 10.

is amiss. Manifestly these writers would not tolerate any depreciation of 'primitiveness' as a test of truth.[1]

It is not then a matter which needs proving, that *novelty* in revelation is equivalent to error, according to the fathers. But this evident proposition leads to an important conclusion. It follows that the authority of the Church is of a more secondary character than is sometimes supposed. She is not a perpetual oracle of divine truth, an open organ of continuous revelation: she is not so much a 'living voice' as a living witness to a once-spoken voice. And it will be observed that whereas the former idea of the Church's function would naturally suggest the probability of a 'central shrine,' where the oracle would be given, a central teaching chair of Christendom—on the other hand the latter idea, that of a witness, suggests the concurrence of manifold traditions. The strength of promulgative authority is centrality; the strength of witness is the consent of independent and distinct voices. Now it is this latter idea of Church authority which is undeniably that of the fathers, always excepting those of the papal school [2] in and after the fifth century. When Tertullian confronts the Gnostics with the *consent* of the different Churches who derived their life and doctrine

[1] As Bp. Meurin depreciated it, *True Basis* etc. pp. 30-34. *Antiquity* is, in Vincent's conception, an *additional* test of truth, besides universality, chap. 27.

[2] I believe, *pace* Mr. Rivington, that this phrase, as I use it, expresses the truth. Papalism began, like the Immaculate Conception, in being the opinion of a school, however much it afterwards won general acceptance in the Churches of the Roman obedience.

from the Apostles, in a creed the opposite of theirs, when he bids them attend to this consent of Corinth, Ephesus, and Rome, when he asks, in one of his incomparable epigrams whether it is probable that so many Churches of such importance should have hit by an accident of error upon an identical creed; and adds that what is found the same amongst so many, can owe its identity only to its being received by all from a single source,[1] it is obvious that he is viewing the Church's authority as based on the convergence of independent testimonies. He is but taking his idea from Irenaeus,[2] who appeals to the fact that whatever languages the different Churches talk, be they civilized or barbarous, they bear witness to the same creed. This is the principle underlying the authority of general Councils—that their 'generality' secures the elimination of what is merely local or individual and the exaltation of the common heritage. So Vincent of Lerins explains the procedure of the general Council of Ephesus. The authorities of eastern fathers, he tells us, were first recited on the question at issue: then "that not Greece and the East only, but the West and the Latin world as well might be proved to have always held the same sentiments," some authorities were quoted from Rome. After that, "that not the head of the world only but the outlying portions (sides) of it also might give their witness to the judgment," authorities of previous ages were cited from Africa and Milan.[3] Here then is a clear in-

[1] *de Praescr.* 24-36. [2] i. 10. 2, iii. 4. 2.
[3] *Comm.* 30.

telligible principle of consentient witness, eliminating local and individual peculiarities, and it must be allowed to be the principle of the fathers in general and of the Ecumenical Councils. Indeed it is only when we keep this principle in mind that the deference we pay to the decisions of general Councils becomes intelligible. The tone of the actual meeting was sometimes polemical and embittered; that is true at least of the Council of Ephesus, so that it does not present the appearance of a trustworthy spiritual guide, or of a good court of final appeal. But our deference to them becomes quite intelligible when they are considered simply as machinery for registering the agreement of the Churches, and when it is further borne in mind that their authority only became decisive after their verdict had been accepted in the Church at large.[1]

The authority of the Church then is the subordinate authority of a witness to the truth, a guardian, a teacher of it; she has no authority to promulgate or reveal new truth. This is very clearly shown in the difference which St. Athanasius notices between the

[1] Three points need to be remembered with reference to these councils: (1) That what was finally authoritative was not the mere council, but the decree of the council when the bishops had separated and their decision had obtained general acceptance.

(2) That the councils simply professed to register and enforce the traditions of the Churches, leaving argument to the theologians.

(3) That our justification in accepting the decisions of the councils lies in the verification of their results taken together. It is most reassuring to find that they represent, not the tyranny of chance majorities, but the gradual working out into a balanced formula of the complex scriptural truth of the Incarnation—guarding it from being overbalanced on one side or the other. The mind of the Spirit is apparent in the result.

formula used by the Fathers of the Council of Nicæa, when settling the Paschal controversy,—a matter of discipline—and when settling the question of faith. 'With reference to Easter' he says,[1] 'such and such things "*were determined*" (ἔδοξε and at such a date), for at that time it was determined that all should obey a certain rule; but with reference to the faith they wrote not "such and such things were determined" but "thus the Catholic Church believes." And they added immediately the statement of their faith, to show that their judgment was not new but apostolic, and that what they wrote was not any discovery of theirs, but was what the apostle taught.'

Thus when the popes began to speak of the 'secret stores' of divine truth (*arcana*) committed to the see of Peter upon which she can draw so as to be the central oracular voice of Christendom, giving replies to the Church in her need,[2] they are beginning to speak in a quite new strain and to give to the Church's authority a new meaning. And it must be observed that this papal idea of a central voice, while it is the natural expression of the idea of promulgative authority, and falls in with the general imperialist tendencies of the Roman Church, is disastrous to the Church's function as a consentient witness. The very centralization of the Roman development removes the security, which the general Councils, truly used, were calculated to

[1] Athan. *de Synodis* 5, quoted by Stanton *Authority in religious belief*, p. 132.

[2] See on the beginning of this tendency in the utterances of Pope Innocent I. in the fifth century, Langen's *Geschichte der römischen Kirche* I. p. 737.

provide, against any local tendency becoming dominant. Thus the Roman centralization is the main cause of what we have already noticed in Roman Catholicism—its one-sidedness. The counter tendencies of other parts of the Church ought to have kept the whole deposit of the faith unnarrowed, by preventing Roman ideas being elevated into catholic dogmas.

According then to the older and really catholic view, the later Church can never know what the early Church did not. She can never have substantially clearer light about the intermediate state, for example, or the relation of the departed to the living, or the 'treasury of merits,' or the position of Mary, than the Church of the second century had. The revelation receives no augmentation, and what for our discipline was left obscure at first, must remain obscure, according to God's providence, till our fragmentary knowledge[1] becomes complete in the Day of Light. It is in fact, as Dr. Salmon remarks, absurd to suppose that the Church's *tradition* can come to convey additional assurance. You cannot have increase of knowledge by tradition. Thus if "the idea of Purgatory had not got beyond a 'perhaps' at the beginning of the fifth century (*i.e.* in St. Augustine's day), we are safe in saying that it was not by tradition that the later Church arrived at certainty on the subject."[2]

Thus we mean broadly by the doctrine which comes on the authority of the Church, the doctrine which

[1] 1 Cor. xiii. 9-12. We know 'in part,' not all: we see a dim reflexion in a mirror.

[2] Salmon *Infallibility* p. 133.

has been recognised and explicitly taught[1] by the legitimate members of the Christian brotherhood in all ages and all parts of the world: we mean 'historical Christianity.' Is there such a thing? Undoubtedly: and we may add that the whole body of catholic theologians, Roman no less than Anglican, are committed to there being this body of catholic truth, held 'ubique,' that is in all parts, as opposed to any one particular Church: 'semper' always, as opposed to only in recent ages: 'ab omnibus' by all, *i.e.* by the general body of the Church, as Vincent explains, not merely as the private opinion of particular teachers. It will be worth while to quote the summary of the catholic tradition as it is given us for example by Origen in the East, early in the third century, and by Irenaeus in the West, in the latter part of the second.

Tradition, according to Origen, "tells us that there is one God, who created all things out of nothing, who is just and good, the Author of the Old as of the New Testament, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ: that Jesus Christ was begotten of the Father before every creature, that through Him all things were made, that He is God and Man, born of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, that He did truly suffer, rise again, and ascend into heaven: that the Holy Ghost is associated in honour and dignity with the Father and the Son, that it is He who inspired the saints both of the Old and of the New Dispensation: that there will be a resurrection of the dead, when the body which is sown

[1] *Explicitly*: thus Tertullian specially excludes all idea of a *secret* tradition—*de Praescr.* 25-27.

in corruption will be raised in incorruption, and that in the world to come the souls of men will inherit eternal life or suffer eternal punishment according to their works: that every reasonable soul is a free agent, plotted against by evil spirits, comforted by good angels, but in no way constrained: that the Scriptures were written by the agency of the Spirit of God, that they have two senses, the plain and the hidden; whereof the latter can be known only to those to whom is given the grace of the Holy Spirit in the word of wisdom and knowledge."[1] This he "gives as 'the teaching of the Church' transmitted in orderly succession from the apostles, and remaining in the Churches to the present day," as the authoritative standard of belief.

Now let us listen to Irenaeus: "The true knowledge" (so he calls the Christian religion) "is the doctrine of the Apostles, and the ancient system of the Church in all the world: and the character of the body of Christ, according to the successions of the bishops, to whom they (the Apostles) delivered the Church in each separate place: the complete use (moreover) of the Scriptures which has come down to our time, preserved without corruption, receiving neither addition nor loss; its public reading without falsification; legitimate and careful exposition according to the Scriptures, without peril and without blasphemy: and the pre-eminent gift of love." Again, "The way of those who belong to the Church is encompassing the whole world, because it holds the tradition firm from

[1] See Dr. Bigg's *Bampton Lectures* p. 152. This 'rule of faith' is abbreviated from the Preface to the *De Principiis*.

the Apostles, and enables us to see that the faith of all is one and the same, while all accept one and the same God the Father, and believe the same dispensation of the Incarnation of the Son of God, and acknowledge the same gift of the Spirit, and meditate the same precepts, and preserve the same form of that ordination which belongs to the Church, and expect the same coming of the Lord, and await the same salvation of the whole man, both soul and body." [1]

Origen and Irenaeus are not speaking exhaustively, and there can be no reasonable doubt that as a matter of historical evidence, the Church always believed not only the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, of the Atonement won in Christ, of the inspiration of Scripture, of resurrection and judgment, of the visible Church, and of the apostolic ministry; but also the doctrine of the sacraments as channels of grace, and of the Eucharist as a sacrifice.[2]

Of this sort then is the historic creed of Christendom, which has been held and publicly taught as Christianity over the whole area of the Church. The denial of any of these elements of belief has always brought a man under suspicion and in the last resort constituted him a formal heretic or schismatic. The Church had indeed immense difficulty in formulating her theology—for example, in making out of human language a formula to guard the truth of the Trinity. There is therefore a certain ambiguity of *language* on some points in the

[1] See Irenaeus, iv. 33. 8, v. 20. 1.

[2] On the three last points I may refer to *The Church and the Ministry* see esp. p. 213: and cap. vii. p. 78 n. [1], p. 226 n. [1].

early theology, though this fact easily admits of being exaggerated. But there is in substance an outspoken expression of this body of truth, in the strictest sense catholic, in the Church. It does not require any very profound or wide reading to discover that the early Church did believe in the sacraments, though the belief was not formulated into dogmas, and did not believe in a treasury of merits which the pope could dispense in indulgences, or an immaculate conception of the blessed Virgin, or an infallibility of the pope. But of this somewhat more hereafter.

And how does this 'general consent' express itself? Let Vincent of Lerins answer. Let us hear what he bids the perplexed inquirer do, amid the manifold heresies of the fifth century, to ascertain the true faith. First he is to seek the authority of general Councils, where such have been held. Their decrees rank first, as authorized and final interpreters of Scripture. But if a new question arises on which no such Council has spoken, then he is to collect the sentiments of the ancients; of those, that is, who remained in the communion of the Church, masters of repute. And here care is to be taken to adhere to no individual opinion of however great a Christian, but to that teaching only in which they are found to agree.[1] This advice is given to ordinary individual Christians again and again.

And now what is the Roman objection to the idea of authority which has just been explained? It may be said to be threefold.

(1) It will be said[2]: "It is not easy then to find out

[1] cc. 28, 29.

[2] As by Mr. Rivington p. 29.

what is catholic on your showing. We have contradictory statements made about what the fathers teach. How are we—not professed theologians or even students—to find out the 'rule of faith'? The Roman idea of Church authority gives a simpler remedy for our difficulties. *Theirs* is a rule of faith of easy access."

To this the answer is that with us too the *proximate* rule of faith is of easy access. The individual Churchman begins by submitting himself to be moulded by the rule of faith which he receives. The proximate authority for each of us consists of the personal teachers to whom by God's providence we are subject, though, from the first, side by side with the personal teachers, and controlling them, are the written formulas of the Church, which she propounds to guide the faith and practice of all her members,—the creed and the catechism, the offices and ceremonies. Thus the personal teachers and the formulas, taken together, constitute the proximate rule of faith. In the assimilation of this each individual finds his primary responsibility. For the apprehension of it there is no need of research. 'The word is very nigh thee.' Nor, if it is defective or superstitious, will God's requirement of truth extend beyond each man's opportunities.

But this proximate rule of faith is not the ultimate authority. It is this ultimate rule of authority—the 'remoter rule'—with which we have been occupied in this chapter. So far as this again is based on Scripture, all Christians have easy access to it, but with that we are not yet concerned. This remoter rule of faith involves, as we have now seen, a comparison of records, a

searching into the past traditions of the Church. Such research is only possible, comparatively, for a few, and only a few are capable of undertaking it. But the few act for the many. The fact that competent persons are constantly engaged in this verifying process of comparison and research guarantees that the current Church teaching is being kept pure from accretion. No doubt, however, this verifying process involves difficulty, and it is one in which to a certain extent all are concerned. What shall we say in regard to the charge that it is difficult?

We reply that there is no reason why it should not be difficult. The fathers do not seem to shrink from recommending, even to ordinary inquirers, a difficult way of arriving at the truth. They do not speak as men who have any 'short and easy' method to recommend,[1] and we would add that in the early centuries such short and easy method was, it would appear,

[1] See Mahan's *Exercise of Faith* (J. G. Palmer, London, 1877) p. 68. "Let us take such a case, for example, as that so graphically described by St. Chrysostom; a case which might have occurred at any time during the first six centuries, and which may occur every day now. A heathen comes forward desiring to be a Christian. He consults so eminent and enlightened a bishop as St. Chrysostom. He says, 'I desire to be a Christian, but to *whom* shall I attach myself? In the contention, and division, and confusion among you all, which dogma shall I take? Which shall I prefer? Since all of you profess to hold the truth, which shall I believe? I know nothing at all of Scriptures; and they who profess to know, produce the same proofs for their respective tenets.' To this Chrysostom replies, 'I am glad that all parties agree thus far; for if we referred you only to reason, you might be justly at a loss; but if we send you to the Scriptures, and they are simple and true, your decision is easy: for *whoever accords with them, he is a Christian; but whoever is at variance with them is very far from it.*' But the man rejoins, 'I have searched the Scriptures, and find that they teach

more 'imperatively needed' than it has ever been since. There was never, perhaps, a time of confusion in the Christian Church equal to the second century. Christianity seemed to the philosopher outside a chaos of dissentient sects, "agreeing in nothing but the name."[1] The various forms of Gnosticism were so seductive that Tertullian witnessed in his day the spectacle of "one and another—the most faithful, the wisest, the most experienced in the Church, going over to the wrong side."[2] The points under discussion were the most fundamental conceivable, the questions of the creation of the world, the unity of God, and the reality of the Incarnation. If ever a clear rule of faith, a papal voice, a centre to Christendom was needed, it was then. But not only had the Church at that time to struggle through her difficulties without an infallible teacher, she had not even yet formulated her creeds or settled her canon. Once more, the years of the Arian contro-

one thing, and you another. What, then, am I to do? Must I make myself a teacher, when I know nothing of the matters at issue, and desire merely to be a learner?'

"Now here is the point at which, if anywhere, the infallible guide is needed. This is the case that demands the simple explicit answer to the question, 'Whom and what shall I believe?' And if Chrysostom and other Church teachers of the first six centuries could give *no such single test of truth*, and no such absolute direction as the case demanded, it proves either that they knew no such simple direction; or else, if they knew it, that they handled the word of God deceitfully, and perplexed the simple souls whom it was their business to guide. In this particular instance, St. Chrysostom, after asking the man whether he had not *a mind* and *judgment of his own*, proceeds to give him such marks of the true Church as he could, and leaves him to make his way clear through the mazes of this complex guidance." (St. Chrysostom *Homilies on the Acts*, xxxiii. in *Library of Fathers* part ii. pp. 462-7.)

[1] Origen *c. Cels.* iii. 12. [2] *de Praescr.* 3.

versy[1] were years of deepest distress. Again a papal voice of authority was sorely needed, if ever. But in the moment of uttermost strain and profoundest peril, the pope did something very different from giving a clear voice for the guidance of Christians. He repudiated Athanasius the great upholder of the truth, and left him alone 'against the world.'[2] The fact is, the argument from the supposed needs of man to the existence of an infallible teaching chair breaks down historically from the fact that, in the hours of greatest need in the Church, there was no remedy such as it is now suggested that man imperatively requires—there was no quick method of finding out the truth. And indeed is not this difficulty, this requirement of patience, in finding out the truth, part of the probation of faith? It is just what is suited to our time of discipline. At any rate we have no right to claim of God the removal of certain difficulties. We must take His revelation under the conditions on which He gives it, and endure what the fathers endured. We make a great mistake about the essence of faith if we imagine that faith is merely the surrendering of our reason and the passive acceptance of an unmistakable voice of external authority. Faith, in the Bible, is opposed not to *reason*, but to *sight*. It was not Christ's will to reveal Himself beyond all possibility of doubt. He did not utter a dogma about Himself and bid men bow down to it. The faith which could accept Him had to see through a veil. When men complained that He kept their souls in uncertainty, when they importunately asked to be 'told plainly,'[3] He made

[1] See App. note iii. p. 212. [2] See Chapter VI. [3] St. John x. 24.

no response to their complaint, except to attribute their unbelief to their not being 'His sheep.' Faith is an inner sense which faithfully and perseveringly apprehends God in spite of difficulties and through the veil. The faith which was required to believe in Christ in spite of ambiguities is the same faith which is required to believe in the Church. And practically a prayerful and patient Christian *can* find out the mind of the Church with quite sufficient security. The current teaching of the Church about what is contained in the Creeds, and about the Sacraments and Ministry has almost always been sufficiently explicit and clear for simple minds, and has afforded a basis of security in the strength of which it is good for most of us to feel a certain amount of hesitation and to experience the necessity of feeling our way.

(2) But it is objected further: 'an authority which leaves you partly dependent on your own reason and judgment is no authority at all. To accept authority is the opposite of what you call "feeling one's own way."' Thus Father Richardson defines the authority of the Church as 'the absolute, peremptory power from which there is no appeal, exercised by a living existing voice, commanding the assent of the intellect in God's name, and speaking as God's instrument.'[1] To this it is only necessary here to give a brief answer. God deals with us as with sons, not as with slaves. He makes us partakers of His counsels, intelligent co-operators with Him. Our attitude towards Him is not 'abject.'[2] It

[1] *What are the Catholic Claims?* p. 51.

[2] As Mr. Ward described it: see *W. G. Ward and the Oxford Movement*, by Wilfrid Ward (Macmillan, 1889) p. 216, but *cf.* St. John xv. 15.

is only to put this in other words to say that authority is not the same thing as absolutism, which is only an exaggerated and perverted form of it. True authority does not issue edicts to suppress men's personal judgment or render its action unnecessary, but it is like the authority of a parent, which invigorates and encourages, even while it restrains and guides the growth of our own individuality. I do not wish to enlarge on this idea here, but I am sure I shall do well to repeat a question asked long ago on this subject. "Is a limited, conditional government in the State such a wise, excellent, and glorious constitution? And is the same authority in the Church such absurdity, nonsense, and nothing at all, as to any actual power? If there be such a thing as obedience upon rational motives, there must be such a thing as authority that is not absolute, or that does not require a blind, implicit obedience. Indeed, rational creatures can obey no other authority; they must have reasons for what they do. And yet because the Church claims only this rational obedience, your Lordship explodes such authority as none at all."[1] I must protest that the authority of the Church is, as we Anglicans understand it, a most real guidance of our spirit and intellect to which, by God's mercy, we love to submit ourselves. Submission to that authority is in the first instance the putting ourselves to school under the Church's primary teaching. Beyond this, as we grow in knowledge, it is the merging of our mere individualism in the whole historic life of the great

[1] Law's *First Letter to the Bishop of Bangor* in his *Works* [ed. 1762] i. pp. 20, 31.

Christian brotherhood; it is making ourselves at one with the one religion in its most permanent and least merely local form. It is surrendering our individuality only to empty it of its narrowness. One with the Christianity of history, the Christianity of creeds and councils, we enter into the heritage of her dogmas and of something as great as her greatest dogmas, the whole joy of her sacraments, the security of her ministry, the communion of her saints, the fellowship of her Spirit. We can read her great fathers and find ourselves one with them in all important matters of faith[1] over the lapse of ages. The hearts of the fathers are seen to be turned towards their children. We believe in the Holy Catholic Church.

(3) 'But,' it is said—and it is the last objection I will consider—'on your own showing the final court of appeal is no longer open to you. You can no longer summon a general council, or what you would acknowledge as such.' To this our answer is partly that we admit our grievous loss, but it is not our fault. With what infinite joy would we hail its possibility! But there is a further answer. A general council is not a necessity. It was impossible from one set of causes for the first three hundred years, but all through that period men like Irenaeus and Tertullian were not prevented from arriving at the mind of the Church by the comparison of traditions. "The judgment of the Church *diffusive*" says Mr. Wilberforce "is no less binding than that of the Church *collective*."[2] The consent of the Church as

[1] Not of criticism or of science, however, which are progressive in a sense in which Revelation is not.

[2] *Principles of Church Authority* p. 77.

it was discoverable before general councils were possible from one set of reasons, so is still discoverable by us since they have become impossible from another. Beyond this we must content ourselves with councils less than ecumenical, though resting on their basis, and it is quite possible that it was not intended in God's providence that the formulation of ecumenical dogmas should go beyond defining the basis of the Christian faith and life, as it is given in the Creeds. The imposition of a dogma as a condition of communion is a necessary evil which should be kept within the smallest limits possible in view of the Church's safety: and a Church shows her life not by creating new dogmas but by living on the old faith and 'commending it to every man's conscience' by rendering it intelligible in view of new needs to new generations of men.

It is necessary to lay down briefly, before we conclude, the sense in which we can accept of 'development' in Christian truth.[1] In such sense as makes it concerned only with the *statement* of truth, we accept and indorse the idea. In this sense Vincent of Lerins makes it the Church's duty to develop truth. His words are exact and well worth quoting[2]: "The Church of Christ, the anxious and careful guardian of the truths committed to her, never changes anything in them, diminishes nothing, adds nothing, neither cuts off what is needful, nor appends what is superfluous: does not lose what is her

[1] See also App., note i. p. 203.

[2] *Common.* c. 23. The whole chapter should be read. The earlier part speaks of the growth of 'religion' as a whole. It grows as a child grows to manhood. Each limb increases in size, but no new limb is added, or old one removed. Then it passes to the development of the *doctrine* of the Church.

own, nor incorporate what is not, but devotes all her pains to this one task—by dealing faithfully and wisely with old truths, to give perfection and finish to whatever was of old left shapeless and inchoate; to consolidate and establish what has been already expressed and developed; to preserve what has been already established and defined. . . . When she was roused by the novelties of heretics, the catholic Church, by the decrees of Councils, has ever effected this and nothing more—that she should consign to posterity in the security of a formal document, what she had received from her ancestors by mere tradition, summarizing great matters in a few words, and generally, with a view to greater clearness, stamping with the speciality of a new term an article of the faith which was not new."

In reference then to the Church's *terminology* we accept the principle of development in the rule of faith, but no further.[1] In such sense as can make it cover the extension of the substance of the faith, so as to include an article such as the Immaculate Conception,

[1] That is, as touches the faith. In discipline there is confessedly development and in the use of the sacraments, provided there is no alteration in doctrine. Thus the practice of reserving confirmation to a later age, and making it the occasion for a renewal of vows, or again the practice of encouraging those who are not at the time communicants to assist at the Eucharist, are developments in practice and discipline, which involve no development in doctrine. I think the maximum of development which is to be found in the early Church is that involved in the recognition of ordinations administered by heretics. I have briefly traced the history of this in *The Church and the Ministry* pp. 187-196. But in any case the development did not touch *the faith of individuals*: all that was in question was how the official Church was to act in the light of her faith about orders, in view of a difficulty where antagonistic truths seemed to collide.

—an idea utterly outside the horizon of a Chrysostom or an Augustine—in such sense we repudiate it. Indeed in her official documents the Roman Church herself prefers to take the line which puts her most in conflict with history, and setting aside the larger idea of development, proclaims her modern dogma of the Infallibility as belonging to the "tradition received from the beginning of the Christian faith."

On the other hand some modern Roman theologians, of whom the ablest is Cardinal Franzelin, convinced apparently of the impossibility of showing that the modern Roman dogmas were recognized, in substantial reality at least, if not in set terms, in the early Church, repudiate the Vincentian canon, in its only intelligible sense, or, in other words, in the sense of its author. "The rule of Vincent" says Cardinal Franzelin "is true in its positive sense (*i.e.* any doctrines which have been openly taught and believed 'ubique, semper, ab omnibus,' are necessarily of faith), but it cannot be admitted in a negative or exclusive sense." "It is contrary to the whole economy of the faith" to say that "only those things which have been explicitly believed from the first are contained in the deposit of the faith." "It is enough to have shown a consent of faith prevailing in the Church at any time in the apostolic succession" *e.g.* the present time "in order to vindicate the divine revelation and apostolic tradition of any head of doctrine."[1] It is only necessary to point out that this is not to interpret Vincent, but to repudiate him. Vincent un-

[1] Franzelin *De Divina Traditione et Scriptura* ed. 3. Rome 1882. *Thesis* ix. *Coroll.* 1. p. 87. *Thesis* xii. *Schol.* i. *Princip.* ii. *Coroll.* 4 p. 121. *Thesis* xxiv. p. 221.

doubtedly meant to make his rule an *exclusive test.* He excludes not only what is contrary to (contra), but also what is 'beside' (praeter) the original deposit.[1] Further, he makes antiquity an additional test of truth, besides present consent.[2] In the sense then that would make the obligatory Christian doctrine or common rule of faith, a germ developing in content and extent, we exclude development.

There is indeed another sense in which the whole life of the Church is constantly developing, as she expands to embrace new material, and brings forth out of her treasury, like a wise householder, things new and old. But such developments to cover new needs can never antiquate the rule of faith. That is adequate for all races, all ages, all contingencies, and as it is with it alone that we are at present concerned, so we protest that for our 'rule of faith' we own with the ancient Church nothing narrower than what was held and taught in all parts of the world, and from the first, and as the common tradition of the Church at large; and we are sure that any advantages which may be gained by narrowing its basis are more than compensated for by the infinite evils which accrue from limiting the tradition of truth within the channel of a single, however powerful, Church.

[1] Capp. 20, 28. [2] Capp. 3, 9, 27.

CHAPTER IV.

THE BIBLE IN THE CHURCH.

In this discussion it may be assumed as a point outside controversy that the Bible does not stand alone as the rule of faith, any one being permitted to interpret it according to his or her isolated judgment.[1] The Church, in fact, existed before the books of the New Testament were written; they were written for those who were already members of the Church and had received her primary instruction;[2] they continually refer back to that primary instruction and pre-suppose it;[3] the Church

[1] It is important to observe, however, that most of the books of the New Testament, considered merely as historical documents, will stand alone without needing any witness of the Church, beyond merely such historical witness as church writings give to their existence and diffusion. Thus we must trust to purely critical grounds for justifying the historical character of the Gospel history and the Acts of the Apostles. Mere historical evidence has justified the belief that St. John wrote the fourth Gospel, and that St. Paul wrote the epistles ascribed to him. Once more historical evidence requires us to believe that the anonymous Epistle to the Hebrews was written by an "apostolic man" before the destruction of Jerusalem. But these books of the New Testament, thus historically certified, bear witness to the Church, and refuse to be detached from her.

[2] St. Luke i. 4; 1 Cor. i. 5, xi. 2, 23, xvi. 5; Heb. v. 12; 2 Peter i. 12; Jude 3; 1 John ii. 20.

[3] See reff. in last note and 1 Timothy iii. 15. The Church is the basis upon which the human witness to the revealed truth ultimately rests.

gradually collected them into a canon and drew the line between the Epistle to the Hebrews in which she recognised primary or apostolic authority, and the Epistle of Clement or the *Shepherd* of Hermas in which she did not; and finally in history the Bible came out into the world simply as the sacred books of a certain society, the Church, accessible to her members and belonging to her alone. All this being so, it may be taken for granted that the Bible does not stand alone as giving the Christian rule of faith, but the Bible interpreted by the Church. The Spirit in the society interprets the Spirit in the books.

Thus we may even assume, at starting, the extreme position of Tertullian when he refuses (rhetorically, not in fact) even to argue the meaning of Scripture with people who do not belong to the historical Christian Church.[1] "Our appeal (in argument with persons outside the Church) must not be made to the Scriptures, nor must controversy be admitted under circumstances where victory will be either impossible or uncertain or not certain enough. For even if a comparison of Scripture should not turn out in such a way as to put the disputants on a level, still the logical order required another question, as yet the only question, to be first propounded,—To whom does the faith itself belong? Whose are the Scriptures? From whom, and through whom, and where, and to whom has been handed down that discipline by which men become Christians? For wherever it shall appear that the reality of the Christian discipline and faith are to be found, there will be also

[1] *de Praescr.* 19.

the reality of the Scriptures and of the interpretations and of all Christian traditions."

Assuming this general position as lying behind the divergence of the Anglican and Roman branches of the Church, a further question arises as to the relation in which the authority of the Church tradition stands to the authority of Scripture. The view of the Anglican Church is clear. Scripture is the final court of appeal in matters of faith, "so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man that it should be believed as an article of the faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation." The Church finds her sphere of authority only in interpreting and teaching the faith contained in Scripture. A canon of the convocation which imposed on the clergy subscription to the Articles, directs preachers "to be careful that they never teach aught in a sermon, to be religiously held and believed by the people, except what is agreeable to the doctrine of the Old and New Testaments, and what the catholic Fathers and ancient bishops have collected from that same doctrine." The Bible is the ultimate record of the faith: the Church is the interpreter. The Church is the primary teacher of the truth to her children but she sends them to the Scriptures to verify it for themselves.

With this position of the Church the Romanist writers and authorities are not in the main satisfied. The Council of Trent[1] declares that "the truth" of the Christian Revelation "is contained in the written books *and* in the unwritten traditions" and that the Council

[1] Sess. iv.

"receives and venerates *with an equal feeling of piety and reverence all the books of the Old and New Testament . . . and also the traditions relating as well to faith as to morals*, as having, either from the word of Christ Himself or the dictation of the Holy Ghost, been preserved by continuous succession in the catholic Church." The teaching of the Roman Church thus makes tradition an authority independent of holy Scripture, so that Scripture is only the *chief source*[1] of catholic truth, but an article of the faith may rest on church teaching alone, as a sufficient basis in itself. This theoretical departure from what we propose to show to have been the primitive conception of the authority of Church tradition, has resulted in a corresponding departure from primitive practice. The early Church, believing the Bible to be the guide of individual Christians in faith and conduct, would have all her members well versed in its contents. They could safely read the Scriptures for themselves and be earnestly exhorted to do so, if only the Church's teaching had first given them the right point of view for their study. Thus guided by the mind of the Church, they were bidden to see for themselves whether the whole teaching of the Church was not to be found in

[1] Cornely *Hist. et Crit. Introd. in V. T. Compendium* Paris 1889 p. 1, speaks thus of the Holy Scriptures: "Ex illis utpote praecipuo revelationis fonte, ecclesia dogmata sua hausit, hauritque." It has been questioned whether the Roman Church is dogmatically committed to the view of tradition which makes it an independent source of truth, parallel to Scripture. The words of the Council of Trent have been explained in a more moderate sense, and there are some Roman theologians on this side. But the practice of the Roman Church and her common teaching is as indicated above. See on the subject Palmer *On the Church* ii. 10-18.

Scripture. Thus the familiarity of the whole body of the people with the original record would serve to maintain a scriptural tone and to keep the Church's current teaching and system from deterioration. The Roman Church, on the other hand, practically makes ordinary Christians only come in contact with the Bible at second-hand. The Church teaches and the laity receive. They are not encouraged to drink for themselves at the fountain-head of Scripture.[1] It is obvious enough what danger this must involve of the Church system becoming autocratic, arbitrary, external, when the check is removed which a generally diffused knowledge of Scripture, always antagonistic to such tendencies, is alone calculated to supply. It is also obvious what audacity is involved in this withdrawal of Scripture into the background, if our Lord's intention was that Scripture should be the constant practical guide of individual souls. We proceed, without further discussion, to illustrate by some quotations the relation in which the Fathers conceived the Church to stand towards the Bible, and the urgency with which they pressed on the laity the free study of Scripture.

Let us listen first to Vincent of Lerins, who holds, as we saw in our last discussion, so remarkable a position in relation to the theory of Church authority.

"Often" he says,[2] "have I inquired with great care

[1] This is admitted by Cardinal Manning in a passage quoted in chap. I, and I do not suppose it will be denied. I am of course aware that Lacordaire and others recommended the freer use of Scripture, but they represented tendencies other than Ultramontane, and the fact at least is as Cardinal Manning states.

[2] *Common.* c. ii.

and much earnestness, of very many men eminent for holiness and doctrine, how I might, by some certain, and, as it were, general and regular way, discern the truth of the catholic faith from the falsehood of heretical pravity: and have always received, from all of them, an answer of this sort: that I, or any other person, wishing to detect the frauds of heretics as they rise, and avoid their snares, so as to keep himself in a sound faith whole and sound, must, with the help of the Lord, fortify his faith in a twofold manner; first, namely, by the authority of the law of God; and then, in the next place, by the tradition of the catholic Church.

"Here, perhaps, some one will ask, What need is there—seeing that the canon of the Scriptures is perfect, and in itself suffices to the full, and more, for all demands—that the authority of the ecclesiastical interpretation should be joined to it? Because the holy Scripture, for its very depth, is not taken of all in one and the same sense; but its expressions are interpreted diversely, by one man in one way, by another in another, so that it seems as if almost as many opinions may be gathered out of it as there are men. . . . . It is, therefore, very necessary, on account of the vagaries of errors so manifold, that the line of interpretation of the prophetical and apostolical writings be drawn by the rule of the ecclesiastical and catholic sense."

Again, at the end of his little treatise[1] he sums up thus:—

"We said in the premises, that this always hath

[1] *Common.* c. xxix.

been, and even at this day is, the custom of Catholics, to try and examine the true faith, by these two methods. First, by the authority of the divine canon: secondly, by the tradition of the catholic Church; not because the canonical Scripture is not of itself sufficient for all things, but because very many expounding GOD'S word at their own pleasure, conceive hereby divers opinions and errors. And for that cause, it is necessary that the interpretation of the heavenly Scripture be directed according to the one only rule of the Church's understanding: only, be it observed, especially in those questions upon which the foundations of the whole catholic doctrine depend."

Now I cite an eastern and earlier authority, Origen[1]: "In the two testaments every word that pertaineth unto God may be sought and discussed, and out of them all knowledge of things may be understood. And if anything remains which Holy Scripture does not determine, no other third scripture ought to be received to authorize any knowledge, but we must 'commit to the fire' what remains, that is, reserve it unto God. For God did not will us to know all in the present life, as the apostle specially says *we know in part.* . . . Do not let us, then, with the presumption of rashness, assume to ourselves the knowledge of everything, lest the same apostle rebuke us as *knowing neither what they speak nor of what they affirm.*" How, on the other hand, Origen insisted on ecclesiastical tradition as guiding our search into Scripture, appeared in the citation from him in the last

[1] *Hom. in Lev.* v. 9 tom. ii. p. 212.

chapter. I will only quote one other authority in this matter—the authority of the great name of St. Athanasius.[1] There is no father more scriptural than St. Athanasius in his method of argument. He insists strongly on the sufficiency of Holy Scriptures "in which alone is the instruction of religion announced—to which let no man add, from which let no man detract—which are sufficient in themselves for the enunciation of truth," but he also insists that a 'point of view' is necessary in reading and interpreting Scripture, and this point of view is the 'Church's mind.' Where the meaning of Scripture is doubtful in itself, it is enough that it 'admits' an interpretation in accordance with the Faith.

[1] It would however be easy to multiply references, see esp. Palmer *On the Church* ii. pp. 10 ff. Harold Browne *Thirty-Nine Articles* on Art. vi. The reference above is to Athanasius *adv. Gentes* init. and *Fragm. Fest. Ep.* xxxix. St. Basil has a passage *de Spir. Sanct.* xxvii. § 66, which, when divorced from its context, appears to countenance the Roman view, and to give 'the unwritten tradition' 'the same force' as Holy Scripture in what the Church holds and declares. But in illustrating what he means, he speaks under the head of tradition only of church practices and rules of discipline (turning to the east, formulas of consecration, ceremonies of baptism, etc.). Such are the 'dogmata' or 'ordinances' which he assigns to tradition. On the other hand, when writing *De Fide* c. 1, he makes the Scripture the sole source of the faith. "It is a manifest falling from the faith, and an argument of arrogancy, either to reject any point of these things that are written, or to bring in any of these things that are not written." The fathers in general draw a distinction between the authority of Scripture for doctrine and the authority of unwritten tradition for practice. Cf. Tertul. *De corona* 3, 4. St. Chrysostom on 2 Thess. ii. 15, and Epiphanius *Haer.* lxi. 6, should be interpreted in accordance with this principle. Cf. Salmon *Infallibility* pp. 142-3, and Mason *Conditions of Our Lord's Earthly Life* (Longmans, 1896) pp. 6 f., who adds: "I do not know one article of belief which is asserted by the Fathers to be derived from tradition outside of the cause of Scripture."

That is to say, the Church is neither more nor less than the authorized interpreter of Scripture.

The following references will indicate how free the Fathers are in urging on Christians the direct study of Scripture. "Do not" St. Cyril of Jerusalem says,[1] speaking even to catechumens, "do not believe me simply, *unless you receive the proof of what I say from Holy Scripture.*" And, exhorting his hearers not to study the apocryphal books, he bids them give zealous attention to the canonical Scriptures. Again, in his next lecture,[2] he bids them "keep that faith only which the Church is now giving to you and which is certificated out of the whole of Scripture." Again, "'Tis from ignorance of Scripture," says Chrysostom, in the beginning of his *Homilies on the Romans*,[3] "that all our evils arise; hence the plague of so many heresies, hence our careless lives, our fruitless labours. . . . They err who look not to the bright rays of the divine Scriptures, because they walk in darkness."[4] When he is preaching his running commentaries on the New Testament, he recommends his hearers to read the passage on which he is preaching before they come to Church, and afterwards to keep quiet at home and study it with their families. "The source of error," says Pope Leo in his famous tome,[5] "is that when men are hindered by some obscurity in knowing the truth, they run not to prophets, or apostles, or evangelists, but to themselves"; they will not "labour in the broad field of Holy Scripture."

[1] A.D. 348 *Catech.* iv. 17, 33.
[2] A.D. 348 *Catech.* v. 12.
[3] Tom. ix. p. 426.
[4] *Hom. in Matt.* i. v. tom. vii. pp. 13, 72.
[5] *Ep.* xxviii. 1.

These few examples must suffice. But such quotations might be multiplied indefinitely. They illustrate two facts: the theory of the fathers that Scripture is the sole *source* of revealed truth—and their practice, based on this theory, of enjoining on all Christians its free study.[1]

The patristic conception of the rule of faith finds it, as we have seen, (*a*) in the Bible, (*b*) in the witness of the general Church interpreting the Bible. Let us briefly indicate to what results the application of this test will lead us. It will lead us to accept first of all those central doctrines of the faith, the Incarnation, and the Trinity, which the Church has formulated in definite dogmas, and which we can, guided by the Church, find clearly enough for ourselves in Scripture—and also the doctrines of the Inspiration of Scripture and of the Atonement, which Scripture declares and which the Church has always believed and inculcated, though there is a remarkable absence of definite dogmas to make an exact claim on our belief on these subjects. Next we shall accept all that body of truth, which is the 'extension of the Incarnation'—the doctrines of Baptismal Regeneration, of the gift of the Spirit in Confirmation, of the Eucharistic Presence and Sacrifice, of the Ministry with its authority in Absolution, and of the visible Church. Two of these doctrines are more or less explicitly stated in the creeds. The rest are parts of the universal Church's teaching and are also contained, as we can verify for ourselves, in the

[1] That it was practicable for Christians of the Roman Empire to possess and read for themselves the books of Scripture, see App. note iv. p. 213.

language of Scripture.[1] These too we shall receive as 'of faith,' even though the absence of definite dogma must make us careful in imputing *heresy* to those whose teaching on the subject is not explicit.[2] When a doctrine is plainly stated in Scripture, like the doctrine of eternal punishment, or of man's free-will on the one hand, and fallen nature on the other, then the general consent of the Church will confirm us in maintaining them, and we shall not be restrained from doing so by the aberrations of individual teachers.[3] Where a doctrine has been commonly held by churchmen, like the actual sinlessness of the blessed Virgin, but cannot either plead quite universal consent nor the authority of Scripture, it will rank rather as a pious opinion than as an article of faith. Where an opinion has been held commonly in Christendom for a while and then abandoned, without being explicitly condemned, as out of harmony with Scripture and reason, like the notion of Christ's offering His death as ransom to the devil, then we shall not scruple to reject what lacks *permanent* Church authority and scriptural basis. Where finally doctrines, lacking any scriptural warrant, come to prevail only in a later age of the Church, and only partially then, like the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, or of Indulgences on the basis of the Treasury of Merits, doctrines

[1] If any one doubts whether the Eucharistic sacrifice is implied in Scripture, he should refer to Willis' *Sacrificial Aspect of the Holy Eucharist.*

[2] See Keble's *Letters of Spiritual Counsel* cxviii-cxxi.

[3] See Vincent of Lerins' *Commonitorium* on the trial of the Church which consists in the errors of single great churchmen (cc. 17 and 18).

ignored or rejected explicitly in the earlier ages, then, even without condemning them as positively heretical, we shall have no hesitation in declining them with emphatic decision.[1]

It is hardly possible to exaggerate the supreme importance of holding to nothing else than this ancient idea of the rule of faith as lying in the consent of the Church *and* the appeal to Scripture. After all, the Church's dogmatic decisions are rather negative than positive. They were passed in order to *warn us off* certain false lines of thought and development, while for positive information, for growth in spiritual knowledge, they still throw us back on the Christ of the Gospels and on the fresh teaching of the apostles. Thus it is only by keeping the whole surface of Scripture constantly before the eyes of the Church at large, that we can have amongst us the real mind of the

[1] I think these, with the Infallibility of the Pope, are the best test questions for the rule of faith. Take for instance the immaculate conception of the blessed Virgin. There is no passage in Scripture which even suggests more than her pre-eminent sanctity and beatitude. There is further no ancient consent even for her actual freedom from venial sins—no evidence at all of any one having held her immaculate conception. When the opinion arose in the Gallican Church of the 12th century, it is well known how St. Bernard denounced the festival instituted in honour of it, in the see of Lyons, and in the strongest terms repudiated the doctrine. His sentiments were constantly repeated by men of note and authority in the Church, and St. Thomas Aquinas summed up against the doctrine. Yet the opposite school has prevailed, and what was at first undreamt of, what Scripture does not hint at, what when it appeared, appeared as the opinion of a school repudiated by the greatest mediæval theologians, has finally been raised to the position of a dogma binding on the faith of every Catholic.

Spirit in all its richness and freedom, so that the Church can make fresh starts in view of new needs, so that she can bring forth out of her treasures things new and old, applying the old faith in new ways, because she is drinking constantly through her whole body at the original fount of inspiration. It is the complexity of our rule of faith—taking in the whole Church and the Scriptures and the individual, which is the gaurantee that the faith will not be centralized and narrowed, as it goes down the ages.

In the strength of such considerations we shall be better able to meet the reproaches which are sometimes aimed at us. For instance, we often hear much which would encourage the notion that the Church shows her vitality by the ready multiplication of dogmas, by the clearness and explicitness and frequency of her anathemas. We are far from minimizing the importance of dogmatic clearness: and we are far from denying that the English Church has had too little of it. But we must urge that a scriptural tone in theology, a scriptural spirit pervading all a Church's literature, is at least as essential a sign of healthy life, and there is a great deal in Scripture which puts a severe curb on the dogmatic temper.[1]

Further, let us not be alarmed when we are told that our rule of faith admits of no certainty. It admits indeed of as much certainty and definiteness, as a Christian who recognizes that truth is not coincident

[1] See on this subject some remarks in Mill's *Sermons on the Nature of Christianity* Serm. 1. The scholastic dogmatists, resenting the reserve of mystery, simply explain away such utterances as that of Christ, St. Mark xiii. 32.

with dogmatic formulas can need to ask. Dogma is not a substitute for truth, but a guide to its apprehension. To accept a dogma on the Church's external authority is only the first step to apprehending it for ourselves. Indeed till 'dogma' has ceased to be a mere dogma, and become part of our own spiritual apprehension, we are not developed Christians, "spiritual men,"[1] and private judgment is only in error where it refuses to be enlightened by the catholic judgment. Scripture, the Church's mind, our own spiritual apprehension, are the three elements which must combine to produce in us the true holding of the Christian creed.

> "These are the three great chords of might,
> And he whose ear is tuned aright
> Will hear no discord in the three,
> But the most perfect harmony."

In conclusion let us explain in what sense we can believe the Church to be infallible. It is in the sense that the real mind of the Church is the Holy Spirit,[2] and where that mind is clearly expressed we can accept its guidance with confidence. It is expressed in her ecumenical creeds and dogmas about the central doctrines of the faith, and also with quite adequate clearness in her ordinary catholic teaching. But there is and has been a great deal *in* the

[1] 1 Cor. ii. 15.

[2] St. Thomas Aquinas like earlier Western teachers prefers the phrase 'I believe *that the Church exists*' to 'I believe *in the Church*.' But "if it is said 'I believe *in* the Holy Catholic Church,' this is to be understood in the sense that our faith is referred to the Holy Spirit who sanctifies the Church, so that the meaning is: 'I believe in the Holy Spirit sanctifying the Church.'" *Summa Theol.* Pars 2da 2dae Quaest. i. art. 9.

Church, that is not *of* her, for the Holy Spirit suffers in His organ, through men's unfaithfulness, and His voice speaks not always as plainly as He would fain let it speak, through human sin. Hence there has been a good deal taught in the Church, from time to time, that was not truth. If the truth has always been taught, yet it has sometimes been clouded by error. Indeed this imperfection in the Church's witness must be admitted by every thinking man. A Roman Catholic must recognize with us that a theory about Christ's ransom referred to just now—a theory at present almost universally rejected—was once for many generations almost universally held, and taught as part of the faith. He must admit that the Roman Church held through the Middle Ages, and taught authoritatively, a view of the 'matter' and 'form' of the Sacrament of Order now condemned. He must admit that the Gallican Church, and the Irish Church under its influence, repudiated for centuries the Papal Infallibility and described it as "no article of catholic belief." What does this mean? That on all showing the infallibility of the Church is not inconsistent with a great deal of error being also taught within her pale. To get at the Church's true mind we must not be content to accept the nearest or the loudest voice, but according to our opportunities "*inside the Catholic Church* we must look to the consent both of universality and antiquity, that we be neither carried away from sound unity to the side of schism, nor yet cast headlong from antiquity of religion into heretical novelties."[1]

[1] Vincent, *Common.* 29.

CHAPTER V.

THE PROMISE TO ST. PETER.

A PERSON anxious to arrive at the true conception of Church unity and Church authority, who had followed us thus far, might fairly urge that we had hitherto taken no account of some very remarkable words of our Lord to St. Peter. "The papal claims," such a person would urge, "are made to rest upon Scripture. They are made to rest upon the position assigned by our Lord Himself to St. Peter in relation to the whole Church, and upon the permanence of this relation in the ministerial succession."[1] To this promise of Christ to St. Peter, then, we will now turn our attention. St. Peter, acting as the spokesman of the other Apostles, had just given expression to the great conviction which had been slowly growing in the minds of the whole band, that the Son of Man was the Christ the Son of the living God. This outspoken confession of His Divine mission and Nature Christ meets and confirms with His most solemn benediction: 'Blessed art thou' (so we may venture to paraphrase it) 'Simon Bar-Jonah: for this conviction is not derived from weak human nature, it is a super-

[1] St. Matt. xvi. 13-20.

natural communication from above: and (in virtue of this thy profession of it) I also say unto thee that thou art Rock-man and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of death shall not prevail against it. And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven;[1] and whatsoever thou shalt prohibit on earth shall be prohibited in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt permit on earth, shall be permitted in heaven.'

This passage is, on the face of it, one involving several ambiguities. It is difficult, I think, to feel any doubt that our Lord is here pronouncing the person Peter to be the Rock. The Church as a human society is to be built on human characters, and in virtue of St. Peter's courageous act of faith in Himself, his deliberate acceptance of His Divine claim, our Lord sees in him, what he had hitherto failed to find among men, a solid basis on which His spiritual fabric may be reared, or at least a basis capable of being solidified by discipline and experience, till it become a foundation of rock on which the Church can rest. So far our Lord is dealing with St. Peter as a human character, but He goes on beyond all question to promise

[1] *i.e.* the power of opening and shutting, and generally the office of the steward, see Isa. xxii. 20-22. On this expression and on the whole passage I must refer to what I have said elsewhere more at length—*The Church and the Ministry*, pp. 38 f. and 222 f. The underlying idea of the passage is admirably expressed by Mr. Holland *Creed and Character* p. 37 f. 'The Rock of the Church.

It is obvious to remark that the more we realize that Christ intended by 'the rock' the man Peter in his personal character, the less support can we suppose the passage to give to the Roman argument. This point was thoroughly argued in an article in the *Guardian* of May 22 1889 pp. 800 f.

to invest him with an office, the office of steward in the Divine kingdom, and with a supernatural legislative authority. So far our Lord's words bear a plain meaning, but after this we enter upon the region of ambiguity. St. Peter speaks in this passage as one of a body of twelve. Is Christ dealing with him as distinct from the others, or as their representative? Is the office to belong to him only or in a special sense, or is it to be given to all who share the apostolic commission? The ground for this question is left the more open by the fact that Christ is not here bestowing an office but promising it. The passage is an anticipation, a promise ('*I will*,' not '*I do*') which waits its interpretation in our Lord's future action, just as His discourse about 'eating His flesh' in St. John and His promise to 'give His flesh' (St. John vi. 51) waits its fulfilment at the institution of the Eucharist. We contend then that this is just one of those passages which want interpreting—one of those passages about the meaning of which it is not possible to arrive at any certainty without the aid of the interpretation, whether of Scripture itself or of the Church, which is given us to fix its meaning, positively and negatively, so far as it can be fixed.

The interpretation put on it by the modern Roman Catholic Church, involves two doctrines—first, a doctrine about St. Peter, and, secondly, a doctrine about the permanence of the Petrine position in the Church of all ages.

1. Our Lord here promised to constitute St. Peter, as the Rock of the Church, the supreme representative

of Christ the Rock. He is to be the Vicar of Christ to the Church on earth. To him alone is primarily given the pastorate of souls and the authority of the keys. To the other Apostles these are only given mediately through him. Whatever they have, they have not directly from Christ, but indirectly from Christ through Peter.[1]

2. Furthermore this position which St. Peter holds relatively to the whole Church, lives on in the Roman see in which St. Peter's 'privilege' abides unto the end, in the form of the universal pastorate and (as recently defined) infallibility, of the Bishop of Rome.

Now, without discussing the inherent probability of

[1] This position first finds expression in St. Leo *Serm.* iv. 2: "Great and wonderful, beloved, is the fellowship in Its own power which the Divine condescension gave to this man. And if It willed the other rulers of the Church to have anything in common with him, It gave only through him whatever it did not withhold from the others." cf. *Ep.* x. 1: "The mystery of this gift the Lord willed to belong to the office of all the Apostles in such sense as that He made blessed Peter, the chief of all the Apostles, the original depositary of it, and that He wills that from him as from a sort of Head, His gifts should flow down to the whole Body." The same idea is expressed by St. Francis de Sales in a passage quoted by Mr. Rivington *Authority* p. 28: "The Apostles all have the same power as St. Peter, but not in the same rank, in as much as they have it as delegates and agents, but St. Peter as ordinary head and permanent officer." The power of the Apostles relatively to Peter, is compared to that of representatives of a king relatively to the king. Fr. Richardson pp. 80-81 repudiates this mediatorial view. But my contentions would apply equally to the view which he accepts. The other apostles, according to him (quoting Allies), received jurisdiction directly from Christ, but in such sense that they could only exercise it in subordination to Peter as their head.

this interpretation (which is here stated very briefly, but not with any exaggeration of the claim made), and assuming simply, with what is almost excessive moderation, that the passage does not necessarily involve it, but is susceptible of others,—we propose to examine whether it can hold in view of the commentary on the promise which is afforded—

(1) by our Lord's own subsequent words and conduct:

(2) by the language of the Acts and Apostolic Epistles, including St. Peter's own:

(3) by the interpretations of the Fathers.

(1) It must, we think, be admitted that our Lord's subsequent language and conduct do not confirm the stronger and more exclusive meaning which has been put upon His promise to St. Peter. The solemn delegations of ministerial authority given by our Lord after His Resurrection, are so given as to imply the essential equality of all the Apostles. They positively exclude the 'mediatorial' position of St. Peter. "As the Father hath sent Me, even so send I *you*" the Apostles in general: "and when He had said this, He breathed on them and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whosesoever sins ye forgive, they are forgiven unto them; whosesoever sins ye retain, they are retained." "All authority hath been given unto Me in heaven and on earth. Go ye therefore and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them . . . . teaching them." Thus the Mission to represent Christ, as endowed with His authority to baptize and to teach, to

remit and to retain sins (which is the power of the keys in its application to individuals) is given to the whole apostolic body at once and equally. To all equally had the Holy Eucharist been committed before His passion. It would seem then that what is promised to St. Peter in virtue of his confession of Christ's name, is bestowed by our Lord equally on all after His Resurrection, and that the primacy which St. Peter undoubtedly held in the apostolic college, carried with it no distinctive powers, but was a personal leadership amongst equals. There are indeed special dealings of our Lord with St. Peter. Thus before His Passion, when he is warning the apostles that 'Satan has asked to have them that he may sift them as wheat,' He tells Simon in particular that He has 'prayed for him that his faith fail not' and bids him 'when he is converted, to strengthen his brethren.' Mr. Rivington interprets this to mean that it was 'unnecessary' for our Lord to pray for all the Apostles because 'there was one head among them with whom they were to be joined': so that He prayed for one, in order to protect all! How strangely is this idea in contrast with the fact of our Lord's prayer in St. John, xvii. 9, 10. On this occasion the motive for His singling out St. Peter is plain to all who are not blind to facts. Thus St. Chrysostom commenting on this incident[1] says it is because his presumption, as indicated by his self-confident professions of loyalty, required rebuke. "He

[1] Tom. vii. p. 785 *Hom. in Matt.* lxxxii. 3, but there is a tendency to see in the charge 'strengthen thy brethren' a sign of Peter's primacy in *Hom. in Act. Apost.* iii., tom. ix. p. 26; but cp. on these Homilies, Salmon *Infallibility* p. 339.

said this sharply rebuking him, and showing that his fall was more grievous than the others and needed more assistance." "Why, if [Satan] asked for all, did He not say 'I prayed' for all? Is it not plain that it is as I said above—because He is rebuking him and showing that his fall is more grievous than that of the others that He turns His speech to him?" Again after the Resurrection Christ's threefold appeal to St. Peter and threefold pastoral charge, suggests irresistibly the interpretation given by the fathers,[1] viz. that St. Peter is here reinstated in the apostolic commission that his threefold denial might be supposed to have lost him; it is no peculiar dignity which is being committed to him. Thus St. Cyril of Alexandria: "through the thrice-repeated confession of the blessed Peter was annulled his sin in thrice denying: and through our Lord saying, Feed my lambs, there is conceived to be a sort of restoration of the apostolate already given to him."

Speaking generally then, we should say that the 'mediatorial' position of St. Peter in the ministry is excluded by our Lord's delegation of official power to all the Apostles directly, equally and together, and that there is nothing in the Gospels to suggest that St. Peter's position among the Apostles was any less personal or any more destined to be an abiding fact in the Church's ministry than that of St. John.[2] Even when our Lord

[1] *e.g.* St. Cyril *in loc.* and St. Augustin (substantially). So also St. Chrysostom, who however speaks here of St. Peter's primacy as the reason of his being singled out: see a little further on.

[2] On this subject we quote the following interesting passage from the end of St. Augustin's Homilies on St. John: "Two states of

was on earth it was not of a sort to prevent James and John asking for the foremost positions of honour in His kingdom, or the apostles discussing 'which of them is accounted to be greatest' (St. Matthew xx. 21; St. Luke xxii. 24).

(2) As we advance from the Gospels to the Acts of the Apostles, the history of the early Church suggests to us an obvious interpretation of St. Peter's primacy. He was the leader—the 'coryphæus' of the apostolic band. He spoke and acted at first as such, and, as holding

life, the life of faith on earth and the life of sight in heaven, were symbolized by Peter and John, the one by the one, the other by the other; but in this life they both of them walked for a time by faith [which Peter represents], and the other—sight [which John represents], they shall both of them enjoy eternally. For the *whole body of the saints*, therefore, inseparably belonging to the body of Christ, and for their safe pilotage through the present tempestuous life, did Peter, the first of the Apostles, receive the keys of the kingdom of heaven for the binding and loosing of sins; and for the same congregation of saints, in reference to the perfect repose in the bosom of that mysterious life to come, did the Evangelist John recline on the breast of Christ. For it is not the former alone, but the whole Church, that bindeth and looseth sins; nor did the latter alone drink at the fountain of the Lord's breast, to utter again in preaching those truths of the Word in the beginning, God with God, and those other sublime truths regarding the Divinity of Christ, and the Trinity and Unity of the whole Godhead, which are to be yet beheld in the kingdom face to face, but meanwhile till the Lord's coming are only to be seen in a mirror and in a riddle; but the Lord has Himself diffused this very Gospel through the whole world, that every one of His own may drink thereat according to his own individual capacity" (*In Ioh. Evang. Tractat.* cxxiv. 7).

St. Peter and St. John each represent, in their single personalities, among the Apostles, qualities and powers belonging to the universal Church. They stand as types of the Church in certain aspects, but the one embodiment is no more permanent than the other.

'the keys of the kingdom of heaven,' opened the door to the Gentiles. But his position of leader does not seem to carry with it any prerogative of primary importance. The Apostles at Jerusalem are described as "sending him"[1] with St. John to Samaria. Later again he occupies no governing position in the Council at Jerusalem. Christ's revelation to him, indeed, when he opened the door to the Gentiles,[2] was a fact which must have been conclusive of the question before the meeting; but the formal authority, the formal "I decide,"[3] comes from St. James, and the decree goes out in the name of "the Apostles and elders"[4] generally.[5] Moreover, St. Peter retires into the background of history after this, as St. Paul rises into prominence. The history would seem to suggest that St. Peter's special function was one which had to do with the opening of Church history,[6] and this impression is augmented by the utterly 'unpapal' tone of St. Peter's own Epistles. The 'fellow-elder' who speaks to the other 'elders'

[1] Acts viii. 14.
[2] Acts xv. 7-11.
[3] Acts xv. 19.
[4] Acts xv. 23.

[5] Bishop Meurin in the controversy which originally gave rise to these papers interpreted Acts xv. 12 'all the multitude held their peace' "as an instance of the deference paid to St. Peter in the Council of Jerusalem, and had likened it to the present order of the Catholic Church, in which, when the successor of St. Peter speaks as such, on a matter of faith, the multitude hold their peace." This interpretation, which is common among modern Roman Catholics, is inconceivably misleading and perverse. The multitude held their peace for no other purpose than to listen to Paul and Barnabas.

[6] This is Tertullian's view (*de Pudicitia* c. 21), but his very powerful exposition is reduced in authority by the Montanist *animus* of the passage, which is aimed against the perpetuity of the power of 'loosing' in the Church.

but as a 'witness of the sufferings of Christ and a partaker of the glory that shall be revealed'[1] gives no hint that he stands in any special relation to the "Chief Shepherd" beyond that in which the other apostles stood.

As to the evidence of the rest of the New Testament, it goes very strongly in the direction of minimizing the position of St. Peter. The 'twelve foundations' of the Church equal and co-ordinate[2] are the twelve Apostles, and this implication of St. John's vision accords well with St. Paul's language.[3] Moreover, if one view can exclude another, St. Paul's assertion of his own essential apostolic independence,[4] and his language about the 'pillar Apostles,' *exclude* the idea of his receiving his authority in any way mediately from St. Peter, though his visit to him at Jerusalem was no doubt due to a

[1] 1 Pet. v. 1-4.

[2] Rev. xxi. 14. [3] Eph. ii. 20.

[4] "Paul an Apostle not *from* man, neither *through* man" Gal. i. 1. "I did not receive it from man, nor was I taught it, but by revelation of JESUS CHRIST" i. 12. "They of repute" (*i.e.* the pillar Apostles, James and Cephas and John) "imparted nothing to me" ii. 6, etc. "The Gospel of the uncircumcision was committed unto me, as the Gospel of the circumcision was unto Peter" ii. 7. There is no sort of dependence of St. Paul on St. Peter which these words do not exclude. The Church officers of the next generation to the Apostles, like St. Timothy and St. Titus, received their authority and the tradition, not indeed *from* men, but *through* men. On the other hand the apostles received *immediately* from CHRIST. When Theodoret, wishing to please St. Leo, to whom he was appealing, speaks of St. Paul as "betaking himself to Peter that he might carry back from him an explanation to those who were raising questions at Antioch"—his language must have had a ring of irony to one as versed in Scripture as St. Leo.

certain deference to him as Captain of the Apostolic band.

We conclude, then, from our review of Scripture that the notion of St. Peter's 'mediatorial' position relatively to the other Apostles is excluded positively by St. Paul's language and conduct, and (by implication supporting this positive evidence) by the silence of the rest of Scripture as to any inequality amongst the Apostles. St. Peter's peculiar position, we should judge, given him in virtue of our Lord's promise, was a leadership in the Apostolic band which has its special exercise in the Church's earliest days, retires into the background with the spread and growth of the Church, and gives no sign of its being perpetuated any more than the special mission of St. Paul.

(3) It remains to summarize briefly the evidence of the Church Fathers on three points—(*a*) the meaning of 'the Rock' in St. Matt. xvi. 18; (*b*) the special position of St. Peter amongst the other Apostles; (*c*) the permanence of his prerogative in the 'see of Peter' at Rome.

(*a*) As regards the meaning of the Rock there is no fixity of interpretation amongst the Fathers, and many of them, like St. Augustin, give different interpretations in different parts of their works. Thus the comments of, say, St. Augustin and St. Chrysostom will convince any candid reader of what is certainly significant, namely, that they did not think the interpretation of this word a matter which at all affected the basis of Church authority, or indeed a very important question at all.

St. Chrysostom on St. Matt. xvi. 18 comments thus: "'On the rock' that is, on the faith of his [Peter's] confession," and passes on. But just below he speaks of God as having "made *a man that is a fisherman* more solid than any rock." A little later[1] he speaks again of Christ having 'built his Church *on his confession.*' St. Augustin finally[2] bids his readers choose between the interpretation of the Rock as St. Peter, which was his earlier view, and Christ as confessed by St. Peter, his later. In the Collect for the Vigil of St. Peter and St. Paul in the Roman Breviary, the rock is interpreted of the apostolic confession 'apostolicae confessionis petra': in the hymn for Sundays at Lauds, on the other hand, Peter is 'ipsa petra ecclesiae.[3]

(*b*) As regards the position of St. Peter amongst the other Apostles we have statements from a number of the fathers. Thus Origen[4] writes: "But if you think the whole Church built upon Peter alone, what will you say of John, the son of thunder, or each one of the Apostles? And are we to dare to say that the gates of hell shall

[1] *Hom.* lxxxii. 3, tom. vii. p. 786.

[2] *Retract.* i. xxii.

[3] But the balance of Liturgical refs. to the passage, with which I have been kindly supplied by the Rev. F. E. Warren, goes in favour of the former interpretation.

[4] Mr. Allnatt (*Cathedra Petri* p. 30) quotes Origen as maintaining how highly St. Peter *transcends "the others" in power.* The words are put in capitals. The context when examined shows that "the others" means not the other Apostles, but the members of the Church generally, and that the point in which he transcends is having authority in "heavens" (plural) not in "heaven" (singular)

not prevail against Peter only, but that against the other Apostles and those who are perfect they shall prevail? Are not the quoted words, 'The gates of hell shall not prevail against it,' and 'Upon this rock I will build my Church,' said of them all, and of each single one of them? Are the keys of the kingdom of heaven given to Peter only, and shall no other one of the blessed men receive them? And if the words, 'I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven' are common to the others, how are not all the words, said before and said after, said as they seem to be to Peter, also common to the others? For in this place the words, 'Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, etc.,' seem as if they were spoken to Peter. But in the Gospel of John, the Saviour giving the Holy Spirit to the disciples by means of the Breath, says 'Receive *ye* the Holy Ghost,'" etc.[1] So again from Alexandria, Cyril, in one of his letters to Nestorius, which have ecumenical authority, speaks of Peter and James as of 'equal honour' as Apostles and disciples.[2] So much later Theophylact on Matt. xvi. 18-19: "They who have obtained the grace of the Episcopate as Peter had, have authority to remit and bind. For though the 'I will give thee' was spoken to Peter alone, yet the gift has been given to all the Apostles. When? When He said, 'Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted.' For this 'I will give' indicates a future time—the time, that is, after the Resurrection."[3] St. Chrysostom very frequently recog-

[1] *in Matt.* tom. xii. 11. [2] *ad Nest.* Ep. iii. 5.

[3] Tom. vii. p. 647 *in Matt. Hom.* lxv. 4: cf. tom. x. p. 329 *in* 1 *Cor. Hom.* xxxv. 5.

nizes the 'primacy' of St. Peter, and calls him "the chief of the apostles, the mouthpiece of the disciples, the leader of the band."[1] He speaks of St. John and St. Paul 'allowing him the primacy.' But this cannot be strained to imply any essential difference of rank, for where he speaks of St. Paul as going up to visit St. Peter, on account of this primacy, he adds "not as needing anything of him nor of his voice, but as being his equal in honour."[2] So he constantly speaks of St. Paul as 'the teacher of the world,' and characterizes St. John 'as the pillar of the Churches over the world, having the keys of heaven."[3]

In Western theology the only definite view given us of St. Peter's relation to the other Apostles (till we come

[1] Tom. viii. p. 525 *in Ioan. Hom.* lxxxviii. 1: ἔκκριτος τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ στόμα τῶν μαθητῶν καὶ κορυφὴ τοῦ χοροῦ. Here he distinguishes 'the apostles' from 'the disciples.' Just below where he says "He intrusts to him [Peter] the presidency of the brethren . . . and says, 'If thou lovest me preside over the brethren'" he means 'the brethren' to represent 'the sheep' of Christ *i.e.* the flock generally. Where lower down he speaks of him (p. 527) as appointed by Christ 'the teacher not of this see (of Jerusalem) but of the whole world,' it is by contrast to St. James who received only 'the throne of Jerusalem.' The term 'coryphaeus' he applies also to Andrew, James, and John, who make up 'the two pairs of coryphaei.' (*Hom. in Matt.* xxxvii. 4; tom. vii. p. 420.) It is noticeable that when he is speaking of the election of Judas' successor he mentions three possible methods of making it. St. Peter might have asked Christ to give him a successor to Judas simply: or the apostles might have elected simply: or St. Peter might have chosen some one himself, see *Hom. in Act. Apost.* iii. 1; tom. ix. pp. 23-25.

[2] *in Gal.* i. 18; tom. x. p. 677 ἰσότιμος ὢν αὐτῷ.

[3] Cf. *in Gen. Hom.* xxxii. 3; lx. 3; xxiv. 4; tom. iv. pp. 320, 581, 222. For St. John cf. *In Ioh. Hom.* i. 1; tom. viii. p. 2; cf. tom. vii. p. 368.

to the 'mediatorial' theory, referred to above as belonging to the Papacy and derived from Leo the Great) is that propounded and developed in the African Church by her great theologians St. Cyprian, St. Optatus, and St. Augustin. This theory may be briefly stated in St. Cyprian's language. It is, that while "the other Apostles were what Peter was, endowed with an equal fellowship both of honour and power," while "the Lord after His resurrection gives equal power to all the Apostles" and gives them all equally the pastoral commission, yet He built His Church upon one (Peter), to "make the unity of His Church plain."[1] This institution of the Church in the person of one man first, was a symbolic act to emphasize Christ's intention of unity. Peter, when Christ speaks to him, after his great confession, is addressed (as St. Augustin often says) as the "representative of the Church." This is an interpretation of our Lord's words to St. Peter which we can all accept, and which is quite intelligible. It is quite distinct from the mediatorial view, according to which St. Peter is something which the other apostles are not, and the source to them of what they are. This latter view is indeed markedly excluded by the language of the fathers generally, except indeed by those like St. Leo who constitute what can be truly called the "papal school" of writers.

(*c*) It remains for us to inquire what is the patristic view about the *permanence of St. Peter's privilege* in his see. On this subject it is not necessary to say much now, as it will come under discussion in the next chapter

[1] *De Unit.* 4.

on the growth of the Roman see. For the present it is only important to make one point clear—that the claim of the Bishop of Rome to be what Peter was among the Apostles becomes a claim which, even if recognized, does not carry us far when we have once gained a true conception of what Peter was among the Apostles. The exaggerated claim which we hear through the lips of Leo, and which has been referred to above, is based on a conception of St. Peter's position the unfoundedness of which we have already seen. Meanwhile, even when this claim has been reduced to its proper limits and made only a claim to be among bishops what Peter really was among Apostles, even so the claim of the see of Rome to the 'Privilege of Peter' cannot show anything approaching ancient *consent* in its favour. Allnatt in his *Cathedra Petri* can at least be trusted to accumulate all the legitimate references to the Fathers in support of a papal view—indeed he does not often stop here—but under the heading "*St. Peter lives and teaches in his successors*" and "*rules in his own see*" he cannot quote a single Father of the first four centuries, except one pope, Siricius (A.D. 386); and under the head of "*the see of Peter*" he cannot quote a single *Oriental* Father of the first four centuries,[1] except indeed Firmilian of Caesarea, who is violently protesting against Pope Stephen's conduct, presumably based upon his claim to sit in Peter's chair, and mentions the claim without expressing his own attitude towards it: "Stephen who

[1] *e.g.* St. Chrysostom in his voluminous works, including letters to the Pope, affords no testimony, though he speaks often of Peter's 'primacy' among the other apostles.

announces that he holds the see of Peter by succession is stirred by no zeal against heretics."[1] I believe indeed that *none of the Greek Fathers of the first six centuries connects the position of the Bishop of Rome with the promise to St. Peter.*[2] In the African Church the theory that the Bishop of Rome occupies that same position as the 'symbol of unity' in the whole Church, which St. Peter occupied in Apostolic days, came to prevail through the influence of St. Cyprian. This interesting view, which in St. Cyprian's sense we should be heartily glad to accept, will come under discussion shortly. For the present the matter must be brought to a close with two observations.

There is a marked contrast between the authority which such a doctrine as the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist can plead, and that which supports the papal view of the 'privilege of Peter.' We accept the Real Presence because (*a*) it was taught by the Fathers of East and West from the first; (*b*) it is confirmed by the natural meaning of our Lord's words, and the language of St. Paul in his epistles. We reject the papal interpretation of Christ's promise to St. Peter, because (*a*) it cannot show in its favour anything approaching to a consent of the fathers—indeed there is something much nearer consent in a

[1] ap. Cypr. *Ep.* lxxv.

[2] This position was suggested to me, and I cannot find any instance to the contrary. (Even from later days the instances seem very rare, and rather by way of casual implication. Theophylact on St. Luke xxii. 32 says simply that Peter by the example of his penitence is to 'strengthen his brethren' to the end of time.) But a universal statement is somewhat hazardous.

view which excludes it; (*b*) it does not appear to be the obvious meaning of our Lord's words at first, and is rendered still more improbable by His later language; (*c*) it is excluded by St. Paul's language about his own authority, discountenanced by the general language of other New Testament writers, while it cannot even plead anything in the New Testament, outside the Gospels, in its support.

It is undoubtedly true that the papacy has possessed itself of the promise of our Lord to St. Peter in popular imagination, just in the same way as Protestantism of an un-catholic sort has possessed itself of certain portions of St. Paul's epistles about justification by faith, and the superiority of the spirit to the letter. Thus there are a number of texts about which we start with a kind of 'false conscience,' which we have to deal with, not (as we are apt to do) by avoiding them, but by dealing with them with attention and prayer, in the light of the mind of the Church, of the general sense of Scripture, and of the reason which God has given us and His Spirit enlightens, till we are familiarized with their true meaning and it has taken its proper place in the context of our catholic faith.

CHAPTER VI.

THE GROWTH OF THE ROMAN CHURCH.

It is important for us, at the present stage of our argument, to have before us a clear historical summary of the position occupied by the see of Rome in the successive ages of the Church, such a historical summary seeming an essential condition of any sound judgment as to what our relation towards the Roman Church ought to be.

The earliest Father then who mentions the subject, St. Irenaeus, regards the Roman Church as having been founded concurrently and equally by St. Peter and St. Paul. In fact, (as we find from St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans) there was a considerable body of Christians at the capital before any Apostle had been amongst them,[1] but St. Paul was amongst them during his first and second captivities, and St. Peter was at Rome probably when he wrote his First Epistle—certainly before his martyr's death, which he shared there with St. Paul, perhaps in A.D. 67.

The prominence in which the Christian Church of

[1] Rom. i. 11, 12. St. Paul had not seen them, and he would not go where any other Apostle had been before him (xv. 20, 21). St. Peter must have come to Rome at any rate not much before the end of St. Paul's first captivity, in A.D. 63.

the capital of the world must have inevitably found herself among other Churches, the glory which accrued to her from her apostolic and other martyrs,[1] and not least, the early munificence of her almsgiving, gave the Roman Church a special position in Christendom from the earliest days. Attention has been called to the fact that when she writes the Epistle which bears St. Clement's name in order to exhort a recalcitrant party in the Church at Corinth to submission to their presbyters, she writes with a tone of considerable authority.[2] "If any disobey the words spoken of God through us, let them know that they will entangle themselves in transgression, but we shall be clear from this sin." "You will cause us joy and exultation if, obeying the things written by us through the Spirit, you cut out the lawless passion, etc." This tone of authority may be due to the prestige of the Church at Rome;[3] but it seems more likely that, though the letter is written in the name of that Church, the authority is mainly St. Clement's, and that he speaks with authority as one of the chief order—the apostolic order of bishops—writing to a Church in which as yet there were no officers higher than presbyters.[4] But in any case it is remarkable that

[1] "That happy Church" Tertullian calls her "for which the Apostles poured out with their blood their whole teaching" (*de Praescr.* 36).

[2] c. 59. The epistle was written about A.D. 95.

[3] "St. Ignatius" says Mr. Allnatt "writes to the '*presiding*' Church of Rome": Yes, 'presiding,' but where? "In the place of the region of the Romans," and there too "having the presidency of love."

[4] See this discussed *The Church and the Ministry* p. 324, cf. p. 329.

the episcopate seems to have been less prominent in the Church at Rome than was the case in the East.[1]

It is towards the end of the second century, when the line of Roman bishops comes into clearer historical light, that we begin to discern dimly the first beginnings of their claim to be successors of St. Peter; and it is in A.D. 196, in the person of Victor, that we have our first anticipation of the aggressive spirit which is to be a distinguishing characteristic of the see of Rome in later ages. Victor ventured in a domineering spirit to excommunicate the Asiatic Churches who held to their Johannine tradition and insisted on keeping Easter on the day of the Jewish passover, whatever day of the week that might be. This arbitrary act on Victor's part brought down upon him the 'sharp rebukes'[2] of a number of bishops, and amongst them of the great St. Irenaeus, who contended that variety in ecclesiastical custom had never hitherto been a bar to fellowship, because such 'difference only serves to commend the unity of the faith.' Victor stood reproved. His excommunication failed. It was a mere 'attempt'—not in the sense that he did not actually issue the sentence, for Eusebius tells us that he did; but simply because it was ignored, and the question of Easter observance

[1] Thus Dr. Salmon *Introd. to N. T.* p. 565 *n.* calls attention to the fact "how all through the first two centuries the importance of the Bishop of Rome is merged in the importance of his Church." Cf. Lightfoot *Clement* i. p. 70: "the later Roman theory supposes that the Church of Rome derives all its authority from the bishop of Rome, as the successor of St. Peter. History inverts this relation, and shows that, as a matter of fact, the power of the bishop of Rome was built upon the power of the Church of Rome."

[2] See Eusebius *Hist. Eccles.* v. 24.

remained an open one till the Council of Nicæa closed it. The attempt however is significant of a spirit already in its slight beginnings present in the Roman Church. And it is important to notice that Eusebius, the fourth century Church historian, sees in Victor's action nothing but a piece of undue intolerance. He acknowledges nothing 'papal' in the bishop of Rome.

It would not appear that any kind of authority was attached to the Roman see during the early centuries even in the West, except such moral authority or prestige as must have belonged inevitably to so great an apostolic see. With reference for instance to the Church's function of bearing witness to the faith, the voice of the see of Rome is but one element in the consentient testimony.[1] But yet her position in this respect has one remarkable feature, due to her relations to the capital city of the world. Rome was the centre of the world's movements. Everybody came thither. She was the world's 'microcosm.' It followed necessarily that she stood, as regards her Church, in a unique freedom of communication with the Churches of the rest of the world. Christians from all parts necessarily gravitated thither. The faith in Rome was not only preserved by the local Christians, but tested by constant comparison with the faith of those who like Hegesippus or Polycarp came from widely different quarters to the world's centre and testified to finding there the same faith as they had believed at home. Thus it was that the testimony of the Roman Church had a 'microcosmic' character; and when Irenaeus wants to

[1] See Tertullian *de Praescr.* 36. St. Irenaeus iii. 3.

select a typical Western [1] Church in order to enumerate the succession of her bishops and 'confound' the Gnostics with her creed, he chooses as a specimen, because "it would be tedious to enumerate the successions of all the churches," the Church of Rome: "for to this Church on account of her superior pre-eminence, it must needs be that every church should come together, *that is, the faithful from all sides*; and in this Church the tradition from the Apostles has been always preserved [not as elsewhere by a merely local body but] *by men from all parts.*"

At an unknown moment, before the middle of the third century, the Church of Rome, which up to that time had been Greek in language—alike in her liturgy and her theology—a Greek colony in the Latin city, became perhaps somewhat suddenly a Latin Church, and in consequence of this change of language, so com-

[1] He balances Rome in the West with Smyrna in the East. This passage from Irenaeus (iii. 3.) has been the subject of much dispute. I believe that Dr. Langen, following Grabe and Neander, has finally fixed its meaning (*Gesch. der röm. Kirche* i. 172 note). He quotes new and apposite illustrations, from twelfth-century Western writers, showing how the words of Irenaeus 'convenire ad Romanam ecclesiam' were then understood. Thus "Roma tunc erat caput mundi et de toto orbe illuc conveniebant" (Herveus of Bourgdieu) "ad quam homines undique terrarum conveniunt" (Hugo Eterianus). We may compare the language of the *Synodicon* of Constantinople, which attributes the primacy of the older Rome to the fact that formerly "affairs converged there and therefore all men came together there" (Milman *Lat. Chr.* ii. 127). No interpretation is tenable which does not give force to the remarkable words I have italicized. The popular Ultramontane interpretation is excluded by its violating the whole context: cf. Salmon *Infall.* pp. 376-7; Puller *Primitive Saints and See of Rome*, pp. 31-43.

pletely forgot her Greek past that in the fourth century she was ignorant of an incident in her life which the coincidences of modern discovery have laid open to our eyes. This incident we notice here only so far as it illustrates with remarkable vividness the position of the Roman Church in this, till recently, unknown epoch of the early third century. St. Hippolytus, the great theologian and bishop[1] of the Church, "who perhaps" says Dr. Newman "has no rival (among ante-Nicene theologians) except his master St. Irenaeus," is in his *Refutation of all Heresies* now discerned denouncing his contemporary, Pope Callistus, with extraordinary violence, as a destroyer of the Church discipline and indeed (to quote Dr. Newman again) as 'a heresiarch ex cathedra.' Now it is a luminous fact that a great theologian can call a bishop of Rome a heresiarch without seeing any more significance in the fact than he would see in the case of the bishop of any other see, and without his attitude towards him affecting the universal reverence in which his name was held, "which a breath of ecclesiastical censure has never even dimmed." This incident, which we cannot but reckon a fact of history, illustrates how little essentially ecumenical there was in the position of the Roman see at this date, and how utterly alien to the mind of the greatest Roman theologian of the third century was

[1] The theory of St. Hippolytus' position which is perhaps the most probable, is that he was 'bishop of the nations,' *i.e.* bishop of the foreigners in the diocese of Rome, taking his title from Portus. See Lightfoot *Clement* ii. pp. 332 ff.

any sort of notion that could even remotely point to the doctrine of Papal infallibility.[1]

Leaving for the next chapter the task of tracing the development of the papacy in Latin Christianity, we proceed now to notice that in the doctrinal and disciplinary system of the Eastern Church the position of the Roman see remained where it was in the conception of Irenaeus. The pre-eminent position of the see is of course recognized, as when the Churchmen of the East complain to St. Dionysius of Rome of the suspicious teaching of St. Dionysius of Alexandria, "because the first of bishops was the person to whom complaints against the second were most naturally carried,"[2] but if either the universal pastorate of the bishop of Rome or, *a fortiori*, his infallibility is put forward as having a claim to be part of the Church's catholic Christianity, such a claim can be shown to be untenable in the light of facts.

Let us consider two or three of these facts.

When in the extreme crisis of the conflict for the Nicene faith the Pope Liberius "subscribed to heretical depravity" (so St. Jerome speaks of his signing a compromising creed), abandoned Athanasius and notified

[1] I may refer on this subject to the *Dict. Chr. Biogr.* s.v. HIPPOLYTUS ROMANUS vol. iii. pp. 88-91, 96. Dr. Newman *Tracts Theol. and Eccl.* p. 222 would apparently regard the passage in the *Elenchus* about Zephyrinus and Callistus as an interpolation. But this is most arbitrary. "I grant" he says "that that portion of the work which relates to the Holy Trinity as closely resembles the works of Hippolytus *in style and in teaching*, as the libellous matter which has got a place in it is *incompatible with his reputation.*" [The italics are mine.]

[2] Robertson's *Church History.*

that he had separated him from his communion, St. Athanasius betrays no other feeling than that of sorrow at the fall of a good man and anxiety to palliate his weakness: "he speaks with a noble tenderness of the fall of both Liberius and Hosius" (of Cordova). Now we contend that if anything in the world can be certain, it is certain that St. Athanasius, had he had any idea of the bishop of Rome being in a unique sense the guardian of the faith, much more any notion of his infallibility, must have adopted another tone in regard to his fall. He must have quivered at the awful shock of finding himself deserted by the 'Holy Father' on the central dogma of the faith. It must have been much more to him than his desertion by Hosius. There is no avoiding or palliating this conclusion.

The impression made upon our minds by this incident is deepened by the evidence of the general Councils. The attempt to foist into the history of the Council of Nicæa any sign of a belief in the universal pastorate of the bishop of Rome is violent in the extreme.[1] The fathers in their 6th Canon recog-

[1] We cannot help quoting the following paragraph from the work of one of the most learned of English Roman Catholic historical writers—Allies' *See of St. Peter* (p. 155). "In the year 325, at the great Nicene Council . . . it is stated 'that the Roman Church always had the primacy.'" [This clause (*a*) originally meant the primacy in her own region (*b*) was a *Roman interpolation* in the acts of the council, expressly disallowed by the East, and rejected even by respectable Roman authorities, such as Hefele.] "The bishop of Corduba, in Spain, apparently at once papal legate and imperial commissioner, and Vitus and Vincentius, legates of S. Sylvester, presided over the Council." [It seems impossible to ascertain exactly who did preside over the Council.

nized in Rome a quasi-patriarchal power in her own region like that which they acknowledged equally in Alexandria and Antioch. They recognized nothing more. And we must go further. The fourth ecumenical Council, at Chalcedon, A.D. 451, following on the lines of the second, makes a canonical statement (Can. xxviii.) about the authority of the see of Rome which shows their view of the matter with unmistakable clearness :—

"The fathers properly gave privileges to the throne

Hosius may have done so, but that he was papal legate comes only on the authority of a confessedly romancing historian of no weight and of the later fifth century, Gelasius of Cyzicus, and that Vitus and Vincentius did so, is not hinted by any authority at all.] "And it was determined that all these things should be sent to Sylvester, bishop of Rome, for his confirmation, which only could make the Council ecumenical." [This statement comes (*see* Hefele *Conciliengeschichte* i. 426) from Dionysius Exiguus, and represents nothing more than the "Roman view" at the beginning of the 6th century.] Thus to ignore all contemporary sources of information and to compile narratives from the fictions of late or romancing authors is the Ultramontane way of writing history. In the same spirit Mr. Rivington makes a reference to a passage in Sozomen p. 42. "Inasmuch as the care of all belonged to him (*i.e.* Julius, bishop of Rome), on account of the rank of his see he restored to each (of the Oriental bishops who had been driven away with Athanasius) his Church." This is from Sozomen *E. H.* iii. 8. But the word translated 'inasmuch' means more strictly 'on the plea that.' It represents Julius' view of his authority, and Mr. Rivington curiously enough has not gone on to quote Sozomen's account of how the orientals dealt with his claim to authority. "They wrote back a letter full of irony and not without stern threatening . . . they did not choose to take the second place . . . they complained of Julius having insulted their synod . . . they repudiated what had been done as unjust and contrary to the rule of the Church." Nor did Mr. Rivington mention that Sozomen's account of Julius' claim, as tested by his own letters, is exaggerated. See *Athanasius' Hist. Writings* (Bright) *Pref.* p. xxvii.

of old Rome, because it was the imperial city, and the 150 Bishops (at Constantinople), being moved with the same intention, gave equal privileges to the most holy throne of new Rome (*i.e.* Constantinople), judging with reason that the city which was honoured with the sovereignty and senate and enjoyed equal privileges with the elder imperial Rome, should also be magnified like her in ecclesiastical matters, being the second after her."

So spake the fathers of Chalcedon in the teeth of the protest of the legates of Rome. Nothing can be more certain than that the bishops who enacted this canon did not regard the privileges of Rome as part of the divine and essential constitution of the Church or they could not have used the expression "the fathers gave": nothing can be more plain than that the primacy of Rome is in their eyes a 'primacy of honour.'[1] Jealousy of the growing claims of Rome may have had something to do with the tone of the canon—with its silence about the *spiritual* dignity of the see of St. Peter; but its language cannot do less than disprove the idea that the claims which Rome was even then beginning to make were regarded by the Eastern Church as part of the catholic faith. Further, this canon explains in what sense, and in what sense only, the Council, in the complimentary letter in which they endeavoured to persuade St. Leo to accept their 28th Canon, can address him as "ruling like a head

[1] See the expression 'privileges of honour' in the 3d Canon of Constantinople to which that of Chalcedon refers back its authority. On the whole subject Dr. Bright's admirable *Notes on the Canons* should be consulted. "The Quinisext Council, 681, confirmed all the Chalcedon canons without exception." Salmon *l.c.* p. 417.

over the members" in the Council, and "commissioned by Christ with the guardianship of the vine."[1] It is quite true that individual oriental bishops, especially appellants to Rome who wished to say what was pleasant, and men like St. Cyril of Alexandria, whose fear of the rising claims of Constantinople united his interests with those of Rome, recognized from time to time in a higher sense the universal pastorate of the Roman bishop,[2] but their expressions belong to individuals only, under circumstances when interest put strong pressure on belief. There is nothing of the sort to be found in St. Basil's or St. Chrysostom's voluminous works, though this belief, had it existed in their minds, must have emerged: and more than this—oriental writers are much given to verbose compliments in addressing distinguished people. The language of rhetoric and compliment must always be interpreted by the severer style of a formal canon.

Once again, whatever strong language may be quoted from a few later oriental writers on behalf of the Roman see, as from St. Theodore the Studite in the 8th century, nothing can override the evidence of the formal

[1] In fact any committee might address its president as "ruling like a head over the members." The 33d Apostolic Canon is very much to the point: "The bishops of each nation (race) ought to recognize the first amongst them and esteem him as a head, and do nothing over and above (their proper business) without his judgment."

[2] Though St. Cyril in the early years of his episcopate preferred remaining outside the communion of Rome to restoring St. Chrysostom's name to the diptychs of the Alexandrian Church, and Theodoret in spite of his language in addressing Leo, which was referred to in the last chapter, signed with a voluntariness which he emphasized the 28th canon of Chalcedon.

action of the 6th General Council in 680, when it condemned Honorius the Pope among the Monothelite heretics. "With them we anathematize" says the Council "and cast out of the Holy Catholic Church, Honorius, who was pope of the elder Rome, because we found that he followed Sergius' opinion in all respects and confirmed his impious dogmas." Roman Catholic writers may endeavour to justify the actual language of Honorius, they may protest that the contemporary pope never intended to assent to his condemnation except for *negligence in opposing heresy*,—we are not concerned at present with these contentions[1]—but no one can possibly, with any show of reason, contend that the insertion of the name of the pope in a list of formal heretics by an ecumenical Council, does not prove that the bishops who composed the Council had no, even rudimentary, idea of the papal infallibility.

Here then we leave the matter. The only claim here made is to have demonstrated one fact—that the belief in the universal pastorate and the doctrinal infallibility of the pope can in no sense be described as part of the catholic faith; it cannot by any stretch of terms be described as part of the creed of Christendom held *ubique*, *semper*, *ab omnibus*. Therefore, on the principles laid down already, it cannot be part of the obligatory creed of Christendom at all. Short of this there is very little we should not be prepared either to grant, or at least to leave an open question. We are not disposed

[1] See Willis' *Pope Honorius and the New Roman Dogma. Papal Infallibility inconsistent with the condemnation of a Pope for heresy, etc.* (Rivington, London, 1879.)

at all to question the unique position held in Western Christendom by the see of Rome. We are not disposed to minimize the magnificence of the vocation assigned to her, especially in view of the Church's need of centralization in the days when the Western Empire was decaying or gone. We would fain not fall short of what is fitting in our veneration of the greatest of Christian patriarchates. But no such veneration can justify us in assenting to *any* claims she likes to make, or in shutting our eyes to the fact that the acceptance of these claims is only possible on the basis either of a 'Manichean' disbelief in the capacity of the human reason to estimate the plainest facts of history, or of a doctrine of development which would cut at the root of the patristic principle that, in the rule of faith obligatory upon Christians, "whatever is truly new" or really partial, "is certainly false."

CHAPTER VII.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PAPACY IN LATIN CHRISTIANITY.

No one can fairly contemplate the greatness of the papacy or consider how vast a position it occupies in the whole of history, without being satisfied that it is something greater than could ever have been created by the ambition or power of individual popes or by the evil forces of injustice and fraud. It is one of those great historic growths which indicate a divine purpose latent in the tendencies of things and the circumstances of the world. A Leo, a Gregory, a Hildebrand could no more have devised or invented the papacy, than a Cæsar, a Constantine, or a Justinian could have elaborated the Roman Empire. It is a natural development of circumstances, and it is in the fashioning of circumstances that we look for the hand of Providence. In the fourth and fifth centuries the fact that the Western mind was comparatively undisturbed by the oriental heresies in regard to the Person of Christ which occupied the great ecumenical councils, caused the Western Church, and the great see which was the acknowledged centre of the Western Church, to seem to the eyes of the distracted orientals as a perpetual harbour of quiet

refuge. Rome in her dignified repose was the recipient of appeal after appeal from the East. Further, though the Roman Church was not a great theological centre, like Antioch or Alexandria, or like the African Church among Latin-speaking peoples, and later the Church of South Gaul, yet in proportion as she was lacking in theological power, she was endowed with a splendid capacity for "holding the tradition" with unswerving orthodoxy. Individual Popes did indeed fail, and at important crises, like Liberius and Honorius, but on the whole the orthodoxy of the see of Rome was conspicuous through all the controversies on the Trinity and the Incarnation. The consequent enhancement of her general ecclesiastical reputation coincided with the deeper sense of the need of a recognized centre to Western Christendom which finds expression in the canon of Sardica. And while the Roman see was thus having greatness thrust upon her from the circumstances of the Church's position, the tendency of events in the secular world was running steadily in the direction of her exaltation. The decay of the Western Empire and the removal of the seat of government from Rome, left the magnificent traditions of authority and the splendid prestige of the eternal city to add lustre to the chair of St. Peter, whose occupants became constantly more important as paganism died away and each Western emperor was more contemptible than the last. Once again, the age which saw the crumbling of the old civilization of the Empire and the surging in of the great sea of fresh and vigorous barbarian life, in wave after wave of invasion, cried out, in the interests of

society as much as of religion, for some centre of moral and social authority; and men's eyes had long grown accustomed to look upon Rome as the centre of the social system.

"Now" says Dean Milman, speaking of the age of Gregory the Great—"Now was the crisis in which the Papacy must re-awaken its obscured and suspended life. It was the only power which lay not entirely and absolutely prostrate before the disasters of the times—a power which had an inherent strength, and might resume its majesty. It was this power which was most imperatively required to preserve all which was to survive out of the crumbling wreck of Roman civilization. To Western Christianity was absolutely necessary a centre, standing alone, strong in traditionary reverence, and in acknowledged claims to supremacy. Even the perfect organization of the Christian hierarchy might in all human probability have fallen to pieces in perpetual conflict: it might have degenerated into a half secular feudal caste with hereditary benefices, more and more entirely subservient to the civil authority, a priesthood of each nation or each tribe, gradually sinking to the intellectual or religious level of the nation or tribe. On the rise of a power, both controlling and conservative, hung, humanly speaking, the life and death of Christianity—of Christianity as a permanent, aggressive, expansive, and to a certain extent uniform system. There must be a counterbalance to barbaric force, to the unavoidable anarchy of Teutonism, with its tribal, or at the utmost national independence, forming a host of small, conflicting, antagonistic kingdoms. . . .

It is impossible to conceive what had been the confusion, the lawlessness, the chaotic state of the middle ages, without the mediæval Papacy; and of the mediæval Papacy the real father is Gregory the Great."[1]

There is, then, in the deepest sense of the words a providential purpose in the papacy, and it is impossible to estimate all that the Church as a whole owes to the great see of Rome. But of course we recognize a providential purpose of a not dissimilar kind, and in relation to the spread of Christianity, in the growth of the Roman Empire and the diffusion of the Greek language. We recognize a divine vocation given to the Eastern Church as the great mother of theology, as least as conspicuous as that which was intrusted to the West in the sphere of discipline and government. But this recognition does not carry with it either of two important consequences. It does not carry with it any recognition of a dogmatic authority given either to East or West in isolation, nor does it carry with it any implication that the vocation we recognize is part of the Church's unalterable system. Any vocation which is rooted in the circumstances of a particular epoch may vanish with the circumstances which conditioned it. It does not follow because governmental authority or centralization was the one thing needed in the seventh century that it is the one thing needed now: what is the very symbol or instrument of unity in one age may be the source of schism in another, and the Divine Providence which gave its vocation first to Greek and then

[1] *Hist. of Latin Chr.* b. iii. c. vii. vol. ii. pp. 100-102 ed. 1883.

to Latin Christianity may have as great a vocation in store (who can tell that it may not be so?) for the English-speaking and Oriental Churches. At any rate we go no way towards recognizing whatever claims Rome may choose to make upon us, when we allow ourselves in unstinting admiration of the greatness of the work which God has allowed her to do; for it is true of everything in Christianity, as in the world at large, —of everything which is not part and parcel of her catholic system doctrinal, moral, and sacramental— that

> "The old order changeth, yielding place to new,
> And God fulfils Himself in many ways,
> Lest one good custom should corrupt the world."

And when we come to look a little closer at the history of the Roman Church it seems to us to have all the appearance, taking it in general, of a system, backed indeed by a divine intention, but perverted by something which is much more satanic than divine. We know that St. Peter Damian called the great Hildebrand his "sanctus Satanas," and the expression, in whatever sense originally used, has a very striking application to the papacy as a whole. The certainly very undivine qualities of ambition, injustice, and dishonesty have been to a strange extent identified with the whole history of the papacy. These qualities are all the more conspicuous when we see them in so real a saint as the man who has a claim to be called the father of the papacy, Leo the Great. Saint as he was, he was wonderfully unscrupulous in asserting the claims of his see, and strangely blinded in conscience to the authority of truth

when he quoted, as a canon of Nicæa, what had been shown to demonstration to be a canon of Sardica and not of Nicæa.[1] Again, we may not be able to fix on any individuals the responsibility for such forgeries as the Donation of Constantine and the Isidorian Decretals, but it goes against our surest instincts to believe that a system, which was corresponding in its actual method of working to a divine purpose, could have been allowed to depend so largely upon forgeries for its substructure at critical epochs, as the Roman system has in fact depended.

Nay, even *conscious* fraud is a familiar element in official acts of the Roman see.[2] And further, the

[1] *Leo the Great* (Fathers for English Readers) pp. 113-115.

[2] See *e.g.* Willis' *Pope Honorius* p. 26: "The condemnation of Pope Honorius for heresy is recorded in the Roman Breviaries until the sixteenth century; at which period the name of Honorius suddenly disappears. The theory of Papal Infallibility was at that time being rapidly developed. A fact opposed it. The evidence for the fact is suppressed. 'I have before me' writes Père Gratry 'a Roman Breviary of 1520, printed at Turin, in which, on the feast of S. Leo, June 28th, I find the condemnation of Honorius: In which synod were condemned Sergius, Cyrus, Honorius, Pyrrhus, Paul and Peter . . . . who asserted and proclaimed one will and operation in our LORD JESUS CHRIST.

"'I open the Roman Breviary of to-day,' he continues, 'and there I find in the instruction of S. Leo (June 28th): In this Council were condemned Cyrus, Sergius and Pyrrhus, who preached only one will and operation in CHRIST. The trifling incident of a Pope condemned for heresy by an Ecumenical Council is simply omitted by the revisers of the Breviary in the sixteenth century. Father Garnier, in his edition of the *Liber Diurnus*, says, with a gentle irony, that they omitted it for the sake of brevity.'"

See also his quotation of Father Gratry's letter, p. 28. "Has GOD, then, need of your falsehoods, that you speak deceitfully for Him? 'Numquid indiget Deus mendacio vestro, ut pro eo loquamini dolos?' This mode of apologetics without openness is

love of interpolations and falsifications is alive still among Roman controversialists. The interpolations in St. Cyprian are still printed as an integral part of the text by Father Hurter[1] and quoted by Allnatt[2]; and perhaps there is nothing which gives to the minds of intelligent and truth-loving men so invincible a prejudice against the Ultramontane system and temper—nothing which so radically convinces them that it is not divine—as the certainty that Ultramontane writers will

one of the causes of our religious decay for centuries past. As soon as human nature perceives in the apostle the smallest trace of craft or duplicity, it turns aside and takes to flight; the best always flee farther than the rest. Their souls do not listen to the voice of liars: 'Oves non audiunt vocem alienorum.' What then, are we—we catholic priests, ministers of Jesus Christ and of His Gospel, and servants of His Church? Are we the preachers of falsehood or the apostles of truth? Is not every truth, every true gift, every historical and real fact for us, just as every falsehood is against us? Has not the time arrived—in this age of publicity, in which everything is seen and brought to light, in which everything that before was spoken in the ear, is now preached upon the housetops—has not the time arrived, I repeat, to reject with disgust the frauds, the interpolations, and mutilations which liars and forgers, our most cruel enemies, have been able to introduce amongst us? . . . I myself was long before I could believe in this apologetic of ignorance, blindness, and half-honesty, or rather dishonesty, which desires the end, which believes in the goodness of its aim and its truths; but which, to attain this end, has recourse to deceit, to mystery, to force, to falsehood, to a fraudulent invention of forged passages. Once more, Has GOD need of these frauds? . . . O ye men of little faith, of low minds, of miserable hearts, have not your cunning devices become the scandal of souls?"

[1] *Sanctorum Patrum Opuscula Selecta* vol. i.

[2] *Cathedra Petri* pp. 40-41. He defends the interpolations by the analogy of the text of 'the heavenly witness' (1 St. John v. 7, 8); as if we would quote that in defence of Trinitarian doctrine!

always be found manipulating facts and making out a case, will never behave as men who are loyally endeavouring to seek the light and present facts as they are.

If the actual history of the papacy prevents us from regarding it as a growth in accordance with the will of God, at least as forcibly does it prevent us from considering the claim it has recently made, to be part of the Christian Revelation, or—what the Vatican Council declared it to be—a 'dogma divinitus revelatum.' It is indeed to 'triumph over history' for the Pope to assert that in decreeing his infallibility he is "faithfully adhering to the tradition received from the first beginnings of the Christian faith." The doctrine of the Papacy is so manifestly a gradual growth by accretion that no one can possibly, with his eyes upon the facts of history, regard it as part of the faith 'once for all delivered.' That the evidence of the Eastern Church will not permit of our accepting as catholic any of the later papal claims has been already shown. It remains to show that in the West also the papal doctrine is of the nature of an occasional growth.

In the fourth century, the Western Church at the Council of Sardica formally allowed an appeal on the part of condemned bishops to Julius of Rome.[1] Their third

[1] In the third century there is an interesting instance of an appeal first to Rome, and then away from Rome to Cyprian. The circumstances were briefly as follows. Two Spanish Bishops, Basileides and Martial, had denied the faith in the Decian persecution, and either resigned their sees or been deposed. Successors had been duly appointed when they visited Rome and, under false pretences, induced the Pope Stephen to take up their cause. Accordingly he took some steps to promote their restoration. Under these circumstances the Spanish Churches appealed to

canon runs as follows: "The bishop Hosius said . . . . If any bishop in any matter seems to have been condemned [unjustly] and supposes himself to be not unsound, but that his case is good for a renewal of the trial: if it please your charity, let us honour the memory of the apostle Peter, and [direct] a letter to be written by the bishops who have tried the case to Julius bishop of Rome, so that the case should be heard again if it be necessary, by the bishops near the province in question, and that he may himself appoint the judges." Here and in the two following canons which form the basis of the appellate jurisdiction of Rome, the bishops of the West appear not as recognizing an existing or essential right, but as conferring a privilege, in view of certain experienced needs—just as the bishops in a Pan-Anglican Conference might find it necessary to institute a right of appeal to Canterbury in honour of the memory of Augustin. When in the case of the African presbyter Apiarius, the Roman bishops quoted these canons of

Cyprian and sought his aid, and Cyprian, in company with other African bishops assembled in the synod of Carthage in A.D. 254, addresses a letter to them strongly affirming the validity of the new consecrations, and apologizing for Stephen's mistaken action on the ground of his distance from the scene and ignorance of the true circumstances. See Cyprian *Ep.* 67. Baronius *Annales* A.D. 258 § v. expresses a 'vehemens suspicio' that Rome must have had a last word in the matter, and this 'suspicion' has become a fact in Gröne *Papstgeschichte* i. p. 58 (Regensburg, 1875). He describes out of his own imagination how the Spanish deputation, after receiving Cyprian's sentence, went to Rome and obtained a reversal of the previous judgment. He then describes the whole incident as "a speaking proof of the primacy of the Roman bishop." The facts, as history records them, are in truth suggestive of the natural, non-theological, manner in which the system of appeals grew up.

Sardica, as canons of Nicæa, and used them to justify interference with the ordinary jurisdiction of an African bishop over his presbyter, the Church of Africa first ascertained by consulting the oriental authorities that these canons were not Nicene, and proceeded in council[1] to guard jealously the rights of their own Church and to repudiate the papal interference: "We find it enacted in no council of the fathers that any persons may be sent as legates of your holiness. . . . . Do not therefore, at the request of any, send your clergy as agents for you, lest we seem to introduce into the Church of Christ the ambitious pride of the world."

The Papal authority is thus, at its root, a growth of circumstances, not a part of a revelation. So again if we examine the language of the theologian of the fourth century who is sometimes quoted as an extreme partisan of the just-developing papal claim—St. Jerome, it will be very evident that what he recognized in Rome is recognized rather in the way of personal predilection than of ecclesiastical doctrine. When he is bewildered amid the confusion of theological disputes in the East, he throws himself upon the authority of the Roman bishop, as he sits aloof in the calm security of the West. "Following no one as chief but Christ" he writes to Pope Damasus "I am associated in communion with your Blessedness, that is with the chair of Peter. On this rock I know the Church was built." "Define, I beseech you, if it pleases you, and I will not fear to speak of three hypostases. If you bid, let a new creed be established after the Nicene, and let

[1] A.D. 425.

us who are orthodox confess our faith side by side with the Arians in similar words." "I meanwhile keep crying out: Whosoever is joined to the see of Peter is mine."[1] This language seems clear enough, but apparently later in life, after he had abandoned Rome in disgust, he can adopt exactly the opposite tone. 'The custom of the Roman Church' he says in effect 'has no more authority than the custom of any other church. The episcopate at Rome has no more authority essentially than any other episcopate.' "If it is a question of authority, the world is greater than the city. Wherever there is a bishop, at Rome, or at Eugubium, or at Constantinople, or at Rhegium, or at Alexandria, or at Tanis, he has the same worth (meritum), the same priesthood. The power of wealth or the humility of poverty do not make a bishop higher or lower. They are all successors of the Apostles."[2] This passage is

[1] *Epp.* 15, 16. One cannot fail to catch the tone of exaggeration almost of irony in the second of these passages. It is perhaps worth noticing that the phrase against which Jerome was protesting so strongly ('tres hypostases') and in his protest against which he had the Pope and the Western Church on his side, after all came to be the accepted phrase.

[2] *Ep.* cxlvi. I have given reasons for dating this letter in the later part of Jerome's life in *Church and Ministry* p. 172 n.[1] The context of the words quoted may be explained thus. St. Jerome after a certain period in his life is zealous in maintaining the dignity of the priesthood of the presbyter, as against the arrogance of bishops and, on the other hand, the self-assertion of deacons. Thus in this epistle he is maintaining in effect that bishops are substantially of the same order as presbyters, only differing in the power of ordination. But the 'custom of the Roman Church' is pleaded against Jerome. At Rome the bishop on the one hand occupied a unique position, and the deacons, on the other, who were only seven in number, occupied a more dis-

not quoted by Roman controversialists, for a very plain reason: because it indicates that the authority of the Roman see rested for Jerome on what is variable in a theologian—on sentiment, on expedience, on feeling —not on what is invariable, the basis of doctrinal authority.

Once again, the theory of the see of Peter held by the African theologians of the third and fourth centuries, while it makes the Roman see amongst other Churches the symbol and normal centre of unity, as Peter was amongst the Apostles, does not involve any distinctive *authority* in the Roman bishop. The see of Peter is the symbol of that episcopacy in which all bishops equally share, which inheres in its entirety in each episcopate, and *renders each bishop fundamentally independent* and responsible for his actions to none but God.[1] This

tinguished position than the presbyters of whom there was a 'crowd.' Jerome treats this plea with great contempt. "If it is a question of authority the world is greater than the city." A bishop is everywhere substantially the same. As for the deacons "Why do you produce against me the custom of one city? . . . Everything is more desired where it is rare. Among the Indians fleawort is more precious than pepper."

[1] "There is" cries Cyprian "one God, and one Christ, and one Church, and one see founded on Peter by the voice of the Lord" (*Ep.* xliii.), but he is asserting not the claims of the see of Rome, but of his own see of Carthage. The see of Peter is equivalent to the episcopate. Fuller references on St. Cyprian's theory of the episcopate will be found in *The Church and the Ministry* p. 165 f. But I may refer here to the expression in *De Unitate* 5: "the episcopate (in the Church) is one, and is shared by each bishop in such a way that he is responsible for the whole" (or "that the whole is held by each"—*a singulis in solidum pars tenetur*). On this basis the independence of each bishop is frequently stated. "Each bishop exercises in the administration of his Church the free choice of his own will, having to give account of his action to

is the theory as St. Cyprian states it. He regarded the see of Rome (as being in a special sense the see of Peter) as the normal centre of unity, but not as the centre of unity in any such sense as would enable it to impose conditions of communion which interfered with the catholic liberty of other Churches. This however was exactly what Stephen of Rome endeavoured to do. He went so far as to excommunicate St. Cyprian and the African and Oriental Churches which agreed with him, for refusing to recognize the validity of heretical baptism—a matter on which there had been no ecu-

the Lord" (*Ep.* lxii. 3). The see of Rome is described (*Ep.* lix. 14) as "the see of Peter, the principal Church, whence sacerdotal unity had its origin," but these last words can only mean that Peter's episcopate was the first given, or (as Puller *Prim. Saints* p. 56 interprets) that the African succession was derived from Rome. In the very context of this expression he goes on to re-assert the independence of each episcopate.

I think it is in place to notice here the evidence of a tract "on dice-players" (*de Aleatoribus*) commonly printed with Cyprian's works. It is plainly written by a bishop, and as he speaks of the divine goodness having bestowed upon him the "leadership of the apostolate," "the vicariate of the Lord," "the original authoritative apostolate on which Christ founded his Church" (c. 1, apostolatus ducatus, vicaria Domini sedes, origo authentici apostolatus) he has been supposed, by Bellarmin and others, to have been bishop of Rome. The evidence however is against this hypothesis: it appears to be by an African bishop of the third century. And in any case it must be noticed that the titles mentioned above are titles not of the papacy but of the episcopate. The 'we' of c. 1 is explained in c. 2 as "we, that is we bishops, shepherds of the sheep" "since we bishops have by the laying on of hands received the same Holy Ghost (as came upon the Apostles) within the shelter of our breast." Thus "the leadership which belongs to the apostolate" "the vicariate of the Lord" "the original authoritative apostolate" are titles of the *episcopate* as such. Indeed that every bishop represents Christ is a commonplace of the theology of Ignatius and of early Church writers in general.

The Forged Decretals represent a step of immense importance in the aggrandizement of the papal claim. It is not that they contain a wholly new claim, but they converted what was a claim, a pretension, an aspiration, into an accepted principle firmly rooted in the precedents of the whole Christian past, reaching back to the Apostles. For what were these Decretals? They were a forgery of the middle of the ninth century, and the first part consisted of a number of decretal letters supposed to be by the early Popes from A.D. 90 to 314. These forged letters represented these bishops of Rome as claiming and exercising the rights of the mediæval Papacy. "The fraud consisted in assigning the language of a later period to the writers of an earlier one." Thus their recognition gave to the growing claims of the Papacy an altogether fallacious appearance of antiquity. No sober historian can deny that this successfully inaugurated a wholly new epoch of canon law. It is impossible to exaggerate the extent to which they elaborated and strengthened the system of appeals to Rome and developed the existing tendency to centralize the governmental authority of the Churches in the hands of the Pope. "The reforms," says the Jesuit Père Regnon, "brought about by the Pseudo-Isidore consisted in reserving to the Roman pontiff the trial and judgment of all bishops."[1]

But the Papacy of these Pseudo-Isidorian decretals only represents a stage in an upward progress. The papal

[1] Quoted by E. G. Wood *Regal Power of the Church*, whose pages on this subject should be consulted: cf. also "Janus'" treatment of the subject pp. 94 ff.

pretension, which grew always with the growth of actual power, reached its extreme point as far as the claim of authority is concerned in the Bull *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII., A.D. 1302.[1] The authority here claimed is absolute and universal in the secular and spiritual spheres alike. But the day of decline, at least for a time, was at hand. The reforming Councils of Constance and Basle (A.D. 1415 and 1432) assert in the strongest language the subordination of the Pope to General Councils. "First of all" so ran the decree of Constance "this Council declares that inasmuch as it is legitimately assembled in the Holy Ghost, constituting a general Council, and representing the Catholic Church militant, it has its power immediately from Christ, and that all men of every rank and dignity, even the Pope, are bound to obey it in matters pertaining to the faith, and the extirpation of the above-mentioned schism, and the general reformation of the Church of God in the head and the members." And the decree goes on to denounce condign penance and punishment, on even a pope who should venture to disobey the decrees of the Council. These decrees were passed without a single dissentient voice. Their language "leaves no doubt that they were understood to be

[1] Quoted in Gieseler (*Eccl. Hist.* iii. 146) who throughout summarizes clearly the stages in the growth of the papal claim. I suppose that the attitude of practical devotion towards the vicar of Christ encouraged among Roman Catholics exceeds the bounds even of the theory. Cardinal Patrizi in a document "addressed" (as is remarked in the *Dublin Review* April 1865 p. 440) "to the Catholics of Pius IX.'s own diocese, by his express sanction and under his very eye," claims for the Encyclical of that Pontiff and, consequently, for every like expression of the Pope's mind, to be the *very word of God*, to be received on pain of forfeiting heaven.

articles of the faith, dogmatic definitions of the doctrine of Church authority. And they deny the fundamental position of the Papal system."[1]

The Pope however on the whole triumphed over the Councils. A Papal reaction set in. And if no general claim since made can exceed that of the *Unam Sanctam*, at least the claim of doctrinal infallibility emerged into greater distinctness, as the logic of events demonstrated the untenability of the theocratic claim over the world. But the doctrine of papal infallibility was the opinion of a school only, not a dogma. It was repudiated with the most genuine earnestness up to a quite recent date, as for example by the Anglo-Roman body in 1789 and by the Irish Bishops in 1810,[2] or in a document as common as Keenan's *Controversial Catechism* where it was declared to be "no article of Catholic belief."[3] Thus nothing can be more certain than that the fully developed Papal claim is the result of a very gradual and intermittent growth. It is

[1] "Janus" *The Pope and the Council* p. 302. See for the decree Creighton *Hist. of the Papacy* i. p. 291 and app. 16.

[2] See Gladstone *Vaticanism* pp. 44-49. He mentions also that the eminent Roman Bishop Baines declared in 1822 that 'he did not believe any Catholics in England or Ireland maintained the Infallibility of the Pope.'

[3] Keenan's *Controversial Catechism or Protestantism Refuted and Catholicism Established* Ed. 1846, with the imprimatur of the Vicars-apostolic for Scotland. P. 117 *of the Powers of a General Council*, etc.: "Must not Catholics believe the Pope in himself to be infallible?" "This is a Protestant invention; it is no article of the Catholic faith; no decision of his can oblige under pain of heresy, unless it be received and enforced by the teaching body—that is, by the bishops of the Church." [In later editions this section is omitted.] The Constitution *Pastor aeternus* declares on the other hand that "it is a dogma divinely revealed that the

in fact not a *development* of the original idea of the Episcopate, so much as a subversal of it. The original ideal of the Episcopate would have secured for the Church a duly representative government, and would have provided, by the confederation of relatively independent Churches, a system of checks upon one-sided local tendencies. The Papacy represents the triumph of imperial absolutism over representative, constitutional authority, and of centralization over consentient witness and co-operation. It was indeed a lamentable 'triumph over history' when Pius IX. declared that in decreeing the Papal Infallibility a "dogma divinely revealed" he was "faithfully adhering to the tradition received from the first beginnings of the Christian faith."[1]

Roman Pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra* . . . is possessed of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be provided for defining doctrine regarding faith or morals: and that therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church."

[1] Some of the 'difficulties' in the way of believing in the infallibility of the bishop of Rome, apart from the question whether it is an article of the catholic faith, have been noticed above in *e.g.* the failure of Liberius, and the condemnation of Honorius as a heretic. There are others however of overwhelming magnitude, especially the apparently and intentionally dogmatic utterances of Popes on the different sacraments, which have turned out erroneous. Thus Nicolas I. assured the Bulgarians that Baptism in the name of Christ only was valid. *Resp. ad consult. Bulgar.* 104. Labbe *Collect. Concil.* ix. 1566. Nicolas II. compelled Berengarius to acknowledge the Capernaite heresy that Christ's body is *sensibly* (sensualiter) touched by the hands and broken by the teeth in the Eucharist. Eugenius IV. in his instructions to the Armenians makes the 'porrection of the instruments' the essential matter of the Sacrament of Order. These are in fact only examples.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE NATURE OF SCHISM.

If it be granted that enough account has already been given of what constitutes the Church's unity of Life, and of what is necessary for her unity in the Truth, yet there still remains to be dealt with, that third sort of unity which was referred to at starting as characterizing the Church. This is the unity of Love, or outward fellowship, 'the bond of peace,' which it is so fully our duty to preserve that wilful schism would annul all the moral fruits which follow from being constitutionally within the ecclesiastical unity. That is to say—schism does not merely mean breaking away from the episcopal form of government. The schisms of the early Church were episcopal in form, but none the less they were understood to put their responsible members outside the Church's saving unity.[1]

What then constitutes the guilt of schism? Not merely being separated, for the separated party may not be the guilty party, as, for example, in the case when Diotrephes 'excommunicated' the brethren who came from St. John,[2] or Pope Victor the Asiatic Churches, or

[1] St. Cyprian 'On Unity' was written against *episcopal schismatics.*

[2] 2 St. John 9, 10.

Pope Stephen St. Cyprian and the African Churches. None of these excommunicated parties were understood to be schismatics. Schism, considered apart from heresy, as a sin excluding from the benefits of church life, means *wilful self-withdrawal from the legitimate succession of the catholic Church* on the part of an individual or party, or, in a secondary sense, the *wilful causing of a breach inside the Church.*

Schism is a state of things which results generally from one of two tempers of mind. It may be the result of the pride which will not brook ecclesiastical subordination, which makes men stand upon their dignity, and resent some supposed slight or injury because they value their own self-esteem above the Church's fellowship. It was this sort of self-assertion and the personal animosity which springs from it, which produced the schism of Felicissimus at Carthage against St. Cyprian, and it has played a large part in the history of modern divisions. It is easily understood that schism so bred, should generally involve heresy, for the self-will which isolates itself to avoid unpleasant subordination is not likely to miss the temper of self-opinionatedness in matters of faith, and we understand St. Jerome's words—"no schism fails to devise a heresy for itself to justify its withdrawal."

But schism may have what we must call a nobler root. It may spring from impatient, undisciplined zeal against evil in the Church. The zealous reformer smarts with indignation against the abuses and undisci pline which deface the Body of Christ. He and his followers are afraid to contaminate themselves by con-

nivance with that which they cannot quickly alter. Their zeal is too much for their reverence for Christ's plan, for their subordination, for their patience. They take the matter of God's Church into their own hands. They deal with it, with more or less of recklessness, in their own way. The temper of reverent caution which fears to dispense with, or lay hands upon, outward forms, whether of divine appointment or reverend antiquity, because for the moment their practical value is obscured—this is forgotten or discarded by the men of intemperate, impatient zeal; and thus they form a Church of their own with a righteousness of their own, and a constitution of their own choosing. This is the second source of schism in the Church. If we consider the causes of the great presbyterian schisms of the Reformation, how undisciplined, how unguarded do we find to have been the zeal of their main authors! Or to go further back, what else was the root of the disciplinary schisms in the early Church—of Montanism, of the schism which Novatian created at Rome, of the schism of the Donatists, of the schism of Lucifer, of the schism at Antioch against St. Meletius? Can we not directly trace Tertullian's development among the Montanists into a schismatical attitude towards the Church to that tone of intellectual and moral impatience which characterized his whole mind, and which he himself deplores when he writes *On Patience*, "as an invalid who, since he is without health, knows not how to be silent about its blessings," "as one ever sick with the heats of impatience must of necessity sigh after and invoke and persistently plead

for that health of patience which he possesses not." This impatience which Tertullian deplores in himself was the animating spirit in the whole body of disciplinary schismatics.

But from whatever cause it may spring, schism—episcopal or not—is unequivocally condemned by the fathers. "It were better to endure anything," said St. Dionysius of Alexandria to Novatian, "than to break up the Church of Christ; martyrdom to avoid division were no less glorious than martyrdom to avoid idolatry; nay, in my judgment were more glorious." "The sin of schism," says St. Cyprian, "seems to be worse than failing to confess Christ in persecutions." "There is nothing more serious than the sacrilege of schism," says St. Augustin. "No such reformation," says Irenaeus, "can be effected by them, as will compensate for the mischief arising from their schism." "It is no less an evil than heresy," says St. Chrysostom.

On one or two of the ancient schisms it is necessary to say something more in detail. First, on Donatism: because (since the days of Dr. Newman's 'Apologia' at any rate) it has been the fashion to compare the condition of the Church of England with that of the Donatists. Let us make an imaginary story of events in England which would bring the facts of the English Church in the sixteenth century into exact analogy to those of Africa in the fourth, and the imaginary case will show us both what sort of conduct would have really constituted an English protestant episcopal schism, and also how far in fact the English Church is from being implicated in anything of the sort. Suppose that a body

of zealous reformers in the reign of Mary, despairing of the Church of England, had, on the election of an archbishop of Canterbury, raised frivolous objections against him, consecrated a rival prelate first to that see, and then in a number of other places; established a separate Church in England, and gathered large numbers of adherents; declared itself not only the only Church of England, but the only Church of the world, the catholic Church having ceased to exist through the contamination of evil; suppose, we say, such a course of action had been pursued, and that the schismatical Church had succeeded in gaining the majority in England for a while and subsisting side by side with the catholic succession, baptizing, as persons not yet Christian, those who came over to them from the catholic Church; then you would have had a parallel to the Donatist schism. Be it ever remembered that the Donatist body in Africa was not constituted by a reform of a national Church, but was as distinct a schism *from* the Church of their own district, as ever took place: and that the Donatist body held itself the only true Church of the world,—in both points differing *toto caelo* from the position of the Anglican communion.

We have avoided entering into the details of the Donatist history to save space, but of the details of the schism at Antioch something must be said, as it illustrates an important principle—that there can be schism *in* the Church as well as a schism from the Church—a schism in the Church, leaving both separated parties within the communion of the Church catholic.

The schism at Antioch, then, dates from the with-

drawal of an orthodox party in the fourth century from the ministrations of an Arian prelate. This withdrawal met with the approval of St. Athanasius and his friends; but the public profession of orthodoxy by the bishop, Meletius, who had been elected under Arian auspices, gave the separated body an opportunity to return into communion with him. All seemed in train for a restoration of unity when the intemperate and hasty action of Lucifer—a firebrand among prelates, who afterwards organized a schism of his own—perpetuated the breach, by giving the orthodox party a separate bishop, Paulinus. There was a great deal of the schismatical spirit of impatient zeal in that action which left the Antiochene Church with rival prelates and rival bodies of adherents, but the most strenuously orthodox party in the Church at large could not bring themselves to disown Paulinus. He was accepted by Rome, by Alexandria, by the West, while the East generally held to St. Meletius. Remaining thus unrecognized by Rome as Bishop of Antioch, St. Meletius notwithstanding presided till his death at the second Council accepted as ecumenical in the Church, and has been acknowledged since his death as a saint both in East and West. We may then quote as appropriate to the case of St. Meletius a remark of the Roman Catholic historian Tillemont with reference to some later Eastern saints of the period of the Monophysite schism (who lived and died out of the communion of Rome because they remained in communion with Acacius, the patriarch of Constantinople, who was excommunicated by the Pope). "As Elias and Flavian had always remained in communion with Acacius by the fact of their con-

tinuing in communion with Constantinople, the Pope Hormisdas [at the restoration of unity] did his best to secure their exclusion from the diptychs of their Churches. But their people preferred to submit to the extremest measures rather than do this injury to the memory of those who had been their glory while they lived. So much so that the Roman Church was obliged to do some violence to her own maxims: she seems in fact to have at last abandoned them by honouring, as her protectors in heaven, those whom she would not admit to her communion on earth."[1] The Antiochene schism is, therefore, significant as illustrating some facts of importance: that there may be a schism with faults on both sides, even in a local Church, when neither side is finally regarded as out of the communion of the Church at large: that there are circumstances when even a somewhat schismatical act like that of Lucifer may be condoned: that breaches of fellowship *in* the Church do not necessarily always involve breaches of communion *with* the Church. Nothing in fact can be called schism in the full sense of the word except conscious self-withdrawal from that part of Christ's visible and orthodox Church to which one belongs, and to neither of the Antiochene parties is this act attributable. In this local separation then we mark the distinction between breaches *in* the Church and separation *from* the Church.

It is very possible to construct an imaginary parallel

[1] *Mem. Eccl.* xvi. 708. I think it is not without importance to notice that the language of the Roman liturgy still involves the idea that the Church is divided and requires corporate reunion: she prays our Lord 'to bring her into peace and unity (pacificare et *coadunare*) according to His will.'

in Reformation history to the case at Antioch. Supposing the English bishops in Elizabeth's reign had become heretical, and an orthodox party retaining communion with the West had withdrawn from their communion: supposing the Anglican bishops, say in James I.'s reign, had returned to orthodoxy, while almost simultaneously a rival succession of bishops was established over the separate body—in such rival successions you would have a parallel to the state of things at Antioch. It is hardly necessary to remark that this parallel *is* imaginary, because the state of things was not as we have supposed. But such a schism might have left both parties with a fair claim to represent the Church catholic in England.

We have established hitherto two principles:—that there is such a sin as schism which in and by itself is sufficient to unchurch a community; and, secondly, that short of this, there is such a thing as a breach of communion *in* the Church, which is due to the 'old leaven' working in her—the temper of schism militating against the temper of love. A little consideration and reading will show that the separation of East and West and the separation of England and Rome[1] were not due to conduct which constitutes schism in the primary sense of the term—not, that is, to self-withdrawal from the Church catholic; but that they *were* due to that temper of schism which is always at work

[1] I shall return to this subject again, but it may be needful, even now, to recall to the reader's mind the fact that the English Church has never excommunicated the Roman Church, but the Roman Church her.

and, like sin in any shape, mars the manifestation of God in the Church at large.

In the party spirit in the Church of Corinth St. Paul sees the schismatical temper. In Victor's conduct when he excommunicated the Asiatic Church for not keeping Easter after the common fashion, Irenaeus would lead us to see the same temper, which is ready to violate the unity of love for something which falls short of the necessities of the faith.[1] Once again, when Pope Stephen endeavoured to excommunicate Churches which held the invalidity of heretical baptism (an opinion which no general church voice had yet condemned), he was anticipating the due action of church authority in the interests of his own see and in the temper of impatience to deal with what he thought disastrous. Pride in the cause of a man's own see, intolerance, impatience, these are notes of the schismatical temper. This is what was plain to St. Cyprian and St. Firmilian, the most conspicuous amongst the bishops attacked. They accuse St. Stephen of intolerable arrogance in interfering with the liberty of other episcopal sees. St. Firmilian says very boldly that the Pope 'is the true schismatic,' and has 'cut off' from communion none other than 'himself'[2]—meaning that the temper of schism, and, therefore, the guilt of schism lies not with those who are unjustly excluded, whether by 'Diotrephes, who loveth to have the pre-eminence, and casteth the brethren out of the Church,' or by any other bishop, but with him who does the unjust act in the interests of ambition or impatience. And we should

[1] Euseb. *H. E.* v. 24. [2] Cypr. *Epp.* lxxii.-lxxiv.

notice St. Augustin's verdict upon St. Cyprian in this matter, where he so strongly asserted the independent rights of his see. He praises him (to the Donatists) as the very type of the unschismatic temper. Why? Because, unlike the Donatists, even in a matter of such great importance as the validity of heretical baptism, he did not press the opinion which the African Church then legitimately held (for it was still an open question); he did not go beyond the limits of ecumenical authority; he did not excommunicate those who held the validity of heretical baptism, but bore with them in a matter where the universal Church's voice was not distinct. "Cyprian and those with him walking in most persistent tolerance, remained in unity with those who taught differently from them." "Though they held that heretics and schismatics did not possess baptism, yet they chose rather to have communion with them when they had been received into the Church without baptism . . . than to be separated from unity; according to the words of Cyprian—'Judging no one and depriving no one of the right of communion if he differ from us.' . . . Behold, I see thus in unity Cyprian and others his colleagues, who on holding a council decided against the validity of baptism given outside the Church. But again, behold, I see in the same unity that certain men think differently in this matter, and do not dare to re-baptize. All of these catholic unity embraces in her motherly breast, bearing each other's burdens in turn, and endeavouring to keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace until the Lord should reveal to one or other of them if in any point they think otherwise than

as they should."[1] Unity, St. Augustin here says with great distinctness, is in a sense to be preferred to truth of opinion. That is to say, to violate the unity of fellowship on behalf of an opinion which may be tenable or true, but is not authoritative, is the schismatical temper, from which Cyprian was then most free when Stephen's intolerance put most pressure upon him to make rejoinder by counter-intolerance. Yet, "being most largely endowed with the holy bowels of Christian charity, he thought we ought to remain in Christian unity with those who differed from ourselves" in a matter lacking in ecumenical authority.

It has been to the absence of a similar temper in East and West that the Great Schism was due. We make a grievous mistake if we suppose that it was the result of any single fact—like the claim of Rome or the *Filioque* clause: it was in fact nothing less than the issue of a long drawn-out tendency to divergence in the Eastern and Western Churches, manifesting itself at Constantinople, at Chalcedon, in the preliminary division on the Monophysite controversy, till finally, after long ages, it took effect in the final separation. That there was much of the schismatical temper in the Roman Church, who can deny? The temper which will not tolerate differences which interfere with that uniformity of outward government which it loves: which is impatient of resistance to its designs: which sacrifices the claims of historical truth, and mercy, and love, to the

[1] See Augustin *de Bapt.* ii. 3-6, v. 25. He is following Jerome, who praises Cyprian on the same ground—that he did not anathematize those who differed from him (*adv. Lucif.* 25).

supremacy of a single see—this temper of intolerance and self-aggrandizement who can read history and deny to have been a governing element in the policy of the Roman Church even when controlled by so great a pontiff as Leo the First? Yet it is the temper of schism; it is responsible, in part, for the divisions it may create by retaliation and antagonism. It is human sin marring the divine witness to the unity of the Church's life. It fostered the spirit of antagonism in the Eastern Church—the blank conservatism which made 'mountains of molehills'; and held a novelty of custom in the rival Church as bad as an innovation upon authoritative doctrine; it fostered the counter-ambition which centred around the see of Constantinople; these again are marks of the temper of schism from which no part of the Church has in fact been free. The Great Schism took place. It destroyed neither part of the Church, but it reduced the fulness of corporate grace and life in both. Who shall divide the sin? No one but the great Judge. But we may be sure the schism will be perpetual, unless God's wonder-working power shall obliterate the temper of ambition and self-assertion in East and West, and granting to both the spirit of toleration in unessential differences, shall lead them again to be at one on the basis of agreement only in the common faith which has been the Church's heritage from the first.

Again, the temper of schism produced the separation of the Anglican Church from the rest of the West. In the Roman Church the temper of schism lay in the making a claim upon us so far greater than the uni-

versal consent of the Church could warrant. But who can deny that the schismatic spirit was at work in the Reformation in England? How much of impatient intolerance was there in the reforming spirit! How carelessly it denounced! How heedlessly it squandered priceless blessings in view of temporary or not irremediable evils! How unwilling it was to admit any fault in itself! We must admit as much as can be claimed of provocation to the spirit of reform in the condition of the Church, we must admit how impossible it seems for a reformation ever to be conducted in a moderate spirit—this is only to admit that human sin is not without palliation, without excuse; it does not amount to acquittal or approval.

And so with something of the schismatical temper, which is indeed nothing but the carnal temper of the old Adam, working in all parts of the Church, the holy bride of Christ on earth has reached her present divided and weakened condition. There is no catholic principle which can justify us in supposing that either the Roman, the Eastern, or the Anglican Church has been guilty of the sin of schism, in that sense in which schism is the act of self-withdrawal from the Church catholic. The English Church at the Reformation claimed to reform herself, and there is no catholic principle which forbade her to do it. She did not withdraw herself in so doing from the catholic Faith or the catholic Church; indeed she professed her intention to remain as fully in submission to the Church as before.

On this point indeed something remains to be said. For the present it is only intended to offer a brief

and summary reply to the Roman claim that we are *ipso facto* schismatic in being separated from Rome. To this claim we Anglicans may reply:

1. There is no such thing as an absolute authority in any part of the Church. The authority of a pope is not even on his own showing greater than that of an apostle, yet at the last resort St. Paul conceives of an appeal behind even his own apostolic authority. "Though we, or an angel from heaven preach unto you any other gospel than that which we preached unto you, let him be anathema." Were then the authority of the papacy in Catholic tradition never so much greater than in fact it is, its authority could never be absolute, without appeal beyond it, unless it was indeed strictly infallible. But we are certain of nothing more than that truth shall never fail in the Church as a whole.

2. The authority of the papacy was as a fact the result of her ecclesiastical and spiritual merits, and of the requirements of circumstance. Catholic history throws us back at the last resort on Cyprian's principle of the independence of each episcopate, or at least on Augustin's, of the subordination of each only to the whole as represented in a general council. All gradations among bishops are of the *bene esse* of the Church, not of her *esse*. "There is no evidence of any divinely appointed order among the bishops."[1] And of course, further than this, whatever claim Rome might have made as the Head of a united Christendom is enormously weakened in force by the existence of millions of the Oriental Church separated from her communion, largely,

[1] *Roman Question* p. 9.

perhaps we should say mainly, on account of the exaggeration of her claim to empire over other churches.

3. If it be urged that at least the ancient Church knew no *permanent* breaches of communion within her body and did not contemplate such as possible, we recognize the force of the objection. The fathers knew at least no breaches of communion as complete and permanent as we experience; they did not—St. Augustin for example did not—even contemplate the possibility of the Church permanently losing the fellowship of intercourse and love.[1] We can only reply by pointing out that St. Augustin was not a prophet of the future. He seems equally unable to contemplate the Church of Christ perishing in any part of the world where she had once been founded, so as to require restoration or refounding from some other part. The Mohammedan conquests and the permanent separations in the Church have in both respects falsified his anticipations. To no man is it given exactly to anticipate either the sorrows or the consolations of a future age. St. Athanasius—to give another instance of this—would have been shocked beyond measure if any one had told him that war would still be a feature in the national life of Christendom.[2]

But though all this argument be true, it is not the less

[1] See *de unitate Eccl.* There is however a remarkable chapter on the division of Judah and Israel (§ 33). Moreover there is nothing in the treatise about Rome as the centre of unity. On the indestructibility of the Church in any place where it has been planted see § 45.

[2] See *de Incarn.* 51, 52: he makes it one proof of Christ's Divinity that Greeks and barbarians, even the most savage races, when they become Christian, cease to make war.

the case that the emphasis which the fathers lay on the outward fellowship of the universal Church ought to make us lay to heart 'the great dangers we are in through our unhappy divisions.' At least there is the duty of acutely deploring the evil and praying for its remedy. It should never be forgotten that the saints in Jerusalem upon whose forehead was stamped the mark of the divine approval, were not those who had successfully counteracted, but those who felt and groaned over the evils under which God's people suffered.[1] And we have the further duty of guarding in our own Church against the schismatical temper. We must be rid of the intolerance which makes an authoritative claim upon the belief of others for matters which fall short of ecumenical consent. We must cultivate the faculty of distinguishing between authoritative doctrine and pious opinion, so that we may not stretch the meaning of heresy and put unnecessary obstacles in the way of internal reunion. And in the wider sphere it is of the greatest importance that we should grasp the breadth of our heritage, that we should realize the spirit of the creed in which we profess our belief, not in the Anglican, but in 'One Holy Catholic Church'; and if it would not be lawful for us, as indeed it would not, for the sake of external peace, to trample under foot conscience and history, and submit to whatever claim Rome may make upon us, it is not less our duty to endeavour to purge our own Church from the evils and unfaithfulnesses which have too often made the character and nature of our true mother hard to recognize.

[1] Ezek. ix. 4.

CHAPTER IX.

ANGLICAN ORDINATIONS.

EVERY Church which claims her fellowship in the catholic fraternity must be prepared not only to show that she is not wilfully schismatical, but also, and before that, to meet two legitimate challenges—to vindicate her orthodoxy, and to vindicate her orders, that is, her claim to be within the historical succession of the Church's life. "Let them produce," says Tertullian, "the account of the origins of their Churches; let them unroll the line of their bishops."[1] It is to meet this latter challenge in the case of the Anglican Church that we are now to apply ourselves.

First, however, let us clear the ground of certain subsidiary issues.

We set aside the question whether Rome has ever acknowledged or half acknowledged the validity of our orders. Our appeal all through has been behind Rome to the Church Catholic and it shall be so still. If our episcopate is questioned, so was St. Paul's apostolate, and we need not be more ashamed to defend ourselves than he was.

Once more let us assume now that our present orders are derived through Matthew Parker, conse-

[1] *Praescr.* 32.

crated Archbishop of Canterbury in 1559, so that their validity depends on the question whether he was a true bishop: in other words let us dismiss the question whether, if we had lost valid orders, we should not have recovered them in the consecration of Laud and Williams, in whom converged the three lines of the Italian, the Irish, and the English succession. This question[1] we dismiss simply because we really do not need any secondary supports.

I. Was then Matthew Parker validly consecrated? "Validly consecrated!" cried the Roman controversialist of old, "why, in place of consecration there was a sacrilegious scene in a tavern, when Scory, an apostate monk, struck the Queen's nominees on the head with a Bible, and bade them receive power to preach the word of God."[2] This "Nag's Head" fable was an impudent assertion of the Romanists at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Its utter baselessness is now admitted on all hands. We quote Canon Estcourt—the author of by far the ablest and most scientific modern Roman work adverse to our orders.[3] "It is very unfortunate that the Nag's Head story was ever seriously put forward; for it is so absurd on the face of it that it has led to the suspicion of Catholic theologians not being sincere in the objections they make to Anglican orders."

[1] Argued in *Priest's Prayer Book* "Anglican Orders" p. 204.

[2] Courayer *Anglican Ordinations* p. 92. We have not given the legend in full. Among other absurdities it implies that Scory was not himself a Bishop.

[3] *The Question of Anglican Ordinations* p. 154.

II. That Parker was consecrated, as is recorded in the Lambeth register, it is, as Canon Estcourt says, impossible to doubt: "It is impossible to doubt that everything did take place that is recorded in the Register."[1] The ceremony took place "about five or six o'clock in the morning." William Barlow, formerly, *i.e.* before Mary's accession, bishop of Bath and Wells, now elect of Chichester, John Scory, formerly bishop of Chichester, now elect of Hereford, Miles Coverdale, formerly bishop of Exeter, and John Hodgkins, bishop suffragan of Bedford, vested, the first "in a silk cope for the performance of the sacred rites," with his two chaplains similarly vested, the second and last in "linen surplices," the third, Coverdale, "only in a long woollen gown," "after prayers and suffrages . . . laid their hands on the archbishop and said in English, *viz.*, Take the Holy Ghost, and remember that thou stir up the grace of God, which is in thee by imposition of hands, etc. When this had been said, they gave the holy Bible into his hands, etc. After they had said this, the bishop of Chichester goes on to the remaining solemnities of the Communion, giving the archbishop no pastoral staff, with whom communicated the archbishop and the four other bishops mentioned above, with others beside." The historical truth of this account is now admitted. "But there is insufficient evidence" so runs the second plea "of Barlow himself having been consecrated." It would not be a matter of the first importance if this *were* doubtful, for all the consecrating bishops laid on their

[1] Pp. 96, 114. There is moreover a convergence of contemporary evidence. *Priest's Prayer Book* p. 205.

hands and *all repeated the words*.[1] Each bishop, therefore, performed the complete act of consecration, and the non-episcopal character of one of them would not affect the matter. But in fact there is no valid ground at all for doubting the fact of Barlow's consecration. The record of his actual consecration is indeed absent from the Lambeth Register,[2] but that is confessedly incomplete: 'The absence of any record of consecration,' says our opponent Mr. Hutton, 'would carry little weight.[3] On the other hand the supposition that he was not consecrated involves the most absurd consequences. It involves that a man, nominated bishop under Henry VIII. (A.D. 1536) who was always emphatic in his desire to minimize the doctrinal and ritual changes effected by the Reformation,[4] could by a

[1] This was a departure from the rubric of 1552. Probably they were only following the rubric of the Exeter Pontifical. That the assisting bishops are co-consecrators when they do *not* recite the words is certainly the more probable opinion. But when they all recite the words as well as lay on hands, there is surely no room for doubt. Yet that certainly occurred in this case, as Canon Estcourt admits p. 109. On this subject, and on the whole subject of Anglican Orders, let me refer to Mr. Brightman's admirable paper, *What Objections have been made to Anglican Orders* (S.P.C.K., for the 'Church Historical Society'). [I may add that the supposition of the Register not representing simply the original account of the Consecration has no bearing, as Escourt admits, on any of the matters stated above. We have the evidence of the Foxe MS. and the MS. in C.C.C. Cambridge.]

[2] His confirmation is recorded. The Diocesan Registers of St. David's and St. Asaph's, whence the omission might have been supplied, are lost.

[3] Hutton's *Anglican Ministry* p. 305. I formerly stated that 'the record of Bishop Gardiner's consecration is equally wanting.' But it exists, as the Dean of Winchester informs me, in the Register of that See Day's case at Chichester is, however, analogous.

[4] It is ludicrous in discussing this possibility to omit to consider

mere whim refuse to be consecrated, and get the archbishop and bishops who ought to have consecrated him to omit the ceremony, thereby subjecting themselves to the pains and penalties of the statute of *praemunire*, and this in the days before the pontifical was reformed, whereas that same archbishop Cranmer, under the extreme reformer Edward VI., forced Hooper to submit to consecration, though he openly protested against the ceremony. It involves that he could sit, unchallenged, among bishops hostile to the Reformation in Convocation and the House of Lords—that he could get himself installed at St. David's and could carry through a long dispute with his chapter in which they left no stone unturned to dispute his rights to the privileges of the see. It involves lastly that he could be recognized as bishop by the bishops who repudiated the Reformation, Lee, Stokesley, Gardiner, and be officially recognized as bishop of Bath and Wells on Mary's accession, when he resigned his see—it involves that he could do all this without its ever being detected that he had not been consecrated at all.[1] Indeed the first men to doubt it

this *conservative* character of the king—in all respects opposed to the extreme Reformation party. Estcourt (p. 76) quite overlooks it. See Dr. Stubbs' *Lectures on Mediæval and Modern History*, p. 259: Henry "never forgot that he was the defender of the faith; nor, whatever were his eccentricities and aberrations in minor particulars, does he seem ever to have gone in this region further in the direction of change than the more enlightened popes and cardinals of his own age would have gone" . . . "doctrinally, although quite able to maintain his own line, he clearly symbolized consistently with Gardiner and not with Cranmer."

[1] For details of these undoubted facts consult Estcourt, esp. p. 78; Bailey's *Defence of English Orders*, especially on the dispute with the Chapter; and Hutton p. 313.

were men who lived eighty years after his consecration, and men of the class who invented and circulated the Nag's Head story. For it must always be remembered that when the imprisoned bishop Bonner in 1563 refused to take the oath of supremacy at the bidding of Horne, bishop of Winchester, in whose diocese his prison was situated, on the ground that Horne was "not elected, consecrated, and provided, according to laws of the Catholic Church, and the statutes and ordinances of this realm"—and that partly because his consecrator Parker was no true archbishop, his objection to Parker consisted (as explained by Coke) in the plea that his consecrators 'being bishops in the reign of Edward VI. were deprived in the reign of Queen Mary and were not restored before their presence at the consecration' —it was an objection, that is, to their legal status, not to their episcopal character.[1]

It is acknowledged[2] that there is no difficulty in assigning *a* date for Barlow's consecration. The fact indeed is one which can be challenged only in that spirit of criticism which can dissolve the evidence for Christ's Resurrection[3] and which has been parodied in the memorable "Historic Doubts about Napoleon Bonaparte" of Archbishop Whately.

[1] See Coke *Institutes* Ed. 1648 Part iii. c. 2 p. 34, Part iv. c. 17 pp. 321 f.; cf. Estcourt l.c. p. 108, 118, and Bramhall *Works* iii. 79.

[2] Estcourt p. 67. The difficulty is about *the* date.

[3] It is indeed a matter more for profound regret, than for surprise, that Mr. Hutton, of the Oratory, who objected some years ago to the evidence for Anglican orders, found himself shortly afterwards unable to accept the evidence for the Christian Religion.

If it be urged that Barlow himself expressed contempt for his own orders, we reply that Barlow's own irreverence is admitted, but is at this stage of the argument nothing to the point: but Barlow's words when he said that "if the king's grace, being supreme head of the Church of England did nominate, choose, elect, any layman, being learned, to be a bishop, he so chosen, without mention made of any orders, *would be as good a bishop as he* (*Barlow*) *was, or the best in England*"—his words imply, as much as words could imply it, that Barlow had himself been duly consecrated. Indeed it is only pretended that he retained his position by a deliberate fraud, which would have exposed him to the greatest possible risks, for no assignable object in the world! "It is a mystery" Canon Estcourt admits "how he could have remained unconsecrated, or how he could have carried on his assumed character unchallenged, especially as he was involved in disputes with his Chapter."[1] But why should he have gone out of his way to remain unconsecrated, and on what possible ground of reason in the absence of all positive evidence to the effect can we be asked to believe he did?

We may sum up this discussion by quoting two opinions—the first that of the Roman Catholic historian Lingard: "When we find Barlow during ten years, the remainder of Henry's reign, constantly associated, as a brother, with the other consecrated bishops, discharging with them all the duties, both spiritual and secular, of a consecrated bishop, summoned equally with them to parliament and convocation, taking his seat among

[1] P. 81.

them, according to seniority, and voting on all subjects as one of them; it seems most unreasonable to suppose, without direct proof, that he had never received that sacred rite, without which, according to the laws of both Church and State, he could not have become a member of the episcopal body."[1] The second shall be the opinion of Dr. Döllinger expressed so emphatically at the Bonn Reunion Conference[2]: "The result of my investigation is that I have no manner of doubt as to the validity of the episcopal succession in the English Church."[3]

In fact our opponents betray a consciousness of our secure historical position by their anxiety to do what they describe as "elevating the controversy to a higher ground."[4] Indeed that the real basis of their objection is not historical is evidenced by the fact that they show no greater disposition to accept the succession of the Anglican Church in Ireland than that in England.[5]

[1] *History of England* vi. p. 329 [note DD].

[2] *Bonn Conference* 1874 p. 51.

[3] The suspicions supposed to be justified by the peculiarities in the form of the grant of temporalities to Barlow (Estcourt p. 72) are dissolved by the discovery of an identical form of grant in the undisputed case of R. Ferrar (Rymer's *Fœdera*, London, 1713, vol. xv. 173: "durante sua vita naturali"). The "suspicious circumstance" again of his being called "bishop" before consecration, when he was only bishop-elect, is now admitted to have many parallels and to have no "suspicions" attaching to it (Hutton *Anglican Ministry* p. 313).

[4] This is Dr. Newman's expression in a preface to Mr. Hutton's Book—surely very unworthy of its great author: cf. Hutton pp. 95, 304, 305.

[5] *Church Quarterly* vol. x. April 1880 p. 222.

III. But perhaps the Anglican form of ordination does not satisfy the requirements of the catholic Church. 'Of course it does not:' said the Roman controversialist of the seventeenth century. 'The essence of valid ordination—the necessary matter and form—is the delivery to the priest of the chalice and paten with the words: "Receive the power to offer sacrifice" etc. The Anglican ordinal is by this single omission rendered null and void. They have no priests and therefore no bishops.' So they spoke in great certainty, for indeed had not a pope in a solemn definition of faith announced this very doctrine about the 'sacrament of order' to the Armenians at the time of the Council of Florence? But alas for so satisfactory and conclusive an objection! it emerged through the historical studies of the great Roman theologian Morinus in the latter part of the seventeenth century, that this ceremony—this 'porrectio instrumentorum'—had been unknown in the Church for a thousand years, and the objectors had the double mortification of having the ground of their objection cut from under their feet, and of finding that the authoritative Roman theology had been elevating a ceremony of late introduction into the position of the 'essential matter and form' of orders, and degrading the true essential—the laying on of hands—into a subordinate and non-essential accompaniment. At any rate we hear no more of this confident objection.[1]

'But if the laying on of hands is sufficient matter,

[1] See *The Church and the Ministry* p. 68 note [1]; Estcourt pp. 261, 171, and Appendix I.

the words "Receive the Holy Ghost," without specification[1] of the office of bishop or priest, are not sufficient form.' ('Form' it may be explained means the formula or words essential to the validity of a sacrament.) This was the last stronghold of objection against the regularity of the externals of Anglican ordination; and it is unnecessary that we should follow Anglican writers in arguing upon it, for Canon Estcourt has himself produced a decision of the Roman Church authoritative and emphatic, in the case of the Church of Abyssinia, which crushes this objection. We simply quote Canon Estcourt's pages.

"'Resolution of the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, given on Fer. iv., being the 9th of April 1704.—In Ethiopia, as it is necessary that the persons to be ordained should assemble for their ordination from distant parts at the city where the schismatic archbishop resides, and as he will only hold an ordination when persons to receive orders are collected together to the number of eight or ten thousand in the said city, he has therefore at such a time to ordain three or four thousand, or even more, in one day. In short, when those that are to receive the priesthood are arranged in ranks in the church, the archbishop passing hastily in front of them, imposes his hands on the head of each, saying *Accipe Spiritum Sanctum.* And for those to be ordained deacons he simply imposes the patriarchal cross on the head of each. And in consequence of the great multitude and the confusion and

[1] These specifications were introduced later into the Anglican Ordinations—in 1662.

the haste with which he proceeds, it follows that the archbishop on some does not impose his hands at all; and in other cases does not pronounce the words of the form; and not a few even are passed over without either one or the other. Hence the question is asked, whether priests and deacons in such a mode and form are validly ordained; and consequently whether such a priest on becoming a catholic ought to be admitted to the exercise of his orders; and by what rule in such circumstances ought a missionary to be guided?

'Resolution of the S.C. The ordination of a priest with imposition of hands and pronouncement of the form as stated in the case is valid; but the ordination of a deacon simply with imposition of the patriarchal cross is altogether invalid. Hence in admitting presbyters and deacons to the exercise of their orders after they have received the catholic faith, the following rules are to be observed:

'If a priest should say absolutely, that he was ordained with imposition of hands and pronouncement of the form, and if there should be no other impediment, the missionary, after giving him a dispensation from irregularity, and absolution from excommunication, may admit him to the exercise of his orders according to the rite, approved and expurgated, in which he was ordained.

'But if such a priest should ingenuously acknowledge that he has not a clear remembrance about the matter and form of his ordination, or if he has a doubt concerning either one or the other, he cannot be admitted to the exercise of his orders, till he has been ordained

conditionally. And if he should absolutely assert that the imposition of hands and pronouncement of the form had been omitted, or either of them, he must be re-ordained absolutely, before he can be admitted to the exercise of his orders.

'But since it may happen that a person may have been validly ordained priest, though his ordination as deacon was invalid; in such a case, before he can exercise his orders, he ought, if it please the Sovereign Pontiff to grant faculties to the missionaries for that purpose, to receive a dispensation from irregularity, not only as having been ordained *per saltum*, but also as under suspension on account of the subsequent exercise of sacred orders,—at least for the time, until he can be validly promoted to the diaconate by a catholic bishop.'

"Such is this most important decision. And it will be seen at once that nothing could be more favourable to the Anglican side of the question. For it establishes the principle that the words *Accipe Spiritum Sanctum* are sufficient as a form of ordination to the priesthood; it renders nugatory the argument raised by Talbot and Lewgar, that the distinctive order must be named in the form; it makes it clear that, even if the Anglican form of the diaconate is invalid, this need not prevent the priesthood being validly conferred; it removes any doubt whether the uncanonical mode of altering the Anglican form would of itself have made it invalid; and it puts aside, as irrelevant, any questions whether the alteration was made by the Church or by the secular power; for no one can trace the origin of the use of

this form among the Abyssinians [it is not to be found in their books], or find any authority for it beyond a mere custom that has crept in without any record of its introduction.

"The decision, indeed, refers only to the priesthood. But in the face of such an indication of the mind of the Church, it would be unbecoming to raise the question whether those same words, *Accipe Spiritum Sanctum*, are insufficient as a form for the episcopate also."[1]

IV. It remains then as an admission even of our adversaries that the Anglican form of ordination is in itself valid. What then can hinder its acceptance in our case? Something not outward but inward; the argument is again taken on to 'higher ground'—even into the cloud-land of 'intention,' or else our opponents are constrained to make their appeal to *a priori* considerations of a very dangerous character. Thus Mr. Hutton, whose work we have alluded to above as having received the sanction of a preface from Cardinal Newman, appeals to the 'moral evidence against the reality of the Anglican priesthood'—or again the '*prima facie* evidence' 'whose persuasiveness is greater than that of any bare arguments.' The Anglican Church in history has not, Mr. Hutton and Cardinal Newman think, *looked* as if it had a priesthood. It is almost charitable to suppose it has not had it. As if one were to argue from the unworthy lives of Christians to the conclusion that they had not received the Baptismal grace. Has the average

[1] Pp. 190-192. The decision of the S. C. given above was confirmed in 1860. But see Appended Note v. p. 214.

life of Christians been such as to make this method of argument a secure one? Assuredly not; it has been such as to make it a constant pretext for schism. The true method of argument for a Catholic is to appeal to outward sacramental transactions in history, and rest assured that the outward transaction is the pledge of the inward grace, and that what is needed is not to doubt the adequacy of the formal transaction, but to stir up the inward grace. The Church of England is stirring up the inward grace of her priesthood. We are not arguing how much cause she may have to be ashamed of her past use of it. But we would vigorously maintain that all the security of the sacramental system is gone if we may argue from a general neglect of a gift to its non-existence. That 'the tree is known by its fruits' is a great truth. It means that holiness can only proceed from the Holy Spirit, and that you can argue back from the effect to the cause. But it does not mean that there can be no such thing in the Christian Church—whether Oriental, Roman, or Anglican—as a talent hid away in a napkin, a light kept under a bushel.

And now what is the doctrine of defective intention which is to invalidate Anglican orders? That 'the unworthiness of the minister hinders not the grace of the sacraments,' is a great principle to which the Roman Church at least is thoroughly committed. Where you have the external conditions of validity for a sacrament, a right 'form' and 'matter' and 'minister'—to use the technical terms already explained—there no spiritual disqualification, whether in understanding or morals, on

the part of the administrator, is a bar to the validity of the rite, and this because of the great principle that the giver of the grace is not the minister, but the Holy Spirit. This principle in regard to the validity of baptism and ordinations administered by heretics or schismatics was fought out by St. Augustin against the Donatists. We assume it now and ask only—for what sort of doctrine of 'requisite intention' does this leave room? For no more than that which Hooker asserts. "Furthermore" he says, "because definitions are to express but the most immediate and nearest parts of nature, whereas other principles farther off, although not specified in defining, are notwithstanding in nature implied and presupposed, we must note that inasmuch as sacraments are actions religious and mystical, which nature they have not unless they proceed *from a serious meaning;* and what every man's private mind is, as we cannot know, so neither are we bound to examine; therefore always in these cases the known intent of the Church generally doth suffice, and where the contrary is not manifest, we may presume that he which outwardly doth the work, hath inwardly the purpose of the Church of God."

If the requirement of intention reaches beyond this point, it becomes as Jewel calls it, "the very dungeon of uncertainty." "The heart of man is unsearchable; if we stay upon the intention of a mortal man, we may stand in doubt of our own baptism." Even within this narrow limit we must recollect that the old story of the baptism by the boy Athanasius shows that the churchmen of the early days could regard as valid a baptism

administered in play.[1] But we may assent freely to Hooker's requirement of intention. We need it, to guard against the possibility of sacraments being consecrated by accident, through a chance collocation of words and materials. This much, then, is granted and no more. In applying this principle to the present controversy, we base our contention on the statement of it given by Canon Estcourt.[2]

"The intention requisite for the valid administration of a sacrament is the *intentio generalis faciendi quod facit ecclesia.* Hence a sacrament conferred with the correct matter and form by a heretic, or even an atheist, is valid, if he intends to do that rite which the Church does,—and not specially the Roman Church, but the Church *in confuso;* even though he might not believe in the reality of the sacrament. And supposing the form be clear and genuine, and the sense of the words is preserved in its integrity, even if the form were changed with an erroneous or heretical intent, the

[1] The evidence for this depends, not on the truth of the story, but on its prevalence, as against Hutton, p. 179.

[2] P. 199 cf. Card. Newman *Via Media* vol. i. p. 339. "In like manner even though a bishop were to use the words, 'receive ye the Holy Ghost,' with little or no meaning, or a priest the consecrating words in the Eucharist, considering it only a commemoration of Christ's death, or a deacon the water and the words in baptism, denying in his heart that it is regeneration; yet they may in spite of their unbelief, be instruments of a power they know not of; and 'speak not of themselves.'" To this is appended in the last edition (1877) the note "Certainly, if the power has been given them." Of course the Roman Church must grant the validity of orders conferred by unbelievers, to meet, for example, such a case as that of Prince Talleyrand, bishop of Autun, and no doubt many other cases in the Middle Ages and at the time of the Italian Renaissance.

sacrament would still be valid. For no amount of heretical intention would invalidate it, provided that he intended in a general way to do what the Church does, and that he does not overthrow or destroy the legitimate sense of the words."

Well now, had the English Church of the Reformation period—not any individual bishop, but the English Church, as represented in the official utterances of her Ordination rite—had she this 'general intention of doing what the Church does,' not the Roman Church, but the Church 'in the vague'? Did she intend to continue the old orders of the Church, and did therefore every Anglican bishop (as officially representing the Church, not 'in his private mind') have the only sort of intention which can be possibly allowed to be requisite? It is surely sufficient answer to quote the language of the Preface to our services of ordination: "It is evident unto all men diligently reading the Holy Scripture and ancient authors, that from the Apostles' time there have been these orders of ministers in Christ's Church — Bishops, Priests, and Deacons. Which offices were evermore had in such reverent estimation that no man might presume to execute any of them, except he were first called, tried, examined . . . and also by public prayer, with imposition of hands, were approved and admitted thereunto by lawful authority. And therefore, to the intent that these orders may be continued, and reverently used and esteemed in the Church of England, etc." '*To the intent that these orders may be continued*'!—there is, then, we contend, no further ground of argument on

this score. The English Church had a serious mind to continue the old orders in the Reformed Church; for their continuance she provided a proper minister, and proper rite, valid in 'matter and form.' What further ground of attack is there? Mr. Hutton falls back on a doctrine of the private intention of the celebrant of a sacrament which would make all orders precarious—nay, all sacraments.[1] We say with St. Thomas Aquinas[2]: "The minister of a sacrament acts as the representative (in persona) of the whole Church of which he is the minister; in the words which he utters, the *intention of the Church is expressed*, which suffices to the perfection of a sacrament, unless the contrary be expressed outwardly on the part of the minister, or recipient of the sacrament."

Canon Estcourt falls back rather on a doctrine which is both wanting in catholic authority and surely tends to militate against the true principle of sacramental grace. The Church (it is maintained) only confers by her sacraments what she intends to confer.

[1] Pp. 179, 327.

[2] *Summa*, pars iii. q. lxiv. art. 8. Of course a later school of Roman theologians would not admit this doctrine. But we are not concerned to maintain that no school of theologians, on any principle they may devise, can object to Anglican orders, but only that they cannot be objected to on grounds which can be called catholic. How insecure an extreme requirement of inward intention may make all orders is shown by Mr. Hutton's own statement, p. 523:—

"Accepting as we do the position that the succession is continued through single lines and not by way of threefold interlacing cords, we have to maintain that each bishop in the chain which historically connects, say Cardinal Manning with the Apostles, was validly baptized, validly ordained to the priesthood, and

If the mind of the Anglican Church can be shown to be deficient on the doctrine of the priesthood, it follows that she did not intend by her priesthood all that the catholic Church intends by it—therefore she did not convey to her ministers what lay outside her own conceptions.

To this our reply is twofold: so far as we are here dealing with an attack upon the orthodoxy of the English Church, we prefer to deal with the matter on its own ground. Whether a Church has orders and whether she is orthodox are *two* questions, not one.[1]

But so far as the doctrine is asserted that the grace given by a sacrament depends on the mind of the particular part of the Church in which it is administered, we entirely decline to accept the doctrine. We believe[2]

validly consecrated to the episcopate. . . . It must be allowed that this position is, humanly speaking, indefensible. But Catholics are, nevertheless, absolutely certain that they have the true ministeriai succession, inasmuch as it is as indefectible as is the Church herself.'

And in a note :—

"Catholics, of course, are not called upon to hold that in no single case has there been a bishop who for lack of valid baptism, ordination, or consecration, was a bishop only in name. But they may well believe that the government of the Church would be so providentially ordered as to hinder such a person from being called on to continue the succession. It falls to the lot of comparatively few bishops to act as the principal consecrator of others."

[1] Canon Estcourt argues in a manner unworthy of him in his miserable Chapter vi. in which he tries to explain away the language of the English office for the Ordination of Priests. Has he read Hooker Bk. v. cap. lxxvii.? Hooker gives to the Anglican office a meaning than which it cannot carry a lower.

[2] This is supported by a recent decree of the Roman Inquisition (1872) cited in Puller, *The Bull Apostolicae Curae*, S.P.C.K. 1896, p. 57 f.

that a baptism administered in due form by Baptists, is valid, in spite of their heretical mind, formally expressed, on baptism. The grace of a sacrament depends not on the mind of any particular part of the Church, but on the intention of the Holy Ghost which can find expression only in the catholic doctrine of the whole Church. We are ready enough to vindicate the orthodoxy of the Anglican Church. But had she denied *in toto* the sacrificial aspect of the Eucharist, as she has assuredly not done, her denial would have affected her position in orthodoxy, not her orders.[1] The grace of orders depends on the original intention and will of the Holy Ghost, and all that we do is to hand on the gift by a sacramental method. The method is intrusted to us; the gift is given by Him: and our insufficient conception of it does in no wise impair its fulness. St. Augustin's language on this subject is quite explicit. "Accordingly[2] if Marcion consecrated the sacrament of Baptism with the words of the Gospel 'in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,' the sacrament was complete, though his faith was not complete, but stained with error. . . . If sacraments are the same they are everywhere complete, even when they are wrongly understood." "If a man[3] offers an erroneous prayer (in baptism) God is present to uphold the words of His gospel, without which the baptism of Christ cannot be consecrated, and He Himself consecrates His sacrament, that in the recipient who turns in truth to God either before he is baptized, when he is baptized, or at some future time, that very sacrament may be profit-

[1] On the argument of the Bull 'Apostolicae Curae,' see Chap. xi.
[2] *de Bapt.* iii. 15. [3] vi. 25.

able to salvation, which were he not to be converted, would be powerful to his destruction. But who is there who does not know that there is no baptism of Christ, if the words of the gospel in which consists the outward visible sign be not forthcoming? But you will more easily find heretics who do not baptize at all, than any who baptize without those words. And therefore we say, not that every baptism (for in many of the blasphemous rites of idols men are said to be baptized), but that the baptism of Christ, that is, every baptism consecrated in the words of the Gospel, is everywhere the same, and cannot be vitiated by any perversity on the part of any men."

V. There is still one more charge to which we must reply. It is asserted that the English bishops, if they have valid orders, have no *jurisdiction*, and though this is in effect only the charge of schism revived in another form, it is necessary not to leave it unanswered.

Consecration we must explain conveys in one sense a universal mission, a share in Christ's universal commission to 'go and make disciples of all nations.' Each Apostle had, and each bishop has, in an abstract sense, this universal mission which carries with it, and indeed is not distinguishable from, what, in the technical language of theology, may be called 'habitual' jurisdiction.[1] But even amongst the Apostles the exercise of this jurisdiction was limited by mutual arrangement,[2] and in the early Church every bishop was limited to a

[1] See *Church Quarterly* vol. xi. Jan. 1881 : *Mission and Jurisdiction*, and Blunt's *Dict. of Hist. and Doct. Theol.*, Art. Jurisdiction.

[2] Gal. ii. 9, Rom. xv. 20, 2 Cor. x. 13-16.

proper diocese, in which alone he was allowed to exercise his functions. Within this sphere alone he has *actual jurisdiction*, i.e. the ecclesiastical right to exercise his functions. Actual jurisdiction is indeed to be regarded, not as a gift super-added to the gift of order, but as the right to exercise this gift within the limit determined by ecclesiastical arrangements from time to time. In Erastian epochs of the Church's life, as under the Byzantine emperors, under Frankish kings, or in periods of the English Church, the secular authority has had a predominant, or even practically exclusive, power over these arrangements, but however the limits of actual jurisdiction are settled, the jurisdiction itself is regarded (from the only point of view which can be called catholic) as inherent in the see. It is entered upon when any bishop is enthroned in his see in a canonical manner, and the idea of a bishop consecrated to no see was abhorrent to the Church's mind. That the pope is the sole source of jurisdiction, and that the Anglican bishops when they ceased to be recognized by the pope became *ipso facto* schismatic, is no doubt a claim of the papacy and a mediæval doctrine, but it has been made sufficiently plain in earlier chapters that it has no claim to be regarded as part of the Church's catholic heritage. It would indeed be nothing less than ludicrous to apply the idea at all to early church history.[1] Now I do not think that any one would really dream of

[1] "Readers of history hardly need to be told that the bishop of Rome was never asked to give either mission or jurisdiction to anybody for the first six centuries of the Christian era." *Church Quarterly* l.c. p. 403.

questioning the jurisdiction of the Anglican episcopate except on the basis of the idea that the pope is the sole fount of jurisdiction, and as that position has been already dealt with—as it has been made quite plain that the whole Anglican position involves an appeal behind the papacy to the principles of the ancient and the universal Church—I cannot think this question of jurisdiction a very serious one. Church history presents us with innumerable irregularities in episcopal succession, but we are not allowed to go back upon them. I hope to show that the *technical* defence of Anglican jurisdiction is adequate, but if it were much less adequate than it is, the contention would still hold that the Anglican succession holds the ground legitimately by default. There was no rival claimant to the see of Canterbury. It is quite true that the atmosphere of the Tudor kingdom is not an atmosphere in which the free canonical action of the Church is likely to flourish, but the 'Erastian' authoritativeness of the Tudors is quite as prominent in Mary's reign as in Edward's or Elizabeth's, and no more destroys the possibility of jurisdiction in Anglican prelates, than in Byzantine or Frankish bishops of similar epochs.[1]

With this preface, we advance our technical defence, which must be based on a brief review of the ecclesiastical situation at the beginning of Elizabeth's reign.

The 'concession' of the clergy in 1531 which acknowledged his Majesty Henry VIII. "the sole pro-

[1] This paragraph I should wish to euphasize. On the subject of Erastianism see the excellent essay of Dean Church *On the Relations between Church and State* (London, Walter Smith) 1881.

tector of the Church and clergy of England, its unique and supreme lord, and, as far as Christ's law allows, even its supreme head," had been passed without any dissent in the convocation of Canterbury, and in the convocation of York with no more than Tunstal's protest on the ground that "though to most men the words seem without danger of any offence, yet some suspected of heresy . . . taking their sense perversely have endeavoured to escape the judgment of their bishops." Tunstal moreover accepted the headship subsequently, as well as an abjuration of the papal authority, when Parliament, in accordance with the resolution of convocation, required him, with the other bishops, to swear to it.[1] This resolution accords well with a petition commonly attributed to convocation,[2] that if the Pope should persist in demanding the payment of Annates "the obedience of the king and people be withdrawn" from the see of Rome, as in like case the French king "withdrew the obedience of him and his subjects" from Pope Benedict XIII.; and with the declaration of three years later, "the Pope had not any greater jurisdiction conferred upon him by God than any other foreign bishop."[3] Nothing was done in Mary's reign to reverse formally these synodical acts.

[1] See Mr. Gladstone's *Elizabethan Settlement of Religion* (*Nineteenth Cent.* July 1888) p. 7. The remainder of this chapter is largely based on this article.

[2] Wilkins' *Concilia* iii. 760, but legitimate doubt has been thrown upon its origin, and I desire to express no opinion; in *State Papers*, Henry VIII. v. p. 344, no. 722 (5) it is called a petition of Parliament.

[3] There was a similar resolution of the York convocation. Collier *Eccl. Hist.* iv. 263.

They were of course reversed, but only by Act of Parliament, and the same authority cancelled these reversals in the first year of Elizabeth. This certainly left it open to the Queen to act upon the unrepealed declarations of the convocation, all the more that the episcopal body which met with its composition unchanged at the beginning of Elizabeth's reign under her brief, took no steps at all, even at the solicitation of the lower house, to repudiate its earlier action.[1] When therefore a legal oath was required of the bishops, an oath "which asserted on the behalf of the Crown less than was contained in the unrepealed and still effective declaration of the Anglican convocations," there was nothing irregular in the requirement, and, considering the period at which it occurred, nothing violent in their deprivation for refusal to take it. It happened curiously enough that of the twenty-seven bishops alive at the Queen's accession, eleven died before she took action. Of the remaining sixteen, all but one—Kitchen of Landaff —refused the oath. They had withdrawn from the position which even Bishops of a conservative mind were not afraid in most cases to take up in Henry's reign. Their consequent deprivation was justified by the action of the Church and was in accordance with the law of the land.[2] It contrasted in this respect with the utterly unconstitutional way in which Mary, following Edward's precedent, had deprived a great number of bishops simply by royal commission, with no justification at all.

[1] Gladstone *l.c.* p. 11.

[2] They were deprived for refusal to take the oath, not for their previous refusal to consecrate Parker. Lingard vi. 8.

It should be noted further that four or five of the bishops deprived by Queen Elizabeth had died before any measures were taken to supply anew the episcopal bench, and of the remaining ten or eleven, at least four or five were disqualified altogether for appealing to their canonical rights, inasmuch as they had been most uncanonically introduced into their sees by Queen Mary in the lifetime of their proper occupants.[1]

Thus when Parker was consecrated it was by bishops as canonically 'provincial' as was possible under the circumstances. Coverdale, formerly bishop of Exeter, had been quite uncanonically deposed on Mary's accession, and only allowed to escape with his life beyond seas;[2] and Barlow had only resigned under pressure. Scory and Hodgkins were bishops within the province, who could be properly summoned to assist. The former indeed had held the see of Chichester,[3] and was now elect of Hereford, as Barlow was of Chichester. Thus, as the see of Canterbury was duly vacated by death: as Parker was elected by the chapter and confirmed without opposition in Bow Church: as he was consecrated by bishops of whom two or three could rightly be called provincial: as there was no official

[1] Palmer *On the Church* i. p. 486. He also points out that four or five others had been put into their sees by papal provisions contrary again to the mind of the English Church as represented in the declaration of convocation, twenty years before.

[2] I think, in spite of what Mr. Rivington says (*Dependence* p. 145), that Coverdale was a legitimate bishop. See Dixon *Hist. of the Church of England*, iii. p. 276, and the account of him in the *Dict. of Nat. Biography*. No doubt however 'Erastianism' colours all ecclesiastical proceedings at this period.

[3] He was intruded by Edward and dispossessed by Mary.

or formal protest at the time and no rival claimant to the see: as finally the formal withdrawal of the Romanist body from the jurisdiction of the Anglican episcopate did not take place for eleven years, and even then there was no establishment of a rival episcopate—we cannot see how any objection can be raised to the claim of Parker and his successors to sit in the seat of Augustin, and to inherit the jurisdiction which belongs to that see.

CHAPTER X.

ANGLICAN ORTHODOXY.

If enough has already been said to vindicate the Church of England against the charge of wilful schism, and against such imputations upon the validity of her orders as would thrust her out of the Church's constitutional unity—yet a reply has still to be made on the charge of heresy.

What is heresy? It is the self-willed repudiation by an individual or a part of the Church of the authoritative rule of faith, especially as embodied in some ecumenical dogmatic decree. What the standard of faith is has been explained already at some considerable length. It remains to ask whether the English Church has rebelled against it.

The Reformation in England was not primarily a *doctrinal* movement at all. In its first intention it was a movement to repudiate papal usurpation, and good care was taken to emphasize the stability of the Anglican position as regards doctrine. "Our said sovereign the king and all his natural subjects, as well spiritual as temporal, continue to be as obedient, devout, catholic and humble children of God and holy Church as any people be within any realm christened."[1] Afterwards,

[1] *Stat.* 23 Henry VIII. c. 20. See Hardwick *Church History* Reformation p. 179.

the doctrinal movement became much more prominent, but the intention of the Anglican Church was never lost sight of—it was to repudiate abuses and later accretions and to retain the original and catholic doctrine. The convocation of 1571, which imposed on the clergy subscription to the Articles of Religion, issued a canon to preachers enjoining them to "teach nothing in their sermons which they should require to be devoutly held or believed by the people except what is agreeable to the doctrine of the Old and New Testaments, and what the ancient fathers and catholic bishops have collected out of that said doctrine." The "authority of the Church in controversies of faith" is maintained in the 20th Article, and the intention of the Anglican branch not "to forsake or reject the Churches of Italy, France, Spain and Germany" except in points where they were fallen from "their ancient integrity and from the Apostolical Churches," is asserted in the Canons.[1] So also the formal appeal of Anglican divines as a whole has been to the 'quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus' and to Scripture.

But, however good her abstract intention, may not the English Church in fact have been betrayed into some authoritative and formal repudiation of an integral part of the Catholic faith, during the wild confusion of the Reformation epoch? The question, we must observe, is as to formal and authoritative repudiation. There was a wild reaction against Mediævalism during the sixteenth century, and many of the extreme reformers in England and in Europe generally held views which

[1] No. 30, *The lawful use of the Cross in baptism explained*

we could not acquit of heresy, but we are not in any way committed to their views, except so far as they have affected our formularies.

There are two further remarks which we must make by way of preliminary. Persons whom it would be hard to call orthodox have been teachers in the Church of England in the sixteenth century and later, and we may be therefore quite sure that the standard of doctrinal discipline in the Church of England has been often unsatisfactory:—but there is a vital distinction between heresy and a failure of doctrinal discipline. We admit the charge of doctrinal laxity sorrowfully enough, but undiscipline does not unchurch a Church. A man may cry out with St. Basil: "Our tribulations are proclaimed the whole world over. The doctrines of the fathers are despised; the apostolic traditions are reckoned for nothing; the discoveries of innovating men hold sway in the Churches; men are no longer theologians but logical disputants. True shepherds are banished and grievous wolves are brought in."[1] Such a condition of things cannot be deplored too deeply, nor can we strive too earnestly after a remedy for it, but the evil is not that the Church's teaching is heretical, but that men are allowed to teach in her name what is not her doctrine.[2] This undiscipline in doctrine is at least no worse than undiscipline in morals. Tolerated teach-

[1] Ep. xc. : cf. Pref. p. xii.

[2] It is important, I think, to notice that people are often accused of heresy when they should only be accused of rash language. Mr. Rivington speaks as if there were a good deal of denial of everlasting punishment in the Church of England. It seems to me that a great many who use what seems very rash language, guard

ing of error[1] no more decatholicizes a Church than tolerated laxity of clerical morals, of which the history of the Churches of the Roman obedience affords only too many examples, extending over great epochs of time. No doubt the English Church largely sold her freedom to exercise her own discipline in payment for her position in the State, and the crippling of her disciplinary action is the penalty, the sore and humiliating penalty, for her undue confidence in the permanent Churchmanship of the national rulers. We attempt no sort of justification for the deplorable subordination to the State into which the English Church allowed herself to be betrayed, but Erastianism no more decatholicizes the doctrine of the English Church than it did that of the Byzantine Church of old or of the Frankish Church in the Middle Ages.

The other preliminary remark which must be made is this. There are in every age a number of misleading phrases justified by prescription but by nothing else, adopted simply because they save the trouble of thought and have a sort of authoritative sound which is the next best substitute for truth. Among such phrases is the 'Reformation settlement.' It requires very little knowledge to make us see that in no department of human action, political or social, intellectual or theological, was

themselves against denying it, *e.g.* notably Dr. Farrar: see *Mercy and Judgment* p. 1: "I have never denied and do not now deny the possible endlessness of punishment." Cf. Pusey's letter to him, quoted by himself: *Guardian*, Oct. 10, 1888, p. 1503.

[1] 'No,' says F. Richardson (p. 145), 'the toleration of heresy is distinctly heretical.' How does this apply to Honorius? He is defended by Romanists as having only tolerated, not professed, the heresy of the Monothelites.

the Reformation age an age which admitted of 'settlement.' It was an age of awakening, an age of transition, but that is just the opposite of an age of settlement. As in every other department of life so it was in theology. The Roman theology of the Council of Trent represents no final settlement. It is theology at the half-way house between catholicity pure and simple, and Ultramontane Romanism. Has the history of the Calvinist and Lutheran Churches suggested the idea that their theology reached a 'settlement' in the days of their respective founders? As for the English Church, her theological *intention* was good, and she was mercifully spared the action upon her of any of those masterful individualities and uncatholic wills, which helped the foreign Reformations down different roads of heretical defection. But when we ask whether the English Church of the Reformation arrived at a satisfactory statement of doctrine in accordance with her fundamental intentions—at a permanent 'settlement'—we must, we fancy, answer to a great extent in the negative. She was in fact suffering from reaction, and her formulas are too often protests against what is exaggerated or false, rather than statements of what is true. She was more at pains to arrive at a working compromise than at a clear statement. Indeed she had not, the Church at large had not, a knowledge of ancient liturgies or ancient theology, such as would have admitted of a position being formulated which could be regarded as (from a simply catholic point of view) a satisfactory settlement.

When we have said this it becomes apparent that we do not think catholic-minded people can be in any

idolatrous attitude towards the English Reformation, or indeed that we can take an optimistic view of the process. The ship of the Church went through a great storm—she lost a great deal, not only in decoration and accoutrements, but in rigging and in bulwarks, but she came out of that storm—the ship. So far then we can accept the statement of our case from Cardinal Newman's lips: "There was a very trying interval for the Church of England in the sixteenth century, when it ran great risk of being wrecked; but it weathered the storm, and its good fortune may be regarded as a providence and become a positive argument for its being what . . . its great history betokens."[1]

And now to enter more into detail—the Church of England is conspicuously orthodox on the great fundamentals of the Trinity and the Incarnation. She accepts —as an establishment no less than as a Church—the ecumenical Councils as criteria of heresy.[2] Nor is it merely that her Creeds and Articles are formally orthodox. It is true further that no Church can boast a richer, more eloquent, more learned, or more powerful body of theology, dogmatic and apologetic, than the post-Reformation Church of England can exhibit on these subjects, beginning with Richard Hooker and coming down to the present day.

But it may be urged that even the Incarnation is not rightly held unless it be held in its proper relation to us and our present lives—unless it be viewed in its 'extension' in the Church and through the sacraments.

[1] Pref. to Hutton's *Anglican Ministry* p. viii.

[2] *Stat.* 1 Elizabeth. See Hardwick p. 225.

Here, then, also, the orthodoxy of the English Church does not admit of a doubt. She plainly asserts that the sacraments are means of grace, are the means through which the grace of the new life of Christ is communicated to us. Her definition of sacraments in general as "effectual signs of grace" is simply the definition of the Roman schools. It asserts that the sacraments are symbols, and not only symbols—that they also effect or convey what they symbolize—they are 'practica' or 'efficacia signa gratiae.' This is undoubtedly the catholic doctrine, which as it is implied with reference to Baptism in the Nicene Creed, so it is further expounded with great clearness with reference to Baptism and the Eucharist in the later part of the Catechism.

Then with reference to the Holy Eucharist in particular the Church of England unmistakably teaches that the Body and Blood of Christ are therein given, taken and eaten, after a spiritual and heavenly manner —that (in Hooker's words) "Christ in the Sacrament imparteth Himself even in His whole entire Person unto every soul that receiveth Him." Further that "what merit, force, or virtue soever there is in His sacrificed Body and Blood, we freely, fully, and wholly have it by this Sacrament," for "here we receive Christ and those graces that flow from Him in that He is man," "and the effect thereof is a real transmutation of our souls and bodies from sin to righteousness, from death and corruption to immortality and life." This is beyond a doubt the positive and emphatic teaching of the Anglican Prayer-book, and it was not for no purpose that she

brought back into emphasis the indirect but most real effect of the Holy Communion upon our *bodies*, a truth of which much had been made in the early Church. Beyond this if the formulas of the Church do not commit us to any definite view as to the nature of Christ's presence in the sacrament we must remember that there was no formulated dogma of Catholic authority on the subject, that the moment was by no means opportune for definition, and that very possibly no more exact determination of the doctrine than existed in the ancient Church is even desirable. At any rate the absence of it is not heretical.[1]

It is not however at all reasonable to dispute that there are defects in the teaching of the English formularies taken alone, and it is necessary to refer to them.

We do conceive that in her desire to restore the communion of the people to its proper prominence in the eucharistic office, and in her reaction from mediæval misconceptions, and abuses connected with the 'mass-

[1] See Keble's *Letters* cxviii-cxxi. It would appear that while the English Church (*a*) excludes a materialistic view of the Real Presence in the 'declaration on kneeling,' and the current view of transubstantiation, and (*b*) on the other side affirms a real communication of the Body and Blood of Christ in the sacrament, she may be said to leave the intermediate ground open. This is Bossuet's view of the matter and it can hardly be described as unfair. It must be remembered however that when the declaration on kneeling was reinstated in 1662, the words which condemned adoration in the sacrament of a 'real and essential presence there being of Christ's natural flesh and blood' were struck out (they had no more than the authority of an order of council in 1552 and had no existence in Elizabeth's Prayer-book) and the words 'corporal presence of Christ's natural flesh and blood' substituted. Thus the Church deliberately refused to condemn an adoration of Christ *really* present.

ing priests,' the Church of England unduly obscured and threw into the background the doctrine of the eucharistic sacrifice. She is not heretical. Her 31st Article is only intended to guard jealously the unique completeness of the sacrifice made by Christ upon the Cross—to guard it, moreover, not as against any formulated doctrine such as that of Trent, but as against a current popular view; and who that knows what has been 'commonly said' in mediæval and modern Roman theology, can doubt that it needs guarding?[1] For the

[1] A doctrine prevailed in the middle ages that while the sacrifice of the Cross was the satisfaction for original sin, the sacrifice of the Mass is the satisfaction for actual sin. This is asserted in sermons *de Sacramento Eucharistiae*, falsely ascribed to Albertus Magnus (see tom. xii. p. 250. Lyons, 1651): "Secunda causa institutionis huius sacramenti est sacrificium altaris, contra quandam quotidianam delictorum nostrorum rapinam. Ut sicut corpus Domini semel oblatum est in cruce pro debito originali; sic offeratur jugiter pro nostris quotidianis delictis in altari et habeat in hoc ecclesia munus ad placandum sibi Deum super omnia legis sacramenta vel sacrificia pretiosum et acceptum." That this doctrine was not only once stated, but became current and prevalent, is shown by the language of the confession of Augsburg pt. ii. art 3: "There was added the opinion which augmented private masses indefinitely, viz. that Christ satisfied by his passion for original sin and instituted the mass as an oblation for daily sins mortal and venial." A similar view is referred to by Latimer, *Sermon* iv. (ed. Parker Soc., vol. i. p. 36): "While they then preached to the people the redemption that cometh by Christ's death to serve only them that died before His coming, that went in the time of the Old Testament; and that now since, redemption and forgiveness of sins, purchased by money and devised by men, is of efficacy, and not redemption purchased by Christ." Such is the background of our 31st Article. It also has in view the undue separation of the priest from the Church, whose mouthpiece he is, in the sacrifice of the altar; cf. *The Church and the Ministry* p. 85.

A view has recently become prevalent, both popularly and in theology, in the Roman Church, which makes each Mass a sub-

Eucharist is not even mystically a *renewal* of Christ's passion but an act of co-operation with Christ's heavenly intercession. Christ upon the eucharistic altar is only 'offered' in the sense that His once-made sacrifice is there perpetually presented and pleaded before the Father, as in heaven, so on earth. The altar is, so to speak, on a line not with Calvary, but with the heavenly Intercession.

Unfortunately however,—there being no authoritative dogma to force the compilers of our Prayer-book to positive statement—they contented themselves with an indefinite protest against current error and gave no positive teaching on the Eucharistic sacrifice. The force of the Protestant reaction was further allowed to rob the Anglican Eucharistic office of a great deal of quite primitive language. No doubt we retained the words from the pre-Reformation Mass about 'the Sacrifice of

stantive sacrifice, distinct from, though dependent upon, the sacrifice of the cross. Christ, it is contended by the recent Roman theologians, gives Himself afresh to be sacrificed in each Mass at the hands of the priest. Each Mass is a fresh 'self-emptying,' a fresh 'immolation,' a renewed 'reduction' of Christ to a state of humiliation. Without this it would not be a proper sacrifice. I have endeavoured elsewhere to give the theological statements of this lamentable doctrine, as found in De Lugo, or Franzelin (see a sermon on *The Eucharistic Sacrifice*, pub. by the C.B.S., 1889), and as an instance of its popular treatment, I would refer to Canon Gilbert's *Love of Jesus* Fifteenth Edition, with the *imprimatur* of Cardinal Manning pp. 41, 46: 'We hold that here [at the Altar] in a mystical manner Thy Body and Blood are separated, and that Thou art, as it were, again nailed to the Cross, and presented to Heaven as a holocaust, for the propitiation of the sins of the world. . . . Why was not one Atonement, dearest Lord, one Sacrifice, one Calvary sufficient? . . . Thou knewest . . . that we should contemn Thy first Sacrifice, and so, dearest Lord, every day Thou art sacrificed again."

praise,' and no doubt the words retain their ancient meaning:[1] further since Andrewes put out his formal reply to Bellarmine: "do ye Romanists take your transubstantiation out of the Mass, and we shall have no further dispute with you about the Sacrifice,"[2] a succession of English theologians in every century have taught the doctrine with sufficient clearness, and it has had a more prominent position restored to it in the Eucharistic offices (which have sprung from the English) of the Scotch and American Churches. All this is true, but it does not amount to a denial that our Liturgy and formulas suffered in this respect from the influence of unguarded reaction.

We can trace the influence of a similar reaction in the silence of our Church's formularies about the primitive practice of prayers for the blessed departed—a reaction in this case from the excesses of the doctrine of purgatory and indulgences. Once again a similar reaction has robbed us for a time of (to say the least of it) the

[1] I think it is only later associations of Protestantism which can lead us to doubt this. The sacrifice of the Mass had been called the 'sacrifice of praise' in Latin, and Eucharist (thanksgiving) in Greek. It was so called because we are not in it 'pleading for admission within the veil,' but claiming, or praising God for, a privilege already won in the acceptance of Christ. Also there is no doubt that the words 'remembrance' in the catechism and 'memory' in the consecration prayer bear naturally their old meaning of a commemoration before God: so Andrewes interprets the word 'memory' (*Respons. ad Bellarm.* p. 251). For the use of the word I should like to refer to the *Theologia Naturalis* of a later schoolman, Raymund of Sabunde (Tit. 289), which affords remarkable analogies to the Anglican consecration prayer as his Tit. 287 (latter part) does to the 'prayer of humble access.'

[2] Andrewes' *Responsio ad Bellarminum* p. 250 f.

immense spiritual convenience of Reservation for the sick, an undoubtedly primitive practice, and of the apostolic practice of Unction of the sick.[1]

These are grave defects—who shall deny it? They are due in part to the temper of compromise, in part, as we say, to the influence of reaction unrestrained by a satisfactory knowledge of ancient doctrine. But if heresy be, as it undoubtedly is, nothing short of the *rejection* of some part of the ancient heritage of truth, the English church is not heretical. She has rejected no truth. Her divines have taught it all. It is being more and more completely taught within her pale to-day. And when we speak of defects in the teaching of the English Church, we must remember for our comfort that the English Church never made a claim to be the whole Church. She never claimed infallibility in her isolated utterances. She always appeals back behind herself to the Scriptures and the ancient Church. A part of a greater whole, she is to us only an authority, so far as, and because, she echoes the voice of what is greater than herself, the universal Church. The defectiveness of the formularies of the 16th and 17th centuries (granting them to be not heretical) are no

[1] The Anglican Confirmation Office is wanting in clear doctrine. But here we propagate (and perhaps exaggerate) an inherited defectiveness of statement which, judged by primitive standards, apparently characterized the mediæval theology on this subject. See the treatise of Canon Mason (Longmans 1891), *The relation of Confirmation to Baptism*. I do not think much apology is needed for our restricted use of the term Sacrament, if Confirmation is regarded as completing Baptism. It is a question of a name. Till the twelfth century the Western Church spoke of *three* sacraments, Baptism, Chrism, and the Eucharist. See my *Dissertations* (Murray) p. 265.

more to us—except in the way of temporary inconvenience—than the defectiveness of the formularies of any other particular moment of the Church's life. The whole Church is our mother. It is the doctrinal heritage of the whole Church that now in the days of completer knowledge, as the mists clear away, is coming out in its indissoluble coherence before the eyes of men, and being taught to the children of the Church.

In this defence of the English Church, I have frankly admitted all the faults of undiscipline, doctrinal compromise and reaction which we think can be fairly laid to our Church's charge. I believe that these are to be set over-against the arrogant claims, the exaggerations of truth, the falsifications of history, the accretions of error, which must be laid to the charge of Rome. Which set of faults is the greater—which Church is more guilty in the eyes of God—it is not for us to determine, it is not our business to attempt to determine.[1] The evils of a Church into which by God's providence we were new-born, granted she *be* a Church, are not an excuse for leaving her, but a spur to action. And I am sure that we Anglicans feel a hearty thankfulness to Almighty God, that He has caused our lot to be cast in a Church, which, however deeply she has sinned, can acknowledge her sins; which, however great her defects even in her authoritative formulas, is not prevented, by any arrogation to herself of what belongs to a greater whole, from confessing them and openly

[1] Of course it is not to be forgotten that in the case of undue reaction the blame is divided between those who suffer themselves to react unrestrainedly and those who cause the reaction.

seeking to reform them. Better anything than to be unable to bear the light: better anything than to be unable to face the facts of history and frankly accept them: better any evils than to have to speak deceitfully for God.

Further than this, however much there may be to be regretted and reformed in the teaching and practice of the Anglican Church at the present day, I must in fairness say that there is no even unauthorized practice of the English Church which I had not as soon be responsible for, as for that withdrawal of the chalice from the laity, to which the whole authority of the Church of Rome is committed:—that I have never heard a sermon in an English Church more to be regretted than one it was once my lot to hear in Strasburg Cathedral, in which Christ was preached as the revelation of Divine justice and Mary as the revelation of Divine love: I have not read in Anglican biography anything which I should more desire to disown than Mother Margaret Mary Hallahan's description of the Pope saying Mass:—"When I heard him sing Mass I cannot express what I felt: it was the God of earth prostrate in adoration before the God of heaven"![1] I have not been confronted in an Anglican book of devotion with any prayer more impossible to pray than

> Soul of the Virgin, illuminate me;
> Body of the Virgin, guard me;
> Milk of the Virgin, feed me;
> Passage of the Virgin, strengthen me;
> O Mary, mother of grace, intercede for me;
> For thy servant take me;

[1] *The Life of Mother Margaret Mary Hallahan* (with a preface by Bishop Ullathorne) p. 430.

Make me always to trust in thee;
From all evils protect me;
In the hour of my death assist me;
And prepare for me a safe way to thee;
That with all the elect I may glorify thee;
For ever and ever."[1]

Thus, all things considered, we Anglicans thank God that He has put us elsewhere than in the Roman Church, though we would fain give her an ungrudging recognition of her glories, and are very far from believing that all even of her educated members need be conscious of that temper in her modern theology which to us is so intolerable.

There is only one further remark which it seems desirable to make.

It may seem to some people that the frank recognition of errors and corruptions in every part of the Church impairs our reverence for her as a whole. If we are able to deny this, it is because we believe that the imperfections in the Church do not prevent her fulfilling her true function, and that our reverence for her is not as our reverence for Christ; it is our reverence for the Bride of Christ, not yet purified—for the organ of the Holy Spirit, not yet perfect. The Church exists not yet to exhibit her glory, save to the eye of faith. As for that vision of the Church in her perfection of unity and truth and holiness, the 'city which lieth four-square,' the 'new Jerusalem descending from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband,' it is the vision of heaven but the hope of

[1] *Vade Mecum piorum sacerdotum.* Nova Editio. Campidonæ, 1865. I have translated the prayer.

earth—we shall see it but not now, we shall behold it but not nigh. Meanwhile we have each and all of us all we can want to satisfy our souls with grace and truth, to inspire us for fresh efforts in the cause of God and His kingdom, to draw us out of the world into the communion of the saints, to fit us for the life of heaven. The errors of the Churches have not any way impaired the treasure of the catholic faith. We will borrow words of striking force to express our meaning.

"At sight of this audacity," says the Abbé Gratry at the conclusion of the second of his great letters against the Papal Infallibility—"at the sight of this audacity and this power of falsehood introducing itself into theology, . . . I can understand that all those who do not take in the whole of the questions should be seized with giddiness, and cry out, 'What, then, can we believe now? What becomes of the bases of the faith?'

"I hasten to give a brief and peremptory reply to this objection, which, I think, will satisfy any mind, the most simple as well as the most learned.

"It is, that all these falsehoods and all these frauds tend only to one point, a single one, and in no way to any other. The treasure of the Catholic Faith is here in no way in question. 'We bear this treasure,' says St. Paul, 'in earthen vessels.' Well! all the falsehoods of which I have already spoken, and all those of which I shall speak, affect the vessel and not the treasure. Our treasure is Jesus Christ, His Gospel, His real Presence, the Eucharist, Penance, and the Remission of sin; the dogma of the Communion of the Saints, the

visible existence of the Holy Church, our Mother; the fact of eternal life, the life divine and supernatural, conferred upon souls when this life is over. This treasure is immaculate, entire, certain, incontestable beyond the reach of frauds and doubts. Fear nothing, Christian souls! Feed upon the divine life, the sources of which are known to you. In every village of every Christian country, the priest of Jesus Christ holds the keys of the Church, into which you may enter to recline as the Apostle St. John did, upon the bosom of the Saviour Jesus, and you can ask of Him His soul, His heart, His blood, His mind, His divinity; this is our treasure. It will not be taken from us."

The Abbé Gratry is right. In spite of falsehoods, in spite of compromise, the catholic Church is still in every place the treasure-house of all the grace and truth which is the legacy of Jesus Christ to His redeemed.

CHAPTER XI

THREE RECENT PAPAL UTTERANCES

THREE recent Papal utterances, all of them considerably later in date than the first issue of this little book (1888), have illustrated so forcibly features in the character and method of the Roman Church to which attention was called in these pages, that it seems to be desirable to take notice of them in a concluding chapter.

I.

The Encyclical (of 1893) on "the Study of Sacred Scripture."

1. The motive of the Encyclical is "to give an impulse to the noble science of Holy Scripture and to impart to Scripture study a direction suitable to the needs of the present day." Thus the bulk of the Encyclical is an exhortation to the study of Holy Scripture by ecclesiastical persons. This is recommended, by arguments such as can easily be imagined, from the authority of our Lord Himself, of St. Peter and the other Apostles, of the Fathers, and of the later Church, of which it is said:—

"She has prescribed that a considerable portion of the sacred books shall be read and piously reflected upon by

all her ministers in the daily office of the sacred psalmody. She has ordered that in cathedral churches, in monasteries, and in other convents in which study can conveniently be pursued, they shall be expounded and interpreted by capable men; and she has strictly commanded that her children shall be fed with the saving words of the Gospel at least on Sundays and solemn feasts. Moreover, it is owing to the wisdom and exertions of the Church that there has always been continued from century to century that cultivation of Holy Scripture which has been so remarkable and borne such ample fruit."

But none the less there is need of further encouragement in this study at the present moment in view of the perils which beset it.

There follows a description of the rationalism which by a natural evolution has taken the place of the older assertion of the right of private judgment as the chief antagonist of the Catholic Church.

The rationalistic critics are described in language applicable only to those who deny altogether the existence and action of supernatural influence, but allusion is made also to would-be theologians and Christians who "attempt to disguise by such honourable names their rashness and their pride"; and there has been a previous allusion to men (apparently within the Church) who "attempt innovations in a deceitful and imprudent spirit."

It is noticed how the attacks of rationalism are not confined to the academic region, but that "the efforts and arts of the enemy are chiefly directed against the more ignorant masses of the people" by every method of propaganda.

Later on an account is given of the principle of

current criticism, with which (apart from the extraordinary exaggeration of the last sentence) many of us would sympathize in part:—

"There has arisen, to the great detriment of religion, an inept method, dignified by the name of 'higher criticism,' which pretends to judge of the origin, integrity, and authority of each book from internal indications alone. It is clear, on the other hand, that in historical questions, such as the origin or the handing down of writings, the witness of history is of primary importance, and that historical investigation should be made with the utmost care; and that in this matter internal evidence is seldom of great value, except as confirmation."

Then Orientalists are not very tenderly dealt with:—

"It is a lamentable fact that there are many who, with great labour, carry out and publish investigations on the monuments of antiquity, the manners and institutions of nations, and other illustrative subjects, and whose chief purpose in all this is too often to find mistakes in the sacred writings, and so to shake and weaken their authority."

Such are the conditions which postulate a fresh access of ecclesiastical zeal in the "scientific" study and interpretation of Holy Scripture. The Vulgate version is to be the main standard of study and reference, but recourse to the original languages is declared to be "useful and advantageous" in cases where the meaning is ambiguous or less clear. The literal sense is to be held to where possible, but legitimate allegorical interpretation is also to be employed as having an authority even apostolic.

In all this there is nothing much to surprise us. It is what we should expect in a Papal Encyclical. It would be practically valuable if it produced an increased

study of Holy Scripture on the part of ecclesiastics. What is remarkable is the doctrine consistently enunciated as to the character of Biblical inspiration. The Vatican Council, following Trent, expressly defined that the books of the Old and New Testaments "have God for their *auctor*." But Newman[1] and others had interpreted "auctor" as meaning no more than "primary cause." Now, however, the Pope declares God their author in such simple and positive sense that any error in the sacred text would involve "that God Himself was deceived":—

"It is true, no doubt, that copyists have made mistakes in the text of the Bible; this question, when it arises, should be carefully considered on its merits, and the fact not too easily admitted, but only in those passages where the proof is clear. It may also happen that the sense of a passage remains ambiguous, and in this case good hermeneutical methods will greatly assist in clearing up the obscurity. But it is absolutely wrong and forbidden, either to narrow inspiration to certain parts only of Holy Scripture, or to admit that the sacred writer has erred. For the system of those who, in order to rid themselves of these difficulties, do not hesitate to concede that divine inspiration regards the things of faith and morals, and nothing beyond, because (as they wrongly think), in a question of the truth or falsehood of a passage, we should consider not so much what God has said as the reason and purpose which He had in mind in saying it—this system cannot be tolerated. For all the books which the Church receives as sacred and canonical are written wholly and entirely, with all their parts, at the dictation of the Holy Ghost; and so far is it from being possible that any error can co-exist with inspiration, that inspiration not only is essentially incompatible with error, but excludes and

[1] *Nineteenth Century*, February 1884, p. 188.

rejects it as absolutely and necessarily as it is impossible that God Himself, the supreme Truth, can utter that which is not true. This is the ancient and unchanging faith of the Church, solemnly defined in the Councils of Florence and Trent, and finally confirmed and more expressly formulated by the Council of the Vatican. These are the words of the last :—

"The Books of the Old and New Testament, whole and entire, with all their parts, as enumerated in the decree of the same Council (Trent) and in the ancient Latin Vulgate, are to be received as sacred and canonical. And the Church holds them as sacred and canonical, not because, having been composed by human industry, they were afterwards approved by her authority; nor only because they contain revelation without error; but because, having been written under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, they have God for their author.

Hence, because the Holy Ghost employed men as His instruments, we cannot, therefore, say that it was these inspired instruments who, perchance, have fallen into error, and not the primary Author. For, by supernatural power, He so moved and impelled them to write—He was so present to them—that the things which he ordered, and those only, they first rightly understood, then willed faithfully to write down, and finally expressed in apt words and with infallible truth. Otherwise, it could not be said that He was the Author of the entire Scripture. Such has always been the persuasion of the Fathers. 'Therefore,' says St. Augustine, 'since they wrote the things which He showed and uttered to them, it cannot be pretended that He is not the writer; for His members executed what their Head dictated.' And St. Gregory the Great thus pronounces :—

"Most superfluous it is to inquire who wrote these things—we loyally believe the Holy Ghost to be the Author of the book. He wrote it Who dictated it for writing; He wrote it Who inspired its execution.

"It follows that those who maintain that an error is possible in any genuine passage of the sacred writings either pervert the Catholic notion of inspiration, or make God the author of such error. And so emphatically were all the Fathers and Doctors agreed that the Divine writings,

as left by the hagiographers, are free from all error, that they laboured earnestly, with no less skill than reverence, to reconcile with each other those numerous passages which seem at variance—the very passages which in great measure have been taken up by the 'higher criticism'; for they were unanimous in laying it down, that those writings, in their entirety and in all their parts, were equally from the *afflatus* of Almighty God, and that God, speaking by the sacred writers, could not set down anything but what was true. The words of St. Augustine to St. Jerome may sum up what they taught:—

"On my own part I confess to your charity that it is only to those books of Scripture which are now called canonical that I have learned to pay such honour and reverence as to believe most firmly that none of their writers has fallen into any error. And if in these books I meet anything which seems contrary to truth, I shall not hesitate to conclude either that the text is faulty, or that the translator has not expressed the meaning of the passage, or that I myself do not understand it."

This passage is most remarkable. It is nothing whatever but an assertion by the Pope of "verbal inspiration" as the indubitable doctrine of the Church. Naturally, therefore, he condemns unhesitatingly any limitation of inspiration, in the sense in which it involves infallibility, to the things of faith and morals, and (by implication) the accompanying recognition of grades of inspiration. Yet this is, I believe, a new departure and of great importance. Newman had remarked that[1]:—

"While the Councils (of Trent and the Vatican) lay down so emphatically the inspiration of Scripture in respect to 'faith and morals,' it is remarkable that they do not say a word directly as to its inspiration in matters of fact." "Four times does the Tridentine Council insist upon 'faith and morality' as the scope of inspired teaching." "In like manner the Vatican Council pronounces that supernatural revelation consists '*in rebus Divinis*.'"

[1] *l.c.*, p. 189.

Newman emphasizes this, though he rejects the large conclusion that "the record of facts does not come under the guarantee of inspiration." When we pass from Councils to Popes, here again it would appear that the see of Rome[1] had maintained silence on the questions raised within the Roman communion as to the limits of inspiration—a silence which might be described as studious. Thus in Canon di Bartolo's useful work, *Critères Theologiques*,[2] it is laid down as the positive proposition that—

"Inspiration is a supernatural succour which flows in upon the intelligence and will of the sacred writer, and causes him to write the true doctrine in matter of faith and morality, the true facts which are inseparably connected with them, and everything else with a right intention and a Divine mission of a quite special character for the salvation of the human race."

Thus the doctrine of *grades* of inspiration, the idea of an inspiration which does not guarantee infallibility, and the limitation of the highest sort of infallibility to things of faith and morals and what is inseparably allied with them—all this is expressly declared by the moderate theologian we are quoting an open and allowed doctrine. An apparently increasing body of Roman writers have been acting on the assumption that it was open doctrine. But now it is utterly condemned by the authority of the Pope. The Encyclical asserts as beyond all question that, when once the right text is ascertained and the sense plain, all possibility of error of any kind is excluded, because the omniscient and

[1] See Manning's *Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost*, p. 158.
[2] French translation from the Italian, pp. 244-258.

infallible God is the real author of the text; with the result that it is "nothing to the point that the Holy Spirit should have employed human instruments, as if anything erroneous could have escaped not from the primary author, but from the inspired writers," for the Holy Spirit actually dictated all the words.

In the Encyclical then, we witness, as it appears, an entire victory of the school of extreme theologians (such as would be represented by Cornely, the leading author of the recent Jesuit *Scripturae sacrae cursus*) who have been trying of recent years to tie the Roman Church to the scholastic rigorism as to the meaning of inspiration.

2. What is the authority which from a Roman Catholic point of view this Encyclical Letter possesses? Is it an utterance of the Pope *ex cathedrâ*, and, therefore, infallible? The Pope is infallible when, "speaking as head of the Church, and in the plenitude of his supreme authority, he defines a doctrine of faith and morals which must be accepted by all Bishops and all the faithful."[1] Provided that the intention of defining authoritatively is clear, a bull, an encyclical, an apostolic letter, a brief, a local council, may be the vehicle of the infallible utterance. Is the Pope in this encyclical expressing a clear intention to define the meaning of the doctrine of inspiration for all Bishops and for all the faithful? One would suppose so from the tone of the letter. But perhaps it would be said that the definition is only assumed by the way as a basis for practical exhortation. No doubt some reason may be

[1] Di Bartolo, p. 93.

found—has, in fact, been found—to declare the Encyclical not infallible, in the same way that the *Decretum* of Eugenius to the Armenians about holy order or the Bull *Unam Sanctam*, so far as it affects the temporal power of sovereigns, has been declared not infallible, having been found in fact erroneous or impracticable. The definition of what are the conditions of *ex cathedrâ* utterances is most conveniently vague in any statement of them, whether Franzelin's or Di Bartolo's. I confine myself, then, to the recognition of the fact that the Pope, being believed to be what he is believed to be in the Roman Church, has proclaimed with absolute decision and complete authoritativeness of tone, as the doctrine of the Church, the doctrine of the exact verbal inspiration of Holy Scripture.

3. This Papal utterance appears to be, from the point of view of one who desires to see a reconciliation of Christian theology with scientific criticism, most disastrous. Let any one read the wise, guarded words of the French theologian M. Loisy, on *la Question Biblique* in what was (alas!) the last number of his periodical *L'Enseignement Biblique*, and estimate what a calamity it is that this utterance of authority should have put an end to the periodical with the ending of the year 1893.[1] The fact is symbolical. It is designed to suppress the school of free and real criticism which seemed to be forming itself in the Roman Church, and

[1] The following *Avis* is prefixed to the last issue:—*L'Enseignement Biblique* ne paraîtra pas en 1894. Fidèlement soumis aux dernières instructions du souverain Pontif Léon XIII., le directeur de la revue éprouve le besoin de se récueiller quelque temps dans un travail silencieux.'

taking such firm root. Nothing is to be allowed—as far as the Pope can secure it—but such apologetics as can be based on the assumption that there are no discrepancies, even minute, between Kings and Chronicles, or one part of the Bible and another (when once the true text is ascertained) that alike the narrative of Genesis i.-xi., and that of Daniel, nay, those of Tobit and Judith, are in the strict sense historical, and that the Pentateuchal Legislation, as put into the mouth of Moses, is all strictly Mosaic. Nothing else is to be allowed—till truth revenges itself as it revenged itself on the same Church when she dealt in similar fashion with the science of Galileo.[1]

4. This is all sad and disheartening enough from the wider point of view. The decision, however, may help to make it apparent that the Anglican Church has, as was suggested above,[2] apart from its ordinary mission to the English-speaking races, a mission of a more special sort, as that part of the Church where faith and free science must win their reconciliation. We should suppose that this Encyclical would have a dissuasive power on persons disposed to put their trust in Rome, if they have any interest in the relation of faith to contemporary knowledge. No document could present more emphatically the spectacle of a great ruler failing to deal with a situation—failing indeed, marvellously,

[1] It should be noticed that the tone of the Encyclical is much more guarded when it proceeds to speak of the relation of Holy Scripture to physical science: see the authorized translation (Burns and Oates), p. 21 ff.

[2] Pp. 14-15.

utterly—than this Encyclical of the Pope to the Bishops of the Roman Catholic communion. It is written as by a being inhabiting a planet different from that which is the scene of modern knowledge. What must be said of a Church which, while making the highest profession of guidance through a chief pastor, has nothing better than this to offer on one of the most difficult subjects that strain the religious thought of the present? There is not a word said, such as one would expect from any Catholic source, of the way in which the Catholic creed focuses the rays of Holy Scripture on a single Person, and exhibits it all, not as a flat surface of uniform level, but as a district of very varying levels and gradients converging upon a city and a sanctuary. The way of regarding the Bible which some describe as purely Protestant appears here to be (what, in fact, students have always known it to be) a product of mediæval scholasticism. All that Renan meant when he said that a student of Holy Scripture would find that "the little finger of the [Roman] Catholic Church is thicker than the loins of Protestantism" is here shown true enough. It cannot, in fact, be conceived how a document more out of date, more crude, more unsympathetic, more unpastoral than the present Encyclical could have been issued. And if the Romans succeed in minimizing its importance, and reassert their liberty to pursue the critical study of Holy Scripture, they only minimize the importance of their chief pastor. All he could do to give authoritative guidance he has done. And the guidance is—what here appears.

It remains, then, for us to try and do better. And we can depend upon it that it is in proportion as we can positively exhibit a catholic life which is open to modern knowledge, which can assimilate its fruits with faith and devotion unimpaired, that we can best minister in the final result to the reunion of Christendom. We must become all that we have it in us to be; and moral needs, both personal and social, as well as the intellectual gains and difficulties of the present, alike give us our opportunity.

II.

The Encyclical on Unity, "Satis Cognitum" (1896).

This Encyclical, though intrinsically less important than the one just discussed, has excited much more attention, owing to the attention which Leo XIII. had been bestowing upon the "recovery of England."

The principle of ecclesiastical unity in the visible Church is stated in the opening portions of this Encyclical in a manner thoroughly consonant to the ancient idea of the apostolic succession, in accordance with which all the bishops are equally successors of the Apostles. From the earlier portion the Cyprianic or Anglican doctrine of the authority of the Episcopal College would naturally follow. The familiar papal conclusion is, however, drawn from the consideration that every society must have a supreme authority which must reside in one person. Nothing is more remarkable than the assumption which henceforth pervades the Encyclical that "only a despotic monarch can secure

to any society unity and strength." This premiss once granted, it follows easily enough that Christ should have appointed Peter Head of the Church, and given him succession in the bishops of Rome.

The rest of the Encyclical expresses the papal claim in its most familiar form. The arguments have been already dealt with in earlier chapters.[1] It is only necessary here to notice some characteristic features of the document.

1. *Its arbitrary assumptions:—*

"The nature of this supreme authority, which all Christians are bound to obey, can be ascertained only by finding out what was the evident and positive Will of Christ. Certainly Christ is a King for ever, and, though invisible, He continues unto the end of time to govern and guard His Church from heaven. But since He willed that His Kingdom should be visible, He was obliged, when He ascended into heaven, to designate a Vicegerent on earth."

How can it be known that Christ must have acted in this particular way? Is not this just the point where careful examination of the earliest Christian documents is needed, to see what was the evident will of Christ? Is not the suggestion of the Pope as to how Christ must have acted, constituting the Church on earth a body complete in itself, with a visible head, in remarkable contrast to the view of St. Augustine, given at length above[2]—a view simply representative of the ancient idea of local Churches, associated in fellowship on earth, but finding their necessary centre of unity, in

[1] See further *The Encyclical Satis Cognitum*, published for the Ch. Hist. Soc. by S.P.C.K.

[2] Page 34.

common with the Church in paradise, at no lower point than in the glorified Christ?

2. *Its wholly unhistorical assertions:—*

"The consent of antiquity ever acknowledged without the slightest doubt or hesitation the bishops of Rome, and revered them as the legitimate successors of St. Peter."

What a marvellous assertion, in view of the fact that (as shown at length above) the papal claim of the succession to Petrine privileges is a purely Western growth. It does not appear[1] that a single Greek Father of the first six centuries recognizes the connection, which is the corner-stone of the Roman claim, between Christ's promise to St. Peter and the position of the Pope. "In the writings of the Greek doctors," says "Janus," "Eusebius, St. Athanasius, St. Basil the Great, the two Gregories, and St. Epiphanius, there is no one word of any [unique] prerogative of the Roman bishop. The most copious of the Greek Fathers, St. Chrysostom, is wholly silent on the subject." What, then, is the meaning of talking of the "consent of antiquity," or of describing the decrees of the Vatican Council as "the venerable and constant belief of every age"? (We may notice in passing that the Encyclical gives no recognition at all to the principle of "development of doctrine.") What, again, is the meaning of saying that "it has ever been unquestionably the office of the Roman pontiffs to ratify or to reject the decrees of Councils," when, as late as the fifteenth century Council of Constance, the subordination of Popes to Councils[2] was unmistakably asserted as the doctrine of the Church?

[1] See p. 91. [2] See p. 122.

3. *Its unjustifiable quotations:*—Of these I will content myself with giving three instances—(*a*) The Pope quotes St. Pacian as saying, "To Peter the Lord spake; to *one* therefore, that He might establish unity upon one." But he omits to mention that he continues, "And soon he was to give the same injunction to the general body." (*b*) He cites, in confirmation of the papal view of Peter as the rock, some quite ambiguous words of Origen, to the effect that no more against the rock, than against the Church, can the gates of hell prevail, although the passage cited above[1] immediately precedes, which proves conclusively that Origen had no idea that Peter had any privilege which all the other Apostles did not share. (*c*) He cites St. Cyprian as saying "of the Roman Church that 'It is the root and mother of the Catholic Church, the Chair of Peter, and the principal Church whence sacerdotal unity had its origin.'" This is a combination of two different passages, of which the first, "the root and mother of the Catholic Church," has no reference to the Roman Church, and the second, from a letter strongly rebuking the Pope, refers to Rome as the source of the apostolical succession in Africa.[2]

Now I may fairly ask whether the accusations of inveracity and disingenuousness which have been made in the course of this book against the Roman method of argument, are not again justified?

III.

The Bull "Apostolicae Curae."

Within the last few months the Pope has issued the

[1] See p. 86. [2] See p. 118.

above bull, condemning our orders as "absolutely null and utterly void."

The bulk of this document is occupied with deciding that the question was not an open one for Roman Catholics, the Roman Church having already determined it. Disputable as this position may be, we are not concerned with it,[1] but, fortunately for us, the Pope is not contented with reasserting a negative attitude, but gives his reasons. As regards these reasons given, then, we notice that there is a marked abandonment of old grounds—not the "Nag's Head" fable only, but the denial also that Barlow was a bishop, and the position of Eugenius as to the form and matter of holy order.[2] All these objections are—the first two tacitly, the last explicitly—abandoned. But

(1) Anglican orders are repudiated,[3] because there was not in the Edwardine service for ordaining priests[4] explicit mention, in the words of ordination, of the office of priesthood to which ordination was being conferred, and more precisely, of "the power of consecrating and offering the true body and blood of the Lord," *i.e.* in the Eucharistic sacrifice.

But it is manifest, from the existing services of ordination, that the specification of this function of the priesthood is equally absent, not only from the

[1] See above, p. 141. [2] See above, pp. 142-9.

[3] This matter is here very briefly dealt with, because *The Bull Apostolicae Curae and the Edwardine Ordinal* (Puller) and *A Treatise on the Bull Apostolicae Curae* (Ch. Hist. Soc., S.P.C.K.) have said everything which needs to be said upon the subject, in as brief compass and as well as possible.

[4] See above, p. 150 and note 1.

Coptic rite, but also from the ancient Roman rite for ordination to the priesthood in the third century, and later down to the ninth century. If the absence of this specification invalidates ordinations, they were indeed invalidated long before the English Church came into existence. Here, in fact, we touch upon a matter of importance. Confessedly the English Church desired to return to the richer and fuller conception of the function of the priest which had prevailed in primitive times, before the function of offering sacrifice had assumed the undue prominence given to it in the Middle Ages. "Be thou a faithful dispenser of the Word of God and of His holy Sacraments" includes, no doubt, the commission to celebrate the Eucharistic sacrifice, but it puts it in context with the whole work of the ministry, according to primitive models and scriptural ideas. Of such a return to antiquity we have no reason to be ashamed, and the Edwardine ordinal makes it abundantly manifest, that the office which is being conferred is nothing else than the office of the priesthood. The Pope must indeed have been dreaming when he said that "in the whole ordinal there is no clear mention of . . . the priesthood"[1]

(2) Passing by a similar objection to the ordination of a bishop, which falls on the same grounds, we find the Pope asserting that the intention of the Anglican Church was inadequate, owing to the defective ideas of the priesthood which her offices express. But here nothing new is alleged. The only requisite intention is the intention to continue the orders which had been

[1] See the *Treatise on the Bull*, pp. 20-28.

all along in the Church, the general intention of continuing to do what the Church in general had done;[1] and so understood the Church of England made her intention perfectly clear. The views of particular men cannot be brought into question, and no requirement can be legitimately made that the Church of England should have been in express agreement with the doctrine current in the Church of Rome at one particular epoch. All this has been argued above.

The real significance of this Bull lies in the fact that a school of liberal Roman Catholic theologians had been within the last few years candidly examining the question of Anglican orders and one after another expressing their belief more or less decisively in their validity; and the Bull is only one more example of the refusal of Rome to sanction free and impartial inquiry into historical facts. The tenor of the Encyclical about Holy Scripture and, of the Bull just considered, is in fact identical. They go together to confirm that view of the Roman spirit which our whole inquiry has forced us to take. But this conclusion—that Rome is inadequate to represent the original purpose and meaning of the Christian Church in tolerable completeness,—should be to us Anglicans a motive to nothing else than a humble, prayerful, and continual effort to realize better in our own branch of the Church the high vocation to which we are called.

[1] See above, p. 156.

APPENDED NOTE I.

THE BEARING OF THE THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.[1]

NO doubt the idea of evolution is a dominant idea in our time. In order to render anything intelligible to ourselves we need to regard it as part of a connected process, either as a result, or as a stage which "looks before and after," and which is to be viewed in the light of that out of which it has grown, and that into which it is passing. In other words, we expect with reference to all subjects an answer, not to the simple question, "What is it?" but rather to the threefold question, "Whence comes it," and "whither goes it," and "by what law?" The effect of this idea of evolution on theology is necessarily important. I may illustrate it by three examples.

(1) It changes our natural way of thinking about God's revelation of Himself. It makes it harder for us to think of revealed truth as a detached and definite body of propositions of equal value given within a certain area of time and space, and it inclines us to think of God as revealing Himself by a gradual process which embraces in a certain sense the whole world, and the whole of human history, which has its initial and imperfect stages, but which has also among the chosen people its region of special intensity, and in Jesus Christ and Pentecost its point of culmination. But in this respect it is perhaps truer to say that modern modes of thought tend to make us, not adopt a new way of thinking about revelation, but recur to an older one.

(2) It modifies our way of thinking about eschatology or

[1] An Address delivered at the Church Congress, Shrewsbury, October 1896.

"the doctrine of the last things." There are two ways of thinking about the results of human lives. You may think of men as receiving beyond the grave rewards or punishments, given from outside by the Divine Judge; or you may think of each human life as perpetually occupied in fashioning its own character, and thus also, according to inevitable law, its own ultimate destiny. These two ways of thinking are not inconsistent. The inevitable outcome may be also the divinely allotted reward or penalty, but in any case the idea of evolution forces us first of all to the latter of the two modes of thinking about the issues of human lives. Whatever is to be our state hereafter, we are quite sure it will only be the natural outgrowth of what we are or are making ourselves here and now.

(3) The idea of evolution has resulted in that way of studying Christian doctrine which is specially exemplified in German *Histories of Dogma*. Dr. Hatch used to complain that theologians would quote all ancient fathers as if they were isolated atoms on a uniform level, whether it were Justin Martyr, or Leo the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, or Gregory of Rome. But this way of quoting the fathers must vanish even from regions where it still flourishes. To each writer must be assigned his "value," by having always in mind the place he occupies in the development of theology in some particular part of the world.

Evolution, then, has taken hold of theology. It has modified our way of thinking about it. It will not be dislodged. But before it became thus broadly an established principle of theological knowledge, it had received a certain controversial application; for in the book which first familiarized the English public with the application of development to theology, a book which we must remember preceded by fifteen years the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species*—I mean, of course, Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*—the idea of evolution (or development) in theology was used to justify the position of the Church of Rome. Quiet thought on the subject seems to me continually to deepen our perception of the varied application of the idea of evolution to theology—sometimes

in ways which Newman would have refused to recognize —while at the same time it weakens the force of the particular application of it which Newman suggested. We may find an analogy for this conclusion in the history of the idea of evolution as applied to nature as a whole. There, too, we may distinguish between the general idea and one particular controversial application of it. The general idea has deepened and strengthened its hold on our minds in every region of inquiry; but the particular controversial application of it, viz. as a sufficient and final answer to the theist's time-honoured "argument from design," has from various causes been weakened rather than strengthened in lapse of time. So it has been in theology; and it is to this particular application of the subject that I proceed to devote myself.

Newman's argument may be in general terms summarized thus:—Christianity came into the world as an idea or a germ. It was planted there to grow. It has grown, and in lapse of time has become the Roman Catholic Church, which is a result of a continuous organic growth over a wide area and on a great scale. And it is the only great growth. The Eastern Church represents a backwater as compared to a current, or a formula as compared to a living principle; Protestantism represents an individualist reaction rather than a growth; and Anglicanism a somewhat hopeless appeal to antiquity in place of a living grasp on the present. I have stated this argument in extreme form, only because for my present purposes I am going to grant all it claims, as if it were a fair statement of the case. Granted, then, for the purposes of argument that the facts are so, may we conclude that because the Roman Catholic Church is the main actual development of Christianity, therefore it is justified in claiming to be the authenticated representative of primitive Christianity? Is what an idea historically becomes necessarily the true interpretation of it? The answer to this question, which may be derived from the history of religions, is a most emphatic No. Nothing is more conspicuous there than the tendency to deterioration, or the tendency on the part of a

religion to change character by gradual self-accommodation to circumstances instead of moulding circumstances in accordance with its original idea. This fact is apparent in the history of Buddhism. No mistake could be so vital as to take the main existing developments of Buddhism as really interpreting the spirit of Sakya Muni. But it may be said the divine presence in Christianity guarantees us against perversion or distortion of the original type. We must look to facts: and first to the history of the Old Covenant. Devotion to the Mosaic law, as divinely given, reached its climax at the return from the Captivity. It was kindled into a splendid enthusiasm through the heroism of the Maccabean period. Then it developed into the Judaism of our Lord's time. That was beyond question its main and substantial growth. Thus when John the Baptist appeared, he appeared as a protestant against the actual development which the inspired religion had received; as one "throwing back" to an earlier prophetic type. Nay, more, when the Christ, the divinely intended result of the Old Covenant, appeared, the representatives of the actual development repudiated and crucified Him; and Christ had already interpreted this fact in His own attitude towards tradition. Tradition, He said, had misled the scribes and Pharisees, because they had not continually tested it by the "Word of God." "Thus have ye made the commandment of God of none effect by your tradition." I draw from this a certain conclusion, namely, that a religion, because divinely inspired, is not therefore preserved from widespread deterioration; is not therefore prevented from receiving a development which, while it must appear as the chief historical development of the original, is in fact its parody. I apply this conclusion to Christianity. Christ indeed did promise that His presence and His Spirit, the Spirit both of truth and grace, should never fail in the Church, and that promise has been verified. The truth essential to make Christian saints has always been shining in the world through the witness of the Christian Church, and the power to correspond with the divine requirements has always been communicated through the means of grace

to the sons of faith. There has, therefore, been no failure of Christ's promise. On the other hand, it is only by a misapplication of Christ's promises, precisely similar to that on which the scribes and Pharisees of Judaism based their false and disastrous claim ("We have Abraham to our father"), that the leaders of the Christian Church have lulled themselves into a perilous security against the possibility that the Church, short of substantial failure, may go far astray. There is no guarantee that the Church may not, if she neglects the means provided to keep her right, get upon a false line of development, and that almost universally. Thus, without stopping to dispute all that Newman says about the Roman Church in its relation to primitive Christianity, we may still affirm that the protest of the Reformation may have been as necessary to recall Christianity to its ideal as the protest of John the Baptist was to recall the Judaism of Israel to its right allegiance, and to interpret our Lord's strong depreciation of a mere, or unchecked, ecclesiastical tradition.

And what are the facts about the Roman Church? When you come to look at them it appears self-evident that the Roman development is a development with two characteristics. First, it is partial or one-sided, a development which has left out elements in the original type—the very splendour of its success in dealing with a particular situation or set of situations tended to make it this. Secondly, it is a development which is the result of an over-reckless self-accommodation to the unregenerate natural instincts in religion. I confine myself to one significant illustration of the latter proposition—I mean the development of the cultus of the saints in its mediæval and modern form. It is written on the face of Church history that this has resulted from Christianity accepting, not without preliminary protest, but finally even with enthusiasm, what is simply an almost universal phenomenon of untaught natural religion all over the world. If you travel in many a Buddhist, or Mohammedan, or Christian country, you see the same facts; the same devotion gathering round the tombs of departed saints, who are regarded as inter-

cessors or mediators, and as patrons of particular places or trades or classes, and are approached with divine or semi-divine homage. The tendency, the exhibited devotion, the results of the devotion, are startlingly identical as one observes them in all parts of the world. Now this saint worship was quite alien to the original spirit of Mohammedanism. It was much more alien to the original spirit of Buddhism; but in both cases the dominant, popular instinct has overmastered the original idea, and the alien or repugnant element has taken its place, perhaps its place of supremacy, in the religion which still retains the ancient name of Mohammed or Buddha. Facts irresistibly point to the conclusion that exactly the same thing has occurred in Christianity. The half-converted masses passed into the Church with this dominant instinct of hero worship still in them—with the dominant demand for mediators and objects of worship less high and holy than God. The demand had met with a strong opposition in the maxims and principles of the Christian theology which belongs to the period when struggle and persecution kept Christianity at a high level; but when Christianity became popular, the incoming flood was too large and too rapid to be resisted or properly educated. It had its way, and a saint worship, which belongs essentially to natural and not to revealed religion, and which exhibits all its old phenomena, has taken its place in Christianity. To say that it belongs to natural religion is to say something *for* it. Moreover, there is in revealed religion a principle of the communion of saints which is akin to it. Therefore I am not now saying that there is no legitimate human and Christian cultus of the saints. God forbid. And I am very far from denying that we in the Church of England have far too little of it. All that I am saying is that the actual development of that cultus as it appeared in the mediæval Church is a development of primitive Christianity, but a development in exactly the same sense in which exactly the same product is a development of Mohammedanism or Buddhism.

My first contention, then, is this: there exists in all

religions a tendency to develop by way of deterioration, by way of a one-sided distortion, and by way of a too easy assimilation of elements in the natural instinct of religion which are really uncongenial—at least without deep transformation—to their original idea. My second contention is that these tendencies are indisputably manifest in the actual development of Romanism out of primitive Christianity. My third contention is that the fact that Christianity is in a special sense a revealed or inspired religion, does not secure it against liability to fall into these tendencies, if it is guilty of neglect in using the means which would prevent such a disaster. My proof of this contention lies in pointing to the actual development of the religion of the Old Covenant, and to the significant warning of our Lord that ecclesiastical developments need checking by the Word of God. We are left, then, in this position. We might grant, as fully as Newman, even in his most extreme moments, seems to require it, that existing Romanism is the only real living development of Primitive Christianity on a large scale. And still we should have to reiterate that it does not therefore follow that a position of protest against it is not the position which makes us inheritors of John the Baptist and of our Lord Himself. Of course, in merely animal or vegetable nature, we may say that the existing development is the only, and therefore the divinely-intended, development; but where, as in human history, the fact of sin comes in, we can say nothing of the kind. The existing development of no human society, not even of the Church, necessarily represents the divine intention. What the divine intention for human society in general may be we are left to ascertain, as best we can, by consulting our judgments and our moral ideals. But in regard to the Church we are provided with more definite guidance. The Church is a continuous society with its necessary "tradition," but it has, or ought to have, ever before its eyes a definite and fixed—because written—ideal to which it is to be continually recurring, the evangelical and apostolic type which is, or ought to be, the test of every doctrine, of every institution, of every moral ideal, claiming the

allegiance of Christians; and to abandon which, for any reason whatever, is nothing else than faithlessness to the divine word.

Briefly I would conclude by indicating the true idea of Christian development. In the Word made Flesh, in the Church in which God and man are at one, is the climax of all possible religious development. No disclosure of God to man, no union of man with God, can be closer than is here attained. Thus the revelation of Godhead, the revelation of manhood, the deposit of truth and the deposit of grace which are original in Christianity, and find their witness enshrined in the original institutions and tradition of the Church and in the writings of the Apostles—this is final and Catholic. But it takes a special development according to the genius of each race and of each age—for example, in Alexandrian, in Russian, in Celtic, early Irish and Scotch, Christianity, and, greatest of all, in Roman Catholicism. The vital point is that no one of these developments, each necessarily partial, should be allowed so to stereotype itself as to limit the power of recurrence to the original truths and institutions in order to a fresh development for a new race or the needs of a new age. This is the meaning of the "appeal to Scripture."

The doctrines of the Nicene creed, the institutions of the apostolic ministry and the sacraments—these can manifestly make good their appeal to the New Testament. Christianity is a life based both on revealed truths and divinely inaugurated and inspired institutions. The dogmas and institutions that can really be called Catholic are the real interpreters of Scripture. They are no obstacle to the freest appeal to any really original feature in Christianity. These are the elements out of which development is continually to take place afresh in view of changing needs and requirements. And in the fact that, with all our weaknesses and all our failures, we in the Church of England have retained the essential Catholic elements, and, hampered though we are in hand and foot, by the results of our past sins and our miserable subservience to statecraft and to wealth, are yet unfettered by any un-

catholic dogma, and are pledged by our whole tradition to the appeal to Scripture—in this fact, I say, there lies the rational ground of a profound belief in the vocation of Anglicanism. The Catholic starting-point is under our feet; the rich experience of the past is stored up to enlighten, but not to enslave us; its old examples of faith and zeal and love have lost none of their inspirations; the needs of the age are clamorous. Can we then "discern the time" we live in, and rise to our vocation?

II

THE CONCEPTION OF CHURCH UNITY IN ST. HILARY.

Cf. p. 32.

THE conception of Church unity explained above in Chapter II. is admirably illustrated by St. Hilary of Poitiers in his argument with the Arians, *de Trin.* viii. 5-8. The Arians interpreted Christ's declaration "I and My Father are one" as referring only to a unity of will or consent, not to a unity of nature, and they justified their interpretation by an appeal to expressions used about the Church such as "of one heart and of one soul"; for the unity of the Church, they said, is also a unity which consists in agreement of wills. But this argument Hilary repudiates, and turns their appeal against themselves. The unity of the Church, he insists, is a unity of nature which exists because all its members are common sharers in the new life of Christ. "They are one through regeneration into the same nature." "The Apostle teaches that the unity of the faithful comes from the nature of the sacraments, when he writes to the Galatians, 'As many of you as were baptized into Christ, have put on Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free, neither male nor female, for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.' This unity, in spite of all differences of race, condition, sex, does it arise from assent of will? Is it not rather sacramental, because they have all received one baptism and been clothed with one Christ? What function then has

harmony of mind to fulfil in a case where unity among men is already secured by the fact that they are clothed with the one Christ, through the nature of the one baptism?"

III

ST. BASIL AND ST. HILARY ON DOCTRINAL CONFUSION IN THE CHURCH. *Cf.* p. 52.

ROMAN Catholic controversialists assure us that there can never be a time of confusion in the Church in matters of doctrine. To assert that there has been "would be, in the mouth of a Catholic, the grossest impiety."[1] How then is it that St. Basil can speak thus in his work on the Holy Spirit (xxx. 77)?—

"Is not the tempest of the Church fiercer than a storm at sea? For in it every landmark of the Fathers has been moved, and everything upon which our opinions rested, or by which they might be defended, has been convulsed. . . . The harsh clamour of disputatious combatants, inarticulate cries, and the confused sounds of perpetual tumults, which end in the destruction of godly orthodoxy, have now filled nearly the whole Church. . . . Every one is a theologian, even the man whose soul is branded with countless pollutions. Hence revolutionists easily augment their numbers, while self-appointed individuals, with a keen appetite for place, reject the dispensation of the Holy Spirit, and then divide among themselves the high offices of the Church. . . . The lust of power is followed by a widespread and prevalent disregard of all authority, and the exhortations of superiors become absolutely null and void, for every one, in his ignorant pride, thinks he is more bound to command than to obey." Moreover, it was the authorities of the church themselves who were in confusion." "We define creeds," writes St. Hilary, "by the year or by the month, and then we repent of our definitions, and repenting afresh we defend them,

[1] Father Richardson's *What are the Catholic Claims?* Kegan Paul, 1889, p. 60.

and then again we anathematize those we have defended." In a word, through all this period, "the faith of the Church was subjected to assault from the Bishops," and was only saved by the faithful laity.[1]

IV

THE COMMON DIFFUSION OF THE SCRIPTURES AMONG CHRISTIANS OF THE EMPIRE. *Cf.* p. 69.

FATHER Richardson (*l.c.* p. 71) assures his readers that "to an educated man who knows what a Bible must have been in Patristic days—its enormous size and exceeding costliness —to take *au pied de lettre* the exhortations of a St. Gregory or a St. Chrysostom to his hearers to search diligently the Scriptures, cannot but provoke a smile." On the contrary "an educated man" knows that books in the Roman Empire were exceedingly cheap. The exceeding low price of books at Rome, says Dean Merivale, "shows that the labour (of transcription) must have been much less and much cheaper than we usually imagine." (One book of Martial, he mentions, could be got for 4d.) Thus "they were within the reach of quite poor people, . . . and the poor fellow whom Juvenal describes as 'living in a garret' had a small collection of books."[2] A similar state of things prevailed among the educated classes of the Roman Empire generally

Thus we should have supposed on general grounds that the "Sacred Scriptures" would be quite common among the Christians, and we actually have the following luminous passages on the subject in St. Chrysostom's homilies: "There is another excuse (for not reading the Bible) employed by persons of an indolent frame of mind, which is utterly devoid of reason, namely, that they do not possess books. Now, as far as the wealthy are concerned, it would

[1] Hilary *ad Constant.* ii. 5, 1-8. See Newman, *Arians of the Fourth Century.* App. note v.

[2] Merivale *Romans under the Empire* vi. p. 408 (ed. 1876). Gow *Companion to School Classics* (Macmillan) p. 23.

be ridiculous to spend words on such a pretext. But as, I believe, many of our poorer brethren are in the habit of using it, I should be glad to ask them the question, Have they not every one got complete and perfect the tools of their respective trades, be the hindrance of poverty never so great? Is it not a shame then if you make no excuse of poverty in such a case, but take care that no impediment shall interfere with you, and in this matter, where such immense benefit is to be reaped, you whine about your want of leisure and your poverty!" "Though hunger pinch men, though poverty afflict them, they will prefer to endure all hardships rather than part with any of the implements of their trade, and live by the sale of them. Many have chosen rather to borrow for the support of their families than give up the smallest of the tools of their trade. And very naturally; for they know that if these be gone, their whole means of livelihood are lost. Now, just as the implements of their trade are the anvil and hammer and pincers, so the implements of our profession are the books of the apostles and prophets and all the scriptures composed by Divine inspiration, very full of profit. As with the implement they fashion whatever vessels they take on hand, so we with ours labour at our own souls, and correct what is injured and repair what is worn out."[1]

V

DOUBTS EXPRESSED AS TO THE NATURE OF THE DOCUMENT ON ABYSSINIAN ORDERS, CITED ABOVE, pp. 150 *ff.*

THIS document has been recently called by *The Tablet* a "bogus document." It was cited by me from the best of recent Roman Catholic divines writing against our orders. But an (otherwise singularly evasive) letter of Cardinal Patrizi, secretary to the Holy Office, written to Cardinal Manning in 1875,[2] asserts that "it was not a decree of the

[1] *Chrysost.* Opp. (ed. Bened.) vol. viii. p. 63; vol. i. p. 736. Quoted by Salmon *Infallibility* pp. 118-19.

[2] *De hierarch.* p. 248.

Sacred College as appears from its records." What it was, he does not say, but recently it has been sugges.ed that it was a (rejected) "votum" of one or more "consultors." Surely, however, if it had been only this, Patrizi would have said so. As it is, in simply saying that it was not a decree, he suggests to one's mind the idea that it may have been something one stage removed from it. (Estcourt, whom I quoted, had not called it a decree, but a resolution.) Supposing, however, that it was only a "votum" in 1704, what *was* the resolution issued at that time? And further, what is to be said against the fact that in 1860 it was cited as authoritative in the reply sent by the Holy Office to a fresh enquiry of the Vicar Apostolic for the Copts in the case of two monophysite priests who desired to be received into the Roman Church, and was described in this reply as (not a decree, but) "a resolution of the S. O., given feria iv. 9. April 1704"? It must have had the authority of the S. O. at least on this later occasion, and was certainly acted upon by the Vicar Apostolic as authoritative.[1] Meanwhile, as the matter is still under discussion, and we clearly have not got to the bottom of the matter, it is important to remark that the argument for the validity of our "form" of ordination, does not in any way depend upon the character of this document. This is apparent in the convincing argument of Fr. Puller's tract on *The Bull Apostolicae Curae*, or of *The Treatise on the Bull* (Ch. Hist. Soc.) referred to above cap. xi. The very various rites of ordination accepted in the Catholic Church at different times do not allow us to suppose anything more to be essential to the "form" or "matter" of ordination than the laying on of a bishop's hands accompanied by some imperative or precatory formula which implies the intention to ordain to the particular office. This intention is in the Anglican ordinal abundantly clear, and we have both a precatory and an imperative formula both in the ordination of bishops and of priests.

[1] This appears in his letter to Estcourt; see Denny and Lacey *De hierarch.* p. 246; see also Mr. Lacey's letter in *Tablet*, December 19, 1896, p. 983, and cf. *Revue Anglo-Romaine*, T. i. p. 369 ff.

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